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From: TSS ()
Subject: Re: Transcript Ag. Secretary Mike Johanns and Dr. John Clifford, Regarding further analysis of BSE Inconclusive Test Results
Date: June 13, 2005 at 7:33 pm PST

In Reply to: Re: Transcript Ag. Secretary Mike Johanns and Dr. John Clifford, Regarding further analysis of BSE Inconclusive Test Results posted by TSS on June 13, 2005 at 9:30 am:

Greetings,

a few comments please;

>>>The Inspector General, in reviewing our surveillance system that
we have in place, decided to retest with a second confirmatory test which
is called the Western Blot. We have received test results showing a positive
on one animal for the Western Blot.<<<

I happened to write the OIG about this very issue, on several occasions.
THIS is _one_ of several emails i sent the OIG about this issue and
others in the past, and all the data to back it up. ...TSS


-------- Original Message --------
Subject: re-USDA's surveillance plan for BSE aka mad cow disease
Date: Mon, 02 May 2005 16:59:07 -0500
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
To: paffairs@oig.hhs.gov, HHSTips@oig.hhs.gov, contactOIG@hhsc.state.tx.us


Greetings Honorable Paul Feeney, Keith Arnold, and William Busby
et al at OIG,

My name is Terry S. Singeltary Sr. and on 12/14/97 I lost my
mother to a most hideous disease called ;

Heidenhain Variant Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease (CONFIRMED)

MY MOM AND MANY MORE
were murdered by corporate greed, to say the least.

I have wasted almost 8 years of my life seeking the truth.
I have been searching for answers ever since. I kindly wish
to submit the following data that I have acquired over the last
7+ years. There has indeed been a cover-up of TSE in the USA
bovine. PLEASE remember, there is now more than one strain
of TSE in cattle. Many strains of TSE in other species. The
new TSE in cattle does not resemble BSE in cattle or
nvCJD in humans, but very similar to the sporadic CJD ;


Identification of a second bovine amyloidotic spongiform
encephalopathy: Molecular similarities with sporadic
Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease

Cristina Casalone *{dagger} , Gianluigi Zanusso {dagger} {ddagger} ,
Pierluigi Acutis *, Sergio Ferrari {ddagger} , Lorenzo Capucci § ,
Fabrizio Tagliavini ¶, Salvatore Monaco {ddagger} ||, and Maria Caramelli *

*Centro di Referenza Nazionale per le Encefalopatie Animali, Istituto
Zooprofilattico Sperimentale del Piemonte, Liguria e Valle d'Aosta, Via
Bologna, 148, 10195 Turin, Italy; {ddagger} Department of Neurological
and Visual Science, Section of Clinical Neurology, Policlinico G.B.
Rossi, Piazzale L.A. Scuro, 10, 37134 Verona, Italy; § Istituto
Zooprofilattico Sperimentale della Lombardia ed Emilia Romagna, Via
Bianchi, 9, 25124 Brescia, Italy; and ¶Istituto Nazionale Neurologico
"Carlo Besta," Via Celoria 11, 20133 Milan, Italy

Edited by Stanley B. Prusiner, University of California, San Francisco,
CA, and approved December 23, 2003 (received for review September 9, 2003)

Transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs), or prion diseases, are
mammalian neurodegenerative disorders characterized by a
posttranslational conversion and brain accumulation of an insoluble,
protease-resistant isoform (PrPSc) of the host-encoded cellular prion
protein (PrPC). Human and animal TSE agents exist as different
phenotypes that can be biochemically differentiated on the basis of the
molecular mass of the protease-resistant PrPSc fragments and the degree
of glycosylation. Epidemiological, molecular, and transmission studies
strongly suggest that the single strain of agent responsible for bovine
spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) has infected humans, causing variant
Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease. The unprecedented biological properties of
the BSE agent, which circumvents the so-called "species barrier" between
cattle and humans and adapts to different mammalian species, has raised
considerable concern for human health. To date, it is unknown whether
more than one strain might be responsible for cattle TSE or whether the
BSE agent undergoes phenotypic variation after natural transmission.
Here we provide evidence of a second cattle TSE. The disorder was
pathologically characterized by the presence of PrP-immunopositive
amyloid plaques, as opposed to the lack of amyloid deposition in typical
BSE cases, and by a different pattern of regional distribution and
topology of brain PrPSc accumulation. In addition, Western blot analysis
showed a PrPSc type with predominance of the low molecular mass
glycoform and a protease-resistant fragment of lower molecular mass than
BSE-PrPSc. Strikingly, the molecular signature of this previously
undescribed bovine PrPSc was similar to that encountered in a distinct
subtype of sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease.

http://www.pnas.org/cgi/content/abstract/0305777101v1

ALSO, PLEASE REMEMBER, SCRAPIE IN SHEEP AND
GOATS ARE RAMPANT IN THE USA, SCRAPIE TRANSMITS
TO PRIMATES, AND THERE HAS NEVER BEEN TRANSMISSION STUDIES ON HUMANS ;

1: J Infect Dis 1980 Aug;142(2):205-8


Oral transmission of kuru, Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, and scrapie to
nonhuman primates.

Gibbs CJ Jr, Amyx HL, Bacote A, Masters CL, Gajdusek DC.

Kuru and Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease of humans and scrapie disease of
sheep and goats were transmitted to squirrel monkeys (Saimiri
sciureus) that were exposed to the infectious agents only by their
nonforced consumption of known infectious tissues. The asymptomatic
incubation period in the one monkey exposed to the virus of kuru was
36 months; that in the two monkeys exposed to the virus of
Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease was 23 and 27 months, respectively; and
that in the two monkeys exposed to the virus of scrapie was 25 and
32 months, respectively. Careful physical examination of the buccal
cavities of all of the monkeys failed to reveal signs or oral
lesions. One additional monkey similarly exposed to kuru has
remained asymptomatic during the 39 months that it has been under
observation.

PMID: 6997404

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=6997404&dopt=Abstract


USDA USE TO BE VERY CONCERNED ABOUT THIS AGENT
AND THE POTENTIAL FOR TRANSMISSION TO HUMANS,
what changed there mind?


12/10/76
AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH COUNCIL
REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTE ON SCRAPIE
Office Note
CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR PETER WILDY

snip...

A The Present Position with respect to Scrapie
A] The Problem

Scrapie is a natural disease of sheep and goats. It is a slow
and inexorably progressive degenerative disorder of the nervous system
and it ia fatal. It is enzootic in the United Kingdom but not in all
countries.

The field problem has been reviewed by a MAFF working group
(ARC 35/77). It is difficult to assess the incidence in Britain for
a variety of reasons but the disease causes serious financial loss;
it is estimated that it cost Swaledale breeders alone $l.7 M during
the five years 1971-1975. A further inestimable loss arises from the
closure of certain export markets, in particular those of the United
States, to British sheep.

It is clear that scrapie in sheep is important commercially and
for that reason alone effective measures to control it should be
devised as quickly as possible.

Recently the question has again been brought up as to whether
scrapie is transmissible to man. This has followed reports that the
disease has been transmitted to primates. One particularly lurid
speculation (Gajdusek 1977) conjectures that the agents of scrapie,
kuru, Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease and transmissible encephalopathy of
mink are varieties of a single "virus". The U.S. Department of
Agriculture concluded that it could "no longer justify or permit
scrapie-blood line and scrapie-exposed sheep and goats to be processed
for human or animal food at slaughter or rendering plants" (ARC 84/77)"
The problem is emphasised by the finding that some strains of scrapie
produce lesions identical to the once which characterise the human
dementias"

Whether true or not. the hypothesis that these agents might be
transmissible to man raises two considerations. First, the safety
of laboratory personnel requires prompt attention. Second, action
such as the "scorched meat" policy of USDA makes the solution of the
acrapie problem urgent if the sheep industry is not to suffer
grievously.

snip...

76/10.12/4.6

http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1976/10/12004001.pdf

http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1976/10/12002001.pdf


SCRAPIE STATUS USA 2005

MONTHLY REPORT

AS of March 31, 2005, there were 70 Scrapie infected source flocks
(Figure 3). There were 11 new infected and source flocks reported
in March (Figure 4) with a total of 51 flocks reported for FY 2005
(Figure 5). The total infected and source flocks that have been released
in FY 2005 are 39 (Figure 6), with 1 flock released in March. The
ratio of infected and source flocks released to newly infected and
source flocks for FY 2005 = 0.76 : 1. In addition, as of March 31,
2005, 225 Scrapie cases have been confirmed and reported by the
National Veterinary Services Laboratories (NVSL), of which
53 were RSSS cases (Figure 7). This includes 57 newly confirmed
cases in March 2005 (Figure 8). Fourteen cases of Scrapie in Goats
have been reported since 1990 (Figure 9). The last goat cases was
reported in January 2005. New infected flocks, source flocks, and
flocks released or put on clean-up plans for FY 2005 are depicted
in Figure 10...

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/vs/nahps/scrapie/monthly_report/monthly-report.html


YEARLY REPORT

Infected and Source Flocks

As of September 30, 2004, there were 67 scrapie infected and source
flocks (figure 3
).
There were a total of 100** new infected and source flocks reported for
FY 2004 (figure 4
).
The total infected and source flocks that have been released in FY 2004
are 77 (figure 5
).
The percent of new infected and source flocks cleaned up or on clean up
plans was 96%. In addition, as of September 30, 2004, 368 scrapie cases
have been confirmed and reported by the National Veterinary Services
Laboratories (NVSL) in FY 2004, of which 54 were RSSS cases (figure 6
,
and figure 7
).
Thirteen cases of scrapie in goats have been reported since 1990 (figure
8
).
One new goat case was reported in FY 2004. New infected flocks, source
flocks, and flocks released for FY 2004 are depicted in chart 4
.
One new goat case was reported in FY 2004. Approximately 3,058 animals
were indemnified comprised of 47% non-registered sheep, 44% registered
sheep, 6% non-registered goats and 1% registered goats.

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/vs/nahps/scrapie/yearly_report/yearly-report.html


PLEASE note, the june 2004 BSE enhanced surveillance
was meaningless and ''NOT SCIENTIFIC'' without WB.

just ask the experts ;


-------- Original Message --------
Subject: Q&A Dr. Jean-Philippe Deslys USDA REFUSAL TO USE WB ON TEXAS
COW WITH BSE SYMPTOMS (FULL TEXT)
Date: Fri, 22 Apr 2005 11:53:47 -0500
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
To: BSE-L@LISTS.UNI-KARLSRUHE.DE

##################### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
#####################

Q&A Dr. Jean-Philippe Deslys

1. What is the standard regime for testing of suspect animals in the EU?

The regime is an initial screening by a high-output test, the Bio-Rad
test. If a result raises suspicion, a confirmatory test is conducted
with the Western blot test.

2. How long has this been the case?

Its a fairly recent development. Only recently has the Western blot
test become sensitive enough, with the addition of phospohtungstic acid
precipitation step. The Bio-Rad test (which Deslys helped develop) is
extremely sensitive, and the standard Western blot is extremely reliable
with high-signal test results. However, it had to be made more sensitive
for low-signal (samples with low density of malformed prions) samples.
It has been made more sensitive.

Reproducibility is the problem with the IHC test. It is not
standardized; depending on the lab and its protocols, or even on the
technician involved in the test, one can get conflicting results.

3. Is there a way to measure the three tests in sensitivity, accuracy
and objectivity?

Historically, yes. The IHC was the gold standard at one point, but we
have shifted to the Western blot. It requires less work, it is more
sensitive and its results are reproducible. IHC relies on localization.
If you have a weak signal case, you may get lucky and test a spot with a
high concentration of prions. But the opposite it true too; you can miss
an infection by testing a sample with low concentrations. Western blot
is much better for low signal situations.

4. The USDA in 2003 used the Western blot to confirm the BSE case in
Washington state, and it sent samples to the U.K. for independent
testing. In the case this November, which it announced was negative, it
instead used the IHC test and did not send samples to the U.K. Is this
good science?

Its not logical. If you have two consecutive questionable screenings,
you do another test. I can only advise, its managements duty at USDA
to make the decisions. But when you have a discrepancy between the rapid
test and the IHC, it is only logical to confirm it with another test.

5. We are hearing now about a new strain of BSE, atypical BSE or aBSE.
Or BaSE. We have heard that IHC, the so-called gold standard, cannot
detect the variant. Is this true?

Yes. There have been a few cases, one in Italy, one in Belgium, one here
in France. It seems to only affect very old animals. The distribution in
the brain is very different than we see with BSE, it looks very
different. The IHC test will come back negative.

This his a very recent phenomenon. I have no opinion on its virulence.
We do not know where it comes from. It could be a version of sporadic
infection. Western blot caught them, but we would not even know it
existed if we werent running systematic testing in the EU.

BSE was around for a long time before we caught it and by then, it was
everywhere. It had become highly infectious. It probably amplified due
to low-temperature rendering. The disease was recycled through the food
chain, and was given time to amplify. By the time it was identified,
even good cooking couldnt eliminate it.

I cant stress enough that systematic testing is necessary. Withdrawing
all positives from the food chain is the best way to break the cycle.

What can happen with testing of only cattle that are clearly at risk is
that several can remain undetected. Canada has tested about 30,000 head
of cattle and has three positives. That would indicate that there are
probably undiscovered cases. And what happens then is that the disease
is allowed to amplify. You have to maintain testing.

When people choose to protect their economic interests over public
health, it can have a boomerang effect. It happened all through Europe.
They always deny; its not OUR problem, it is our neighbors problem.
And then a single case is discovered and the public reacts. The economic
results are devastating. It would be better to just assume BSE is
present and use systematic testing as protection. That way, the public
is reassured that it is not entering the food supply.

By systematic testing, I mean doing as we do in the EU, which is to test
every animal over 30 months of age when it is slaughtered. In Europe,
three times as many cases of BSE have been caught by systematic testing
as by clinical testing (of clearly sick animals). In 2004, eight
clinical cases were discovered, 29 were discovered at rendering plants,
and 17 at slaughter. We should be using these tests as a weapon to
protect the public and to give them assurance that the food supply is
being protected.

6. USDAs list of specified risk materials excludes some products, like
blood and bone meal, that are banned in the EU and UK. Is our feed
supply safe?

With SRMs, where do you stop? Tests have found prions in meat, nerves
travel through meat, and so on. The main infectivity is in the brain and
the spinal cord. A blood and bone meal ban in animal feed is not really
necessary, because except in cases of highly infective animals, it is
unlikely that they are dangerous in themselves. If you combine
systematic testing and targeted SRM removal, the brain and the spinal
column in cattle over 30 months, you can have a compromise that is both
safer and less costly than expanded feed bans.

Certainly, you can stop the spread of BSE with a total ban on offal. But
it has to be a total ban. It cant be given to sheep or swine or
poultry. It would be very expensive and virtually impossible to
accomplish. You can have farmers using the wrong feed or transportation
errors.

Systematic testing makes far more sense. I think of it as a thermometer.
It not only allows us to catch the disease, it also allows us to monitor
its progress. We can watch the levels of infectivity and if they start
going up instead of down, we can take measures.

To an extent, our environment is contaminated. About 10 percent of wild
animals test positive for TSEs. If you recycle these agents, they can
evolve and get more dangerous. This is probably what happened with
BSE. It wasnt very dangerous until it evolved to the disease we know
today.

People complain that testing is very expensive. It is much more
expensive to kill and test whole herds.

7. In your opinion, is infected feed the sole method of transmission of
BSE, apart from the very rare maternal transmission?

Feed is the main problem. However, we are seeing some other
possibilities, including through fat and greases. Calves are fed milk
extracts, with the cream removed. To make it nutritious, they are using
fat and grease from cattle.

(FOLLOW QUESTION: Would that allow BSE to develop into an infective
level in cattle younger than 30 months, assuming they might be getting
infected at a younger age?)

8. You were involved in a study that tested two primates who were fed
infected brain tissue. One eventually died of TSE; the other survived.
The press reported that the main finding was that it would take
something on the order of 1.5 kilograms of infected matter to create an
infection, but that seems to be an oversimplification. Could you explain
it further?

The findings suggest that as little as five grams is enough to infect.
The 1.5 kilo figure is the amount of infected tissue that would have to
be ingested from an animal that would be below the threshold of
infection, and would test negative. In other words, even though a
younger animal may be developing the disease, it would take a
considerable amount of tissue to transmit the disease.

An animal could be just below the testing level, and not be particularly
dangerous. But that is why you have to keep testing. Once it reaches the
threshold, it can become highly infective.

9. BSE is a pretty horrifying disease, but overall, it has killed less
than 200 humans, and only a handful in recent years. Listeria, by
comparison, kills thousands every year. Overall, how do you rate the
threat from BSE?


The overall risk is not particularly high. Over two million infected
animals went into the food chain in Europe, 400,000 of them before the
SRMs, the brains and spinal column, were removed from the carcass. Less
than 200 died, and less than 4,000 are at risk of developing the
disease. What we know now is that one particle is not going to kill you.
There has to be condensation of the prions to be truly dangerous.

This is not a sterile world. But the danger is that now that the crisis
appears to be over, attention will turn elsewhere and that will allow
the disease to amplify again. Just as we stopped paying attention to
AIDS when medication seemed to control it, then were surprised when a
new and more infectious and aggressive strain appeared, we could be
surprised by a more serious strain of BSE. That is why I support
systematic testing for the long term. The object is to keep levels of
BSE low, and to recognize the danger if it suddenly pops back up. ...END

TSS

######### https://listserv.kaliv.uni-karlsruhe.de/warc/bse-l.html
##########

-------- Original Message --------
Subject: Re: Q&A Dr. Jean-Philippe Deslys USDA REFUSAL TO USE WB ON
TEXAS COW WITH BSE SYMPTOMS (FULL TEXT)
Date: Fri, 22 Apr 2005 12:14:14 -0500
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
To: BSE-L@LISTS.UNI-KARLSRUHE.DE
References: <42692C1B.7090200@wt.net>

##################### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
#####################

IN FACT, i must bring this up again.
IN TEXAS, when they are really worried about a mad cow,
when the cow is clinical and stumbling and staggering, TEXAS
does not bother TESTING the cow at all. nope, they just send
it directly to be rendered head and all to get rid of all evidence.
the june 2004 enhanced bse cover-up was just that. the USA
could test every cow that goes to slaughter, and it would be meaningless
unless properly done with the most sensitive testing to date.
but not in TEXAS or any other state in the USA.............


FDA Statement

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Statement
May 4, 2004

Media Inquiries: 301-827-6242
Consumer Inquiries: 888-INFO-FDA


Statement on Texas Cow With Central Nervous System Symptoms

On Friday, April 30 th , the Food and Drug Administration learned that a
cow with central nervous system symptoms had been killed and shipped to
a processor for rendering into animal protein for use in animal feed.

FDA, which is responsible for the safety of animal feed, immediately
began an investigation. On Friday and throughout the weekend, FDA
investigators inspected the slaughterhouse, the rendering facility, the
farm where the animal came from, and the processor that initially
received the cow from the slaughterhouse.

FDA's investigation showed that the animal in question had already been
rendered into "meat and bone meal" (a type of protein animal feed). Over
the weekend FDA was able to track down all the implicated material. That
material is being held by the firm, which is cooperating fully with FDA.

Cattle with central nervous system symptoms are of particular interest
because cattle with bovine spongiform encephalopathy or BSE, also known
as "mad cow disease," can exhibit such symptoms. In this case, there is
no way now to test for BSE. But even if the cow had BSE, FDA's animal
feed rule would prohibit the feeding of its rendered protein to other
ruminant animals (e.g., cows, goats, sheep, bison).

FDA is sending a letter to the firm summarizing its findings and
informing the firm that FDA will not object to use of this material in
swine feed only. If it is not used in swine feed, this material will be
destroyed. Pigs have been shown not to be susceptible to BSE. If the
firm agrees to use the material for swine feed only, FDA will track the
material all the way through the supply chain from the processor to the
farm to ensure that the feed is properly monitored and used only as feed
for pigs.

To protect the U.S. against BSE, FDA works to keep certain mammalian
protein out of animal feed for cattle and other ruminant animals. FDA
established its animal feed rule in 1997 after the BSE epidemic in the
U.K. showed that the disease spreads by feeding infected ruminant
protein to cattle.

Under the current regulation, the material from this Texas cow is not
allowed in feed for cattle or other ruminant animals. FDA's action
specifying that the material go only into swine feed means also that it
will not be fed to poultry.

FDA is committed to protecting the U.S. from BSE and collaborates
closely with the U.S. Department of Agriculture on all BSE issues. The
animal feed rule provides crucial protection against the spread of BSE,
but it is only one of several such firewalls. FDA will soon be improving
the animal feed rule, to make this strong system even stronger.

####

http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/news/2004/NEW01061.html

TSS

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Date
------------------------------------------------------------------------

APHIS Statement: June 29 Inconclusive BSE Test is Negative
07/02/2004

APHIS Statement: First Inconclusive BSE Test is Negative
06/30/2004

APHIS Statement Regarding Second Inconclusive BSE Test
06/29/2004

APHIS Statement Regarding First Inconclusive BSE Test
06/25/2004

Week 25
(11/1511/21)
7,900
1
Negative
0
7,901

Week 5
(6/287/4)
3,500
1
Negative
0
3,501
Week 4
(6/216/27)
3,254
1
Negative
0
3,255

USDA orders silence on mad cow in Texas

By Steve Mitchell
United Press International
Published 5/11/2004 10:16 PM

WASHINGTON, May 11 (UPI) -- The U.S. Department of Agriculture has
issued an order instructing its inspectors in Texas, where federal mad
cow disease testing policies recently were violated, not to talk about
the cattle disorder with outside parties, United Press International has
learned.

The order, sent May 6 by e-mail from the USDA's Dallas district office,
was issued in the wake of the April 27 case at Lone Star Beef in San
Angelo, in which a cow displaying signs of a brain disorder was not
tested for mad cow disease despite a federal policy to screen all such
animals.

The deadly illness also is known as bovine spongiform encephalopathy.

Both the USDA and its Inspector General -- amid allegations that an
offsite supervisor overruled the opinion of the inspectors onsite and
made the final decision not to test the animal -- have opened up
investigations to determine why agency policy was violated.

The order, which was obtained by UPI, was issued by Ijaz Qazi, circuit
supervisor for the USDA's Food Safety and Inspection Service's Dallas
district, which covers the entire state. It reads: "All BSE inquiries
MUST be directed to Congressional Public Affairs Phone 202-720-9113
attention Rob Larew OR Steve Khon. This is an urgent message. Any
question contact me. Ijaz Qazi."

Although the language might sound innocuous, experienced inspectors
familiar with USDA parlance have taken to referring to the notice as a
"gag order."

The National Joint Council of Food Inspection Locals -- the national
inspectors union -- considers the order a violation of inspectors' free
speech rights and is considering legal action against the USDA for
breaching the labor agreement they have with the agency.

Inspectors alleged the order also suggests the agency is concerned about
its personnel leaking damaging information about either the Texas case
or the USDA's overall mad cow disease surveillance program, which has
come under fire since the discovery of an infected cow in Washington
state last December.

"Anytime the government suppresses an individual's freedom of speech,
that's unconstitutional," Gary Dahl, president of Local 925, the
Colorado inspectors union, told UPI.

Stanley Painter, chairman of the National Joint Council, said the USDA
has sent out notices in the past stating inspectors cannot talk to
reporters.

"It's an intimidation thing," Painter told UPI. Inspectors have the
right to talk to anybody about any subject, as long as they clarify they
are not speaking on behalf of the USDA and they are not doing it on
government time, he said.

USDA spokesman Steven Cohen said he was not familiar with the notice
from the Dallas office. He said he would look into it, but did not
respond by UPI's publication time. In general, Cohen said, "There's an
expectation any statement on behalf of the agency would come from the
office of communications (in Washington.)"

Asked if employees could speak freely as long as they clarified that
their views did not reflect those of the agency, Cohen said, "We'd
rather that agency policy be communicated by those in a position to
speak for the agency."

Qazi told UPI the notice was not issued in conjunction with the Texas
case and it was routine agency practice that outside inquiries be
referred to the Washington office. He said inspectors are free to talk
to outside parties, including reporters, and he did not consider the
e-mail a violation of the labor agreement with the inspectors.

Painter said the USDA's efforts to keep its employees from talking about
mad cow would be better spent "with issues like protecting the consuming
public instead of trying to hide things." He added he would "just about
bet his last nickel" agency management was attempting to suppress
information about the Texas case.

"To keep federal employees from reporting government waste, misuse of
appropriations -- those types of things -- that's not a good thing
either," Dahl said. "If there is something wrong, let's get it out in
the open -- let's get it fixed. We're working for the public, the
American consumers. I think they have the right to know this," he said.

"And believe me there's so many indicators saying that the USDA's mad
cow testing program is broken," Dahl added.

At least one member of Congress, Sen. Tom Harkin, D-Iowa, agrees.

Harkin, a long-time critic of the USDA, sent a letter to Agriculture
Secretary Ann Veneman on Monday, saying the Texas incident "calls into
question the effectiveness and reliability of USDA's current and
proposed surveillance system."

The USDA has proposed testing more than 200,000 cows -- or 10 times its
current rate -- in an expanded program scheduled to begin June 1. Harkin
wrote in the five-page letter, however, that given the realities of the
cattle industry, it is "quite doubtful" the USDA will be able to test
that many cows, particularly because it had difficulty finding 20,000
last year.

"We simply cannot tolerate a BSE testing system that fails to give valid
answers to critical questions for U.S. consumers and foreign customers,"
Harkin said in the letter, which sharply criticizes the agency's failure
to address explicitly how its new surveillance program will be implemented.

"We look forward to receiving (Harkin's) letter and having the
opportunity to review it and respond to him," USDA spokesman Ed Loyd
told UPI. "USDA has acknowledged there was a failure in not testing that
cow in Texas for BSE, so we are all working to ensure that does not
occur again."

Jim Rogers, a spokesman for USDA's Animal and Plant Health Inspection
Service, which oversees the agency's mad cow surveillance program, told
UPI the agency has tested about 15,500 animals since fiscal year 2004
began, on Oct. 1, 2003. However, the agency has refused to identify the
states and facilities from which the cows originated. Rogers said UPI
would have to seek that information through the Freedom of Information Act.

The question is central to the USDA's implementation of its expanded
surveillance program. Downer cows -- those unable to stand or walk --
made up the bulk of the animals the agency tested for mad cow in
previous years, but these were banned from being slaughtered for human
consumption in December. This means the agency inspectors no longer can
obtain brain samples from these cows at slaughterhouses as they could in
the past.

Furthermore, the USDA has not provided any evidence it has worked out
agreements with rendering facilities or ranchers, where downers and dead
cows are now most likely to be found, to obtain the extra animals for
testing.

Loyd said the agency is "working very hard to get animals on the farm
that would never show up in a processing facility," and he was "not
aware of any issues" that would delay the launch of the new program.

However, he was unable to provide the names or locations of the
rendering facilities where the agency will be obtaining cow brains for
BSE testing. He said he would look into it but did not return two
follow-up phone calls from UPI before publication.

--

Steve Mitchell is UPI's Medical Correspondent. E-mail sciencemail@upi.com

Copyright © 2001-2004 United Press International

http://www.upi.com/view.cfm?StoryID=20040511-015527-4917r


USDA did not test possible mad cows

By Steve Mitchell
United Press International
Published 6/8/2004 9:30 PM

WASHINGTON, June 8 (UPI) -- The U.S. Department of Agriculture claims it
tested 500 cows with signs of a brain disorder for mad cow disease last
year, but agency documents obtained by United Press International show
the agency tested only half that number.

USDA officials said the difference is made up in animals tested at state
veterinary diagnostic laboratories, but these animals were not tested
using the "gold standard" test employed by the agency for confirming a
case of the deadly disease. Instead, the state labs used a less
sensitive test that experts say could miss mad cow cases.

In addition, the state lab figures were not included in a March 2004
USDA document estimating the number of animals most likely to be
infected among U.S. herds, and apparently were not given to a
congressional committee that had requested agency data on the number of
cows with brain disorder signs that had been tested for the disease.

"This is just adding to the demise of USDA's credibility," said Felicia
Nestor, senior policy adviser to the Government Accountability Project,
a group in Washington, D.C., that works with federal whistleblowers.

"If the USDA is going to exclude from testing the animals most likely to
have the disease, that would seem to have a very negative impact on the
reliability of their conclusion," Nestor told UPI.

Nestor, who has monitored the USDA's mad cow surveillance program
closely for several years, asked, "Are they deliberately avoiding
testing animals that look like they have the disease?"

Concerns about the number of cows in U.S. herds with brain disorder
symptoms have been heightened due to the recent case in Texas, in which
USDA officials failed to test an animal with such symptoms, also known
as central nervous system or CNS signs. This was a violation of USDA
policy, which stipulates all CNS cows should be tested because they are
considered the most likely to be mad cow infected. To date, the
Washington cow that tested positive last December is the only confirmed
case of mad cow disease -- also known as bovine spongiform
encephalopathy -- among U.S. herds.

The Texas incident has alarmed the public and members of Congress
because humans can contract a fatal brain disorder called variant
Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease from consuming meat infected with the mad cow
pathogen. If the USDA's surveillance program is allowing the riskiest
cows to go untested, it raises concerns about the ability of the
monitoring system to detect the disease reliably in U.S. herds, Rep.
Henry Waxman, D-Calif., charged in a May 13 letter to Agriculture
Secretary Ann Veneman.

Dr. Peter Lurie, of the consumer group Public Citizen, said CNS cows
should be the one category that absolutely has to be tested to have a
sound surveillance system.

"CNS animals are far and away the most important animals to test," said
Lurie, who has done several analyses of the USDA's mad cow surveillance
program.

"If there's any category that needs 100 percent testing, that's it,
because they would be the most likely place to find mad cow in America,"
he told UPI. "Any CNS cow that slips into the food supply represents a
major case of malpractice by USDA, and similarly, the failure to test
the brain of that animal to see if it was indeed infected is really a
failure to protect the public."

USDA officials said the agency has no estimate on how many CNS cows
occur in U.S. herds. But spokesman Ed Loyd has told UPI, and at least
one other media outlet, that 500 CNS cows were tested in fiscal year
2003. Yet agency testing records for the first 10 months of FY 2003,
obtained by UPI under the Freedom of Information Act, show only 254
animals that fall under the CNS category -- or about half the number
Loyd cited.

After failing to respond to repeated requests from UPI for clarification
of the apparent discrepancy, Loyd finally offered the explanation that
an additional 45 CNS cows were tested by the USDA during the final two
months of FY 2003. The remainder, he said, was made up by CNS cases
tested at various state veterinary diagnostic laboratories.

"We also include data reported to us from state veterinary diagnostic
laboratories, and all of these are CNS cases that have been tested for
BSE using a histological examination," Loyd said.

"We were not using any other labs during this period, other than (the
USDA lab), to run the IHC tests for BSE, which is the gold standard," he
said. "This (state laboratory) information contributes important data to
our surveillance effort."

However, the state labs did not use the immunohistochemistry test, which
the USDA has called the "gold standard" for diagnosing mad cow disease.
Instead, the labs used a different test called histopathology, which the
USDA itself does not use to confirm a case, opting instead for the more
sensitive IHC test.

The histopathology test, unlike the IHC test, does not detect prions --
misfolded proteins that serve as a marker for infection and can be
spotted early on in the course of the illness. Rather, it screens for
the microscopic holes in the brain that are characteristic of advanced
mad cow disease.

According to the USDA's Web site, histopathology proves reliable only if
the brain sample is removed soon after the death of the animal. If there
is too much of a delay, the Web site states, it can be "very difficult
to confirm a diagnosis by histopathology" because the brain structures
may have begun to disintegrate.

That is one reason the agency began using the IHC test -- it can confirm
a diagnosis if the brain has begun disintegrating or been frozen for
shipping.

The state labs used histopathology to screen 266 CNS cases in FY 2003,
as well as 257 cases in FY 2002, according to Loyd. He did not explain
why this information was not included in the testing records the agency
provided to UPI and has not responded to requests for the identity of
the state labs.

Linda Detwiler, a former USDA veterinarian who oversaw the agency's mad
cow testing program, told UPI the histopathology test probably is
adequate for screening CNS cows. If they have mad cow disease, she said,
it would likely be an advanced stage that should be obvious.

Other mad cow disease experts, however, said having a back-up test such
as IHC would be advisable, because histopathology tests sometimes can
miss evidence of infection.

The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations offers
similar recommendations in its protocol for conducing a histopathology
test. The protocol states that even if histopathology is negative,
"further sampling should be undertaken" in cases "where clinical signs
have strongly suggested BSE" -- a criteria that includes all of the cows
tested at the state labs.

The USDA seems to agree on the need for a back-up test. Its expanded
surveillance program, which began June 1, calls for using IHC -- or
another test called Western blot -- to confirm any positives found on
rapid tests. The March 15 document that describes the new program does
not mention using histopathology to confirm cases of mad cow disease.

"Subtle changes can be missed on histopathology that would probably not
be as easy to miss using IHC," said Elizabeth Mumford, a veterinarian
and BSE expert at Safe Food Solutions in Bern, Switzerland, a company
that provides advice on reducing mad cow risk to industry and governments.

"Therefore I believe it is valuable to run (histopathology)," Mumford
told UPI.

She noted that in Europe, two tests -- neither one the histopathology
test -- are used to ensure no cases are missed. A rapid test is used
initially for screening, followed by IHC as a confirmatory test.

Markus Moser, a molecular biologist and chief executive officer of the
Swiss firm Prionics, which manufactures tests for detecting mad cow
disease, agrees about the possibility of a case being missed by
histopathology.

"There were cases which were (histopathology) negative but still clearly
positive with the other (testing) methods," Moser said. "BSE testing
based on histology on sub-optimal tissue was probably one of the reasons
why Germany was allegedly BSE-free until our test discovered that they
were not" in 2000, Moser told UPI.

He agreed with Detwiler that histopathology should be suitable for most
cases of CNS cows, but added it still can fail to detect the disease in
some CNS cases -- particularly if the sample is not optimum.

"It is difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish the subtle changes
in a diseased brain from artifacts like ruptures in the tissue due to
tissue damage during the sampling, transport or preparation," he said.

Loyd asserted the additional CNS cases from the state labs actually
yielded a total of 565 such cows the USDA had tested -- 65 more than his
original figure of 500. Whether the USDA considers its total to be 500
or 565, however, either figure would exceed the agency's own estimates
for the total number of such cows that it identifies annually.

According to data the USDA provided to the House Committee on Government
Reform, and numbers the agency included in the March document about its
expanded surveillance plan, only 201 to 249 CNS cows are identified at
slaughterhouses. Approximately 129 additional cases occur on farms
annually. At most, that yields a combined total of 378 CNS cows, or
nearly 200 less than the 565 Loyd claims the agency tested.

The USDA surveillance plan document makes no mention of the number of
CNS animals tested at state veterinary diagnostic labs. The figure also
does not appear to be included in the agency's estimates of the number
of high-risk animals that occur in the United States each year. The
latter number was used to help the USDA calculate the number of animals
it will screen for mad cow disease in its expanded surveillance plan.

USDA officials also did not include the state lab figures in response to
a question from the House Committee on Government Reform, a source close
to the issue told UPI. The committee, on which Waxman is the ranking
Democrat, had requested in a March 8 letter to Veneman that she provide
"the number of BSE tests that were conducted on cattle exhibiting
central nervous system symptoms" for each of the last five years.

Loyd did not respond to a request from UPI asking why agency officials
did not provide that information to the committee or include it in
USDA's explanation of its expanded surveillance plan.

The committee has taken note of the CNS issue and plans to delve into it
further in a hearing slated for sometime in the next few months.

"The committee will explore this and other issues surrounding USDA and
BSE testing at a hearing later this summer," Drew Crockett, spokesman
for the committee, told UPI.

--

Steve Mitchell is UPI's Medical Correspondent. E-mail sciencemail@upi.com

Copyright © 2001-2004 United Press International

http://www.upi.com/view.cfm?StoryID=20040608-014607-3865r

IN FACT, i must bring this up again.
IN TEXAS, when they are really worried about a mad cow,
when the cow is clinical and stumbling and staggering, TEXAS
does not bother TESTING the cow at all. nope, they just send
it directly to be rendered head and all to get rid of all evidence.
the june 2004 enhanced bse cover-up was just that. the USA
could test every cow that goes to slaughter, and it would be meaningless
unless properly done with the most sensitive testing to date.
but not in TEXAS or any other state in the USA.............


FDA Statement

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Statement
May 4, 2004

Media Inquiries: 301-827-6242
Consumer Inquiries: 888-INFO-FDA


Statement on Texas Cow With Central Nervous System Symptoms

On Friday, April 30 th , the Food and Drug Administration learned that a
cow with central nervous system symptoms had been killed and shipped to
a processor for rendering into animal protein for use in animal feed.

FDA, which is responsible for the safety of animal feed, immediately
began an investigation. On Friday and throughout the weekend, FDA
investigators inspected the slaughterhouse, the rendering facility, the
farm where the animal came from, and the processor that initially
received the cow from the slaughterhouse.

FDA's investigation showed that the animal in question had already been
rendered into "meat and bone meal" (a type of protein animal feed). Over
the weekend FDA was able to track down all the implicated material. That
material is being held by the firm, which is cooperating fully with FDA.

Cattle with central nervous system symptoms are of particular interest
because cattle with bovine spongiform encephalopathy or BSE, also known
as "mad cow disease," can exhibit such symptoms. In this case, there is
no way now to test for BSE. But even if the cow had BSE, FDA's animal
feed rule would prohibit the feeding of its rendered protein to other
ruminant animals (e.g., cows, goats, sheep, bison).

FDA is sending a letter to the firm summarizing its findings and
informing the firm that FDA will not object to use of this material in
swine feed only. If it is not used in swine feed, this material will be
destroyed. Pigs have been shown not to be susceptible to BSE. If the
firm agrees to use the material for swine feed only, FDA will track the
material all the way through the supply chain from the processor to the
farm to ensure that the feed is properly monitored and used only as feed
for pigs.

To protect the U.S. against BSE, FDA works to keep certain mammalian
protein out of animal feed for cattle and other ruminant animals. FDA
established its animal feed rule in 1997 after the BSE epidemic in the
U.K. showed that the disease spreads by feeding infected ruminant
protein to cattle.

Under the current regulation, the material from this Texas cow is not
allowed in feed for cattle or other ruminant animals. FDA's action
specifying that the material go only into swine feed means also that it
will not be fed to poultry.

FDA is committed to protecting the U.S. from BSE and collaborates
closely with the U.S. Department of Agriculture on all BSE issues. The
animal feed rule provides crucial protection against the spread of BSE,
but it is only one of several such firewalls. FDA will soon be improving
the animal feed rule, to make this strong system even stronger.

####

http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/news/2004/NEW01061.html


-------- Original Message --------
Subject: Screening tests for animal TSE: present and future
Date: Sun, 1 May 2005 16:02:16 -0500
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
To: BSE-L@aegee.org

##################### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
##################### Tests de dépistage des ESST animales : présent et
futur Screening tests for animal TSE: present and future J.P. Deslysa
and J. Grassib , Corresponding Author Contact Information , E-mail The
Corresponding Author aCEA, groupe dinnovation diagnostique et
thérapeutique sur les infections à prions, département de recherche
médicale, CEA/Fontenay aux Roses, France bCEA, service de pharmacologie
et dimmunologie, département de recherche médicale, bâtiment 136,
CEA/Saclay, 91191 Gif sur Yvette cedex, France Received 23 February
2004; accepted 28 July 2004. Available online 21 September 2004. Résumé
En 1999, trois tests rapides (Prionics, Bio-rad et Enfer) ont été
validés par la Commission Européenne pour le diagnostic post-mortem de
l'ESB chez les bovins. Aujourd'hui, ils sont utilisés à grande échelle
sur le territoire européen. Ils reposent tous sur une détection
immunologique de la PrPres. En l'absence d'anticorps reconnaissant
spécifiquement la PrPres dans sa conformation native, la distinction
avec la forme normale de la PrP est obtenue sur la base des propriétés
biochimiques de la forme anormale (résistance à la protéinase K,
agrégation en présence de détergents). Dans tous les cas, ces tests
incluent une étape de dénaturation de la PrPres afin de permettre sa
détection à l'aide d'anticorps. Appliqués sur des populations de bovins
à risques ou sur les animaux abattus pour la consommation humaine, ils
ont permis de préciser l'étendue réelle de l'épizootie et d'éliminer
efficacement de la chaîne alimentaire les animaux présentant un risque
pour l'homme. Depuis 2002, ils sont aussi utilisés pour le diagnostic
post-mortem de la tremblante chez les ovins et les caprins. Cinq
nouveaux tests ont été récemment évalués par la Commission européenne
(ID-Lelystad ; Perkin-elmer, Prionics Check LIA, UCSF, Imperial college)
mais il est trop tôt pour évaluer la place qu'ils tiendront sur le
terrain. Les tests actuels permettent une détection préclinique des
ESSTs, notamment chez les ovins où une détection très précoce est
possible sur les organes lymphoïdes périphériques. Cependant, à ce jour,
aucun test sur animal vivant n'a été véritablement validé. Compte tenu
du nombre d'équipes de recherche maintenant mobilisées sur cet objectif,
il est raisonnable d'attendre des développements spectaculaires dans les
années à venir. Abstract In 1999, three rapid tests (Prionics, Bio-Rad,
Enfer) have been validated by the European Commission for the
post-mortem diagnosis of BSE in cattle. They are now used on a large
scale over the entire Europe. In absence of antibodies specifically
recognizing the native conformation PrPres, its selective determination
is based on the biochemical properties of this abnormal form (PK
resistance, aggregation in presence of detergents). In addition, all
these tests include a denaturation step so that PrP can be detected by
appropriate antibodies. When applied on risk populations or on
healthy animals entering into the human food chain, these rapid tests
have provided a better estimation of the epizootic and allowed an
efficient removal of animals bearing a risk for human consumption. Since
2002, they have also been used for the post-mortem diagnosis of scrapie
in sheep and goat. Five new tests have been recently evaluated
(ID-Lelystad; Perkin-elmer, Prionics Check LIA, UCSF, Imperial college)
but it is too early to know which place they will take in the field.
Current tests allow a preclinical diagnosis of TSE, especially in sheep
and goats for which a very early detection is possible in peripheral
lymphoid tissues. However, to date, no test on living animal has been
validated. Taking into account the important number of research teams
now involved on this topic one may expect spectacular progress in the
forthcoming years. Mots clés: Encéphalopathies spongiformes subaiguës
transmissibles (ESSTs); Encéphalopathie spongiforme bovine; diagnostic
des ESSTs; tests rapides; ELISA; western-blot; anticorps anti-PrP
Keywords: Transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs); bovine
spongiform encephalopathy; diagnosis of TSEs; rapid tests; ELISA;
western-blot; anti-PrP antibodies Corresponding Author Contact
Information Auteur correspondent.
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6W8H-4DCD84V-1&_coverDate=05%2F31%2F2005&_alid=272857000&_rdoc=1&_fmt=&_orig=search&_qd=1&_cdi=6655&_sort=d&view=c&_acct=C000050221&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=10&md5=e550564d4bd0e589e21154c3b67bbc4c
TSS ############ https://www.lists.uni-karlsruhe.de/warc/bse-l.html
############

-------- Original Message --------
Subject: Discriminating BSE from Scrapie in sheep
Date: Sun, 1 May 2005 16:13:10 -0500
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
To: BSE-L@aegee.org

##################### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy #####################

Discriminating
BSE from scrapie
in sheep

A DISCRIMINATORY diagnostic kit to
distinguish between scrapie and BSE in
sheep has recently been launched by the
Veterinary Laboratories Agency (VLA).
DEFRA notes that EU legislation
requires that, from 2005, all samples
from small ruminants that are positive
for a TSE on rapid testing should be further
screened using an approved discriminatory
method. A small number
of methods have been evaluated and
approved. The method developed by
the VLA uses protein extraction and
Western blotting techniques to differentiate
between scrapie and BSE. The
new kit is a modified version of the
Prionics-Check technique and DEFRA
says it provides a cleaner, more defined
signal of the abnormal prion protein
profile for analysis.

http://veterinaryrecord.bvapublications.com/cgi/reprint/156/17/527-a

TSS

############ https://www.lists.uni-karlsruhe.de/warc/bse-l.html ############

WHY ELSE IS THE NIH NOW DESTROYING OUR LOVED
ONES BRAINS THAT WE STRAINED TO DONATE FOR SCIENCE? I will tell you why,
they know we are very very close
to strain typing and finding route and source of agent;

NIH sends mixed signals on CJD brains


By Steve Mitchell
Medical Correspondent

Washington, DC, Apr. 7 (UPI) --

Terry Singeltary, whose mother passed away from a type of CJD in 1997,
said the NIH should use the samples for scientific research, not just
store them in freezers.

Both Singeltary and Ewanitz said they would feel more reassured if Major
verified in writing the collection will not be destroyed.

"I would go further and ask Major what he plans to do with them,"
Singeltary said. "If the samples are just going to sit up there and go
bad, then they should give them out to researchers looking for cause and
cure."

snip...

http://washingtontimes.com/upi-breaking/20050407-110535-2570r.htm

United Press International: French woman may have had vCJD in 1971
... collection," said Terry Singeltary, who is associated with several
CJD patient
... died of a type of CJD called Heidenhain variant in 1997, told UPI. ...
www.upi.com/view.cfm?StoryID=20050323-061733-6847r - 11k - Cached
- Similar pages


United Press International: NIH may destroy human brain collection
... Terry Singeltary, whose mother died of a type of CJD called
Heidenhain ...
a lot of trouble to get these brain samples to the NIH," Singeltary
told UPI. ...
www.upi.com/view.cfm?StoryID=20050323-053919-8481r - 14k - Cached
- Similar pages


Groups seek to save NIH brain collection
... The NIH, as UPI reported last week, may destroy its collection of
brains and
... them is an outrage," Terry Singeltary, whose mom died of CJD in
1997, ...
www.sciencedaily.com/upi/index.php?feed=Science&
article=UPI-1-20050401-16375100-bc-us-nihbrains.xml - 44k - Cached
- Similar pages

Groups seek to save NIH brain collection - (United Press ...
... Singeltary's mother died of a type of CJD called Heidenhain variant
in 1997.
Hutchinson's office did not return a call from UPI. ...
washingtontimes.com/upi-breaking/ 20050401-033307-7296r.htm - 54k - Apr
11, 2005 - Cached
- Similar pages


French re-testing 1971 case for vCJD - (United Press International)
... Allied Countries Collaborative Study Group of CJD, wrote in an
e-mail to UPI.
... Singeltary, whose mother died of a type of CJD called the Heidenhain
...
www.washtimes.com/upi-breaking/ 20050331-095613-8807r.htm - 51k - Cached
- Similar pages


SouthAsiaNews.com - US health body to discard brain collection
... find a cure for the brain-wasting illness Creutzfeldt Jakob, reports
UPI. ...
Terry Singeltary, whose mother died of a type of CJD called Heidenhain ...
www.southasianews.com/showNews.asp?nid=1264 - 30k - Cached
- Similar pages


Mad Cow: Linked to thousands of CJD cases?


By Steve Mitchell
United Press International
Published 12/29/2003 9:50 AM

The U.S. government's monitoring system for cases of Creutzfeldt-Jakob
disease, a fatal human brain illness, could be missing tens of thousands
of victims, scientists and consumer advocates have told United Press
International. ...

http://www.upi.com/view.cfm?StoryID=20030721-102924-4786r


USDA vets question agency's mad cow lab

By Steve Mitchell
United Press International
Published 2/9/2004 7:06 PM

WASHINGTON, Feb. 9 (UPI) -- The federal laboratory in Ames, Iowa, that
conducts all of the nation's tests for mad cow disease has a history of
producing ambiguous and conflicting results -- to the point where many
federal meat inspectors have lost confidence in it, Department of
Agriculture veterinarians and a deer rancher told United Press
International.

The veterinarians also claim the facility -- part of the USDA and known
as the National Veterinary Services Laboratories -- has refused to
release testing results to them and has been so secretive some suspect
it is covering up additional mad cow cases. ...

http://www.upi.com/view.cfm?StoryID=20040209-061848-3665r


UPI Exclusive: No mad cow tests in Wash.

By Steve Mitchell
United Press International
Published 1/15/2004 2:46 PM

WASHINGTON, Jan. 15 (UPI) -- Federal agriculture officials did not test
any commercial cattle for mad cow disease through the first seven months
of 2003 in Washington state -- where the first U.S. case of the disease
was detected last month -- according to records obtained by United Press
International.

The U.S. Department of Agriculture's records of mad cow screenings,
conducted on 35,000 animals between 2001 to 2003, also reveal no animals
were tested for the past two years at Vern's Moses Lake Meats, the
Washington slaughterhouse where the mad cow case was first detected.

In addition, no mad cow tests were conducted during the two-year period
at any of the six federally registered slaughterhouses in Washington
state. This includes Washington's biggest slaughterhouse, Washington
Beef in Toppeni$h -- the 17th largest in the country, which slaughters
290,000 head per year -- and two facilities in Pasco that belong to
Tyson, the largest beef slaughtering company in the United States.

In 2002, nearly every test conducted in Washington was on animals from
Midway Meats in Centralia, the packing plant where Vern's Moses sent the
infected cow carcass. The meat was distributed to several states where
some people apparently consumed it, raising concerns about the
possibility of contracting the human equivalent of mad cow, an always
fatal, brain-wasting condition known as variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob
disease. ...

http://www.upi.com/view.cfm?StoryID=20040114-041124-1470r


Mad Cow: Prion research misguided?

By Steve Mitchell
United Press International
Published 12/29/2003 9:30 AM

http://www.upi.com/view.cfm?StoryID=20030701-094458-6348r


There will be several more emails of my research to follow.

I respectfully request a full inquiry into the cover-up of TSEs
in the United States of America over the past 30 years. I
would be happy to testify...

Thank you,
I am sincerely,

Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
P.O. Box 42
Bacliff, Texas USA 77518
281-559-3131


Docket No, 04-047-l Regulatory Identification No. (RIN) 091O-AF46 NEW
BSE SAFEGUARDS (comment submission)

https://web01.aphis.usda.gov/regpublic.nsf/0/eff9eff1f7c5cf2b87256ecf000df08d?OpenDocument

Docket No. 03-080-1 -- USDA ISSUES PROPOSED RULE TO ALLOW LIVE ANIMAL
IMPORTS FROM CANADA


https://web01.aphis.usda.gov/BSEcom.nsf/0/b78ba677e2b0c12185256dd300649f9d?OpenDocument&AutoFramed


Docket No. 2003N-0312 Animal Feed Safety System [TSS SUBMISSION]

http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/03n0312/03N-0312_emc-000001.txt

Docket Management Docket: 02N-0273 - Substances Prohibited From Use in

Animal Food or Feed; Animal Proteins Prohibited in Ruminant Feed

Comment Number: EC -10

Accepted - Volume 2


http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/03/Jan03/012403/8004be07.html

PART 2


http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/03/Jan03/012403/8004be09.html

PDF]Freas, William TSS SUBMISSION

File Format: PDF/Adobe Acrobat -

Page 1. J Freas, William From: Sent: To: Subject: Terry S. Singeltary

Sr. [flounder@wt.net] Monday, January 08,200l 3:03 PM freas ...

http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/01/slides/3681s2_09.pdf

Asante/Collinge et al, that BSE transmission to the 129-methionine

genotype can lead to an alternate phenotype that is indistinguishable

from type 2 PrPSc, the commonest _sporadic_ CJD;

http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/03/slides/3923s1_OPH.htm

Docket Management Docket: 96N-0417 - Current Good Manufacturing Practice
in Manufacturing, Packing, or Holding Dietary Ingredients a
Comment Number: EC -2
Accepted - Volume 7

http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/03/Mar03/031403/96N-0417-EC-2.htm


[PDF] Appendices to PL107-9 Inter-agency Working Group Final Report 1-1
File Format: PDF/Adobe Acrobat - View as HTML
Agent, Weapons of Mass Destruction Operations Unit Federal Bureau of
those who provided comments in response to Docket No. ...
Meager 8/18/01 Terry S. Singeltary Sr ...


www.aphis.usda.gov/lpa/pubs/pubs/PL107-9_Appen.pdf

Docket No. 2003N-0312 Animal Feed Safety System [TSS SUBMISSION
TO DOCKET 2003N-0312]

http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/03n0312/03N-0312_emc-000001.txt

# Docket No: 02-088-1 RE-Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of
2002; [TSS SUBMISSION ON POTENTIAL FOR BSE/TSE & FMD 'SUITCASE BOMBS'] -
TSS 1/27/03 (0)

Docket Management

Docket: 02N-0276 - Bioterrorism Preparedness; Registration of Food Facilities, Section 305
Comment Number: EC-254 [TSS SUBMISSION]

http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/02n0276/02N-0276-EC-254.htm


Dockets Entered On October 2, 2003 Table of Contents, Docket #,
Title, 1978N-0301,

OTC External Analgesic Drug Products, ... EMC 7, Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
Vol #: 1, ...

www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/03/oct03/100203/100203.htm


Daily Dockets Entered on 02/05/03

DOCKETS ENTERED on 2/5/03. ... EMC 4 Terry S. Singeltary Sr. Vol#: 2.
... Vol#: 1.

03N-0009 Federal Preemption of State & Local Medical Device Requireme. ...


www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/03/Feb03/020503/020503.htm


Docket Management

Docket: 02N-0370 - Neurological Devices; Classification of Human Dura Mater

Comment Number: EC -1

Accepted - Volume 1


http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/03/Jan03/012403/8004be11.html


http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/03/Jan03/012403/8004bdfe.html


http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/03/Jan03/012403/8004bdfc.html


Daily Dockets - 04/10/03

... 00D-1662 Use of Xenotransplantation Products in Humans.
EMC 98 Terry S. Singeltary Sr. Vol#: 3. 01F ...
www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/03/Apr03/041003/041003.htm - 05-20-2003
- Cached


2003D-0186
Guidance for Industry: Use of Material From Deer and Elk In Animal Feed


EMC 1
Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
Vol #:
1

http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/03/Jun03/060903/060903.htm


2003D-0186
Guidance for Industry: Use of Material From Deer and Elk In Animal Feed


EMC 7
Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
Vol #:
1

2003D-0186
Guidance for Industry: Use of Material From Deer and Elk In Animal Feed


EMC 7
Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
Vol #:
1


http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/03/oct03/100203/100203.htm

01N-0423 Substances Prohibited from use in animal food/Feed Ruminant

APE 5 National Renderers Association, Inc. Vol#: 2

APE 6 Animal Protein Producers Industry Vol#: 2

APE 7 Darling International Inc. Vol#: 2

EMC 1 Terry S. Singeltary Sr. Vol#: 3

http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/01/Oct01/101501/101501.htm

Send Post-Publication Peer Review to journal:


Re: RE-Monitoring the occurrence of emerging forms of Creutzfeldt-Jakob

disease in the United States


Email Terry S. Singeltary:


flounder@wt.net

I lost my mother to hvCJD (Heidenhain Variant CJD). I would like to

comment on the CDC's attempts to monitor the occurrence of emerging

forms of CJD. Asante, Collinge et al [1] have reported that BSE

transmission to the 129-methionine genotype can lead to an alternate

phenotype that is indistinguishable from type 2 PrPSc, the commonest

sporadic CJD. However, CJD and all human TSEs are not reportable

nationally. CJD and all human TSEs must be made reportable in every

state and internationally. I hope that the CDC does not continue to

expect us to still believe that the 85%+ of all CJD cases which are

sporadic are all spontaneous, without route/source. We have many TSEs in

the USA in both animal and man. CWD in deer/elk is spreading rapidly and

CWD does transmit to mink, ferret, cattle, and squirrel monkey by

intracerebral inoculation. With the known incubation periods in other

TSEs, oral transmission studies of CWD may take much longer. Every

victim/family of CJD/TSEs should be asked about route and source of this

agent. To prolong this will only spread the agent and needlessly expose

others. In light of the findings of Asante and Collinge et al, there

should be drastic measures to safeguard the medical and surgical arena

from sporadic CJDs and all human TSEs. I only ponder how many sporadic

CJDs in the USA are type 2 PrPSc?


http://www.neurology.org/cgi/eletters/60/2/176#535

LANCET INFECTIOUS DISEASE JOURNAL


Volume 3, Number 8 01 August 2003


Newsdesk


Tracking spongiform encephalopathies in North America


Xavier Bosch

My name is Terry S Singeltary Sr, and I live in Bacliff, Texas. I lost

my mom to hvCJD (Heidenhain variant CJD) and have been searching for

answers ever since. What I have found is that we have not been told the

truth. CWD in deer and elk is a small portion of a much bigger problem.


49-year-old Singeltary is one of a number of people who have remained

largely unsatisfied after being told that a close relative died from a

rapidly progressive dementia compatible with spontaneous

Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD). So he decided to gather hundreds of

documents on transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSE) and

realised that if Britons could get variant CJD from bovine spongiform

encephalopathy (BSE), Americans might get a similar disorder from

chronic wasting disease (CWD)the relative of mad cow disease seen among

deer and elk in the USA. Although his feverish search did not lead him

to the smoking gun linking CWD to a similar disease in North American

people, it did uncover a largely disappointing situation.


Singeltary was greatly demoralised at the few attempts to monitor the

occurrence of CJD and CWD in the USA. Only a few states have made CJD

reportable. Human and animal TSEs should be reportable nationwide and

internationally, he complained in a letter to the Journal of the

American Medical Association (JAMA 2003; 285: 733). I hope that the CDC

does not continue to expect us to still believe that the 85% plus of all

CJD cases which are sporadic are all spontaneous, without route or source.


Until recently, CWD was thought to be confined to the wild in a small

region in Colorado. But since early 2002, it has been reported in other

areas, including Wisconsin, South Dakota, and the Canadian province of

Saskatchewan. Indeed, the occurrence of CWD in states that were not

endemic previously increased concern about a widespread outbreak and

possible transmission to people and cattle.


To date, experimental studies have proven that the CWD agent can be

transmitted to cattle by intracerebral inoculation and that it can cross

the mucous membranes of the digestive tract to initiate infection in

lymphoid tissue before invasion of the central nervous system. Yet the

plausibility of CWD spreading to people has remained elusive.


Part of the problem seems to stem from the US surveillance system. CJD

is only reported in those areas known to be endemic foci of CWD.

Moreover, US authorities have been criticised for not having performed

enough prionic tests in farm deer and elk.


Although in November last year the US Food and Drug Administration

issued a directive to state public-health and agriculture officials

prohibiting material from CWD-positive animals from being used as an

ingredient in feed for any animal species, epidemiological control and

research in the USA has been quite different from the situation in the

UK and Europe regarding BSE.


Getting data on TSEs in the USA from the government is like pulling

teeth, Singeltary argues. You get it when they want you to have it,

and only what they want you to have.


Norman Foster, director of the Cognitive Disorders Clinic at the

University of Michigan (Ann Arbor, MI, USA), says that current

surveillance of prion disease in people in the USA is inadequate to

detect whether CWD is occurring in human beings; adding that, the

cases that we know about are reassuring, because they do not suggest the

appearance of a new variant of CJD in the USA or atypical features in

patients that might be exposed to CWD. However, until we establish a

system that identifies and analyses a high proportion of suspected prion

disease cases we will not know for sure. The USA should develop a

system modelled on that established in the UK, he points out.

Ali Samii, a neurologist at Seattle VA Medical Center who recently

reported the cases of three hunterstwo of whom were friendswho died

from pathologically confirmed CJD, says that at present there are

insufficient data to claim transmission of CWD into humans; adding that

[only] by asking [the questions of venison consumption and deer/elk

hunting] in every case can we collect suspect cases and look into the

plausibility of transmission further. Samii argues that by making both

doctors and hunters more aware of the possibility of prions spreading

through eating venison, doctors treating hunters with dementia can

consider a possible prion disease, and doctors treating CJD patients

will know to ask whether they ate venison.


CDC spokesman Ermias Belay says that the CDC will not be investigating

the [Samii] cases because there is no evidence that the men ate

CWD-infected meat. He notes that although the likelihood of CWD

jumping the species barrier to infect humans cannot be ruled out 100%

and that [we] cannot be 100% sure that CWD does not exist in humans&

the data seeking evidence of CWD transmission to humans have been very

limited.


http://infection.thelancet.com/journal/journal.isa


he complained in a letter to the Journal of the American Medical

Association (JAMA 2003; 285: 733). I hope that the CDC does not

continue to expect us to still believe that the 85% plus of all CJD

cases which are sporadic are all spontaneous, without route or source.<<<

actually, that quote was from a more recent article in the Journal of

Neurology (see below), not the JAMA article...

Full Text

Diagnosis and Reporting of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease

Singeltary, Sr et al. JAMA.2001; 285: 733-734.

http://jama.ama-assn.org/cgi/content/full/285/6/733?maxtoshow=&HITS=10&hits=10&RESULTFORMAT=&fulltext=dignosing+and+reporting+creutzfeldt+jakob+disease&searchid=1048865596978_1528&stored_search=&FIRSTINDEX=0&journalcode=jama

BRITISH MEDICAL JOURNAL

SOMETHING TO CHEW ON

BMJ

http://www.bmj.com/cgi/eletters/319/7220/1312/b#EL2

BMJ

http://www.bmj.com/cgi/eletters/320/7226/8/b#EL1

THE PATHOLOGICAL PROTEIN

BY Philip Yam

Yam Philip Yam News Editor Scientific American www.sciam.com
http://www.thepathologicalprotein.com/

IN light of Asante/Collinge et al findings that BSE transmission to the
129-methionine genotype can lead to an alternate phenotype that is
indistinguishable from type 2 PrPSc, the commonest _sporadic_ CJD;

-------- Original Message -------- Subject: re-BSE prions propagate as

either variant CJD-like or sporadic CJD Date: Thu, 28 Nov 2002 10:23:43

-0000 From: "Asante, Emmanuel A" To:
"'flounder@wt.net'"

Dear Terry,

I have been asked by Professor Collinge to respond to your request. I am

a Senior Scientist in the MRC Prion Unit and the lead author on the

paper. I have attached a pdf copy of the paper for your attention. Thank

you for your interest in the paper.

In respect of your first question, the simple answer is, yes. As you

will find in the paper, we have managed to associate the alternate

phenotype to type 2 PrPSc, the commonest sporadic CJD.

It is too early to be able to claim any further sub-classification in

respect of Heidenhain variant CJD or Vicky Rimmer's version. It will

take further studies, which are on-going, to establish if there are

sub-types to our initial finding which we are now reporting. The main

point of the paper is that, as well as leading to the expected new

variant CJD phenotype, BSE transmission to the 129-methionine genotype

can lead to an alternate phenotype which is indistinguishable from type

2 PrPSc.

I hope reading the paper will enlighten you more on the subject. If I

can be of any further assistance please to not hesitate to ask. Best wishes.

Emmanuel Asante

<> ____________________________________

Dr. Emmanuel A Asante MRC Prion Unit & Neurogenetics Dept. Imperial

College School of Medicine (St. Mary's) Norfolk Place, LONDON W2 1PG

Tel: +44 (0)20 7594 3794 Fax: +44 (0)20 7706 3272 email:

e.asante@ic.ac.uk (until 9/12/02)

New e-mail: e.asante@prion.ucl.ac.uk (active from now)

____________________________________

snip...

full text ;

http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/03/slides/3923s1_OPH.htm


AND the new findings of BASE in cattle in Italy of Identification of a
second bovine amyloidotic spongiform encephalopathy: Molecular
similarities with sporadic

Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease


http://www.pnas.org/cgi/content/abstract/0305777101v1


Adaptation of the bovine spongiform encephalopathy agent to primates
and comparison with Creutzfeldt- Jakob disease: Implications for
human health

THE findings from Corinne Ida Lasmézas*, [dagger] , Jean-Guy Fournier*,
Virginie Nouvel*,

Hermann Boe*, Domíníque Marcé*, François Lamoury*, Nicolas Kopp [Dagger

] , Jean-Jacques Hauw§, James Ironside¶, Moira Bruce [||] , Dominique

Dormont*, and Jean-Philippe Deslys* et al, that The agent responsible
for French iatrogenic growth hormone-linked CJD taken as a control is
very different from vCJD but is similar to that found in one case of
sporadic CJD and one sheep scrapie isolate;

http://www.pnas.org/cgi/content/full/041490898v1

Characterization of two distinct prion strains
derived from bovine spongiform encephalopathy
transmissions to inbred mice

http://vir.sgmjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/85/8/2471


ALL animals for human/animal consumption must be tested for TSE.

ALL human TSE must be made reportable Nationally and Internationally,
of ALL AGES...TSS


Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
P.O. Box 42
Bacliff, Texas USA 77518
281-xxx-xxxx


TSS


----- Original Message -----
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
To:
Sent: Sunday, June 12, 2005 5:09 PM
Subject: Re: Transcript of Tele-News Conference with Agriculture Secretary Mike Johanns and Dr. John Clifford, Regarding further analysis of BSE Inconclusive Test Results


> ##################### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy #####################
>
> Release No. 0207.05
> Contact:
> USDA Press Office (202)720-4623
>
>
> Transcript of Tele-News Conference with Agriculture Secretary Mike Johanns
> and Dr. John Clifford, Chief Veterinary Officer, Animal Plant Health
> Inspection Service Regarding further analysis of BSE Inconclusive Test
> Results Washington, D.C.
> June 10, 2005
>
>
> snip...
>
>
> DR. CLIFFORD: "Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
>
>
> snip...
>
>
> http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/!ut/p/_s.7_0_A/7_0_1OB?contentidonly=true&con
> tentid=2005/06/0207.xml
>
>
> >>>"In addition, there are definite differences between these two tests. The
> IHC is internationally recognized, and why we chose that for our enhanced
> surveillance program is because that particular test does two things. It
> allows you to visualize the anatomic location where the lesions are most
> likely to be found which is the obex. At the same time it uses a staining
> technique on the prions, on abnormal prions in the tissue in that location.
> ...<<<
>
>
> ANOTHER reason is by only looking at one portion of the brain, you miss the
> rest of the brain that could be potentally infected. kinda like a 1 in 10
> chance of finding
> something. but this is par for the course with these folks....TSS
>
>
> USDA 2003
>
> We have to be careful that we don't get so set in the way we do things that
> we
> forget to look for different emerging variations of disease. We've gotten
> away from collecting the whole brain in our systems. We're using the brain
> stem and we're looking in only one area. In Norway, they were doing a
> project and looking at cases of Scrapie, and they found this where they did
> not find lesions or PRP in the area of the obex. They found it in the
> cerebellum and the cerebrum. It's a good lesson for us. Ames had to go
> back and change the procedure for looking at Scrapie samples. In the USDA,
> we had routinely looked at all the sections of the brain, and then we got
> away from it. They've recently gone back.
> Dr. Keller: Tissues are routinely tested, based on which tissue provides an
> 'official' test result as recognized by APHIS
> .
>
> Dr. Detwiler: That's on the slaughter. But on the clinical cases, aren't
> they still asking for the brain? But even on the slaughter, they're looking
> only at the brainstem. We may be missing certain things if we confine
> ourselves to one area.
>
>
> snip.............
>
>
> Dr. Detwiler: It seems a good idea, but I'm not aware of it.
> Another important thing to get across to the public is that the negatives
> do not guarantee absence of infectivity. The animal could be early in the
> disease and the incubation period. Even sample collection is so important.
> If you're not collecting the right area of the brain in sheep, or if
> collecting lymphoreticular tissue, and you don't get a good biopsy, you
> could miss the area with the PRP in it and come up with a negative test.
> There's a new, unusual form of Scrapie that's been detected in Norway. We
> have to be careful that we don't get so set in the way we do things that we
> forget to look for different emerging variations of disease. We've gotten
> away from collecting the whole brain in our systems. We're using the brain
> stem and we're looking in only one area. In Norway, they were doing a
> project and looking at cases of Scrapie, and they found this where they did
> not find lesions or PRP in the area of the obex. They found it in the
> cerebellum and the cerebrum. It's a good lesson for us. Ames had to go
> back and change the procedure for looking at Scrapie samples. In the USDA,
> we had routinely looked at all the sections of the brain, and then we got
> away from it. They've recently gone back.
>
> Dr. Keller: Tissues are routinely tested, based on which tissue provides an
> 'official' test result as recognized by APHIS
> .
>
> Dr. Detwiler: That's on the slaughter. But on the clinical cases, aren't
> they still asking for the brain? But even on the slaughter, they're looking
> only at the brainstem. We may be missing certain things if we confine
> ourselves to one area.
>
>
> snip...
>
>
> FULL TEXT;
>
>
> Completely Edited Version
> PRION ROUNDTABLE
>
>
> Accomplished this day, Wednesday, December 11, 2003, Denver, Colorado
>
>
> http://www.vegsource.com/talk/madcow/messages/94543.html
>
>
> TSS
>
>
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
> To:
> Sent: Saturday, June 11, 2005 3:33 PM
> Subject: Re: Transcript of Tele-News Conference with Agriculture Secretary
> Mike Johanns and Dr. John Clifford, Regarding further analysis of BSE
> Inconclusive Test Results
>
>
> > ##################### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
> #####################
> >
> > Release No. 0207.05
> > Contact:
> > USDA Press Office (202)720-4623
> >
> >
> >
> > Transcript of Tele-News Conference with Agriculture Secretary Mike Johanns
> > and Dr. John Clifford, Chief Veterinary Officer, Animal Plant Health
> > Inspection Service Regarding further analysis of BSE Inconclusive Test
> > Results Washington, D.C.
> >
> > June 10, 2005
> >
> > MR. ED LOYD: "Good evening, everyone, and thank you for joining us late on
> a
> > Friday evening. I certainly appreciate your getting on with us on such
> short
> > notice for an update of our BSE surveillance. Just so you know, our format
> > tonight we're going to have Agriculture Secretary Mike Johanns is going to
> > make a brief introductory statement, followed by Dr. John Clifford, the
> > chief veterinary officer of the APHIS, the Animal Plant Health Inspection
> > Service, who will go into some more technical background.
> >
> > "With that, I will turn this over to Agriculture Secretary Mike Johanns."
> >
> > SEC. JOHANNS: "Well, good evening everyone, and let me also just express
> my
> > appreciation for your willingness to join us tonight. As you know, over
> the
> > past many months we have been working on a number of fronts relative to
> BSE.
> >
> > "Most recently we had a roundtable discussion in St. Paul yesterday where
> > literally all players with a variety of opinions participated. It went
> very,
> > very well. We've been working with our rulemaking process and the
> government
> > of Canada to reopen Canada to their exports into our country of beef.
> >
> > "We have also been working very aggressively and diligently with a number
> of
> > countries around the world, most notably, of course, Japan and Korea.
> >
> > "And as you know, now nearly a year ago or maybe even more than a year ago
> > we started a very aggressive surveillance system. During that surveillance
> > process we have had three inconclusives on rapid tests. It's a rapid test
> > that is done, and there were three inconclusives.
> >
> > "Each was then followed up with an IHC test. Each confirmatory IHC test
> was
> > negative. The Inspector General, in reviewing our surveillance system that
> > we have in place, decided to retest with a second confirmatory test which
> is
> > called the Western Blot. We have received test results showing a positive
> on
> > one animal for the Western Blot.
> >
> > "I would like to make a couple of points, and then I'll ask Dr. Clifford
> to
> > offer some thoughts.
> >
> > "Number two, the firewalls that the USDA put in place did work. As I point
> > out, the animal did not enter the food or the feed chain. Therefore,
> there's
> > no risk to human health.
> >
> > "The third point is that I feel very strongly that this information should
> > not impact our discussions with Japan, Korea or Canada.
> >
> > "The fourth point that I want to make is that the test was also done, the
> > Western Blot test, on the two other animals and those test results were
> > negative.
> >
> > "With that, I would like Dr. Clifford to speak about the test, and he'll
> > take it from here. And then when he's finished, we'll go ahead and open it
> > up to your questions."
> >
> > DR. CLIFFORD: "Thank you, Mr. Secretary. And thanks everyone for being on
> > the phone tonight.
> >
> > "Since the USDA enhanced surveillance program for BSE began in June 2004
> > more than 375,000 animals from the targeted cattle population have been
> > tested for BSE using a rapid test. Three of these animals tested
> > inconclusive and were subsequently subjected to the immunohistochemistry
> > (IHC) testing. The IHC is an internationally recognized confirmatory test
> > for BSE. All three inconclusive samples tested negative using the IHC
> test.
> >
> > "As the Secretary said earlier this week, USDA's Office of Inspector
> General
> > which has been partnering with APHIS, FSIS and ARS, the Agriculture
> Research
> > Service, by impartially reviewing BSE-related activities and making
> > recommendations for improvement, recommended that all three of these
> samples
> > be subjected to a second internationally recognized confirmatory test, the
> > Western Blot.
> >
> > "We received final results a short time ago. As the Secretary stated, of
> the
> > three samples two were negative, but the third came back reactive on that
> > test.
> >
> > "Because of the conflicting results on the IHC and Western Blot test, a
> > sample from this animal will be sent to the OIE recognized reference
> > laboratory for BSE in Weybridge, England. USDA will also be conducting
> > further testing which will take several days to complete.
> >
> > "Regardless of the outcome, it is critical to note that USDA has in place
> a
> > sound system of interlocking safeguards to protect human and animal health
> > from BSE including most significantly a ban on specified risk materials
> from
> > the human food supply. In the case of this animal, it was a nonambulatory
> > downer animal and as such was banned from the food supply. It was taken to
> a
> > facility that handles only animals unsuitable for human consumption, and
> the
> > carcass was incinerated.
> >
> > "USDA's enhanced surveillance program is designed to provide information
> > about the level of prevalence of BSE in the United States. Since the
> > inception of this program we have fully anticipated the possibility that
> > additional cases of BSE would be found. And in fact, we are extremely
> > gratified that to date more than 375,000 animals have been tested for the
> > disease, and with the exception of this conflicting result we received for
> > this one animal all have ultimately proven to be negative for the disease.
>
> >
> > "USDA is committed to ensuring that our BSE program is the best that it
> can
> > be, keeping pace with science and international guidelines, and to
> > considering recommendations made by OIG and others in this regard.
> >
> > "We are committed to ensuring that we have the right protocols in place,
> > ones that are solely grounded in science and consistently followed.
> >
> > "After we receive additional test results on this animal, we will
> determine
> > what further steps need to be taken and what changes if any are warranted
> in
> > our surveillance program."
> >
> > MR. LOYD: "With that, Operator, we would open this up to some questions."
> >
> > OPERATOR: "Once again if you do want to ask a question at this time please
> > press *1 on your touchtone phone, and you must record your name. It will
> be
> > just a moment for the first question. The first question comes from Jeff
> > Nalley. Your line is open."
> >
> > REPORTER: "Mr. Secretary and Mr. Veterinarian this is Jeff Nalley. We're
> > broadcasting from Owens Brook, Kentucky, this evening. I'll share with
> you;
> > we got the news from the USDA while we were in a restaurant, an
> > all-you-can-eat steak buffet. So I'm having seconds just to show our
> > confidence.
> >
> > "But how can you give credence to what has been said before that this is a
> > beef issue and not a human issue and something that we have well in hand
> > certainly within the OIE standards?"
> >
> > SEC. JOHANNS: "Well, we have the best example I could possibly give
> tonight,
> > and that example is this. We've tested 375,000 animals so far. Even with
> > this one animal, we tested the three that on the rapid test showed a
> > positive and the original test showed negative. We went, the IHC test-- we
> > went from there even an additional step. We have two negatives and this
> > third test we can point to the fact that our firewalls work. This animal
> was
> > a downer animal. It did not get in the food or the feed chain. There just
> is
> > no risk whatsoever.
> >
> > "Enjoy beef. I'm going to do exactly what you're doing tonight. I'm going
> to
> > enjoy a good steak. There just simply is not a risk here, and we want to
> > illustrate, which I believe we have done by even exceeding what's
> required.
> > We have gone well beyond any standard that is out there to illustrate the
> > safety of this herd. And it is a safe beef product; there's just no doubt
> > about it."
> >
> > MR. LOYD: "Could we have the next question, please"
> >
> > OPERATOR: "The next question comes from Peter Shinn. Your line is open."
> >
> > REPORTER: "Yes, good evening. This is Peter Shinn from the National
> > Association of Farm Broadcasters.
> >
> > "Mr. Secretary, I don't mean to ask a difficult question, but it just
> > immediately comes to mind. What exactly happened in terms of how could you
> > have gotten it not right the first time? And what's the difference between
> > the IHC and the Western Blot? That might be a question for Dr. Clifford."
> >
> > SEC. JOHANNS: "Yeah. I'll ask Dr. Clifford to get in. It's not really a
> > question of not getting it right. They are, both tests are accepted by the
> > OIE. Both tests if you use those, they are accepted under the standard. So
> > it's not a question of getting it right. All of the protocols were
> followed.
> > We had the positive and the rapid response test, the IHC test was applied
> > according to the protocols, and that is the test that has been used in the
> > United States.
> >
> > "And so it's not a situation where you've got one test that isn't accepted
> > and one that is. They both are accepted. There are differences in the
> tests,
> > and I'll let Dr. Clifford explain that.
> >
> > "And maybe, Dr. Clifford, you can even explain if you would just what this
> > test showed and how you went about getting through the testing process."
> >
> > DR. CLIFFORD: "Thank you, Mr. Secretary. And yes, we're confident in the
> > results of actually both of these tests. The IHC was negative for this
> > sample. Actually the Western Blot test, if you go back to the December cow
> > that was found from Canada the Western Blot that was run on that
> particular
> > sample we used one milligram of tissue to run that test and was found to
> be
> > a very strong positive.
> >
> > "In order to find a positive in this particular case with this Western
> Blot,
> > they had to enhance or enrich it, in which that basically means you're
> > concentrating the abnormal protein. So they had to use 20 times the
> amount.
> > You would have to use about 20 times the amount of tissue for this to
> > determine to be a positive or reactive on the Western Blot versus the one
> > that was discovered in December in the state of Washington.
> >
> > "In addition, there are definite differences between these two tests. The
> > IHC is internationally recognized, and why we chose that for our enhanced
> > surveillance program is because that particular test does two things. It
> > allows you to visualize the anatomic location where the lesions are most
> > likely to be found which is the obex. At the same time it uses a staining
> > technique on the prions, on abnormal prions in the tissue in that
> location.
> >
> > "So that's what the IHC does.
> >
> > "In the Western Blot case, it's actually a homogenate (sp) of a sample of
> > brain tissue that is centrifuged and they concentrate the prion protein
> and
> > then they use a protease to destroy the normal protein, leaving the
> abnormal
> > protein present. And then basically that is run through a gel-type
> > separation using specific antibodies that will give you bands.
> >
> > "And they look at those bands and the molecular weight of those bands to
> > determine the outcome of that test.
> >
> > "So this test would actually be referred to as a weak positive test in
> this
> > case for the Western Blot, and as a result of that and the unusualness of
> > this case it's going to require additional testing before we can confirm
> one
> > way or another whether this is truly BSE or not."
> >
> > SEC. JOHANNS: "Doctor, somebody's going to ask you this so let me just ask
> > it. When you say "weak positive," it would be helpful if you could
> describe
> > what you mean by that."
> >
> > DR. CLIFFORD: "What we mean by "weak positive," Mr. Secretary, is going
> back
> > to the original case. It required and enrichment of these and a greater
> > amount of normal tissue in order to enhance this outcome. So in order to
> > find the abnormal protein present you had to use more material and
> > concentrate it."
> >
> > SEC. JOHANNS: "Okay, thank you. That's very helpful. We'll take the next
> > question."
> >
> > OPERATOR: "The next question will come from Joe Pelka (sp). Your line is
> > open.
> >
> > REPORTER: "Hi. Good evening, gentlemen. I actually have three questions. I
> > think I can state them succinctly. First of all, why did the IG ask for a
> > retest in this case? What do you expect they'll do differently at
> Weybridge
> > that they do from Ames, Iowa, in the IHC testing? And which cow of the
> three
> > or which animal of the three that had the earlier positives are we looking
> > at tonight?
> >
> > SEC. JOHANNS: "I'll answer the first one just as best as I can, and then
> > Doctor, I'll just queue you up that I'll ask you to answer the final two.
> >
> > "The IG has been looking at the surveillance. As you know, we've tested
> now
> > 375,000 animals, and Secretary Veneman wanted to be sure that we were
> > touching the right places-- regions of the country and etcetera to make
> sure
> > that when that surveillance was done we were satisfied that we got a good
> > surveillance of the herd.
> >
> > "Again, keep in mind that was a surveillance effort; it was never
> portrayed
> > to be a food safety approach.
> >
> > "In that effort I believe that the IG decided just to make sure that all
> the
> > bases were touched that this additional testing should be done. So go
> ahead,
> > Doctor."
> >
> > DR. CLIFFORD: "Thank you, Mr. Secretary. The reason we're sending this to
> > Weybridge is because we feel this is an unusual case, and we'd like to
> have
> > the assistance of an internationally recognized laboratory for BSE.
> >
> > "The inconclusive that we're referring to here is the one that we gave
> > notification of in November of 2004. I think it was actually November 15,
> > 2004. With regards to the OIG's recommendation, I think that
> recommendation
> > was based upon a strong reaction on the biorad test and the negative IHC,
> > and in order for us to try to resolve those discrepancies that have been
> > raised relative to that."
> >
> > SEC. JOHANNS: "Okay, great. Next question?"
> >
> > REPORTER: "Hi. It's Elizabeth Weiss. I'm beginning to think I should never
> > go on vacation because every time I do there's a case of BSE. I'm San
> Diego,
> > and I don't have any of my files. But I'm working from memory here.
> >
> > "The November case, was that the Texas cow? If it was -"
> >
> > SEC. JOHANNS: "You know, Elizabeth, I don't believe the USDA ever talked
> > about location."
> >
> > REPORTER: "I presume when you start doing trace back though for this
> animal
> > you will be then talking about the location?"
> >
> > SEC. JOHANNS: "You know, I haven't even gotten that far down the road. I
> > just wanted to get the information out there as quickly as we had it. So."
> >
> > REPORTER: "Okay. And the other question I have -- I'm sorry."
> >
> > SEC. JOHANNS: "We had not, we're not that far down the road in terms of
> what
> > that would be about. We just simply wanted to get the information out to
> you
> > folks as quickly as we had it."
> >
> > REPORTER: "And we appreciate that, especially those of us who don't
> publish
> > until Monday.
> >
> > "A further question, at the time of that test I talked to a lot of people
> > internationally and actually spoke to the scientist who developed the
> > immunohistochemistry test, and he said while his test was state of the art
> > when it was first developed he now considers it as he put it more art than
> > science. And so I'm wondering, is USDA considering switching to one of the
> > newer tests, say the one that Prusinger's Lab has created, something
> that's
> > got a low false positive but is perhaps a more sensitive test because
> Europe
> > thinks we've kind of outgrown the immunohistochemistry test.
> >
> > SEC. JOHANNS: "Yes. You talk about the curiosity of timing; it just so
> > happened that today I was touring our Ames laboratory facility in Ames,
> > Iowa. And that had been set up well before this was an issue, and I just
> > wanted to see how they were doing there. And I talked to many of the
> > scientists that are involved in our BSE research, and I talked about the
> > tests. And I probed very extensively about both tests being accepted under
> > OIE standards.
> >
> > "I believe at the risk of talking for scientists that you'd get a pretty
> > lively debate about what test is best, under what circumstances is it
> best.
> >
> > "I do know this, that the IHC test is recognized by the OIE. It's an
> > accepted test. It's a test that we have employed and we're not alone.
> Other
> > parts of the world do.
> >
> > "We would never make a decision about changing protocol in a knee-jerk
> sort
> > of way. We would certainly want to debate that. We would want to get a lot
> > of good scientific analysis. So it's not something that we would do just
> > very, very quickly. It's something I'd want very, very cautious, careful
> > consideration about because there are some who say, 'No the IHC is where
> you
> > want to be.'
> >
> > "So like I said, at the risk of talking for scientists I think you could
> get
> > a pretty lively debate on your question.
> >
> > "Doctor, do you want to offer anything to that?"
> >
> > DR. CLIFFORD: "I just would like to add one thing, Mr. Secretary, or a
> > couple of things. Again, to reiterate, we do not, we have not confirmed a
> > case of BSE in the U.S. at this time. We're going to do further analysis
> and
> > study on this.
> >
> > "I'd also like to state for the audience, there is such a thing in Europe
> > that is called "atypical BSE" about which there's a lot of information and
> > data that is still needed out there. And in those particular cases, you
> have
> > in some cases; you had where IHC has been negative and a Western Blot been
> > positive.
> >
> > "In addition with regards to the epidemiology, we have preliminary already
> > done some preliminary epidemiology back when the first inconclusive was
> > first announced, and we'll be ready to perform that as necessary."
> >
> > MR. LOYD: "Operator, next question, please?"
> >
> > OPERATOR: "The next question comes from Libby Quaid. Your line is open."
> >
> > REPORTER: "Thank you. Could you go into a little bit more on what test you
> > expect will now be performed and when you expect to know for sure whether
> > this was a positive or a negative test?"
> >
> > SEC. JOHANNS: "Go ahead, Doctor."
> >
> > DR. CLIFFORD: "Actually what I'd like to do is to provide that
> > information -- our scientists are working in the Agriculture Research
> > Service and APHIS in our National Veterinary Services Lab, and they'll
> also
> > be discussing this with the scientists at Weybridge, and they'll be
> > developing a protocol early next week and procedures for further testing."
> >
> > SEC. JOHANNS: "Next question?"
> >
> > OPERATOR: "The next question comes from Ken Root. Your line is open."
> >
> > REPORTER: "Yes. Mr. Secretary, was this a native-born U.S. cow?"
> >
> > SEC. JOHANNS: "Has that been -- that dates back to before I got to the
> USDA.
> > Doctor, do you know if that's been released?"
> >
> > DR. CLIFFORD: "Actually, Mr. Secretary, it has not. What I can say though
> is
> > that at this time we would have no information that it was an imported
> > animal; also that the animal was an aged animal. It was getting up in age
> > and was a beef breed. That's what we're willing to release at this time."
> >
> > REPORTER: "Okay, great. Thank you."
> >
> > SEC. JOHANNS: "Next question?"
> >
> > OPERATOR: "The next question comes from Anita Manning. Your line is open?"
> >
> > REPORTER: "Oh, my questions have been answered. Thank you."
> >
> > SEC. JOHANNS: "Okay, thank you, Anita."
> >
> > OPERATOR: "Next question comes from Dan Goldstein. Your line is open."
> >
> > REPORTER: "Yeah. Hi. It's Dan Goldstein. Two questions, one for Dr.
> Clifford
> > and one for the Secretary. Mr. Secretary, first of all, does this somewhat
> > do you think may shake the confidence of the international community, one,
> > in the ability of the Ames Laboratory and, two, also the efficacy of the
> IHC
> > test?
> >
> > "And then also for Dr. Clifford, what does this mean in terms of the
> > protocols? Will you now have to go back and perhaps test more animals with
> > Western Blot tests?"
> >
> > SEC. JOHANNS: "Let me address the question about the Ames Laboratory, and
> > I'm sure the doctor will want to offer a thought also.
> >
> > "One of the things we are very, very proud of is that Ames laboratory.
> They
> > do great work there, and again I remind everybody that the IHC test is an
> > internationally accepted test. And that comes from the OIE, and like I
> said
> > even amongst scientists you would get debate about the test.
> >
> > "But it is an internationally accepted test. It was done according to
> > protocol. It was properly done and produced negative results as the doctor
> > explained.
> >
> > "In terms of the confidence of the international community, I believe they
> > look to us as leaders. Not only are we aggressive when it comes to this
> > disease; we quite honestly don't leave any stone unturned in terms of our
> > efforts to make sure that we're proceeding along the right pathway.
> >
> > "As the doctor pointed out, this is an aged animal. Our discussions with
> > Japan have related to 20-month animals as you know. Our discussions with
> > Korea have related to 30-month animals, and the rule relative to Canada or
> > the Minimal Risk Rule in general I should say relates to animals under 30
> > months and meat product under 30 months.
> >
> > "So I really don't believe this has any impact on our international
> trading
> > partners. We'll be working with them to get information in their hands and
> > make sure that they understand the situation. But again just because of
> what
> > we're talking about here and the age of the animal, we've got a vast
> > difference between what this is about and what we're working with them
> > about.
> >
> > "Doctor?"
> >
> > DR. CLIFFORD: "Thank you, Mr. Secretary. And I agree wholeheartedly.
> > Internationally our National Veterinary Services Lab is recognized and
> well
> > respected, and this doesn't put any dent in their armor. They have run the
> > IHC flawlessly, and we're confident in every result that's resulted from
> > that IHC.
> >
> > "We're confident in the result of the IHC with this particular animal. As
> > I'd indicated earlier, and actually the ARS scientists as well as our own
> > because this had to be enriched this wouldn't have been found-- this
> > particular case would have missed the type testing we did exactly on the
> > December cow in Canada. It was the IHC and the Western Blot both in those
> > cases that were found to be positive.
> >
> > "We have also discussed this particular issue with international
> scientists,
> > and I think they have complete confidence in our program while they also
> > recognize and would recommend that this one particular animal because of
> the
> > unusualness of this case they feel that it should have been run also
> against
> > the Western Blot."
> >
> > MR. LOYD: "Next question?"
> >
> > OPERATOR: "The next question comes from Tom Stever (sp). Your line is
> open."
> >
> > REPORTER: "Thank you. How frequently has the Western Blot test been used?
> > And also what makes you think that this will not affect the ongoing
> efforts
> > to reopen the borders to U.S. beef in Japan and Korea?"
> >
> > SEC. JOHANNS: "I'll talk about the issue relative to our trading partners,
> > and Doctor if you could, after I'm done, address the other issue relative
> to
> > frequency?"
> >
> > DR. CLIFFORD: "Yes, sir.
> >
> > SEC. JOHANNS: "Again, the doctor points out that this is an aged beef
> > animal. What we are working with in terms of Canada as you know is 30
> months
> > and under. What we are working with Japan, because of a concession made in
> > the negotiations, is 20 months and under, and then Korea 30 months and
> > under.
> >
> > "And again in terms of our firewalls that are in place, removal of
> specified
> > risk material, the extensive surveillance that we have done, our diligence
> > in the process of testing, I really do believe that this should not have
> any
> > impact on the discussions that we are having with those countries. If
> > anything, it should illustrate to them the diligence by which we pursue
> the
> > safety of our feed supply and the safety of our supply of food for human
> > consumption.
> >
> > "The other thing I do want to mention is, again I point out that our
> > firewall has worked here. This animal did not enter the food supply or the
> > feed supply. There are a number of inter-related firewalls that we have in
> > place, and again we have a prime example tonight that they work and this
> > animal did not enter the food or feed supply.
> >
> > Doctor, talk about frequency."
> >
> > DR. CLIFFORD: "Yes, sir. Actually both of these tests are used extensively
> > internationally, and it will vary from country to country as to which test
> > they choose or whether they use both tests in some cases. And in most
> cases
> > countries would not use both though, except under certain circumstances or
> > unusual circumstances."
> >
> > MR. LOYD: "Operator, we have time for about two more questions, please?"
> >
> > OPERATOR: "The next question comes from Beth Gorham. Your line is open.
> >
> > REPORTER: "Hi, there. Beth Gorham from the Canadian Press Wire Service.
> > Thanks for taking my question.
> >
> > "Mr. Secretary, I understand that you think that this isn't going to
> affect
> > talks with international partners, but given the timing of this and I'm
> not
> > quite clear -- I know the protocols are being developed next week, but, A,
> > is there an answer on how long this will take? And B, given the fact that
> > the appeal is scheduled to go ahead on July 13 in Seattle, are you worried
> > about the impact as far as the judicial proceedings are concerned?"
> >
> > SEC. JOHANNS: "You know, I am really not. And let me explain to you why. I
> > believe that you will have the entire cattle industry over the next few
> days
> > and the folks involved in processing beef and serving beef to customers
> > recognize and talk very publicly about what we've talked about tonight.
> And
> > that is that the firewalls we have in place do work.
> >
> > "We did not have an animal that entered the feed or food chain. All of the
> > protocols were followed. The laboratory in Ames meticulously followed the
> > step-by-step process, came up with a negative, and I just think you're
> going
> > to have the industry say, hey, what we see is that the USDA firewalls are
> > working, they're getting the job done for us.
> >
> > "And again as you know, Canada really follows the same approach that we
> do.
> > So I just don't anticipate an issue there, and again I don't anticipate a
> > problem with our trading partners. They'll want to know what the issues
> are
> > and what we have done, and we'll provide them with that information.
> >
> > "One of the things about this call tonight is, we want to assure them and
> to
> > assure the public that what we're doing here is transparent. I had these
> > results just barely 10 minutes before we got on the line to visit with
> you.
> > So I think that's very important.
> >
> > "Doctor, if you could go ahead and offer some thoughts, that would be
> great.
> >
> > DR. CLIFFORD: "Thank you, Mr. Secretary. And I definitely agree. I think
> one
> > of the things too with BSE that we need to put this disease in a proper
> > perspective, especially internationally. And just remind everyone that it
> > was just a very short time ago that the OIE adopted a new chapter for BSE.
> > It talks about the safe trade in certain products, and that's really where
> > we need to go with this issue is talking about how you safely trade
> products
> > with BSE.
> >
> > "And we have those firewalls and protections in place in the U.S. And also
> > to remind everyone that our surveillance program is a program in order to
> > determine if the disease exists in this country and if so to estimate the
> > prevalence level of the disease in order for us to make the determinations
> > that our firewalls are working. And we know that those are working.
> >
> > SEC. JOHANNS: "Doctor, if you might -- and I don't want to extend this
> > longer than necessary, but it might be good for a quick refresher on the
> > significance of the rule specifying 30 months and under and in Japan's
> case
> > 20 months and under. Do you know what I'm driving at?
> >
> > DR. CLIFFORD: "Hang on just a second, sir.
> >
> > SEC. JOHANNS: "Okay.
> >
> > DR. CLIFFORD: "Yes. With regard to the SRM removal, yes. Basically the
> > animals under 30 months of age, you know with regards to SRM removal we
> > remove the tonsils and small intestines, and over 30 months of age animals
> > we remove the spinal cord, the small intestines, as well as tonsils,
> > eyeballs, the brain tissue, and the dorsal root ganglia. Those are the
> > tissues that are removed in order to protect the human health in this
> > country."
> >
> > SEC. JOHANNS: "Okay. Again, another firewall. We'll go ahead and take the
> > next question."
> >
> > OPERATOR: "The next question comes from Tom Brand. Your line is open.
> >
> > REPORTER: "Good evening. Mr. Secretary, as we've been on this call here
> this
> > evening I was actually with a group of some cattle producers and have been
> > relaying some information along to them. And the question has come up from
> > them, why are we still running the review of tests that came from an
> > inconclusive back in November of 2004?
> >
> > "They're also interested in why we upped the sample amount to such, the 20
> > times, in order to get that positive?
> >
> > "And also just wondering how you feel, will there have to be as much of a
> > public relations campaign as there was back in December 2003, or do you
> feel
> > like consumer confidence will remain?"
> >
> > SEC. JOHANNS: "Consumer confidence I am very, very confident will remain.
> > Again I point out that this is a situation where the firewalls work. We do
> > not have a human health risk here. This animal did not enter the food
> chain.
> >
> > "So from that standpoint I feel very strongly that it's important that we
> > get the facts out, and we have done that. In terms of the question about
> why
> > the additional testing, if you'll remember there was discussion about,
> well,
> > maybe some additional testing should be done. I believe Secretary Veneman
> > also wanted to get a notion as to whether the surveillance process was
> > actually touching all of the right bases. And the Inspector General, as
> you
> > know who operates independently in our federal form of government, decided
> > to request the additional testing. And so that's how that came about.
> >
> > "Doctor, maybe you could offer some thoughts on anything I might have
> missed
> > there in that answer."
> >
> > DR. CLIFFORD: "I would only add, when you talk about the enrichment of the
> > sample that's something that is allowed with regards to that test and the
> > protocol in order to determine if there's low levels of abnormal protein
> > present. And that's a technique that has been probably used in more recent
> > years and is something that is widely used."
> >
> > SEC. JOHANNS: "Okay. Let me just wrap up with just a couple of quick
> > comments, and then we'll call it good for the night and we'll let you get
> > off the line.
> >
> > "The first thing I want to mention again is that there is no risk to human
> > health here. The animal did not get in the food or the feed chain. The
> > firewalls that the USDA put in place some time ago once again have shown
> > that they do work. I do not believe that the information that we have
> > released should impact our discussions with Japan, Korea or Canada. Again,
> > age of animal alone would indicate we're dealing with a much different
> > circumstance.
> >
> > "And with that, I do want to point out that as the doctor indicated even
> > this third test is not a confirmed case of BSE. Additional testing will
> > occur. The other two animals did test negative on the additional testing.
> >
> > Doctor, do you want to offer any thoughts to wrap up?"
> >
> > DR. CLIFFORD: "I don't have anything additional, sir."
> >
> > SEC. JOHANNS: "Okay, great. Thank you, everyone."
> >
> > MR. LOYD: "Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Dr. Clifford's statement is now on
> the
> > USDA website, and we will also have a transcript of this call available on
> > the website, and we will send it out tomorrow morning. As we gather
> > additional information, we will make that available, but at this point we
> do
> > not anticipate any further announcements over the weekend. So have a good
> > weekend, everyone."
> >
> >
> > Last Modified: 06/10/2005
> >
> >
> >
> >
> http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/!ut/p/_s.7_0_A/7_0_1OB?contentidonly=true&con
> > tentid=2005/06/0207.xml
> >
> >
> > >"The fourth point that I want to make is that the test was also done, the
> > Western Blot test, on the two other animals and those test results were
> > negative. <
> >
> > WHY, why was WB not done on this Texas cow?
> >
> > Seems Texas has a serious problem with complying with proper protocol i.e.
> > rendering the stumbling and staggering mad cow without any test at all AND
> > then this downer
> > cow without WB.
> >
> > WHO gave the authority NOT to use WB???
> > PROBABLY the same person that gave the OK to import that banned
> > Canadian beef.
> >
> > THE cow first tested positive with rapid tests.
> > Seems some media are saying the cow first tested
> > negative. this is simply not true.
> >
> > TSS
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > --------------------------------------------------------------------------
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> >
> > From: TSS ()
> > Subject: Re: U.S. checking for possible case of mad cow disease Friday,
> June
> > 10, 2005
> > Date: June 11, 2005 at 1:28 pm PST
> >
> > Release No. 0207.05
> > Contact:
> > USDA Press Office (202)720-4623
> >
> >
> >
> > Transcript of Tele-News Conference with Agriculture Secretary Mike Johanns
> > and Dr. John Clifford, Chief Veterinary Officer, Animal Plant Health
> > Inspection Service Regarding further analysis of BSE Inconclusive Test
> > Results Washington, D.C.
> >
> > June 10, 2005
> >
> > MR. ED LOYD: "Good evening, everyone, and thank you for joining us late on
> a
> > Friday evening. I certainly appreciate your getting on with us on such
> short
> > notice for an update of our BSE surveillance. Just so you know, our format
> > tonight we're going to have Agriculture Secretary Mike Johanns is going to
> > make a brief introductory statement, followed by Dr. John Clifford, the
> > chief veterinary officer of the APHIS, the Animal Plant Health Inspection
> > Service, who will go into some more technical background.
> >
> > "With that, I will turn this over to Agriculture Secretary Mike Johanns."
> >
> > SEC. JOHANNS: "Well, good evening everyone, and let me also just express
> my
> > appreciation for your willingness to join us tonight. As you know, over
> the
> > past many months we have been working on a number of fronts relative to
> BSE.
> >
> > "Most recently we had a roundtable discussion in St. Paul yesterday where
> > literally all players with a variety of opinions participated. It went
> very,
> > very well. We've been working with our rulemaking process and the
> government
> > of Canada to reopen Canada to their exports into our country of beef.
> >
> > "We have also been working very aggressively and diligently with a number
> of
> > countries around the world, most notably, of course, Japan and Korea.
> >
> > "And as you know, now nearly a year ago or maybe even more than a year ago
> > we started a very aggressive surveillance system. During that surveillance
> > process we have had three inconclusives on rapid tests. It's a rapid test
> > that is done, and there were three inconclusives.
> >
> > "Each was then followed up with an IHC test. Each confirmatory IHC test
> was
> > negative. The Inspector General, in reviewing our surveillance system that
> > we have in place, decided to retest with a second confirmatory test which
> is
> > called the Western Blot. We have received test results showing a positive
> on
> > one animal for the Western Blot.
> >
> > "I would like to make a couple of points, and then I'll ask Dr. Clifford
> to
> > offer some thoughts.
> >
> > "Number two, the firewalls that the USDA put in place did work. As I point
> > out, the animal did not enter the food or the feed chain. Therefore,
> there's
> > no risk to human health.
> >
> > "The third point is that I feel very strongly that this information should
> > not impact our discussions with Japan, Korea or Canada.
> >
> > "The fourth point that I want to make is that the test was also done, the
> > Western Blot test, on the two other animals and those test results were
> > negative.
> >
> > "With that, I would like Dr. Clifford to speak about the test, and he'll
> > take it from here. And then when he's finished, we'll go ahead and open it
> > up to your questions."
> >
> > DR. CLIFFORD: "Thank you, Mr. Secretary. And thanks everyone for being on
> > the phone tonight.
> >
> > "Since the USDA enhanced surveillance program for BSE began in June 2004
> > more than 375,000 animals from the targeted cattle population have been
> > tested for BSE using a rapid test. Three of these animals tested
> > inconclusive and were subsequently subjected to the immunohistochemistry
> > (IHC) testing. The IHC is an internationally recognized confirmatory test
> > for BSE. All three inconclusive samples tested negative using the IHC
> test.
> >
> > "As the Secretary said earlier this week, USDA's Office of Inspector
> General
> > which has been partnering with APHIS, FSIS and ARS, the Agriculture
> Research
> > Service, by impartially reviewing BSE-related activities and making
> > recommendations for improvement, recommended that all three of these
> samples
> > be subjected to a second internationally recognized confirmatory test, the
> > Western Blot.
> >
> > "We received final results a short time ago. As the Secretary stated, of
> the
> > three samples two were negative, but the third came back reactive on that
> > test.
> >
> > "Because of the conflicting results on the IHC and Western Blot test, a
> > sample from this animal will be sent to the OIE recognized reference
> > laboratory for BSE in Weybridge, England. USDA will also be conducting
> > further testing which will take several days to complete.
> >
> > "Regardless of the outcome, it is critical to note that USDA has in place
> a
> > sound system of interlocking safeguards to protect human and animal health
> > from BSE including most significantly a ban on specified risk materials
> from
> > the human food supply. In the case of this animal, it was a nonambulatory
> > downer animal and as such was banned from the food supply. It was taken to
> a
> > facility that handles only animals unsuitable for human consumption, and
> the
> > carcass was incinerated.
> >
> > "USDA's enhanced surveillance program is designed to provide information
> > about the level of prevalence of BSE in the United States. Since the
> > inception of this program we have fully anticipated the possibility that
> > additional cases of BSE would be found. And in fact, we are extremely
> > gratified that to date more than 375,000 animals have been tested for the
> > disease, and with the exception of this conflicting result we received for
> > this one animal all have ultimately proven to be negative for the disease.
> >
> > "USDA is committed to ensuring that our BSE program is the best that it
> can
> > be, keeping pace with science and international guidelines, and to
> > considering recommendations made by OIG and others in this regard.
> >
> > "We are committed to ensuring that we have the right protocols in place,
> > ones that are solely grounded in science and consistently followed.
> >
> > "After we receive additional test results on this animal, we will
> determine
> > what further steps need to be taken and what changes if any are warranted
> in
> > our surveillance program."
> >
> > MR. LOYD: "With that, Operator, we would open this up to some questions."
> >
> > OPERATOR: "Once again if you do want to ask a question at this time please
> > press *1 on your touchtone phone, and you must record your name. It will
> be
> > just a moment for the first question. The first question comes from Jeff
> > Nalley. Your line is open."
> >
> > REPORTER: "Mr. Secretary and Mr. Veterinarian this is Jeff Nalley. We're
> > broadcasting from Owens Brook, Kentucky, this evening. I'll share with
> you;
> > we got the news from the USDA while we were in a restaurant, an
> > all-you-can-eat steak buffet. So I'm having seconds just to show our
> > confidence.
> >
> > "But how can you give credence to what has been said before that this is a
> > beef issue and not a human issue and something that we have well in hand
> > certainly within the OIE standards?"
> >
> > SEC. JOHANNS: "Well, we have the best example I could possibly give
> tonight,
> > and that example is this. We've tested 375,000 animals so far. Even with
> > this one animal, we tested the three that on the rapid test showed a
> > positive and the original test showed negative. We went, the IHC test-- we
> > went from there even an additional step. We have two negatives and this
> > third test we can point to the fact that our firewalls work. This animal
> was
> > a downer animal. It did not get in the food or the feed chain. There just
> is
> > no risk whatsoever.
> >
> > "Enjoy beef. I'm going to do exactly what you're doing tonight. I'm going
> to
> > enjoy a good steak. There just simply is not a risk here, and we want to
> > illustrate, which I believe we have done by even exceeding what's
> required.
> > We have gone well beyond any standard that is out there to illustrate the
> > safety of this herd. And it is a safe beef product; there's just no doubt
> > about it."
> >
> > MR. LOYD: "Could we have the next question, please"
> >
> > OPERATOR: "The next question comes from Peter Shinn. Your line is open."
> >
> > REPORTER: "Yes, good evening. This is Peter Shinn from the National
> > Association of Farm Broadcasters.
> >
> > "Mr. Secretary, I don't mean to ask a difficult question, but it just
> > immediately comes to mind. What exactly happened in terms of how could you
> > have gotten it not right the first time? And what's the difference between
> > the IHC and the Western Blot? That might be a question for Dr. Clifford."
> >
> > SEC. JOHANNS: "Yeah. I'll ask Dr. Clifford to get in. It's not really a
> > question of not getting it right. They are, both tests are accepted by the
> > OIE. Both tests if you use those, they are accepted under the standard. So
> > it's not a question of getting it right. All of the protocols were
> followed.
> > We had the positive and the rapid response test, the IHC test was applied
> > according to the protocols, and that is the test that has been used in the
> > United States.
> >
> > "And so it's not a situation where you've got one test that isn't accepted
> > and one that is. They both are accepted. There are differences in the
> tests,
> > and I'll let Dr. Clifford explain that.
> >
> > "And maybe, Dr. Clifford, you can even explain if you would just what this
> > test showed and how you went about getting through the testing process."
> >
> > DR. CLIFFORD: "Thank you, Mr. Secretary. And yes, we're confident in the
> > results of actually both of these tests. The IHC was negative for this
> > sample. Actually the Western Blot test, if you go back to the December cow
> > that was found from Canada the Western Blot that was run on that
> particular
> > sample we used one milligram of tissue to run that test and was found to
> be
> > a very strong positive.
> >
> > "In order to find a positive in this particular case with this Western
> Blot,
> > they had to enhance or enrich it, in which that basically means you're
> > concentrating the abnormal protein. So they had to use 20 times the
> amount.
> > You would have to use about 20 times the amount of tissue for this to
> > determine to be a positive or reactive on the Western Blot versus the one
> > that was discovered in December in the state of Washington.
> >
> > "In addition, there are definite differences between these two tests. The
> > IHC is internationally recognized, and why we chose that for our enhanced
> > surveillance program is because that particular test does two things. It
> > allows you to visualize the anatomic location where the lesions are most
> > likely to be found which is the obex. At the same time it uses a staining
> > technique on the prions, on abnormal prions in the tissue in that
> location.
> >
> > "So that's what the IHC does.
> >
> > "In the Western Blot case, it's actually a homogenate (sp) of a sample of
> > brain tissue that is centrifuged and they concentrate the prion protein
> and
> > then they use a protease to destroy the normal protein, leaving the
> abnormal
> > protein present. And then basically that is run through a gel-type
> > separation using specific antibodies that will give you bands.
> >
> > "And they look at those bands and the molecular weight of those bands to
> > determine the outcome of that test.
> >
> > "So this test would actually be referred to as a weak positive test in
> this
> > case for the Western Blot, and as a result of that and the unusualness of
> > this case it's going to require additional testing before we can confirm
> one
> > way or another whether this is truly BSE or not."
> >
> > SEC. JOHANNS: "Doctor, somebody's going to ask you this so let me just ask
> > it. When you say "weak positive," it would be helpful if you could
> describe
> > what you mean by that."
> >
> > DR. CLIFFORD: "What we mean by "weak positive," Mr. Secretary, is going
> back
> > to the original case. It required and enrichment of these and a greater
> > amount of normal tissue in order to enhance this outcome. So in order to
> > find the abnormal protein present you had to use more material and
> > concentrate it."
> >
> > SEC. JOHANNS: "Okay, thank you. That's very helpful. We'll take the next
> > question."
> >
> > OPERATOR: "The next question will come from Joe Pelka (sp). Your line is
> > open.
> >
> > REPORTER: "Hi. Good evening, gentlemen. I actually have three questions. I
> > think I can state them succinctly. First of all, why did the IG ask for a
> > retest in this case? What do you expect they'll do differently at
> Weybridge
> > that they do from Ames, Iowa, in the IHC testing? And which cow of the
> three
> > or which animal of the three that had the earlier positives are we looking
> > at tonight?
> >
> > SEC. JOHANNS: "I'll answer the first one just as best as I can, and then
> > Doctor, I'll just queue you up that I'll ask you to answer the final two.
> >
> > "The IG has been looking at the surveillance. As you know, we've tested
> now
> > 375,000 animals, and Secretary Veneman wanted to be sure that we were
> > touching the right places-- regions of the country and etcetera to make
> sure
> > that when that surveillance was done we were satisfied that we got a good
> > surveillance of the herd.
> >
> > "Again, keep in mind that was a surveillance effort; it was never
> portrayed
> > to be a food safety approach.
> >
> > "In that effort I believe that the IG decided just to make sure that all
> the
> > bases were touched that this additional testing should be done. So go
> ahead,
> > Doctor."
> >
> > DR. CLIFFORD: "Thank you, Mr. Secretary. The reason we're sending this to
> > Weybridge is because we feel this is an unusual case, and we'd like to
> have
> > the assistance of an internationally recognized laboratory for BSE.
> >
> > "The inconclusive that we're referring to here is the one that we gave
> > notification of in November of 2004. I think it was actually November 15,
> > 2004. With regards to the OIG's recommendation, I think that
> recommendation
> > was based upon a strong reaction on the biorad test and the negative IHC,
> > and in order for us to try to resolve those discrepancies that have been
> > raised relative to that."
> >
> > SEC. JOHANNS: "Okay, great. Next question?"
> >
> > REPORTER: "Hi. It's Elizabeth Weiss. I'm beginning to think I should never
> > go on vacation because every time I do there's a case of BSE. I'm San
> Diego,
> > and I don't have any of my files. But I'm working from memory here.
> >
> > "The November case, was that the Texas cow? If it was -"
> >
> > SEC. JOHANNS: "You know, Elizabeth, I don't believe the USDA ever talked
> > about location."
> >
> > REPORTER: "I presume when you start doing trace back though for this
> animal
> > you will be then talking about the location?"
> >
> > SEC. JOHANNS: "You know, I haven't even gotten that far down the road. I
> > just wanted to get the information out there as quickly as we had it. So."
> >
> > REPORTER: "Okay. And the other question I have -- I'm sorry."
> >
> > SEC. JOHANNS: "We had not, we're not that far down the road in terms of
> what
> > that would be about. We just simply wanted to get the information out to
> you
> > folks as quickly as we had it."
> >
> > REPORTER: "And we appreciate that, especially those of us who don't
> publish
> > until Monday.
> >
> > "A further question, at the time of that test I talked to a lot of people
> > internationally and actually spoke to the scientist who developed the
> > immunohistochemistry test, and he said while his test was state of the art
> > when it was first developed he now considers it as he put it more art than
> > science. And so I'm wondering, is USDA considering switching to one of the
> > newer tests, say the one that Prusinger's Lab has created, something
> that's
> > got a low false positive but is perhaps a more sensitive test because
> Europe
> > thinks we've kind of outgrown the immunohistochemistry test.
> >
> > SEC. JOHANNS: "Yes. You talk about the curiosity of timing; it just so
> > happened that today I was touring our Ames laboratory facility in Ames,
> > Iowa. And that had been set up well before this was an issue, and I just
> > wanted to see how they were doing there. And I talked to many of the
> > scientists that are involved in our BSE research, and I talked about the
> > tests. And I probed very extensively about both tests being accepted under
> > OIE standards.
> >
> > "I believe at the risk of talking for scientists that you'd get a pretty
> > lively debate about what test is best, under what circumstances is it
> best.
> >
> > "I do know this, that the IHC test is recognized by the OIE. It's an
> > accepted test. It's a test that we have employed and we're not alone.
> Other
> > parts of the world do.
> >
> > "We would never make a decision about changing protocol in a knee-jerk
> sort
> > of way. We would certainly want to debate that. We would want to get a lot
> > of good scientific analysis. So it's not something that we would do just
> > very, very quickly. It's something I'd want very, very cautious, careful
> > consideration about because there are some who say, 'No the IHC is where
> you
> > want to be.'
> >
> > "So like I said, at the risk of talking for scientists I think you could
> get
> > a pretty lively debate on your question.
> >
> > "Doctor, do you want to offer anything to that?"
> >
> > DR. CLIFFORD: "I just would like to add one thing, Mr. Secretary, or a
> > couple of things. Again, to reiterate, we do not, we have not confirmed a
> > case of BSE in the U.S. at this time. We're going to do further analysis
> and
> > study on this.
> >
> > "I'd also like to state for the audience, there is such a thing in Europe
> > that is called "atypical BSE" about which there's a lot of information and
> > data that is still needed out there. And in those particular cases, you
> have
> > in some cases; you had where IHC has been negative and a Western Blot been
> > positive.
> >
> > "In addition with regards to the epidemiology, we have preliminary already
> > done some preliminary epidemiology back when the first inconclusive was
> > first announced, and we'll be ready to perform that as necessary."
> >
> > MR. LOYD: "Operator, next question, please?"
> >
> > OPERATOR: "The next question comes from Libby Quaid. Your line is open."
> >
> > REPORTER: "Thank you. Could you go into a little bit more on what test you
> > expect will now be performed and when you expect to know for sure whether
> > this was a positive or a negative test?"
> >
> > SEC. JOHANNS: "Go ahead, Doctor."
> >
> > DR. CLIFFORD: "Actually what I'd like to do is to provide that
> > information -- our scientists are working in the Agriculture Research
> > Service and APHIS in our National Veterinary Services Lab, and they'll
> also
> > be discussing this with the scientists at Weybridge, and they'll be
> > developing a protocol early next week and procedures for further testing."
> >
> > SEC. JOHANNS: "Next question?"
> >
> > OPERATOR: "The next question comes from Ken Root. Your line is open."
> >
> > REPORTER: "Yes. Mr. Secretary, was this a native-born U.S. cow?"
> >
> > SEC. JOHANNS: "Has that been -- that dates back to before I got to the
> USDA.
> > Doctor, do you know if that's been released?"
> >
> > DR. CLIFFORD: "Actually, Mr. Secretary, it has not. What I can say though
> is
> > that at this time we would have no information that it was an imported
> > animal; also that the animal was an aged animal. It was getting up in age
> > and was a beef breed. That's what we're willing to release at this time."
> >
> > REPORTER: "Okay, great. Thank you."
> >
> > SEC. JOHANNS: "Next question?"
> >
> > OPERATOR: "The next question comes from Anita Manning. Your line is open?"
> >
> > REPORTER: "Oh, my questions have been answered. Thank you."
> >
> > SEC. JOHANNS: "Okay, thank you, Anita."
> >
> > OPERATOR: "Next question comes from Dan Goldstein. Your line is open."
> >
> > REPORTER: "Yeah. Hi. It's Dan Goldstein. Two questions, one for Dr.
> Clifford
> > and one for the Secretary. Mr. Secretary, first of all, does this somewhat
> > do you think may shake the confidence of the international community, one,
> > in the ability of the Ames Laboratory and, two, also the efficacy of the
> IHC
> > test?
> >
> > "And then also for Dr. Clifford, what does this mean in terms of the
> > protocols? Will you now have to go back and perhaps test more animals with
> > Western Blot tests?"
> >
> > SEC. JOHANNS: "Let me address the question about the Ames Laboratory, and
> > I'm sure the doctor will want to offer a thought also.
> >
> > "One of the things we are very, very proud of is that Ames laboratory.
> They
> > do great work there, and again I remind everybody that the IHC test is an
> > internationally accepted test. And that comes from the OIE, and like I
> said
> > even amongst scientists you would get debate about the test.
> >
> > "But it is an internationally accepted test. It was done according to
> > protocol. It was properly done and produced negative results as the doctor
> > explained.
> >
> > "In terms of the confidence of the international community, I believe they
> > look to us as leaders. Not only are we aggressive when it comes to this
> > disease; we quite honestly don't leave any stone unturned in terms of our
> > efforts to make sure that we're proceeding along the right pathway.
> >
> > "As the doctor pointed out, this is an aged animal. Our discussions with
> > Japan have related to 20-month animals as you know. Our discussions with
> > Korea have related to 30-month animals, and the rule relative to Canada or
> > the Minimal Risk Rule in general I should say relates to animals under 30
> > months and meat product under 30 months.
> >
> > "So I really don't believe this has any impact on our international
> trading
> > partners. We'll be working with them to get information in their hands and
> > make sure that they understand the situation. But again just because of
> what
> > we're talking about here and the age of the animal, we've got a vast
> > difference between what this is about and what we're working with them
> > about.
> >
> > "Doctor?"
> >
> > DR. CLIFFORD: "Thank you, Mr. Secretary. And I agree wholeheartedly.
> > Internationally our National Veterinary Services Lab is recognized and
> well
> > respected, and this doesn't put any dent in their armor. They have run the
> > IHC flawlessly, and we're confident in every result that's resulted from
> > that IHC.
> >
> > "We're confident in the result of the IHC with this particular animal. As
> > I'd indicated earlier, and actually the ARS scientists as well as our own
> > because this had to be enriched this wouldn't have been found-- this
> > particular case would have missed the type testing we did exactly on the
> > December cow in Canada. It was the IHC and the Western Blot both in those
> > cases that were found to be positive.
> >
> > "We have also discussed this particular issue with international
> scientists,
> > and I think they have complete confidence in our program while they also
> > recognize and would recommend that this one particular animal because of
> the
> > unusualness of this case they feel that it should have been run also
> against
> > the Western Blot."
> >
> > MR. LOYD: "Next question?"
> >
> > OPERATOR: "The next question comes from Tom Stever (sp). Your line is
> open."
> >
> > REPORTER: "Thank you. How frequently has the Western Blot test been used?
> > And also what makes you think that this will not affect the ongoing
> efforts
> > to reopen the borders to U.S. beef in Japan and Korea?"
> >
> > SEC. JOHANNS: "I'll talk about the issue relative to our trading partners,
> > and Doctor if you could, after I'm done, address the other issue relative
> to
> > frequency?"
> >
> > DR. CLIFFORD: "Yes, sir.
> >
> > SEC. JOHANNS: "Again, the doctor points out that this is an aged beef
> > animal. What we are working with in terms of Canada as you know is 30
> months
> > and under. What we are working with Japan, because of a concession made in
> > the negotiations, is 20 months and under, and then Korea 30 months and
> > under.
> >
> > "And again in terms of our firewalls that are in place, removal of
> specified
> > risk material, the extensive surveillance that we have done, our diligence
> > in the process of testing, I really do believe that this should not have
> any
> > impact on the discussions that we are having with those countries. If
> > anything, it should illustrate to them the diligence by which we pursue
> the
> > safety of our feed supply and the safety of our supply of food for human
> > consumption.
> >
> > "The other thing I do want to mention is, again I point out that our
> > firewall has worked here. This animal did not enter the food supply or the
> > feed supply. There are a number of inter-related firewalls that we have in
> > place, and again we have a prime example tonight that they work and this
> > animal did not enter the food or feed supply.
> >
> > Doctor, talk about frequency."
> >
> > DR. CLIFFORD: "Yes, sir. Actually both of these tests are used extensively
> > internationally, and it will vary from country to country as to which test
> > they choose or whether they use both tests in some cases. And in most
> cases
> > countries would not use both though, except under certain circumstances or
> > unusual circumstances."
> >
> > MR. LOYD: "Operator, we have time for about two more questions, please?"
> >
> > OPERATOR: "The next question comes from Beth Gorham. Your line is open.
> >
> > REPORTER: "Hi, there. Beth Gorham from the Canadian Press Wire Service.
> > Thanks for taking my question.
> >
> > "Mr. Secretary, I understand that you think that this isn't going to
> affect
> > talks with international partners, but given the timing of this and I'm
> not
> > quite clear -- I know the protocols are being developed next week, but, A,
> > is there an answer on how long this will take? And B, given the fact that
> > the appeal is scheduled to go ahead on July 13 in Seattle, are you worried
> > about the impact as far as the judicial proceedings are concerned?"
> >
> > SEC. JOHANNS: "You know, I am really not. And let me explain to you why. I
> > believe that you will have the entire cattle industry over the next few
> days
> > and the folks involved in processing beef and serving beef to customers
> > recognize and talk very publicly about what we've talked about tonight.
> And
> > that is that the firewalls we have in place do work.
> >
> > "We did not have an animal that entered the feed or food chain. All of the
> > protocols were followed. The laboratory in Ames meticulously followed the
> > step-by-step process, came up with a negative, and I just think you're
> going
> > to have the industry say, hey, what we see is that the USDA firewalls are
> > working, they're getting the job done for us.
> >
> > "And again as you know, Canada really follows the same approach that we
> do.
> > So I just don't anticipate an issue there, and again I don't anticipate a
> > problem with our trading partners. They'll want to know what the issues
> are
> > and what we have done, and we'll provide them with that information.
> >
> > "One of the things about this call tonight is, we want to assure them and
> to
> > assure the public that what we're doing here is transparent. I had these
> > results just barely 10 minutes before we got on the line to visit with
> you.
> > So I think that's very important.
> >
> > "Doctor, if you could go ahead and offer some thoughts, that would be
> great.
> >
> > DR. CLIFFORD: "Thank you, Mr. Secretary. And I definitely agree. I think
> one
> > of the things too with BSE that we need to put this disease in a proper
> > perspective, especially internationally. And just remind everyone that it
> > was just a very short time ago that the OIE adopted a new chapter for BSE.
> > It talks about the safe trade in certain products, and that's really where
> > we need to go with this issue is talking about how you safely trade
> products
> > with BSE.
> >
> > "And we have those firewalls and protections in place in the U.S. And also
> > to remind everyone that our surveillance program is a program in order to
> > determine if the disease exists in this country and if so to estimate the
> > prevalence level of the disease in order for us to make the determinations
> > that our firewalls are working. And we know that those are working.
> >
> > SEC. JOHANNS: "Doctor, if you might -- and I don't want to extend this
> > longer than necessary, but it might be good for a quick refresher on the
> > significance of the rule specifying 30 months and under and in Japan's
> case
> > 20 months and under. Do you know what I'm driving at?
> >
> > DR. CLIFFORD: "Hang on just a second, sir.
> >
> > SEC. JOHANNS: "Okay.
> >
> > DR. CLIFFORD: "Yes. With regard to the SRM removal, yes. Basically the
> > animals under 30 months of age, you know with regards to SRM removal we
> > remove the tonsils and small intestines, and over 30 months of age animals
> > we remove the spinal cord, the small intestines, as well as tonsils,
> > eyeballs, the brain tissue, and the dorsal root ganglia. Those are the
> > tissues that are removed in order to protect the human health in this
> > country."
> >
> > SEC. JOHANNS: "Okay. Again, another firewall. We'll go ahead and take the
> > next question."
> >
> > OPERATOR: "The next question comes from Tom Brand. Your line is open.
> >
> > REPORTER: "Good evening. Mr. Secretary, as we've been on this call here
> this
> > evening I was actually with a group of some cattle producers and have been
> > relaying some information along to them. And the question has come up from
> > them, why are we still running the review of tests that came from an
> > inconclusive back in November of 2004?
> >
> > "They're also interested in why we upped the sample amount to such, the 20
> > times, in order to get that positive?
> >
> > "And also just wondering how you feel, will there have to be as much of a
> > public relations campaign as there was back in December 2003, or do you
> feel
> > like consumer confidence will remain?"
> >
> > SEC. JOHANNS: "Consumer confidence I am very, very confident will remain.
> > Again I point out that this is a situation where the firewalls work. We do
> > not have a human health risk here. This animal did not enter the food
> chain.
> >
> > "So from that standpoint I feel very strongly that it's important that we
> > get the facts out, and we have done that. In terms of the question about
> why
> > the additional testing, if you'll remember there was discussion about,
> well,
> > maybe some additional testing should be done. I believe Secretary Veneman
> > also wanted to get a notion as to whether the surveillance process was
> > actually touching all of the right bases. And the Inspector General, as
> you
> > know who operates independently in our federal form of government, decided
> > to request the additional testing. And so that's how that came about.
> >
> > "Doctor, maybe you could offer some thoughts on anything I might have
> missed
> > there in that answer."
> >
> > DR. CLIFFORD: "I would only add, when you talk about the enrichment of the
> > sample that's something that is allowed with regards to that test and the
> > protocol in order to determine if there's low levels of abnormal protein
> > present. And that's a technique that has been probably used in more recent
> > years and is something that is widely used."
> >
> > SEC. JOHANNS: "Okay. Let me just wrap up with just a couple of quick
> > comments, and then we'll call it good for the night and we'll let you get
> > off the line.
> >
> > "The first thing I want to mention again is that there is no risk to human
> > health here. The animal did not get in the food or the feed chain. The
> > firewalls that the USDA put in place some time ago once again have shown
> > that they do work. I do not believe that the information that we have
> > released should impact our discussions with Japan, Korea or Canada. Again,
> > age of animal alone would indicate we're dealing with a much different
> > circumstance.
> >
> > "And with that, I do want to point out that as the doctor indicated even
> > this third test is not a confirmed case of BSE. Additional testing will
> > occur. The other two animals did test negative on the additional testing.
> >
> > Doctor, do you want to offer any thoughts to wrap up?"
> >
> > DR. CLIFFORD: "I don't have anything additional, sir."
> >
> > SEC. JOHANNS: "Okay, great. Thank you, everyone."
> >
> > MR. LOYD: "Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Dr. Clifford's statement is now on
> the
> > USDA website, and we will also have a transcript of this call available on
> > the website, and we will send it out tomorrow morning. As we gather
> > additional information, we will make that available, but at this point we
> do
> > not anticipate any further announcements over the weekend. So have a good
> > weekend, everyone."
> >
> >
> > Last Modified: 06/10/2005
> >
> >
> >
> >
> http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/!ut/p/_s.7_0_A/7_0_1OB?contentidonly=true&con
> > tentid=2005/06/0207.xml
> >
> >
> > >"The fourth point that I want to make is that the test was also done, the
> > Western Blot test, on the two other animals and those test results were
> > negative. <
> >
> > WHY, why was WB not done on this Texas cow?
> >
> > Seems Texas has a serious problem with complying with proper protocol i.e.
> > rendering the stumbling and staggering mad cow without any test at all AND
> > then this downer
> > cow without WB.
> >
> > WHO gave the authority NOT to use WB???
> > PROBABLY the same person that gave the OK to import that banned
> > Canadian beef.
> >
> > THE cow first tested positive with rapid tests.
> > Seems some media are saying the cow first tested
> > negative. this is simply not true.
> >
> > TSS
> >
> > ----- Original Message -----
> > From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
> > To:
> > Sent: Saturday, June 11, 2005 3:27 PM
> > Subject: Transcript of Tele-News Conference with Agriculture Secretary
> Mike
> > Johanns and Dr. John Clifford, Regarding further analysis of BSE
> > Inconclusive Test Results
> >
> > #################### https://lists.aegee.org/bse-l.html
> ####################
> >
>
> #################### https://lists.aegee.org/bse-l.html ####################
>



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