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From: TSS ()
Subject: Re: NCBA, others blast USDA over scattershot BSE policy
Date: June 20, 2005 at 6:50 pm PST

In Reply to: NCBA, others blast USDA over scattershot BSE policy posted by TSS on June 20, 2005 at 6:48 pm:

##################### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy #####################

greetings Robert and other list members,


Robert wrote;

>>>It should be noted that the cattle industry in the USA are squarely
behind
the best scientific testing for BSE, and are angry that USDA has fumbled on
this. Their position is that only being aboveboard and open about the
issues involved will get them through this crisis. Double-talk, secrecy and
recanting will only make things worse.<<<


i don't think all of them are so gung-ho about the testing or retesting ;


Cattle Group Criticizes BSE Tests

Omaha World-Herald, June 18, 2005

by Chris Clayton WORLD-HERALD STAFF WRITER

A decision last week to retest an animal for mad cow disease has created an
unstable cattle market while doing nothing to increase the safety of the
U.S. food supply, said the president of the National Cattlemen's Beef
Association.

In a conference call Friday, NCBA officials asked why Phyllis Fong,
inspector general for the U.S. Department of Agriculture, ordered retests of
three samples going back to last year. They also questioned why Fong had the
authority to "intervene" in the USDA's testing protocols.

Texas rancher Jim McAdams, president of the NCBA, said government officials
have not adequately explained why they ordered the Western blot test, which
is considered more sensitive and is used in other countries but not in the
United States.

The NCBA regards that move as an "apparent break of established scientific
prool" by tocUSDA, McAdams said.

"It's imperative the USDA restore integrity to the process to avoid further
and lasting criticism that can jeopardize consumer confidence and access to
international markets and create unnecessary market volatility," McAdams
said.

McAdams and other NCBA officials told U.S. Agriculture Secretary Mike
Johanns on Friday that the USDA's action creates market uncertainty that
hurts cattle producers.

"It's unfortunate a debate over which test to use or how to follow the
protocols has risen to this level of attention because the protocols we all
agreed upon were very effective protocols," McAdams said.

On Thursday, the USDA sent tissue samples from one animal to a lab in
Weybridge, England, to determine if it had mad cow disease. It could take
two weeks before final results are known.

Market prices for live cattle fell quickly and remained about $2.50 lower
per hundredweight this week, selling at about $84 Friday. Prices were $86.50
before the USDA announced that a downer animal from last November produced a
"weak positive" result when the Western blot test was used. The USDA's
standard test on the animal was negative.

The previously used final confirmation test is the immunohistochemistry
test, which USDA and industry officials have repeatedly called the "gold
standard" for testing.

"Our concern is that the program must operate under an established and
consistent testing protocol the industry and the American public can have
the utmost confidence in," McAdams said.

The USDA is reviewing how it will conduct tests in the future, said Jim
Rogers, a spokesman for the USDA's Animal and Plant Health Inspection
Service.

(C) 2005 Omaha World-Herald. via ProQuest Information and Learning Company;
All Rights Reserved


http://www.mycattle.com/news/dsp_regulatory_article.cfm?storyid=17379

THE only thing the NCBA is behind is more of the same
"Double-talk, secrecy and recanting" ... TSS


>>>Texas rancher Jim McAdams, president of the NCBA, said government
officials have not adequately explained why they ordered the Western blot
test, which is considered more sensitive and is used in other countries but
not in the United States.

The NCBA regards that move as an "apparent break of established scientific
prool" by tocUSDA, McAdams said.

"It's imperative the USDA restore integrity to the process to avoid further
and lasting criticism that can jeopardize consumer confidence and access to
international markets and create unnecessary market volatility," McAdams
said.

McAdams and other NCBA officials told U.S. Agriculture Secretary Mike
Johanns on Friday that the USDA's action creates market uncertainty that
hurts cattle producers.

"It's unfortunate a debate over which test to use or how to follow the
protocols has risen to this level of attention because the protocols we all
agreed upon were very effective protocols," McAdams said.<<<


Nope, old Jim wants more of the same protocols i wrote about previously
today in TEXAS ...TSS


B. Investigation of Handling of CNS-Suspect Cow in San Angelo, Texas

Overview

On May 4, 2004, the FSIS Acting Regional Director in Dallas, Texas reported
that a cow

identified as having Central Nervous System (CNS) symptoms by an FSIS
veterinarian at

Lone Star Beef Processors (Lone Star Beef), a beef processing facility in
San Angelo,

Texas was not tested for BSE after it had been slaughtered. The initial
decision by the

FSIS Veterinary Medical Officer (VMO) on-site at Lone Star Beef to have the
cow tested

for BSE was overturned by a senior APHIS official and the cow's carcass was
sent to a

rendering plant. FSIS regulations at the time of the incident required VMOs
to contact

the APHIS Assistant Area Veterinarian in Charge (AAVIC) to allow APHIS to
collect a

BSE surveillance sample from suspect cattle.

OIG initiated an investigation to determine if the AAVIC in Austin, Texas,
provided a

false statement to USDA FSIS investigators during their inquiry of his
decision not to test

the animal at Lone Star Beef. To conduct our investigation, OIG reviewed
previously

obtained statements, various documents and USDA regulations, and interviewed
APHIS,

FSIS, beef processing facility, and rendering company personnel.

Summary of OIG Findings

The OIG investigation found no substantive evidence that the USDA
official(s)

responsible for the decision not to take brain tissue samples from the cow
for BSE

testing, or any other USDA personnel, provided false information or engaged
in

intentional misconduct. We determined that a misjudgment was made by at
least one

USDA veterinary official in the handling of the suspect cow. Sworn
statements provided

by the two responsible USDA veterinary officials involved differ as to
whether both

concurred in this decision.

The suspect cow's carcass was sent to a rendering plant in San Angelo on
April 27, 2004

for processing as inedible by-product. APHIS then utilized its "Indemnity
Plan"

10

procedures to purchase the by-products as a preventative safety measure, and
disposed of

it at a local landfill in accordance with applicable environmental
standards.

Evidence shows that at the time of this incident, communication problems
occurred

between the APHIS and FSIS employees involved. Taken together, the
statements of

both APHIS and FSIS personnel and other evidence indicate inconsistencies in
their

understanding of procedures for BSE tissue sampling of CNS suspect cattle in
certain

circumstances, and the handling of the carcass pending test results. It is
apparent from

the sworn statements provided to OIG that APHIS and FSIS personnel and Lone
Star

Beef officials could not resolve how best to proceed, and that confusion
existed about

how to properly handle the CNS-suspect carcass.

On May 5, 2004, FSIS and APHIS Veterinary Services announced a new joint
policy

regarding BSE sampling of condemned cattle at slaughter plants. The policy
establishes

protocols for the agencies' responsibilities to obtain samples from
condemned cattle

exhibiting signs of CNS disorders, regardless of age. ...

snip...

http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/Testimony7-2004.pdf


THE TEXAS GONZALES/PURINA INCIDENT SHOWED THAT 5.5 GRAMS OF
RUMINANT PROTEIN WAS FED TO CATTLE ;

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
P01-05
January 30, 2001
Print Media:
301-827-6242
Broadcast Media:
301-827-3434
Consumer Inquiries:
888-INFO-FDA

FDA ANNOUNCES TEST RESULTS FROM TEXAS FEED LOT

Today the Food and Drug Administration announced the results of tests
taken on feed used at a Texas feedlot
that was suspected of containing meat and bone meal from other domestic
cattle -- a violation of FDA's 1997
prohibition on using ruminant material in feed for other ruminants.
Results indicate that a very low level of
prohibited material was found in the feed fed to cattle.

FDA has determined that each animal could have consumed, at most and in
total, five-and-one-half grams -
approximately a quarter ounce -- of prohibited material. These animals
weigh approximately 600 pounds.

It is important to note that the prohibited material was domestic in
origin (therefore not likely to contain infected
material because there is no evidence of BSE in U.S. cattle), fed at a
very low level, and fed only once. The
potential risk of BSE to such cattle is therefore exceedingly low, even
if the feed were contaminated.

According to Dr. Bernard Schwetz, FDA's Acting Principal Deputy
Commissioner, "The challenge to regulators
and industry is to keep this disease out of the United States. One
important defense is to prohibit the use of any
ruminant animal materials in feed for other ruminant animals. Combined
with other steps, like U.S. Department
of Agriculture's (USDA) ban on the importation of live ruminant animals
from affected countries, these steps
represent a series of protections, to keep American cattle free of BSE."

Despite this negligible risk, Purina Mills, Inc., is nonetheless
announcing that it is voluntarily purchasing all 1,222
of the animals held in Texas and mistakenly fed the animal feed
containing the prohibited material. Therefore,
meat from those animals will not enter the human food supply. FDA
believes any cattle that did not consume
feed containing the prohibited material are unaffected by this incident,
and should be handled in the beef supply
clearance process as usual.

FDA believes that Purina Mills has behaved responsibly by first
reporting the human error that resulted in the
misformulation of the animal feed supplement and then by working closely
with State and Federal authorities.

This episode indicates that the multi-layered safeguard system put into
place is essential for protecting the food
supply and that continued vigilance needs to be taken, by all concerned,
to ensure these rules are followed
routinely.

FDA will continue working with USDA as well as State and local officials
to ensure that companies and
individuals comply with all laws and regulations designed to protect the
U.S. food supply.

http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/NEWS/2001/NEW00752.html


FACTs ARE STILL,


> THE study has limitations that prevent accurately estimating the
> minimum infective dose for humans, ...


IF .1 gram is lethal for other species, and since this new study
confirms 1 out of 2 transmission
of BSE to primate with 5 gram oral dose, i see this study as being very
very disturbing.
BUT of course i have nothing to gain financially for making such a
statement...

http://www.maddeer.org/audio/BBC4farmingtoday2_1_03.ram


Risk of oral infection with bovine spongiform encephalopathy agent in
primates

Corinne Ida Lasmézas, Emmanuel Comoy, Stephen Hawkins, Christian Herzog,
Franck Mouthon, Timm Konold, Frédéric Auvré, Evelyne Correia, Nathalie
Lescoutra-Etchegaray, Nicole Salès, Gerald Wells, Paul Brown, Jean-Philippe
Deslys
Summary The uncertain extent of human exposure to bovine spongiform
encephalopathy (BSE)--which can lead to variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease
(vCJD)--is compounded by incomplete knowledge about the efficiency of oral
infection and the magnitude of any bovine-to-human biological barrier to
transmission. We therefore investigated oral transmission of BSE to
non-human primates. We gave two macaques a 5 g oral dose of brain homogenate
from a BSE-infected cow. One macaque developed vCJD-like neurological
disease 60 months after exposure, whereas the other remained free of disease
at 76 months. On the basis of these findings and data from other studies, we
made a preliminary estimate of the food exposure risk for man, which
provides additional assurance that existing public health measures can
prevent transmission of BSE to man.

Published online January 27, 2005

http://www.thelancet.com/journal/journal.isa

Neurobiology
Adaptation of the bovine spongiform encephalopathy agent to primates and
comparison with Creutzfeldt- Jakob disease: Implications for human health
Corinne Ida Lasmézas*,, Jean-Guy Fournier*, Virginie Nouvel*, Hermann Boe*,
Domíníque Marcé*, François Lamoury*, Nicolas Kopp, Jean-Jacques Hauw§, James
Ironside¶, Moira Bruce, Dominique Dormont*, and Jean-Philippe Deslys*

* Commissariat à l'Energie Atomique, Service de Neurovirologie, Direction
des Sciences du Vivant/Département de Recherche Medicale, Centre de
Recherches du Service de Santé des Armées 60-68, Avenue du Général Leclerc,
BP 6, 92 265 Fontenay-aux-Roses Cedex, France; Hôpital Neurologique Pierre
Wertheimer, 59, Boulevard Pinel, 69003 Lyon, France; § Laboratoire de
Neuropathologie, Hôpital de la Salpêtrière, 83, Boulevard de l'Hôpital,
75013 Paris, France; ¶ Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease Surveillance Unit, Western
General Hospital, Crewe Road, Edinburgh EH4 2XU, United Kingdom; and
Institute for Animal Health, Neuropathogenesis Unit, West Mains Road,
Edinburgh EH9 3JF, United Kingdom

Edited by D. Carleton Gajdusek, Centre National de la Recherche
Scientifique, Gif-sur-Yvette, France, and approved December 7, 2000
(received for review October 16, 2000)


Abstract


There is substantial scientific evidence to support the notion that bovine
spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) has contaminated human beings, causing
variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD). This disease has raised concerns
about the possibility of an iatrogenic secondary transmission to humans,
because the biological properties of the primate-adapted BSE agent are
unknown. We show that (i) BSE can be transmitted from primate to primate by
intravenous route in 25 months, and (ii) an iatrogenic transmission of vCJD
to humans could be readily recognized pathologically, whether it occurs by
the central or peripheral route. Strain typing in mice demonstrates that the
BSE agent adapts to macaques in the same way as it does to humans and
confirms that the BSE agent is responsible for vCJD not only in the United
Kingdom but also in France. The agent responsible for French iatrogenic
growth hormone-linked CJD taken as a control is very different from vCJD but
is similar to that found in one case of sporadic CJD and one sheep scrapie
isolate. These data will be key in identifying the origin of human cases of
prion disease, including accidental vCJD transmission, and could provide
bases for vCJD risk assessment.


Introduction

snip...


Conclusions

From BSE and vCJD transmissions in nonhuman primates, a number of
conclusions can be drawn that are of major importance for human health: (i)
human-adapted BSE appears to be a variant of the BSE agent that is more
virulent for humans than cattle BSE and is efficiently transmitted by the
peripheral route; (ii) the detection of vCJD in unusually young patients is
probably not because of a lack of diagnosis of cases in older patients, thus
raising the question of the source of human contamination with BSE early in
life; and (iii) iatrogenic transmissions from patients with vCJD would be
readily recognized by using the same diagnostic criteria as those applied to
vCJD [clinical and pathological criteria (27) comprising neuronal loss and
gliosis in the thalamus correlated with high MRI signal (28, 29)], whether
such contaminations had occurred by the central or i.v. route. Primary and
iatrogenic cases of vCJD could be distinguished on the basis of the
patient's clinical history.

The risk assessment of biological products of human origin, notably those
derived from blood, has been deeply modified by the appearance of vCJD. We
confirm that the BSE agent has contaminated humans not only in the U.K. and
the Republic of Ireland but also in France, and we show that its pathogenic
properties for primates are being enhanced by a primary passage in humans.
Considering the flow of potentially contaminated bovine-derived products
between 1980 and 1996, it is obvious that further vCJD cases may occur
outside the U.K. Thus, and in the light of the present study, it is
necessary to sustain worldwide CJD surveillance regardless of national BSE
incidence and to take all precautionary measures to avoid iatrogenic
transmissions from vCJD.


http://www.pnas.org/cgi/content/full/041490898v1


ANOTHER ONE OF FDAs infamous UNTITLED DOCUMENTS TSEs;


Tissue distribution of bovine spongiform

encephalopathy agent in primates after intravenous

or oral infection

C Herzog, N Saks, N Etchegaray, A Charbonnier, S Freire, D Dormont, J-P

Deslys, C I Lasmezas


http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/04n0081/04n-0081-bkg0001-Tab-02-vol
2.pdf


BASE in cattle in Italy of Identification of a
second bovine amyloidotic spongiform encephalopathy: Molecular
similarities with sporadic

Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease


http://www.pnas.org/cgi/content/abstract/0305777101v1


Adaptation of the bovine spongiform encephalopathy agent to primates
and comparison with Creutzfeldt- Jakob disease: Implications for
human health

THE findings from Corinne Ida Lasmézas*, [dagger] , Jean-Guy Fournier*,
Virginie Nouvel*,

Hermann Boe*, Domíníque Marcé*, François Lamoury*, Nicolas Kopp [Dagger

] , Jean-Jacques Hauw§, James Ironside¶, Moira Bruce [||] , Dominique

Dormont*, and Jean-Philippe Deslys* et al, that The agent responsible
for French iatrogenic growth hormone-linked CJD taken as a control is
very different from vCJD but is similar to that found in one case of
sporadic CJD and one sheep scrapie isolate;

http://www.pnas.org/cgi/content/full/041490898v1


Characterization of two distinct prion strains
derived from bovine spongiform encephalopathy
transmissions to inbred mice

http://vir.sgmjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/85/8/2471

1: J Infect Dis 1980 Aug;142(2):205-8

Oral transmission of kuru, Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, and scrapie to
nonhuman primates.

Gibbs CJ Jr, Amyx HL, Bacote A, Masters CL, Gajdusek DC.

Kuru and Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease of humans and scrapie disease of sheep
and goats were transmitted to squirrel monkeys (Saimiri sciureus) that were
exposed to the infectious agents only by their nonforced consumption of
known infectious tissues. The asymptomatic incubation period in the one
monkey exposed to the virus of kuru was 36 months; that in the two monkeys
exposed to the virus of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease was 23 and 27 months,
respectively; and that in the two monkeys exposed to the virus of scrapie
was 25 and 32 months, respectively. Careful physical examination of the
buccal cavities of all of the monkeys failed to reveal signs or oral
lesions. One additional monkey similarly exposed to kuru has remained
asymptomatic during the 39 months that it has been under observation.

PMID: 6997404

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_ui
ds=6997404&dopt=Abstract


SEEMS like everytime the NCBA gets one foot out of there mouth, old jim or
someone
else from the NCBA will stick two more in. kinda hard to understand someone
with both
feet stuck in there mouth all the time. THESE people and others just like
them are the very
reason cattleman and all industries involved are in the mess they are in.
...


>>>The NCBA regards that move as an "apparent break of established
scientific prool" by tocUSDA, McAdams said.<<<


SEEMS old jim just does not understand proper protocol, unless you are using
junk science
for human/animal TSE. jim would do good to educate himself on proper
scientific TSE protocol;

BSE USDA MAD COW PROTOCOLS, OIG $ GAO [cover up until caught, then cover up
some more] NO SPANK POLICY - TSS 6/20/05 (0)

http://www.vegsource.com/talk/madcow/messages/94638.html

USDA SPONTANEOUS EVENTS OF PURE BSe with transmission studies - TSS 6/19/05
(0)

http://www.vegsource.com/talk/madcow/messages/94636.html


old jim probably never read this either;

Subject: BSE Red Book October 1998
Date: Thu, 25 Nov 2004 16:58:32 -0600
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."

Subject: When a case of B.S.E. is found in the U.S/Response to Disease
outbreak...'redbook'
Date: March 13, 2000 at 10:13 am PST

October 1998

BSE Red Book 2.1-26

5.0 Response to Disease Outbreak

5.1 Notifications

When the Deputy Administrator of VS and the Administrator of APHIS
concur with the diagnosis of a presumptive case of BSE, the Response and
Notification/ Briefing section of the BSE Response Plan will be
activated.
Because BSE is not known to be contagious or vector borne, a declaration
of national emergency is not automatically necessary but may be
requested if warranted by the particular circumstances of the outbreak.

5.1.1 Checklist of Notification Actions Upon Diagnosis of BSE
See Response and Notification/Briefing sections of BSE Response Plan.

5.2 Declaring an Emergency

Because BSE has an extremely long incubation period, is not a herd
disease, appears to be transmitted primarily by contaminated
ruminant-origin rendered feed ingredients, and is not known to be
contagious or vector borne, an outbreak of the disease is not an
epidemiologic emergency.
The declaration of an animal disease emergency need not be automatic. To
avoid undue public alarm, an emergency should not be declared unless
indicated by the particular circumstances of the BSE outbreak.
The Secretary of Agriculture has authority under the Federal Act of July
2, 1962 (Title 21 U.S. Code, 134-134 h) to declare an emergency when a
disease exists that constitutes a threat to the livestock or poultry
industries of the United States. Title 9, Code of Federal Regulations
(CFR), Part 76 contains regulations issued under this and other
authorities.
Declaration of an animal disease emergency authorizes the Federal
Government to control and eradicate the disease problem and allows the
Government to seek funds from the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) and
other sources, to expend funds, and to place Federal quarantines on the
interstam movement of animals and animal products.
When appropriate, the Secretary would issue a formal declaration of
emergency. All affected States would be notified and expected to
cooperate by signing a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the USDA
specifying actions and responsibilities for activities such as
surveillance, quarantine, indemnity, and seizure of animals. Both
Federal and State quarantines may be used simultaneously.
The most probable reason for declaring a BSE animal disease emergency
would be the inability to obtain funds for BSE-related activities in any
other manner, such as from the Secretary's contingency fund. Because BSE
outbreaks do not spread rapidly, adequate time to seek funding from the
usual sources or to prepare a budget request to Congress should be
available.

October 1998

BSE Red Book 2.1-27

5.3 Declaring an Extraordinary Emergency

Under authority of the Act of July 2, 1962 (21 U.S. Code 134a, 134b,
134d, and 145f) the Secretary of Agriculture may declare an
extraordinary emergency when adequate measures to control a disease are
not being taken by thc State involved. These acts authorize the Federal
Government to quarantine portions of a State, to enter premises after
obtaining a warrant, and to seize and destroy animals if necessary to
control the disease. It would seldom be necessary to declare an
extraordinary emergency for an outbreak of BSE, except to obtain
funding.

5.4 Authority To Pay Indemnity

Under provisions of Title 9, CFR, Part 53, USDA has the authority to pay
the fair market value or up to 100 percent of the expenses to purchase
and dispose of animals and materials required to be destroyed due to an
FAD (BSE), depending on the availability of funds for that purpose.
Because BSE can be transmitted through rendered animal products,
CNS-suspect animals must not be sent to slaughter. In the event of a
confirmed diagnosis of BSE or a presumptive diagnosis, notify FDA, CVM
if carcasses have moved to rendering or animal feed manufacturing.
Funds at 100 percent of the slaughter value at the time the suspect
animal is surrendered to the Government may be paid for suspect animals,
providing that:

*The animals are surrendered voluntarily to USDA for euthanasia and
disposal, or for research, observation, and diagnostic purposes;

*The owner agrees to cooperate with all BSE epidemiologic
investigations, diagnostic procedures, and disease preventive measures
considered necessary by APHIS; and

*The Secretary of Agriculture or anthorized representative agrees to
accept
the animals.

At the beginning of a BSE outbreak, it is strongly recommended that
APHIS choose to purchase all animals in an infected herd for research,
observation, or depopulation.

5.5 Inspections and Seizures

Authority is provided under Section 5 of the Act of July 2, 1962 for
Federal and State inspectors (when specifically designated by the Deputy
Administrator of VS) to stop vehicles carrying bovids, make inspections,
and seize animals and other items to prevent the transmission and spread
of an FAD (BSE).
The applicable authority, 21 U.S. Code 134d, states that:

"Employees of the Department of Agriculture designated by the Secretary
for the purpose, when properly identified, shall have authority:

October 1998

BSE Red Book 2.1-28

"To stop and inspect, without a warrant, any person or means of
conveyance, moving into the United States from a foreign country, to
determine whether such person or means of conveyance is carrying any
animal, carcass, product, or article regulated or subject to disposal
under any law or regulation administered by the Secretary for prevention
of the introduction or dissemination of any communicable animal disease;
"To stop and inspect, without a warrant, any means of conveyance moving
interstate upon probable cause to believe that such means of conveyance
is carrying any animal, carcass, product, or article regulated or
subject to disposal under any law or regulation administered by the
Secretary for the prevention of the introduction or dissemination of any
communicable animal disease; and
"To enter upon, with a warrant, any premises for the purpose of making
inspections and seizures necessary under such laws and regulations. Any
Federal judge, or any judge of a court of record in the United States,
or any United States commissioner, may within his jurisdiction, upon
proper oath or affirmation indicating probable cause to believe there is
on certain premises any animal, carcass, product, or article regulated
or subject to disposal under any law or regulation administered by the
Secretary for the prevention of the introduction or dissemination of any
communicable animal disease, issue warrants for the entry upon such
premises and for inspections and seizures necessary under such laws and
regulations. Such warrants may be executed by any authorized employee of
the Department of Agriculture."

Since BSE is infectious but not a contagious disease under normal
circumstances, it will rarely be necessary to stop vehicles or seize
animals and other related materials.


===============================================


oops, they forgot the airports and air traffic passengers;


Docket: 02N-0276 - Bioterrorism Preparedness; Registration of Food
Facilities, Section 305
Comment Number: EC-254 [TSS SUBMISSION]

http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/02n0276/02N-0276-EC-254.htm
===============================================


5.6 Other Authorities

Authorities for the control and eradication of diseases and pests of
livestock and poultry are changed from time to time. Consult the Office
of the General Counsel, USDA, and the Federal Register for authorities,
rules, and regulations.

October 1998

BSE Red Book 2.1-29

6.0 Quarantine

6.1 Authority To Quarantine

State and Federal regulatory officials have authority to impose
quarantines or hold orders. Usually, State quarantines are imposed on
individual herds and premises when any foreign animal disease is
suspected. Control of intrastate movement is by application of State
authority. It is important to coordinate efforts with State officials. A
survey of all State Veterinarians in the United States was conducted,
and all agreed to use quarantine authority on a herd in their State in
the event that BSE was diagnosed.
In contrast, Federal quarantines control the interstate and
international movement of diseased livestock. Only a declaration by the
Secretary of Agricultare of an Extraordinary Emergency will provide
Federal authority to control livestock movements within a State. Federal
and State quarantines may be used simultaneously.

6.2 Suspected Premises Quarantine or Hold Order

When BSE or any foreign animal disease is suspected, the investigating
veterinarian or FAD diagnostician should decide the issuance of a State
quarantine or a hold order on the promises. The slow onset and
progression of clinical signs will often require that an individual
suspect animal be held and monitored for several weeks. Although BSE is
not a rapidly spreading disease, the suspect animal or any other
potentially infected carcasses must be kept out of the animal and human
food chains and rendering channels. The reason for the issuance of the
quarantine should be listed as a CNS suspect.

6.3 Affected Premises Quarantine

When there is presumptive diagnosis of BSE, movement of all bovine
animals on and off the promises should be restricted to allow time for a
thorough epidemiologic investigation. A hold order or quarantine
indicating the number, age, sex, breed, and identification of all bovine
embryos, ova. and semen supplies should be completed. No bovine animals,
embryos, ova or semen from the affected premises shoald be sold,
slaughtered, or rendered.
Although the role of maternal transmission in the spread of BSE has not
been fully determined and epidemiologic evidence suggests that maternal
transmission may not be significant, cow-to-calf transmission cannot be
ruled out. Hence, until more conclusive scientific evidence either
confirms or refutes maternal transmission, precautions (an extended
quarantine or other movement restrictions) to prevent disease spread via
this route are prudent. At this time, natural progeny of the
BSE-affected cows need to be traced and should be purchased. This
recommendation may be modified if scientific research data become more
definitive.

October 1998 2.1-30

BSE Red Book

It is strongly recommended that the Government (APHIS) purchase all
cattle in the herd. No cattle from this herd shall be rendered. Tissues
from cattle dying of neurologic or prolonged wasting condition should be
submitted to a diagnostic laboratory.
If the herd of birth and the herd of last residence of the infected
animal are different, an investigation should be done to determine if
husbandry practices in the herd of birth are the likely source of
infection. Under certain circumstances, a quarantine (or other movement
restrictions) of this herd may be warranted until the epidemiologic
investigation is completed.

6.3.1 Affected Premises Security
Record the number and permanent identification of bovine animals,
embryos, ova and semen at the time of the quarantine or hold order.
Animals should not be allowed to move unless permitted by a State or
Federal animal health official. Introduction of new bovine animals to
the premises should be discouraged.
Because BSE is not a highly contagious disease, the need to post police
or other monitoring personnel is not obligatory.
Restriction of movements of non-Bovidae animals and vehicles or
inanimate objects must be determined on a case-to-case basis. However,
normal biosecurity and sanitary precautions should be observed.

6.3.2 Procedures on Affected Premises
A detailed epidemiologic investigation (sec. 4) should be performed on
all premises where BSE-confirmed animals are found.
Evidence from the United Kingdom has shown that the clinical
manifestation of BSE in any given herd is usually confined to a single
animal or a small group of animals. Although another suspect is unlikely
to be found, all cattle should be examined.
If another suspect is identified, that animal should have tissues
collected and submitted for diagnostic purposes after clinical signs
have sufficiently progressed. Carcasses of BSE-confirmed or suspect
animals should be incinerated.
Because BSE is not known to be highly contagious or vector borne, herds
found to contain a confirmed BSE case may or may not be depopulated.
Depending on circumstances, the government may purchase all animals
(suspect and exposed animals) for destruction or research purposes.
Embryos, ova, and semen from herds with confirmed BSE animals should be
held until an epidemiologic investigation is completed and the hold
order or quarantine is removed.
Milk from healthy animals in herds that have had BSE-confirmed animals
may be used for consumption, but milk from BSE suspects should be
withheld and disposed of in an environmentally acceptable method. Public
health authorities should be informed of the herd's BSE status. Litter,
bedding, feces, and urine from herds that have had BSE-confirmed animals
is not likely to be infectious. However, materials should be disposed of
according to good husbandry practices.
Feeds or feeding ingredients do not need to be destroyed simply because
they were near (or in contact with) suspect or confirmed animals.
However, if it is determined that feeds or feed ingredients contain
rendered animal protein originating from suspect or confirmed animals,
or that the feed or feed ingredient has

October 1998

BSE Red Book 2.1-31

been epidemiologically linked to known BSE outbreaks, then the feeds or
feeding ingredients should he destroyed and disposed of by incineration.
Other steps that should be adhered to are the following:

*Federal, State and local policies concerning the feeding of rendered
ruminant or other mammalian protein to ruminants should be closely
followed.

*In light of recent preliminary research findings concerning maternal
transmission, farmers should be advised to promptly remove and
incinerate or bury placentas from calving pens. Calving pens should be
cleaned and disinfected. The disinfectants of choice are 4-percent
sodium hydroxide or 2-percent available chlorine.

6.4 Establishment of Quarantine Zone or Buffer Zone

Epidemiologic evidence indicates that the primary route of BSE
transmission is via infected meat and bone meal that is used in the
rations. Thus there is no need to establish a quarantine or buffer Zone
surrounding the affected premises.

6.5 Quarantine of Public Livestock Concentration Points

Livestock concentration points should be notified and employees should
be educated concerning the clinical signs of BSE. Any animal exhibiting
signs indicative of the disease should be reported. All bovids showing
evidence of neurological disease should be placed in an observation
facility within the premises. If the clinical signs are sufficiently
advanced, the animal should be euthanized and its tissues should be
submitted for examination. The carcass should be incinerated or buried
and must not be rendered. Due to the modes of disease transmission,
there is no need to quarantine livestock at concentration points.

6.6 Quarantine at Slaughter Plants

BSE is not known to be contagious or vector berne. Therefore, it is not
necessary to quarantine slaughter plants. Food Safety and Inspection
Service and slaughter-plant employees should be notified and educated
concerning BSE. Any animal exhibiting signs suggestive of the disease
should be reported. All CNS suspects should be isolated in a facility
where the animals can he adequately observed. The animal should be
euthanized and tissues submitted for examination. The carcass should not
permitted to enter the human or animal food chain. If laboratory
diagnostic tests have ruled out BSE the carcass may be rendered. In the
event of a presumptive diagnosis or a confirmed diagnosis of BSE, notify
FDA, CVM if carcasses have moved to rendering or animal feed
manufacturing plants.

October 1998

BSE Red Book 2.1-32

6.7 Moratorium on Animal Movements

No moratorium on the movement of animals (except as required by the
provision of the quarantine on affected herds) is necessary. However, if
animals from the same herd are presented for slaughter, those carcasses
should be held. Consult VS, Emergency Programs staff.

6.8 Veterinary Practitioners Operating in a Quarantine or Buffer Zone

A quarantine zone or buffer zone is not necessary in case of a BSE
outbreak, but the area must be geographically identified if the BSE
cases were domestic cases; similar feeding practices in the area may be
a risk factor. Veterinary practitioners throughout the United States
should be alerted and encouraged to report all animals with suspicious
signs. The Regional Emergency Animal Disease Eradication Organization
(READEO) director and the local AVIC or designated personnel should have
the responsibility for notifying all private practitioners in the
outbreak area after consultation with Emergency Programs staff.
Guidelines for working with a CNS-suspect animal or a BSE-affected herd:

*Practitioners should immediately report to regulatory authorities any
animal showing signs suggestive of ESE.

*Practitioners should wear clean coveralls and boots on each premises
visited.

*If performing a caesarian section, assisting with the calving of a BSE
suspect, or performing this work on an infected farm, the practitioner
should wear gloves and eye protection.

*If no FAD deagnostician or pathologists are available and the
veterinary practitioner must remove the brain of a CNS suspect for
diagnostic submission, every precaution should be taken to prevent
exposure of the skin or mucous membranes because rabies cannot be ruled
out. Practitioners should record all clinical signs and their
progression.
Veterinarians who need to visit premises under quarantine for BSE should
be allowed to do so and should observe normal disease control
precautions. They should wear clean overalls or similar apparel and
rubber hoots. Boots should be cleaned with an approved and registered
disinfectant before entering and when leaving a premise. Thermometers,
restraint devices (tongs), and other equipment should be disinfected
between premises as other contagious diseases cannot be ruled out.

6.9 Artificial Insemination, Germ Plasm Collection, and Embryo Transfer

The role that germ plasm plays in the transmission of the spongiform
encephalopathies, especially BSE, is still unclear. Studies involving
bovine semen and embryos are in progress and to date have revealed no
evidence of playing a role in the transmission of BSE. Due to recent
experimental evidence that scraple

October 1998

BSE Red Book 2.1-33

may be transmitted by embryos, precautions against BSE transmission by
ova and embryos are reasonable (Foster et al. 1992 and 1996). All semen,
ova, and embryos produced by BSE--confirmed animals should be located,
inventoried and destroyed if the owner is agreeable. If an owner of
semen, ova, and embryos from a BSE-confirmed animal is not willing to
have these materials destroyed, guidance must be sought from VS,
Emergency Programs staff at once. Field personnel should not offer
indemnity for semen, ova, or embryos unless authorized by Emergency
Programs.
Normal reproductive activities, including semen and ova collection,
natural and artificial insemination, and embryo transfer, may be allowed
to continue during the quarantine period on premises that have had
BSE-confirmed animals. However, movements of semen, ova, or other germ
plasm collected on the premises with confirmed cases of BSE should be
restricted until the quarantine is released.

6.10 Animal Protein Preservation

The carcasses from BSE-affected animals must not be used for human or
animal consumption. Dispose of carcasses by environmentally acceptable
methods, preferably incineration or deep burial. Consult VS, Emergency
Programs and public health authorities if necessary.

6.11 Controlled Slaughter of Potentially Exposed But Clinically
Unaffected Bovines

Cattle from premises under quarantine for BSE should not be slaughtered
or rendered until the epidemiologic investigation has been completed and
the quarantine has been lifted. Depending on the findings, the herd may
be purchased for research or depopulation.

6.11.1 Control of Animal Products From Affected Premises
Even if public health regulations allow, utilization of products of
clinically healthy animals from quarantined premises should not be
transported and processed for human consumption (except milk) during the
quarantine period.

6.11.2 Meat Products
Meat from BSE-suspect animals must not be used for human or animal
consumption or enter the rendering chain.

6.11.3 Offal
Federal, State, and national rendering policies and FDA regulations
concerning the use of viscera and rendered proteins in animal feeds and
human food must be followed. Cooperation from other Government agencies
involved, as well as the rendering industry, is very important.

October 1998

BSE Red Book 2.1-34

6.11.4 Skins or Hides
Skins or hides from healthy or exposed animals are not a risk for
spreading BSE. Normal processing precautions should be observed.

6.11.5 Milk
Milk from BSE-suspect animals should not be used for human consumption.
Milk from clinically healthy animals may be pasteurized and used without
further restriction. Public health officials should be informed.

6.12 Adjacent Premises

Area spread of BSE by vectors or other methods is not known to occur.
Therefore, quarantine of adjacent premises is not necessary.

6.13 Guidelines for Zoologic Parks and Exhibitions

Zoologic parks where transmissible spongiform encephalopathies have been
confirmed should be handled in a manner similar to that of beef or dairy
farms. Confirmed operation of the park and public access may be
continued. Affected animals should be isolated and observed for the
progression of the clinical signs before a final disposition is made.

6.14 Quarantine Release

After the epidemiologic investigation has been completed and decisions
are made concerning the disposition of the herd, the quarantine may be
released. At the beginning of an outbreak, it is strongly recommended
that the Government purchase affected herds for research and
observation.


October 1998

Subject: Emergency Operations...BSE Red Book
Date: March 13, 2000 at 1:30 pm PST
BSE Red Book 2.1-35

7.0 Emergency Operations

The section below would be implemented only after a first case of BSE is
confirmed in the United States.

7.1 READEO Activation

READEO activation will rarely be necessary for BSE outbreaks. Different
from most other foreign animal diseases and infectious diseases, BSE is
not a rapidly spreading, acute epizootic; is not thought to be
transmitted horizontally between animals within a herd, has an extremely
long incubation period, and usually affects only isolated single animals
or, at most, a few animals within herds. Because BSE does not spread
rapidly, the workload to investigate and manage most outbreaks should
not normally exceed the capability of existing local field personnel.
READEO activation should be considered only if the particular
circumstances of a BSE outbreak warrant. If field personnel feel they
are unable to manage a BSE outbreak, they should communicate this to
their Regional Director and VS, Emergency Program staff, who will
evaluate the need for READEO activation.

7.2 READEO Organization

If READEO is activated, a reference should be made to the revised READEO
Manual for further guidance on READEO organization and operations.

7.2.1 Office of the Director
When an animal disease emergency exists, the Task Force Directors are
responsible for the READEO activities. The directors immediately move to
the location of the outbreak and setup the READEO headquarters. Work is
coordinated with State officials of the States involved in the outbreak.
7.2.1.1 State Director--(Note: This is the new designation for the
Assistant Director.) Each READEO may have one or more State Directors
since each State where the disease outbreak is found will be represented
in the READEO by State officials designated by the State Veterinarian.
7.2.1.2 Emergency Program Officer--This individual, designated by the
Chief Staff Veterinarian of VS, Emergency Programs, provides liaison
between the READEO and the Emergency Programs at APHIS headquarters.
7.2.1.3 Public Affairs Officer--The Public Affairs Officer plans,
develops, supervises, and maintains information activities for the
READEO.
7.2.1.4 Legal--The Legal Advisor provides counsel and assistance to the
READEO.
7.2.1.5 Military--The U.S. Armed Forces Command will designate a senior
line officer to be the Military Support Officer on the staff of the
READEO Task Force Directon The individual is assigned to be the liaison
between the Depart-

October 1998

BSE Red Book 2.1-36

ment of Defense and VS, Emergency Programs,and to coordinate needed
military assistance during eradication of an FAD outbreak.
7.2.1.6 Meat and Poultry Inspection Operations--The Meat and Poultry
Inspection Operations, Food Safety and Inspection Service, will
designate personnel to report to the READEO Task Director and to provide
liaison between the Task Force and the Meat and Poultry Inspection
Operations.
7.2.1.7 Laboratory Coordination--The Laboratory Coordination Officer
will advise the READE(3 Director concerning laboratory capabilities and
appropriate laboratory examinations to be conducted to provide needed
results as rapidly as possible. This individual will assist with
interpretation of results.

7.2.2 Administration
The Administrative Officer assigned to the READEO will direct and
coordinate all facets of general administrative functions. Refer to the
revised READEO Manual for a detailed description of the organization and
responsibilities.

7.2.3 Field Operations
The Field Operations Officer will direct line operations and supervise
field personnel in a READEO. Disease investigation, field epidemiology,
disease security and personnel security, animal movement control and
quarantine enforcement, appraisals of animals and materials,
depopulation and disposal, and cleaning and disinfection are among this
person's responsibilities.

7.2.4 Technical Support
Staff support consists of a technically competent staff designed to act
as a resource for the READEO Task Force. Personnel may include but are
not limited to individuals who have expertise in the following areas:
animal welfare, data systems, disease reporting, economics,
environmental impact, epidemiology, evaluation, orientation and
training, risk analysis, and wildlife. The staff communicates the needs
of the Field Epidemiology Delivery System (FEDS) to the READEO Director
as required to maintain an efficient, accurate, up-to-date FEDS.
7.2.4.1 Animal Welfare---Animal Welfare Officers must be knowledgeable
about current Federal and State animal welfare regulations, humane
methods of animal depopulation, and socioeconomic concerns related to
animal welfare issues. They advise the technical support staff and field
operations concerning current procedures and accepted methods for use in
the humane depopulation of livestock and poultry.
7.2.4.2 Wildlife-- Wildlife Officers participate with the Director and
other officials of the READEO to establish and carry out wildlife
policies and objectives for the emergency animal disease operation.
Through familiarity with the topography, wildlife density, susceptible
wildlife species, and movements of susceptible wildlife, the Wildlife
Officers can review maps and make recommendations concerning areas to be
included in the quarantined high-risk and buffer zones. These officers
maintain contact with local, State, and Federal wildlife enforcement
officers and wildlife biologists. They develop strategies for conducting
surveys of susceptible wi!dlife in the outbreak

October 1998

BSE Red Book 2.1-37

area to determine the incidence of the disease. They direct and
coordinate the vaccination and depopulation of wild animals as necessary
to eliminate the disease.

7.3 Supplies and Equipment

During an outbreak of BSE, supplies and equipment should be obtained
through normal procurement procedures. If a READEO is activated,
supplies and equipment should be ordered through the READEO Procurement
and Supply Officer.

7.3.1 General Field Supplies Guidelines
Refer to APHIS Directive 326.1, 10/10/77 and 221.1, 1/29/74.

7.4 Personnel Responsibilities

During a BSE outbreak, field personnel should follow instructions issued
through the normal chain of command. If a READEO is activated, personnel
should refer to the revised READEO Manual for detailed descriptions of
individual responsibilities.

7.4.1 Personnel
Personnel assigned to the READEO Task Force are individually accountable
for equipment and supplies checked out to them. They should order
replacement equipment and supplies or return equipment for repairs
through the READEO Procurement and Supply Officer. All damages or losses
to equipment or vehicles should be reported immediately to the READEO
Administrative Officer, and the required forms should be completed and
submitted promptly.

7.4.2 Travel
Employees of the READEO Task Force are responsible for recording and
preparing all travel-related documents. Claims for travel, lodging, per
diem, and incidental expenses should be submitted to the READEO
Administrative Officer for processing.

7.4.3 Vehicles
Employees of the READEO Task Force are responsible for operating,
cleaning, and performing routine maintenance of assigned vehicles. They
also are responsible for recording mileage, expenses, and services.
Required reports are to be submitted to the READEO Vehicle Officer.

7.4. 4 Clothing
Employees of the READEO Task Force are issued protective clothing to
wear when entering a premises where BSE has been diagnosed or is
suspected. Clean clothing should be worn on each premises. Employees are
responsible for laundering the clothing before reusing it.

October 1998

BSE Red Book 2.1-38

In a large task-foree operation, arrangements may be made for a
commercial laundry service to handle the clothing. If it is possible and
practical, all clothing should be labeled to identify the employees to
whom it is assigned.

7.4.5 Miscellaneous Responsibilities
Employees are responsible for conducting their assigned tasks in a
professional manner. Complaints concerning task force employees should
be directed to the READEO Director for resolution or appropriate action.

All animals, products, and materials to be destroyed because of BSE
should be appraised according to 9 CFR 53.3 and appropriate State
regulations.

7.5.1 Appraisal Teams
Appraisals must represent the interests of the owner, the State, and the
Federal Government and be consistent with fair market values. If State
authorities approve, State and Federal interests may be represented by a
VS employee alone. Owners may, at their discretion and expense, employ a
professional appraiser to advise them or to act as their agent. Either
the owner or the owner's agent must be present at appraisals.
No animals may be destroyed until after the appraisal forms are signed
by the owner or the owner's agent. Appraisers should be certain that the
owner or the owner's agent is aware of the indemnity form's clause
concerning liens and mortgages.
When the number of animals to be destroyed is small, and the total value
of animals, products, and materiais is low, APHIS field personnel may
negotiate the appraised value with the animal's owner without assistance
from a professional appraiser. The appraised value of a BSE suspect
should be the slaughter value of the animal, taking into account any
existing defects or diseases that would affect the slaughter value but
ignoring those signs that caused the animal to be classified as a BSE
suspect. If field personnel are in doubt concerning the need to use a
professional appraiser, they should consult their supervisor or VS,
Emergency Programs staff.
If a determination is made that healthy progeny, ova, semen, or embryos
must be destroyed, they should be appraised at 100 percent of
replacement value.
Feeds or feed ingredients located on suspect farms will rarely need to
be destroyed. If a determination is made that feeds or feed ingredients
must be destroyed (for example, to comply with a policy decision to
remove all rendered products from animal feeds), then these materials
should be appraised and indemn'ff~ed according to 9 CFR 53.3.

October 1998

BSE Red Book 2.1-39

7.6 Depopulation Procedures

7.6.1 Factors and Considerations
If the owner is agreeable, a humane method of euthanasia of BSE suspects
will be necessary to facilitate the accurate diagnosis of the disease
problem, to ensure that the suspect animal is not slaughtered or
rendered, and to terminate the animal's suffering. Under no
circumstances may BSE suspects be sent fo slaughhter or rendering.
Notify FDA, CVM if you suspect that the carcass of a BSE-confirmed
animal has moved to rendering or animal feed manufacturing. The VS,
Emergency Programs staff, Riverdale, MD, must authorize the use of
euthanasia, depopulation, and indemnity payments for READEO operations.

7.6.2 Humane Euthanasia Methods
Only experienced veterinarians should perform euthanasia because there
are inherent dangers. Precautions should be taken to prevent accidents.
Owners should be given a complete explanation of what to expect, and
only humane euthanasia methods should be used. Euthanasia should be
performed away from public view, and, if possible, the owner should not
be present. Euthanized animals must be checked to confirm death. (See VS
Memo 583.1, 1992.)
7.6.2.1 Mechanical (Firearms)--Because the only acceptable method for
euthanizing an animal by using firearms is to shoot it in the head, and
because the animal's brain must be preserved to diagnose BSE, firearms
are not an acceptable euthanasia method.
7.6.2.2 Chemicals(Toxic Gas or Lethal Injection)--Follow guidelines
established by the American Veterinary Medical Association. When using a
regulated controlled substance (e.g., barbiturates), control and
administration of the euthanasia agent must be given by a veterinarian
having a Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) number issued by the U.S.
Treasury. Control and administration of chemical substances for
euthanasia must be authorized by the AVIC unless directed by the VS
Deputy Administrator. (See VS Memorandum 583.1, 1992.)

7.6.3 Supervision of Depopulation
Field personnel should never perform depopulation or euthanasia without
explicit permission from their supervisor or, if appropriate, the READEO
Humane and Disposal Officer. (Refer to the revised READEC) Manual.)

7. 6.4 Permits for Movement
All BSE suspects may be moved under permit to facilitate medical
treatment, euthanasia, necropsy examination, or carcass disposal.
Permitted movement will be according to the quarantine restrictions and
will be administered by the State or Federal officials.

7. 6. 5 Security
Because BSE is neither contagious nor vector borne, strict disease
security measures are not necessary. Personnel should observe normal
disease security measures that are standard procedure for all farm
visits. The READEO's Security and Disease Prevention Officer has the
responsibility for establishing biosecurity measures.

October 1998

BSE Red Book 2.1-40

7.7 Disposal
Under no circumstances may BSE suspects be sent to slaughter or
rendering. Notify FDA, CVM if you suspect that the carcass of a
BSE-confirmed animal has moved to rendering or animal feed
manufacturing. Field personel should arrange for the carcass to be
transported to and examined by a qualified veterinary pathologist or
field veterinary medical officer. After the pathologic examination has
been completed and the necessary diagnostic specimens have been
obtained, field personnel should arrange for disposal of the carcass.
Before a method of disposal is selected, there are many factors that
must be considered, and often other State and Federal agencies must be
consulted. The environmental and legal impacts of the operation must be
considered. Upon recommendation of the State or Federal agencies, VS may
consider other disposal methods.

7.7.1 Incineration
Incineration, although more expensive than burial, is the preferred
disposal method for BSE-suspect carcasses. Federal, State, and local
environmental regulations may restrict the use of this method and
permits may be necessary. As soon as BSE suspects are reported to APHIS,
field personnel should investigate the location and availability of
incinerators of sufficient size to process a bovine carcass.
Institutions likely to have incinerators include State and university
diagnostic laboratories, waste contractors, large municipalities, and
private industries. Ideally, the diagnostic laboratory where the
pathologic examination was done will have incineration facilities.
The BSE-suspect carcass disposal is APHIS' responsibility (not the
diagnostic laboratory's). Field personnel should arrange for
transportation and final disposal of the suspect carcass and should
inform their supervisors and/or the READEO Humane and Disposal Officer
of these arrangements.
Personnel should be aware that some laboratories dispose of carcasses by
rendering and should specifically inquire if this is the case. CNS
suspects should be incinerated or held from rendering until a diagnosis
of BSE can be ruled out. Under no circumstances may BSE susuects be sent
to slaughter or rendering. Notify FDA, CVM if you suspect that the
carcass of a BSE-confirmed animal has moved to rendering or animal feed
manufacturing.
Field personnel should be prepared to accompany the carcass from the
farm of origin to the diagnostic laboratory and then to the disposal
site if any doubt exists concerning the final disposal method.

7.7.2 Burial
If there are no other avenues for carcass disposal, burial of
BSE-suspect carcasses may be an acceptable disposal method. APHIS field
personnel should inquire with environmental authorities concerning
Federal, State, and local regulations that may impose restrictions on
this method.
The burial site may be on the affected farm, at the diagnostic
laboratory where the carcass is examined, or in a local landfill. The
site should be inaccessible to animals, removed from populated areas,
not used for agricultural purposes, clearly marked, and properly
protected.

October 1998


BSE Red Book 2.1-41

Burial sites should also be located a sufficient distance from
underground utility lines, septic systems, water wells, and surface
water. Local environmental or public works officers may be helpful in
locating a satisfactory site.
Field personnel should consult with their supervisors and/or the READEO
Environmental Impact Officer before digging. Burial trenches are
normally at least 9 feet deep with floor dimensions of 7 by 2 feet per
adult bovine carcass. Carcasses should be covered with at least 6 feet
of soil. This soil should not be tightly packed because gas formation
may cause a tightly packed trench to crack and leak.

7.7.3 Rendering
Because BSE is spread by rendered animal protein, BSE-suspect and
confirmed carcasses must not be rendered, unless the rendered material
is incinerated. Notify FDA, CVM if you suspect that dead BSE animals or
carcasses have moved to rendering or animal feed manufacturing.

7.7.4 Other Disposal Methods
The AVIC, the State animal health officials, and the READEO Director may
recommend other methods of disposal to the Deputy Administer, VS, for
approval (9 CFR 53.4). Options for disposal must be discussed and
approved by VS, Emergency Programs staff and must comply with all State
and local Environmental Protection Agency regulations.

7.8 Cleaning and Disinfecting (C&D)

Although BSE is neither contagious nor vector borne, appropriate C&D is
required to prevent farm-to-farm transmission of most other infectious
diseases. Field personnel must remember, however, that at the time they
are requested to euthanize a BSE-suspect animal, a confirmed diagnosis
of BSE will not be available. Signs compatible with BSE may be caused by
numerous infectious diseases and many BSE-suspect animals will, in fact,
have some other disease. Although the C&D of items such as manure,
bedding, feed, stalls, halters, milking machines, and other supplies and
equipment that have been in contact with BSE suspects is not
specifically necessary to control BSE, C&D is still advisable to control
other diseases that may be present.

7.8.1 Procedures for Cleaning and Disinfecting
7.8.1.1 Premises and Items--Field personnel are not responsible for C&D
of premises such as barns, stalls, and animal pens unless invasive
diagnostic procedures (such as a necropsy examination or the removal of
the suspect animal's brain) were performed on the premises. If possible,
field personnel should avoid doing such procedures on the farm. If
circumstances require that such procedures must be done on the farm,
personnel should clean and disinfect the immediate area after completing
the work.
7.8.1.2 Vehicles--Vehicles used to transport personnel to affected
premises should be kept clean, and normal precautions against the
farm-to-farm spread of any disease should be observed.

October 1998

BSE Red Book 2.1-42

7,8.1.3 Carriers--Thoroughly clean trucks and trailers transporting BSE
suspects. Manure and bedding may be disposed of by any environmentally
accepted method such as spreading on fields or composting. After
conveyances have been thoroughly cleaned, disinfectant should be sprayed
on the sides and floor of the truck bed.
7.8.1.4 Livestock Markets--The risk of BSE transmission at livestock
markets is negligible. If a BSE suspect is found at a livestock market,
it should be managed the same as if it were found at a farm. Because of
the high risk of transmission of diseases other than BSE, invasive
diagnostic procedures, such as a necropsy examination or removal of the
suspect animal's head, should not be performed at livestock markets. Due
to the recent research findings concerning maternal transmission, any
pens or areas in which calving occurs should be thoroughly cleaned and
disinfected.
Cleaning and disinfection is not necessary to prevent the spread of BSE.
However, the C&D procedures are recommended to prevent the spread of
other diseases from pens or buildings where BSE suspects were held.
7.8.1.5 Slaughter Plants--Becanse BSE is spread by rendered animal
protein in cattle feeds, BSE suspects must not be slaughtered nor
rendered. If a BSE suspect is found at a slaughter plant, it should be
managed similarly to finding a suspect at a farm.

7.8.2 Approved Disinfectants
Field personnel should use professional judgment in the choice of a
disinfectant. Preferred disinfectants to inactivate the BSE agent
include 1N sodium hydroxide solution or sodium hypochlorite solution
containing 2 percent chlorine (1 hour exposure at 20 %C [68 %F]). This
should be used whenever there is reason to strongly suspect that BSE is
in fact the cause of the suspect animal's disease. Such reasons include
previously confirmed BSE in the geographic area or signs more compatible
with BSE than with any other neurologic disease.
If the suspect animal's signs are more compatible with diseases such as
rabies or listeriosis, then a phenolic disinfectant such as "One Stroke"
may be preferable. (Refer to appendix A Survival of BSE Agent and sec.
1.4.4.)

7. 8. 3 Precautions
All disinfectants are hazardous to human beings, animals, and the
environment. Label directions should be carefully read and followed.
Many disinfectants, including sodium hypochlorite solution, are also
corrosive and should be used with caution on metal and other corrodible
materials. Thorough rinsing is necessary if corrosive disinfectants are
used on metallic items.
Disinfectants, especially in concentrated form, may irritate skin, eyes,
and respiratory systems. Protective equipment such as appropriate
clothing, rubber boots, rubber gloves, mask and goggles should be worn
during mixing and application of disinfectants. If areas of the body are
exposed to a disinfectant, they should be washed thoroughly with water.
Employees should notify their supervisor and their Health and Safety
Officer if excessive human or animal exposure to disinfectants occurs or
if there is accidental release into the environment.

October l998

BSE Red Book 2.1-43

Field personnel should use normal hygienic procedures (such as washing
and disinfecting boots and removing the outer layer of clothing) when
leaving the farm. Unless the disease problem is noncontagious, personnel
should not travel to other livestock premises for the duration of that
day.

7.9 Vector Control

Current scientific data indicate that BSE is not spread by vectors.

7.10 Disease Prevention and Philosophy

The goal of disease prevention and control is to confine the occurrence
of BSE to as few herds as possible and to prevent recycling of the BSE
agent in the ruminant food supply. If undiagnosed cases are rendered and
included in ruminant rations, the long incubation period may allow many
animals to be exposed.
Action should be taken immediately after the detection and confirmation
of BSE to initiate an extensive epidemiologic investigation to determine
the source and extent of the disease, to stop the spread, and to
eradicate the disease.
7.10.1 Philosophy--Immediate action should be taken to prevent
contamination of the animal food supply by prohibiting rendering of any
infected or suspect bovine carcasses. In addition, care should be taken
to monitor those animals born and raised in affected herds and to
prevent their becoming a source of infection to other herds.
7.10.2 Agent Spread--Epidemiologic evidence indicates that the primary
route of BSE transmission is through the feeding of contaminated meat
and bone meal that has been manufactured using scrapie infected sheep
carcasses or BSE infected bovine carcasses. Recent research findings
suggest that maternal transmission may occur at a rate of approximately
1 percent in some species. It is believed that this route of
transmission is not significant enough to maintain an epidemic. Cases of
apparent maternal transmission have also been identified in captive
exotic ruminants.
7.10.3 Control of Products and Conveyances--Carcasses of BSE suspects
should be incinerated. Carcasses must not be rendered and incorporated
in animal feed. If carcasses are transported for disposal, conveyances
should be cleaned and disinfected after use with either a sodium
hypochlorite solution (2 percent available chlorine) or 1 N lye (sodium
hydroxide solution).
7.10.4 Control of Biologics and Drugs--Although no documented cases of
BSE have resulted from the use of biologics derived from bovines,
tissues from suspect or exposed animals must not be used for the
production of biologics and drugs.
The agents responsible for causing the transmissible spongiform
encephalopathies are highly resistant to normal inactivation processes.
Careful selection of source materials is the best way to secure maximum
safety of ingredients or reagents of bovine origin used in the
manufacture of biologics or other medicinals. Factors that should be
considered are the age of the animals, exposure to the agent, and the
tissue or organ from which the product is derived.

October 1998

BSE Red Book 2.1-44

7.10.5 Wild Birds, Wind and Insects---Wild birds, wind and insects are
not known factors in the spread of BSE.
7.10.6 Rodents--Rodents are not known factors in the spread of BSE.
7.10.7 Hunting--Restrictions on the hunting of wild animals are not
necessary to prevent BSE.
7.10.8 Exhibitions--Cancelling scheduled exhibitions is not necessary.
7.10.9 Rendering Trucks and Drivers--The carcasses from BSE suspects
must not be rendered. If any rendering truck is used to transport a
suspect, it should be cleaned, washed, and disinfected as above. (Refer
to appendix A--Agent Survival and sec. 7.8.2--Disinfectants.)
7.10.10 Treatment--Currently there is no known treatment for BSE.
7.10.11 Prevention--Suspects and animals confirmed to have BSE must not
be rendered. Producers, feed mills, and rendering establishments should
adhere to U.S. State and local rendering policies and FDA regulations
concerning the feeding of rendered animal protein to ruminants. Because
of the possibility that some transmissible spongiform encephalopathies
may be transmitted at the time of parturition, precautions should be
taken to prevent exposure of healthy animal to placenta and reproductive
fluids. Importation of live animals and animal products from countries
with BSE or having high risk factors for BSE should be restricted based
upon scientific risk assessment.
7.10.11.1 Immunization--The agent that causes BSE elicits no detectable
immune response in the host. Therefore, vaccination is not a viable
option. There is no vaccine currently developed for BSE or other TSE's.
7.10.11.2 Sanitation--Although it is unknown whether a contaminated
environment plays any role in the spread of BSE, it is suggested that
pens having contained BSE-infected animals be cleaned and disinfected.
The disinfectants o choice are sodium hydroxide (lye) and sodium
hypochlorite, in infected herds it is also advisable that all placentas
be removed promptly and buried or incinerated. The calving pens also
should be cleaned and disinfected.
7.10.113 Producer Defense---The most effective way to prevent an
intruduction of BSE into a herd is not to feed ruminant byproducts to
ruminants. As of August 4, 1997, the FDA has a ban in place which
prohibits the feeding of most mammlian proteins to ruminants.

7.11 Records Maintenance in a Foreign Animal Disease Outbreak

The APHIS FEDS will be used by the READEO to record information. FEDS a
computerized network designed to transmit accurate information rapidly
during any emergency disease outbreak. The use of FEDS will allow the
READEO to direct its attention to the minute-to-minute business of
containing and eradicating the disease.
For an accurate record of the activities, all field supervisors in a
READEO task force should maintain a diary. Activities and observations
should be recorded in the diary when they occur. Date all documents and
enter events by time and date to show a correct chronology.
Enter events as they occur in the diary as well. An accurate history is
of considerable value in developing policies and plans for future
disease-eradication

October 1998

BSE Red book 2.1-45

programs, and it may be important if there is litigation. A diary will
be helpful for day-to-day administration of funds, personnel, and
equipment. It is also useful as a later reference in preparing reports
and summaries of activities.

7.11.1 Daily Reporls
Submit daily reports of significant activities to the READEO Director
and the VS, Emergency Programs staff Riverdale, MD. (Refer to appendix F
for current telephone listings.)
Include the following as part of the historical file of an outbreak:

*Maps showing premises where BSE-infected animals were found;
*Inventory of feeds and feed sources;
*Origin of BSE-suspeet and confirmed animals;
*Public information material distributed, newspaper clippings; and,
Administrative reports to support the expenditure of funds, utilization
of personnel and equipment, and disposition of excess materials and
equip­ment at the end of the program.

7.11.2 Distribution
The VS, Emergency Programs staff will distribute reports of significant
activities to all AVIC's, State cooperators, and industry cooperators at
least weekly. As soon as significant events occur, Emergency Programs
will inform all APHIS


----------------------------------------------------------------------------
----

Subject: Re: Emergency Operations (part 2)...BSE Red Book
Date: March 13, 2000 at 1:34 pm PST
In Reply to: Emergency Operations...BSE Red Book posted by Terry S.
Singeltary Sr. on March 13, 2000 at 1:30 pm:

will inform all APHIS headquarters units through normal reporting
channels. Emergency Programs also will immediately report any
significant events to the Deputy Administrator, VS, who will immediately
advise the APHIS Administrator, especially of legal or politically
important events. A weekly summary report of control and eradication
activities will be provided to the APHIS Administrator and the Deputy
Administrator, VS. See BSE Response Plan, communications section.

7.11.3 Disposition
Records should be maintained until a historical account of the program
has been prepared and all pertinent information has been gleaned from
the records.
Furthermore, all records should be maintained if there may be legal
action pending as a result of the program activities. Usually,
administrative records are maintained a minimum of 3 years for audit
purposes.


TSS


===================================
===================================


maybe old jim has not read the USA BSE EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN,
the real one;

Subject:
U.S. Emergency Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Response Plan Summary
Date: Tue, 4 May 1999 18:25:12 -0500 From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
Reply-To: BSEL To: BSEL snip... If additional tests do suggest a
presumptive diagnosis of BSE, an NVSL pathologist will hand carry the
sample to the United Kingdom for confirmation. It is at this critical
point, when NVSL suggests a diagnosis of BSE and is preparing to send
the sample to the United Kingdom, that this BSE Response Plan is
initiated. The Plan begins the preliminary notification from NVSL to
APHIS. Preliminary Notification The director of NVSL is responsible for
immediately notifying the APHIS, Veterinary Services (VS) deputy
administrator when tests suggest a presumptive diagnosis of BSE. Once
NVSL has made a presumptive diagnosis of BSE, APHIS and FSIS field
activities will also be initiated. APHIS will receive notification
(either confirming or not confirming NVSL's diagnosis) from the United
Kingdom anywhere between 24 and 96 hours. (The international animal
health community has recognized the United Kingdom's Central Veterinary
Laboratory {CVL} as the world's reference laboratory for diagnosing BSE.
Other countries, including Belgium, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Portugal, and Switzerland, have all sent samples to this
lab to confirm their first case of BSE). snip...end...TSS

Docket No, 04-047-l Regulatory Identification No. (RIN) 091O-AF46 ...(RIN)
091O-AF46 NEW BSE SAFEGUARDS (comment submission) ... if we look at the USA
BSE EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN, where it states; Subject: US Emergency Bovine
...

https://web01.aphis.usda.gov/regpublic.nsf/0/eff9eff1f7c5cf2b87256ecf000df08
d?OpenDocument


FULL TEXT POST TO BSE-L 1999

Subject: U.S. Emergency Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Response Plan
Summary
Date: Tue, 4 May 1999 18:25:12 -0500
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
To: BSE-L@uni-karlsruhe.de

From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr., Bacliff, Texas......

I thought it might be interesting for those of you who have not seen
this plan, to do so. So here it is...........

The mission of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) is to enhance
the quality of life for the American people by supporting production
agriculture; ensuring a safe, affordable, nutritious, and accessible
food supply; caring for agricultural, forest, and range lands;
supporting sound development of rural communities; providing economic
opportunities for farm and rural residents; expanding global markets for
agricultural and forest products and services; and working to reduce
hunger in America and throughout the world.

USDA's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) is responsible
for ensuring the health and care of animals and plants. APHIS improves
agricultural productivity and competitiveness and contributes to the
national economy and the public health. USDA's Food Safety and
Inspection Service (FSIS) is responsible for protecting the Nation's
meat and poultry supply--making sure it is safe, wholesome,
unadulterated, and properly labeled and packaged. These two agencies
have come together to lead USDA's actions in the prevention, monitoring,
and control of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in the U.S.
livestock and food supply.
The public knows BSE as "MAD COW DISEASE", a disease linked to human
cases of new-variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (nvCJD). USDA knows BSE
as the disease that devastated the livestock industry in the United
Kingdom and shattered consumer confidence in Europe. BSE has affected
international trade and all aspects of the animal and public health
communities. It has called even greater attention to the U.S.
Government's accountability for a safe food supply.
No case of BSE has ever been found in the United States. Since 1989,
USDA has had a number of stringent safeguards in place to prevent BSE
from entering the country. USDA conducts an ongoing, comprehensive
interagency surveillance program for BSE. This surveillance program
allows USDA to monitor actively for BSE to ensure immediate detection in
the event that BSE were to be introduced into the United States.
Immediate detection allows for swift response. As an emergency
preparedness measure, USDA has developed this BSE Response Plan to be
initiated in the event that a case of BSE is diagnosed in the United
States. The Plan details comprehensive instructions for USDA staff as to
who is to do what, when, where, and how in the event that BSE were to be
diagnosed in the United States.

BACKGROUND

APHIS is responsible for being prepared for potential FOREIGN animal
disease outbreaks. The purpose of such preparation is to provide a
step-by-step plan of action in the event that a FOREIGN animal disease,
such as BSE, is detected in the United States. These plans, often
referred to as "RED BOOKS", provide guidance by outlining certain
actions that should take place, such as identification of a suspect
animal, laboratory confirmation, epidemiologic investigation, and animal
and herd disposition activities. Copies of Red Books for specific
FOREIGN animal diseases are distributed to agency headquarters and each
regional and field office to have in preparation for a disease outbreak.

In 1990, APHIS developed a plan to respond to a confirmation of BSE in
the United States. In August 1996, a joint APHIS-FSIS working group
updated the BSE Red Book in accordance with current science and research
surrounding BSE and the related family of disease called transmissible
spongiform encephalopathies (TSE's). The BSE Red Book is officially
entitled BSE EMERGENCY DISEASE GUIDELINES.
The APHIS-FSIS working group determined that the BSE Red Book, which
detailed laboratory and field activities to be carried out in an
emergency, needed another component. After the March 1996 announcement
by the United Kingdom that BSE was linked to nvCJD, it became apparent
to the working group that the Plan needed to address communication
issues, both internally within USDA and the Federal Government and
externally to the public at large. A confirmed case of BSE would affect
such a vast array of stakeholders-consumers, cattle producers, the food
animal industry, international trading partners, animal and public
health communities, media, and others. Having clear, accurate
information readily available would build trust and credibility and
facilitate any response measures needed. There needed to be a
notification plan. Who was responsible for notifying who, what, when,
and how? The plan needed to identify clear channels of communication as
to ensure immediate collection and dissemination of accurate
information.
The joint APHIS--FSIS working group became formally known as the BSE
Response Team and is responsible for the development of this BSE
Response Response Plan. BSE Response Team members represent a mix of
backgrounds and expertise, including veterinary medicine, food safety,
public health, epidemiology, pathology, international trade, and public
affairs. The Team is coordinatied by two Team Leaders, one each from
APHIS and FSIS, who serve as liaisons and technical advisors to their
respective agencies on regulations and policies regarding BSE.
Over the past 2 years, the BSE Response Plan has been reviewed, edited,
revised, and approved by officials at all levels of APHIS, FSIS, and
USDA. The Plan has also been shared with other Government agencies, such
as the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC), and the National Institutes of Health
(NIH), and other stakeholders, such as the Animal Ag Coalition.
The BSE Response Team monitors and assesses all ongoing events and
research findings regarding TSE's. The Team leaders are responsible for
ensuring that prevention and diagnostic measures are continually revised
and adjusted as new information and knowledge become available.

NOTIFICATION: Roles and Responsibilities

Surveillance

As part of USDA's surveillance program for BSE in the United States,
veterinary pathologists and field investigators from APHIS and FSIS have
received training from British counterparts in diagnosing BSE. FSIS
inspects cattle before they go to slaughter; these inspection procedures
include identifying animals with central nervous system conditions.
Animals with such conditions are considered suspect for BSE, prohibited
from slaughter, and referred to APHIS for examination as explained
below.
Pathologists at APHIS National Veterinary Services Laboratories (NVSL)
histopathologically examine the brains from these condemned animals. In
addition, samples are tested using a technique called
immunohistochemistry, which tests for the presence of the
protease-resistant prion protein (a marker for BSE). NVSL also examines
samples from neurologically ill cattle and nonambulatory ("DOWNER")
cattle identified on the farm or at slaughter and from rabies-negative
cattle submitted to veterinary diagnostic laboratories and teaching
hospitals.

NOTIFICATION

Because of their responsibility for examining condemned or BSE-suspect
animals, NVSL is the organization responsible for activating the
notification and BSE response process. It is NVSL that will begin the
activation of the BSE Response Plan. From the time a sample is
submitted, it takes 14 to 18 days to confirm a diagnosis of BSE In the
first 10 to 13 days, pathologists at NVSL have enough information to
either rule out BSE or determine the need for additional tests. If it is
determined that there is no evidence of BSE, the results are added to
the more than 7,500 others that have also been negative. NVSL maintains
these data.
If additional tests do suggest a presumptive diagnosis of BSE, an NVSL
pathologist will hand carry the sample to the United Kingdom for
confirmation. It is at this critical point, when NVSL suggests a
diagnosis of BSE and is preparing to send the sample to the United
Kingdom, that this BSE Response Plan is initiated. The Plan begins the
preliminary notification from NVSL to APHIS.

Prelimanary Notification

The director of NVSL is responsible for immediately notifying the APHIS,
Veterinary Services (VS) deputy administrator when tests suggest a
presumptive diagnosis of BSE.
Once NVSL has made a presumptive diagnosis of BSE, APHIS and FSIS field
activities will also be initiated. APHIS will receive notification
(either confirming or not confirming NVSL's diagnosis) from the United
Kingdom anywhere between 24 and 96 hours. (The international animal
health community has recognized the United Kingdom's Central Veterinary
Laboratory {CVL} as the world's reference laboratory for diagnosing BSE.
Other countries, including Belgium, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Portugal, and Switzerland, have all sent samples to this
lab to confirm their first case of BSE).

NVSL

NVSL will provide all laboratory support in carrying out this BSE
Response Plan and serve as the liaison with CVL. NVSL will prepare its
facility to receive and process additional samples from the suspect
animal's progeny or herdmates or other suspects. NVSL will also
coordinate any other assistance from State or university diagnostic
laboratories if necessary.

APHIS, VS DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR

Veterinary Services is the animal health arm of APHIS and the program
responsible for carrying out field actions in response to BSE. Upon
notifiction of a presumptive diagnosis from NVSL, the APHIS, VS deputy
administrator immediately notifies the FSIS, Office of Public Health and
Science (OPHS) deputy administrator. APHIS and FSIS deputy
administrators will alert the BSE Response Team and activate the
Response Plan. The VS deputy administrator serves as the liaison between
the BSE Response Team and the APHIS administrator.
The APHIS, VS deputy administrator notifies the APHIS administrator and
the VS regional director of the State from which the suspect animal
originated.

APHIS Administrator

The APHIS Administrator immediately notifies the USDA Assistant
Secretary for Marketing and Regulatory Programs. This immediate
notification will be followed by an official informational memorandum
from the APHIS Administrator, through the Assistant Secretary for
Marketing and Regulatory Programs, to the Secretary of Agriculture. This
memorandum will be prepared by the BSE Response Team; a draft is
maintained by the Team leaders in the reserved section of their plans.
The APHIS Administrator is responsible for securing indemnity funds for
depopulation of the herd if CVL confirms NVSL's diagnosis.

Assistant Secretary for Marketing and Regulatory Programs

The Assistant Secretary for Marketing and Regulatory Programs, in
conjuction with the Undersecretary for Food Safety, is responsible for
notifying the Secretary. The Assistant Secretary serves as the liaison
between APHIS and Department-level officials.

Secretary of Agriculture

The Secretary has the authority to declare a Federal EMERGENCY if
appropriate and approve funding as necessary. Information will be
provided to the Secretary up the chain of command from the BSE Response
Team.

FSIS, OPHS Deputy Administrator

The OPHS Deputy Administrator, together with the APHIS, VS Deputy
Administrator, alert the BSE Response Team leaders and instruct them to
assemble the BSE Response Team and activate the Plan. The OPHS Deputy
Administrator serves as the liaison between the BSE Response Team and
the FSIS Administrator.
The OPHS Deputy Administrator is responsible for notifying the FSIS
regional director in charge of the State from which the suspect animal
originated.

FSIS Deputy Administrator

The FSIS Deputy Administrator is responsible for notifying the
Undersecretary for Food Safety.

Undersecretary for Food Safety

The Undersecretary for Food Safety, in conjuction with the Assistant
Secretary for Marketing and Regulatory Programs, notifies the Secretary
of Agriculture.

APHIS, VS, Regional Director

The APHIS, VS regional director in charge of the State from which the
suspect animal originated notifies the VS Area Veterinarian-in-Charge
(AVIC) for that State. The regional director is the liaison between VS
field staff and the VS Deputy Administrator at headquarters. In
addition, the regional director shares all information with the BSE
Response Team.

APHIS, VS, AVIC

The VS AVIC, in cooperation with State animal health authorities, is
responsible for coordination the field activities surrounding the
emergency response to BSE. The AVIC assembles the local VS staff to
initiate activities outlined in the BSE Red Book including tracing the
progeny and herdmates of the suspect animal and beginning an
epidemiologic investigation. The VS AVIC coordinates with the State
Veterinarian to quarantine the suspect animal's herd of origin. The
State has the authority to order a routine quarantine for a neurological
disease. The BSE Response Team surveyed every State to determine if they
would utilize this authority in the event that NVSL identifies a
presumptive diagnosis of BSE. All States responded that they would issue
a quarantine.

BSE Response Team

The BSE Response Team leaders will notify each team member and instruct
them to assemble in the Situation Room at APHIS headquarters in
Riverdale, MD. The Team leaders are responsible for ensuring that all of
the Team's duties are fulfilled. It is their responsibility to ensure
that the technical information and expert recommendations reach the
decisionmakers in a timely fashion. Together with VS Emergency Programs
staff, the Team leaders will obtain APHIS, VS administrative support
staff in Riverdale, MD, to ready the room for use as BSE headquarters.
The Team will begin gathering and assembling information from APHIS and
FSIS region and field staff. The Team will pull the draft documents from
the third section in the Team leaders manuals and begin filling in
current information as it becomes available.

Public Notification

Should NVSL receive notice from CVL confirming a case of BSE, the next
level of notification is activated. Each player will follow the same
notification protocol as described above for preliminary notification to
confirm the diagnosis of a case of BSE.

BSE Response Team

The BSE Response Team will complete the informational memorandum for the
Secretary. The Team will prepare the letter to the Office of
International Epizootics (OIE), the international animal health
organization, for signature by the APHIS, VS Deputy Administrator. OIE
requires that all countries submit official notification within 24 hours
of confirming a diagnosis of BSE.
The BSE Response Team and the office of the APHIS, VS Deputy
Administrator would coordinate a teleconference to inform all APHIS
regional directors and AVIC'S.
The BSE Response Team and the office of the FSIS, OPHS Deputy
Administrator would coordinate a teleconference to inform all regional
and field FSIS offices.
The BSE Response Team would coordinate a teleconference to notify other
Federal agencies.
The BSE Response Team would coordinate a teleconference to notify key
industry/consumer representatives.
The BSE Response Team and APHIS International Services would notify
foreign embassies.
The BSE Response Team would establish a toll-free 800 telephone line for
industry representatives, reporters, and the public.
The BSE Response Team would coordinate with APHIS Legislative and Public
Affairs and USDA office of Communications to issue a press release the
day the diagnosis is confirmed. The press release would announce a press
conference to be held the morning after the diagnosis is confirmed......

THE END

===============

Subject: hunkering down in the APHIS BSE Situation Room
Date: Wed, 12 May 1999 01:55:54 -0800
From: tom
Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
To: BSE-L@uni-karlsruhe.de

i am looking now a bizarre Oct 98 internal USDA publication describing
a james bond-type US effort to control media should the long-anticipated
first case of BSE in the US be admitted.

'Players' on the 27 member BSE Response Team are to be flown in from all
over the country to a BSE Headquarters 'situation room' apparently an
underground bunker in Riverdale, Maryland under the command of the
Assistant Secretary of Marketing.

Authentic press releases are already prepared and ready to go out after a
few specifics have been filled in. They are spelled out in a separate
document, the BSE Red Book, aka BSE Emergency Disease Guidelines.

Aphis' National Veterinary Services Laboratories (NVSL) activates team
assembly. From the time a bovine brain sample is submitted, it takes
14-18 days to confirm a diagnosis of BSE. In the first 10-13 days, NVSL
have enough information to determine the need for additional tests. If a
provisional BSE diagnosis is made, the sample is 'hand-carried' (are
they going to tell the airline and customs?) to the Central Veterinary
Laboratory in England for confirmation, where they are expecting a 24 to
96 hour turn-around.

I guess that means we can get the white tiger brain analyzed by Friday
despite the 22 year delay to date. Maybe we could throw in a few cougar
brains from NE Colorado too.

A Team Member is designated to silently monitor this listserve and
www.mad-cow.org (among others) -- for what, it doesn't say. The
Freedom of Information Act request from the East Coast consumer group
turned up numerous top-secret USDA downloads from that site and
Dealler's.

After 24 hours of secret briefings for 'select industry and trading
partners' (to allow them to take positions on the commodities markets
opposite the 'non-select' industry and trading partners?), a press
conference will be held the next day.

There are plans to trace the cow, its lineage, its herdmates, the
renderer, traceout of product, buyout of herd, farm of origin, to get the
state involved to quarantine the herd (pre-arranged for all 50 states),
expectations for trade bans, notification of OIE within 24 hours, media
800 numbers, spokespersons and backups, notify CDC, FDA, NIH, and many
other commendable activities. The Flow Chart is a sight to behold, I
will try to scan it in tomorrow.

In short, that cow is going to be toast by the time the public first
hears about it.

The Plan does not speak to the scenario in which the CVL says, yes, this
is bovine spongiform encephalopathy all right but it is one of your
strains, not ours. Invoking their Absence of Evidence is Evidence of
Absence principle, there may be no perceived need for public disclosure
in this case.

USDA is caught completely unprepared if BSE first turns up in a US zoo
animal. These animals could easily be diagnosed outside the "system"
and be the subject of a publicity-seeking lab press release. I think
this is a more likely scenario because the US has likely imported many
thousands of zoo animals with advanced infections from Britain and
France and there has been zero monitoring. Unlike with downer cows,
anyone with the right colleagues can get ahold of a fallen zoo animal.
Zoo animals enter the food chain in some cases after being rendered.

Another scenario would be some stock market speculator obtaining the Red
Book and issuing a flurry of bogus but authentic-looking press releases
that included bogus 800 and hacked USDA web links. The press here is so
lazy and so accustomed to putting out public relation handouts as news
that the objectives would be accomplished for a few hour (or days,
depending on the Response Team's paralysis vis-a-vis off-flow chart
events). Some people think a practise run for this happened in the
Indiana case a year or two back.

The first case of nvCJD in an American will also be a public relations
fiasco. In the dim bulb of the public mind, any American with mad cow
disease would have gotten it from eating meat here. USDA has no way to
prove that the victim acquired it on a three week trip to England in
1987. This will sound lame even to the press. All CJD is synonymous with
mad cow disease in the public perception; the more often the different
kinds are explained, the more their suspicions are aroused. The first
case of nvCJD in an American will simply validate what they already know
and just be viewed as an overdue admission from the government.

tom

========

Subject: A Quantitative Assessment of the Possible Role of Nonambulatory
Cattle in Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy in the United States...
Date: Mon, 6 Mar 2000 14:15:00 -0600
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
To: BSE-L@uni-karlsruhe.de

######### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
#########

A Quantitative Assessment of the Possible Role of Nonambulatory Cattle
in Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopath¥ in the United States

Background

The emergence of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in Great Britain
and other countries has focused attention on certain cattle populations
in the U.S. One such population is nonambulatory cows. The term
nonambulatory cow (or "downer" cow) refers to any cow that is recumbent
when the reason for the recumbency is unknown (1,2). Some researchers
feel that nonambulatory cows occur secondarily to low blood levels of
calcium (2,3), while others suggest that nonambulatory cows occur as a
sequela to prolonged recumbency due to a variety of other causes (e.g.,
mastitis, metritis, calving paralysis, and milk fever) (4). Though many
causes for nonambulatory cows have been proposed, most studies have
failed to find evidence of any of these conditions in a large fraction
of the nonambulatory cows. Nonambulatory cows are alert and unresponsive
to therapy if treated. Terminal cows due to a known disease are not
considered nonambulatory. For the purpose of this report, the term
nonambulatory cow refers to a cow that is culled because it is unable to
stand.

BSE is a neurologic disorder that affects cattle. BSE has occurred
in-seven countries, and is believed to have been initiated through the
feeding of meat and bone meal contaminated with sheep scrapie. BSE is
not known to exist in the U.S., but it has been suggested that an
unidentified transmissible spongiform encephalopathy (TSE} may-be
present in U.S. nonambulatory cows (5). This hypothesis is based on an
alleged association between feeding nonambulatory cattle to mink and
outbreaks of transmissible mink encephalopathy (TME) (6,7). There have
been
five reported outbreaks of TME in the United States; one in 1947, three
in the early 1960's, and one in 1985. The outbreaks in the early 1960's
were associated with common food sources and movements between farms
(8). The large fraction of nonambulatory cases that are due to unknown
cause provides a basis for the hypothesis that a TSE may exist in U.S.
cows and be a source of TME. The purpose of this report is to describe
the occurrence and disposition of nonambulatory cows in States with both
dairy and mink industries, and to assess the potential role of these
cattle in the transmission of a spongiform encephalopathy.

Nonambulatory Cow Prevalence and Disposition

The prevalence of nonambulatory cattle in the U.S. is difficult to
estimate due to the numerous options for disposition of such animals.
Nonambulatory cows may go to Federal or State slaughter plants, to
rendering plants, be custom slaughtered, sold locally, or killed and
disposed on the premises (Figure 1). Of particular interest are the
number sold locally to mink producers. The greatest number of
nonambulatory cows are believed to go to rendering. Rendering facilities
do not maintain records on numbers and causes of nonambulatory cows as
nonambulatory cows represent only a small fraction of incoming rendered
product,

Figure I (NOT AVAILABLE...TSS)
Page 21

and acquisitions are made by drivers who are not trained nor charged
with responsibility to assess reasons for moribundity.

Three sources of information on the prevalence and disposition of
nonambulatory cows were utilized for this report: a review of the
literature; State-inspected slaughter plants that slaughter
nonambulatory cattle exclusively; and a survey to determine incidence
and disposition patterns at the farm level.

Literature Review

The reported incidence of nonambulatory cows varies with the definition
used. The annual incidence of nonambulatory cows was 21.4 per 1,000
cow-years at risk, in dairy herds participating in the Dairy Herd
Improvement Association in Minnesota in 1983. Cows unable to stand for
no obvious reason, including those that eventually recovered, were
considered to be nonambulatory (1). A prospective study of 34 dairy
herds in New York revealed that 28 nonambulatory cow cases occurred out
of 7,763 lactations (4,092 animals) during a 4-year period, or 3.6 per
1,000 cow-years at risk (9). For that study, cows that recovered were
not reported as nonambulatory.

Concerning disposition of nonambulatory cattle, Milian-Suazo et al. (10)
reported that more than one-half of nonambulatory cows were culled in
the same lactation. It has also been reported that some mink ranchers
have contracts with local slaughter plants to pick up nonambulatory or
dead cows (8). The entire carcass is reportedly ground into feed at the
mink facility.

Antemortem Slaughter Inspection in Federal and State Plants

One possible endpoint for nonambulatory cows is a Federal or State
slaughter plant. The United States Department of Agriculture: Food
Safety Inspection Service (USDA:FSIS) maintains a record of animals
condemned antemortem due to a variety of reasons, but there is no
category specifically for nonambulatory cows. State-inspected slaughter
plants may also accept nonambulatory cows. The only available data on
nonambulatory cows from State plants came from Wisconsin, which has the
largest number of milk cows in the U.S. and has four State-inspected
plants specifically for nonambulatory cows. In 1992, these four plants
slaughtered a total of about 10,000 nonambulatory cows (G. Jacobsen,
AVIC, USDA:APHIS:VS, personal communication). Neither the number of cows
that were condemned antemortem and not slaughtered nor the slaughtered
cows' State of origin was known.

Farm-level Information on Numbers and Disposition Patterns

Because data from slaughter were limited and do not capture the fraction
of nonambulatory cows going directly from farm to mink producer, a
survey was conducted to determine the incidence and disposition of
nonambulatory cows at the farm level. Sampling was from States with both
dairy and mink industries, and was not random. Seven States were
selected based on geographic distribution and ranking by numbers of milk
cows and mink bred. Twenty-one dairy practitioners were selected from
lists provided by university faculty, dairy organizations, and USDA
contacts. Each practitioner was asked to select three herds to sample
for the study, one from each of three size categories (small n <--50;
medium 51 < n<-..100; and large n > 100) . The number of practitioners
selected for each State was calculated based on the number of dairy cows
per State. Eight practitioners were contacted in Wisconsin; four in New
York; three in Pennsylvania; three in Minnesota; and one each in Idaho,
Utah, and Washington. Eighty-one percent (17/21) of the practitioners
responded. The response rate by State was 100 percent for New York,
Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and Idaho; 33 percent for Minnesota; and 0
percent for Washington and Utah. A total of 51 herds was represented.

Page 22

Incidence of Nonambulatory Cows in the Study Sample

Responding veterinarians reported 363 nonambulatory cows out of 13,429
cows on the 51 premises for 1990-1992, for an incidence of 27 per 1,000
cow-years at risk. Incidence of nonambulatory cows was 35, 21, and 28
per 1,000 cow-years at risk for small, medium, and large herds,
respectively. There was no evidence of regional differences in rates of
nonambulatory cows.

Only those cattle without identifiable reasons for being nonambulatory
have been hypothesized as potentially having a TSE. The incidence of
nonambulatory cows of unknown cause reported in the study sample for
1992 was 8 per 1,000 cow-years at risk. Nonambulatory cows of unknown
cause accounted for 22.8 percent of all nonambulatory cows. Incidence
for nonambulatory cows of unknown cause in 1992 was 12, 5, and 8 per
1,000 cow-years at risk for small, medium, and large herds,
respectively.

Disposition of Nonambulatory Cows in 1992

For 1992, there were 158 nonambulatory cows reported in the study
sample. The initial disposition of more than half of the nonambulatory
cows was rendering (Table 1). Most of the remaining nonambulatory cows
initially went to slaughter, with those condemned at slaughter
potentially going to rendering or to mink producers. Of the 6.3 percent
of nonambulatory cows that went directly to mink producers, half had no
identifiable reason for being nonambulatory.

Table 1
Initial Disposition of Nonambulatory Cows from 51 Dairies in 1992

Disposition - Number Percent*

Renderer 83 52.5
Regular Slaughter 45 28.5
Mink Producers 10 6.3
Dealer 10 6.3
Custom Slaughter 9 5.7
Livestock Market I 0.6
Total 158 100.0
Totals may not add due to rounding

There was no correlation between distance to disposition site and
method of disposition. The average distance from a herd to:
the nearest slaughter plant was 29 miles; the nearest renderer was 25
miles; and the nearest mink ranch was 36 miles.

Nonambulatory Cattle as a Potential Source of TSE

In this study, Wisconsin was the only State in which mink producers were
reported to receive nonambulatory cows directly from dairies. However,
given the small number of surveyed herds this finding is likely a result
of the sampling design. Because mink producers pay a premium for
nonambulatory cows, it appears reasonable that the practice of feeding
nonambulatory cows to mink could occur wherever both large numbers of
dairy cows and mink are found. As many as 2,157(3) nonambulatory cows
per million milk cows, or a total of 9,482 nonambulatory cows, could
have been fed to mink in the 7 surveyed States in 1992. Based on the
sample response, only half of those cows would have had an identifiable
reason for being nonambulatory. This equates to an estimated 4,741
nonambulatory cows that were, hypothetically, a potential source of TSE
in the surveyed States.

(3)This estimate does not account for any nonambulatory cows received
from slaughter plants.

Page 23


The five reported outbreaks of TME in the U.S. reveal no discernable
trend. Assuming an average of 2,000 mink farms in the U.S. during the
last 50 years, one outbreak of TME has occurred per 20,000 mink
farm-years. Extrapolating from the data gathered in this study, 66,374
nonambulatory cows have been fed to mink in the 7 surveyed States since
the last reported outbreak of TME in 1985. Of those, 33,187 would have
had no identifiable reason for being nonambulatory and were
hypothetically a potential source of TSE. Given the severity of signs
and number of mink affected by TME it is unlikely that outbreaks have
gone unreported. If any form Of a TSE (infectious, spontaneous, or
other) occurs in U.S. cattle that is transmissible to mink in the form
of TME, then it must be exceedingly rare or the conditions for its
transmission must be highly specific and unusual. Nonetheless, studies
are underway at the State and Federal levels to further characterize the
disposition of nonambulatory cows and usage on mink farms.

Summary

Little attention has been given to nonambulatory cows in the past. The
emergence of BSE and TME has brought the issue of nonambulatory cows
into focus. Limited information is available on the numbers and
disposition of nonambulatory cattle in the U.S. Available estimates vary
greatly, depending on how the condition is defined. Federal and State
slaughter plants provide information on antemortem condemnation rates
due to a variety of reasons, but no data exist that capture all
nonambulatory cows.

Data from a nonrandom survey of dairy herds in States with mink were
used to estimate the incidence of nonambulatory cows between 1990 and
1992. In surveyed herds, the incidence of nonambulatory cows was 27 per
1,000 cow-years at risk. In 1992, the incidence of cows which were
nonambulatory for no obvious reason was 8 per 1,000 cow-years at risk.
Over half of the nonambulatory cows reported went to rendering. Most of
the remaining nonambulatory cows initially went to slaughter and 6.3
percent went directly to mink.

An estimated 4,741 nonambulatory cows hypothetically considered to be
potential sources of TSE may have been fed to mink in the 7 surveyed
States in 1992. This equates to 33,187 such cows fed to mink since the
last reported outbreak of TME in mink. Given this large number of
nonambulatory cows fed to mink, the historic and current mink
population, and the infrequent occurrence of TME, if TSE exists in
cattle in the U.S. it must be very rare or transmissible to mink only
under very unusual conditions.

References

(1) Cox, V.S., Marsh, W.E., Steuernagel, G.R. et al. 1986. Downer cow
occurrence in Minnesota dairy herds. Prev Vet Med 4:249-260.

(2} Fenwick, D.C. 1969. The downer cow syndrome. Aust Vet J 45:184-188.

(3) Curtis, R.A., Cote, J.F., and Willoughby, R.A. 1970. The downer cow
syndrome. A complication, not a disease. Mod Vet Prac 51:25-28.

(4) Cox, V.S. and Onapito, J.S. 1986. An update on the downer cow
syndrome. Bovine Prac 21:195-199.

(5)
Marsh, R.F. 1992. Transmissible mink encephalopathy, scrapie and downer
cow disease: potential links. Proceedings of the Third International
Workshop on Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy, Bethesda, MD, pg. 1-7.


Page 24


(6) Marsh, R.F. 1990. Bovine spongiform encephalopathy in the United
States. J Am Vet Med Assoc 196(10):1677.

(7) Burger, D. and Hartsough, G.R. 1965. Transmissible encephalopathy of
mink. In: Gajdusek, D.C., Gibbs, C.J., and Alpers, M. (eds.) Slow,
latent, and temperate virus infections. U.S. Department of Health,
Education and Welfare, National Institute of Neurological Diseases and
Blindness, Monograph No. 2, pg. 297-305.

(8) Bridges, V., Bleem A., and Walker, K. 1991. Risk of transmissible
mink encephalopathy in the U.S. Animal Health Insight, Fall, 1991 pg.
7-14.

(9) Milian-Suazo, F., Erb, H.N., and Smith, R.D. 1989. Risk factors for
reason-specific culling of dairy cows. Prev Vet Med 7:19-29.

(10) Milian-Suazo, F., Erb, H.N., and Smitl~, R.D. 1988. Descriptive
epidemiolog¥ of culling in dairy cows form 34 herds in New York state.
Prev Vet Med 6:243-251.

Page 25

kind regards,
Terry S. Singeltary Sr., Bacliff, Texas USA

############ http://mailhost.rz.uni-karlsruhe.de/warc/bse-l.html
############


From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. (216-119-130-117.ipset10.wt.net)
Subject: Quantitative Risk Assessment of BSE in the United States
Date: February 13, 2000 at 3:43 pm PST

Contents

Executive Summary.....1
Introduction.....2
Systems Model of BSE Epidemiology.....3
Scrapie/BSE Contamination of Rendered Product.....5
Infectious Rendered Product Incorporated into Cattle Feeds.....7 General
Parameters and Assumptions of the Systems Model.....7
State-Level Quantitative Risk Assessment.....8
County-Level Quantitative Risk Assessment.....10
Conclusions.....14
List of Figures.....15
_________________________________________________________

Executive Summary

Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) is a major new cattle disease
problem. The current hypothesis suggests that BSE is the clinical
manifestation of the sheep scrapie agent in cattle. While the disease has
not been definitively diagnosed in the United States, sheep scrapie does
exist along with the feeding of rendered sheep products to cattle. ...

snip...full text;

http://www.vegsource.com/talk/madcow/messages/7247.html


Qualitative Analysis of BSE Risk Factors in the United States (part 1) -
Terry S. Singeltary Sr. 2/13/00 (0)

http://www.vegsource.com/talk/madcow/messages/7245.html


Qualitative Analysis of BSE Risk Factors in the United States (part 2) -
Terry S. Singeltary Sr. 2/13/00 (0)


http://www.vegsource.com/talk/madcow/messages/7246.html


From: Jeff (webwizard.vegsource.org)
Subject: Very interesting letter from son of CJD victim -- and alleged
connection to cows
Date: April 22, 1998 at 19:53:42 EST

This was sent to Oprah Winfrey, reprinted here by permission:

I am the madson of a deadmom who died of madcow.(heidenhain variant
creutzfeldt-jacob disease.) I sat with her for 10 weeks and watched as this
hidious disease ate her brain up. She wrote in her journal that she started
to see brown spots on sept. 27, 1997. These were her first symptoms --
apprx.10 days later she was blind, about 2 weeks later she had lost control
of her coordination, walking, and speech.

She would get these uncontrolable jerks that at times would take 3 of us to
hold her down. Around the 8th week she was totally bedridden. She died in
the 10th week on 12-14-97. THANK GOD!

If you ever see this disease, as I did with my mom, you will truly believe
that madcow is here. I truely believe that is what my mom died of. They can
call it what ever they want to.

Now, I will take this a step further. My neighbor's mother also died of
c.j.d. She died on 12-14-96, they had diagnosed it as Alzheimers, until the
autopsy he demanded ruled out alzheimers and ruled in c.j.d.

About a month ago my neighbor called me over, he had been going through some
old boxes of his mom's and came across some pills he thought I should see.
When I read the ingredients I just about sh*t!

INGREDIENTS: vacuum dried bovine brain, bone meal, bovine eye, veal bone,
bovine liver powder, bovine adrenal, vacuum dried bovine kidney, and vacuum
dried porcine stomach. It was a cow in a pill! This woman taking these pills
died of c.j.d. Could it be madcow in a pill?

I called the texas dept. of health (T.D.H.) the next day, and the following
day they were out here and got the pills. I had located the manufacture and
called with a bogus story and a list of doctors that would prescribe them in
houston. The T.D.H. called a few days later, asking for the list of doctors,
their phone numbers, and told
me they would take it from there. I need not persue it any further!

Not to long ago, 4 or 5 weeks, a girl showed up at my door. She had called
crying a week earlier and could not talk. She had seen a story on T.V. about
my mother. Anyway, when I first saw her I knew she had seen it too (madcow).
Her mother had died of c.j.d. on 2-14-97.

This disease is here and you can call it what ever you want, c.j.d.,
n.v.c.j.d., hvCJD, b.s.e. or madcow, for what it is. But, that young man who
died of n.v.c.j.d. in England, Steve Churchhill, had the exact same symptoms
as my mother. There is also a girl in Ft. Worth Texas who called me. She had
seen an article about my mom in the dallas morning news. Her dad had died of
c.j.d. so far we have come up with about 18 people who has died of c.j.d. in
texas, 15 confirmed. I have heard from other people its up to 32.

I am tired of hearing this crap about nv-cjd being in just young people.
That same old line about how nv-cjd victims are much younger and their
clinical course from first sign of symtoms to death is much longer. Any
diseases clinical course is going to be longer in younger people, because
their body and organs are much younger and healthier. But, in the end, their
brains are full of spongiform holes, just like the older folks. Just because
the plaques are more extreme, does not mean its a different disease. Could
it not be just a more extreme case of typical c.j.d.????

Greed is what it is all about. They banned feeding cattle to cattle. But,
are still allowed to feed those downer cows to pork and poultry. Then they
are still allowed to feed the pork and poultry byproducts back to the cows.
Now Dr. Gibbs writes that the prion-protien can survive the digestinal track
and composting process. So the
prion-protein goes right back to the cow. We must ban feeding all animals to
animals. Its just an endless cycle of greed thats killing people.

I have requested that further test be done on my moms brain.(frozen tissue,
paraffeine sections and serum) be sent to case western reserve university in
Cleveland, Ohio. Dr. Pierre Lugi Gambetti.

I hope you find some interest in this. I just don't believe we are being
told everything. The gov. lied about asbestos for 75 years.

P.S.-- the results from Case Western Reserve Universitiy, on my Mothers
Brain, came back positive for the prion protein PrPres, confirming the prion
disease.........

kind regards,
Terry S. Singelary Sr.
Bacliff, Texas USA


http://www.vegsource.com/talk/madcow/messages/7252.html


Greetings again,

FULL TEXT MAD COW ARCHIVE 1 OF TSS TSE (well
actually there was the first board with Mr. Lyman and Miss Oprah
Winfrey before the trials, and those files lost and part of another board
with data lost if i am not mistaken. i am sure some will be thankful
for that;-) many thanks to Jeff at VEGSOURCE for giving me the
platform to document and comment on this ongoing cover-up.
the BSE-Inquiry documents do not have urls due to the fact
i was recieving the documents before they were on the WWW.
i can now find the urls if anyone needs them...

more of the truth;

http://www.vegsource.com/talk/madcow/archive1.html

TSS

Terry S. Singeltary Sr.


----- Original Message -----
From: "Robert A LaBudde"
To:
Sent: Monday, June 20, 2005 3:31 PM
Subject: Re: NCBA, others blast USDA over scattershot BSE policy


> ##################### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
#####################
>
> At 10:40 AM 6/20/2005, Terry wrote:
> >##################### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
#####################
> >
> > NCBA, others blast USDA over scattershot BSE
> >policy
> >
> > by Pete Hisey on 6/20/2005 for Meatingplace.com
>
> It should be noted that the cattle industry in the USA are squarely behind
> the best scientific testing for BSE, and are angry that USDA has fumbled
on
> this. Their position is that only being aboveboard and open about the
> issues involved will get them through this crisis. Double-talk, secrecy
and
> recanting will only make things worse.
>
> ================================================================
> Robert A. LaBudde, PhD, PAS, Dpl. ACAFS e-mail: ral@lcfltd.com
> Least Cost Formulations, Ltd. URL: http://lcfltd.com/
> 824 Timberlake Drive Tel: 757-467-0954
> Virginia Beach, VA 23464-3239 Fax: 757-467-2947
>
> "Vere scire est per causas scire"
> ================================================================
>
> #################### https://lists.aegee.org/bse-l.html
####################
>

#################### https://lists.aegee.org/bse-l.html ####################




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