SEARCH VEGSOURCE:

 

 

Follow Ups | Post Followup | Back to Discussion Board | VegSource
See spam or
inappropriate posts?
Please let us know.
  




From: TSS ()
Subject: TEXAS MAD COW GRILLING INSTRUCTIONS FOR T-BONE STEAKS
Date: June 30, 2005 at 9:17 pm PST

TEXAS MAD COW GRILLING INSTRUCTIONS FOR T-BONE STEAKS

SOME POTENTIAL EXPOSURE WOULD RESULT FROM THE PRESENCE OF SPINAL CORD IN CERTAIN BONE-IN CUTS OF BEEF, LIKE T-BONE STEAKS......


http://www.aphis.usda.gov/lpa/issues/bse/risk_assessment/mainreporttext.pdf

Anatomy of the T-Bone
Anatomically, it is a lumbar vertebra sawed in half through the vertebral column. The downward stroke on the 'T' is a transverse process of the vertebra, and the flesh surrounding it was the spinal muscles. The small semi-circle at the top of the 'T' is half the vertebral foramen.

Although the spinal cord is removed by packers during processing, there is still concern (in the European Union) that it could be a source of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, more popularly known as mad cow disease. This is because spinal tissue contains nerve cells, and these can experimentally transmit the prion that causes this disease.

SO, WHILE grilling those T-bones, just be sure to heat up old sparky to about 600 degrees C. turn that baby to ash and then hope it does not still contain TSE agent.

Published online before print March 14, 2000, 10.1073/pnas.050566797;
Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA, Vol. 97, Issue 7, 3418-3421, March 28, 2000


Medical Sciences
New studies on the heat resistance of
hamster-adapted scrapie agent: Threshold
survival after ashing at 600°C suggests an
inorganic template of replication

Paul Brown*,, Edward H. Rau, Bruce K. Johnson*, Alfred E. Bacote*,
Clarence J. Gibbs Jr.*, and D. Carleton Gajdusek§

* Laboratory of Central Nervous System Studies, National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke, and Environmental
Protection Branch, Division of Safety, Office of Research Services, National Institutes of Health, Bethesda, MD 20892; and
§ Institut Alfred Fessard, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 91198 Gif sur Yvette, France

Contributed by D. Carleton Gajdusek, December 22, 1999

Abstract


One-gram samples from a pool of crude brain tissue from hamsters infected with the 263K strain
of hamster-adapted scrapie agent were placed in covered quartz-glass crucibles and exposed for
either 5 or 15 min to dry heat at temperatures ranging from 150°C to 1,000°C. Residual infectivity
in the treated samples was assayed by the intracerebral inoculation of dilution series into healthy
weanling hamsters, which were observed for 10 months; disease transmissions were verified by
Western blot testing for proteinase-resistant protein in brains from clinically positive hamsters.
Unheated control tissue contained 9.9 log10LD50/g tissue; after exposure to 150°C, titers equaled or exceeded 6 log10LD50/g,
and after exposure to 300°C, titers equaled or exceeded 4 log10LD50/g. Exposure to 600°C completely ashed the brain samples,
which, when reconstituted with saline to their original weights, transmitted disease to 5 of 35 inoculated hamsters. No
transmissions occurred after exposure to 1,000°C. These results suggest that an inorganic molecular template with a
decomposition point near 600°C is capable of nucleating the biological replication of the scrapie agent.

transmissible spongiform encephalopathy | scrapie | prion | medical waste | incineration

Introduction


The infectious agents responsible for transmissible spongiform encephalopathy (TSE) are
notoriously resistant to most physical and chemical methods used for inactivating pathogens,
including heat. It has long been recognized, for example, that boiling is ineffective and that higher
temperatures are most efficient when combined with steam under pressure (i.e., autoclaving). As a
means of decontamination, dry heat is used only at the extremely high temperatures achieved
during incineration, usually in excess of 600°C. It has been assumed, without proof, that incineration
totally inactivates the agents of TSE, whether of human or animal origin. It also has been assumed that the replication of these
agents is a strictly biological process (1), although the notion of a "virus" nucleant of an inorganic molecular cast of the infectious
-pleated peptide also has been advanced (2). In this paper, we address these issues by means of dry heat inactivation studies.

full text;

http://www.pnas.org/cgi/content/full/97/7/3418

infectivity surviving ashing to 600*C is (in my opinion) degradable but infective. based on Bown & Gajdusek, (1991), landfill and burial may be assumed to have a reduction factor of 98% (i.e. a factor of 50) over 3 years. CJD-infected brain-tissue remained infectious after storing at room-temperature for 22 months (Tateishi et al, 1988). Scrapie agent is known to remain viable after at least 30 months of desiccation (Wilson et al, 1950). and pastures that had been grazed by scrapie-infected sheep still appeared to be contaminated with scrapie agent three years after they were last occupied by sheep (Palsson, 1979).

http://europa.eu.int/comm/food/fs/sc/ssc/out58_en.pdf

PAUL BROWN SCRAPIE SOIL TEST

http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/sc/seac07/tab03.pdf


1: J Neurol Neurosurg Psychiatry 1994 Jun;57(6):757-8


Transmission of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease to a chimpanzee by electrodes contaminated during neurosurgery.

Gibbs CJ Jr, Asher DM, Kobrine A, Amyx HL, Sulima MP, Gajdusek DC.

Laboratory of Central Nervous System Studies, National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke, National Institutes of Health, Bethesda, MD 20892.

Stereotactic multicontact electrodes used to probe the cerebral cortex of a middle aged woman with progressive dementia were previously implicated in the accidental transmission of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) to two younger patients. The diagnoses of CJD have been confirmed for all three cases. More than two years after their last use in humans, after three cleanings and repeated sterilisation in ethanol and formaldehyde vapour, the electrodes were implanted in the cortex of a chimpanzee. Eighteen months later the animal became ill with CJD. This finding serves to re-emphasise the potential danger posed by reuse of instruments contaminated with the agents of spongiform encephalopathies, even after scrupulous attempts to clean them.

PMID: 8006664 [PubMed - indexed for MEDLINE]
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=8006664&dopt=Abstract


AND IF YOU THINK THAT NOV. 2004 TEXAS MAD COW THAT WAS INCONCLUSIVE FOR 7+ MONTHS is something, then you should see that other TEXAS MAD COW, the one that got away;

FDA Statement
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Statement
May 4, 2004
Media Inquiries: 301-827-6242
Consumer Inquiries: 888-INFO-FDA

Statement on Texas Cow With Central Nervous System Symptoms
On Friday, April 30 th , the Food and Drug Administration learned that a cow with central nervous system symptoms had been killed and shipped to a processor for rendering into animal protein for use in animal feed.

FDA, which is responsible for the safety of animal feed, immediately began an investigation. On Friday and throughout the weekend, FDA investigators inspected the slaughterhouse, the rendering facility, the farm where the animal came from, and the processor that initially received the cow from the slaughterhouse.

FDA's investigation showed that the animal in question had already been rendered into "meat and bone meal" (a type of protein animal feed). Over the weekend FDA was able to track down all the implicated material. That material is being held by the firm, which is cooperating fully with FDA.

Cattle with central nervous system symptoms are of particular interest because cattle with bovine spongiform encephalopathy or BSE, also known as "mad cow disease," can exhibit such symptoms. In this case, there is no way now to test for BSE. But even if the cow had BSE, FDA's animal feed rule would prohibit the feeding of its rendered protein to other ruminant animals (e.g., cows, goats, sheep, bison).

FDA is sending a letter to the firm summarizing its findings and informing the firm that FDA will not object to use of this material in swine feed only. If it is not used in swine feed, this material will be destroyed. Pigs have been shown not to be susceptible to BSE. If the firm agrees to use the material for swine feed only, FDA will track the material all the way through the supply chain from the processor to the farm to ensure that the feed is properly monitored and used only as feed for pigs.

To protect the U.S. against BSE, FDA works to keep certain mammalian protein out of animal feed for cattle and other ruminant animals. FDA established its animal feed rule in 1997 after the BSE epidemic in the U.K. showed that the disease spreads by feeding infected ruminant protein to cattle.

Under the current regulation, the material from this Texas cow is not allowed in feed for cattle or other ruminant animals. FDA's action specifying that the material go only into swine feed means also that it will not be fed to poultry.

FDA is committed to protecting the U.S. from BSE and collaborates closely with the U.S. Department of Agriculture on all BSE issues. The animal feed rule provides crucial protection against the spread of BSE, but it is only one of several such firewalls. FDA will soon be improving the animal feed rule, to make this strong system even stronger.

####

http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/news/2004/NEW01061.html

AND DON'T FORGET WHAT WE FEED TEXAS MAD COWS;

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
P01-05
January 30, 2001
Print Media: 301-827-6242
Consumer Inquiries: 888-INFO-FDA

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Note: On Dec. 23, 2003, the U.S. Department of Agriculture reported that a cow in Washington state had tested positive for bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE, or mad cow disease). As a result, information on this Web page stating that no BSE cases had been found in the United States is now incorrect. However, because other information on this page continues to have value, the page will remain available for viewing.

FDA ANNOUNCES TEST RESULTS FROM TEXAS FEED LOT


Today the Food and Drug Administration announced the results of tests taken on feed used at a Texas feedlot that was suspected of containing meat and bone meal from other domestic cattle -- a violation of FDA's 1997 prohibition on using ruminant material in feed for other ruminants. Results indicate that a very low level of prohibited material was found in the feed fed to cattle.

FDA has determined that each animal could have consumed, at most and in total, five-and-one-half grams - approximately a quarter ounce -- of prohibited material. These animals weigh approximately 600 pounds.

It is important to note that the prohibited material was domestic in origin (therefore not likely to contain infected material because there is no evidence of BSE in U.S. cattle), fed at a very low level, and fed only once. The potential risk of BSE to such cattle is therefore exceedingly low, even if the feed were contaminated.

According to Dr. Bernard Schwetz, FDA's Acting Principal Deputy Commissioner, "The challenge to regulators and industry is to keep this disease out of the United States. One important defense is to prohibit the use of any ruminant animal materials in feed for other ruminant animals. Combined with other steps, like U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) ban on the importation of live ruminant animals from affected countries, these steps represent a series of protections, to keep American cattle free of BSE."

Despite this negligible risk, Purina Mills, Inc., is nonetheless announcing that it is voluntarily purchasing all 1,222 of the animals held in Texas and mistakenly fed the animal feed containing the prohibited material. Therefore, meat from those animals will not enter the human food supply. FDA believes any cattle that did not consume feed containing the prohibited material are unaffected by this incident, and should be handled in the beef supply clearance process as usual.

FDA believes that Purina Mills has behaved responsibly by first reporting the human error that resulted in the misformulation of the animal feed supplement and then by working closely with State and Federal authorities.

This episode indicates that the multi-layered safeguard system put into place is essential for protecting the food supply and that continued vigilance needs to be taken, by all concerned, to ensure these rules are followed routinely.

FDA will continue working with USDA as well as State and local officials to ensure that companies and individuals comply with all laws and regulations designed to protect the U.S. food supply.


http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/NEWS/2001/NEW00752.html

W.H.O. Dr Maura Ricketts BSE/TSE .1 GRAM LETHAL realplayer audio

http://www.maddeer.org/audio/BBC4farmingtoday2_1_03.ram


Risk of oral infection with bovine spongiform encephalopathy agent in primates

Corinne Ida Lasmézas, Emmanuel Comoy, Stephen Hawkins, Christian Herzog, Franck Mouthon, Timm Konold, Frédéric Auvré, Evelyne Correia, Nathalie Lescoutra-Etchegaray, Nicole Salès, Gerald Wells, Paul Brown, Jean-Philippe Deslys
Summary The uncertain extent of human exposure to bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE)--which can lead to variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD)--is compounded by incomplete knowledge about the efficiency of oral infection and the magnitude of any bovine-to-human biological barrier to transmission. We therefore investigated oral transmission of BSE to non-human primates. We gave two macaques a 5 g oral dose of brain homogenate from a BSE-infected cow. One macaque developed vCJD-like neurological disease 60 months after exposure, whereas the other remained free of disease at 76 months. On the basis of these findings and data from other studies, we made a preliminary estimate of the food exposure risk for man, which provides additional assurance that existing public health measures can prevent transmission of BSE to man.

Published online January 27, 2005

http://www.thelancet.com/journal/journal.isa

1: J Infect Dis 1980 Aug;142(2):205-8


Oral transmission of kuru, Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, and scrapie to nonhuman primates.

Gibbs CJ Jr, Amyx HL, Bacote A, Masters CL, Gajdusek DC.

Kuru and Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease of humans and scrapie disease of sheep and goats were transmitted to squirrel monkeys (Saimiri sciureus) that were exposed to the infectious agents only by their nonforced consumption of known infectious tissues. The asymptomatic incubation period in the one monkey exposed to the virus of kuru was 36 months; that in the two monkeys exposed to the virus of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease was 23 and 27 months, respectively; and that in the two monkeys exposed to the virus of scrapie was 25 and 32 months, respectively. Careful physical examination of the buccal cavities of all of the monkeys failed to reveal signs or oral lesions. One additional monkey similarly exposed to kuru has remained asymptomatic during the 39 months that it has been under observation.

PMID: 6997404
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=6997404&dopt=Abstract

FIRE UP THOSE GRILLS, who needs to test these cows for mad cow disease. Johanns says everything is o.k.

Course, i don't think there is a grill in Texas that will cook up to 600-1000 degrees celsius.

THE June 2004 BSE ENHANCED BSE SURVEILLANCE and those 388,000 some odd cows tested to date, don't count now.

THEY must all be retested, and Johann must go for his part in this cover-up. Johann must resign!

HIS actions and others have caused millions to become exposed to this deadly agent.

WE must test all cattle for human/animal consumption.

THE MRR POLICY GW et al dreamed up, must GO, trashed, nada. it was nothing more than a tool to legally trade all strains of TSEs globally. IT was nothing more than about commodities and futures, open borders at all cost, to hell with human health.

THE BSE GBR risk assessments must be adhered to and strengthened to include all TSEs.

dont let the incubation period fool you.

have a safe 4th of July...

TSS




Follow Ups:



Post a Followup

Name:
E-mail: (optional)
Subject:

Comments:

Optional Link URL:
Link Title:
Optional Image URL: