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From: TSS ()
Subject: COOL, PACKERS, Rep. Henry Bonilla R-Texas, BSE, HUMAN HEALTH, AND why you should be concerned
Date: June 11, 2005 at 7:06 am PST

House Agriculture Appropriations Subcommittee Makes Quiet Attempt to Delay COOL Once Again
By R-CALF USA
May 18, 2005, 20:19


(Billings, Mont.) – In a meeting earlier this week, the U.S. House of Representatives’ Agriculture Appropriations Subcommittee ramped up opposition to Mandatory Country-of-Origin Labeling (M-COOL) for meat products.

Chairman Henry Bonilla, R-Texas, persuaded the subcommittee – through a voice vote – to postpone the implementation date of M-COOL to September 2007. Opponents of M-COOL already were successful once before in delaying the implementation date to Sept. 30, 2006, which still stands as the effective date unless Bonilla’s effort takes hold in budget discussions in the entire House Appropriations Committee.

"U.S. cattle producers want the ability to remain competitive here in the U.S. – the largest beef-consuming nation in the world – and to be competitive, we need the ability to differentiate our superior product, which is produced under higher standards, from generic, imported beef," said Danni Beer, R-CALF USA’s COOL Committee Co-Chair. "This is an underhanded maneuver to not only attempt to completely do away with Mandatory COOL, but it also denies consumers their right to know where the meat they serve their families actually comes from."

"As boxed beef imports continue to climb to record levels, there has never been a more intense level of competition or such a huge mix of products in the marketplace," said Chuck Kiker, R-CALF USA Region V Director. "To remain competitive, U.S. producers need the ability to utilize Mandatory COOL as a tool to remain No. 1 in the global marketplace, and this tool is the one that’s most widely supported by consumers and producers alike."

R-CALF USA, along with the many producer and consumer organizations that successfully passed M-COOL in the 2002 Farm Bill, believe they have already waited too long for the law to be implemented.

"We look forward to working with our broad coalition in the House and Senate to implement Mandatory COOL as quickly as possible," Beer said.


http://www.foodconsumer.org/777/8/House_Agriculture_Appropriations_Subcommittee.shtml

http://www.foodconsumer.org/777/8/printer_House_Agriculture_Appropriations_Subcommittee.shtml

HOUSE COMMITTEE VOTES TO DELAY MANDATORY COOL

The House Appropriations subcommittee on agriculture votes to block funding for mandatory country-of-origin labeling (COOL) for beef and other meats. The vote came as markup began Tuesday on the fiscal 2004 Ag Appropriations bill. The subcommittee under chairman Henry Bonilla, R-Texas, voted that none of the funds in the bill shall be used for implanting mandatory COOL. This effectively delays implementation of mandatory COOL for one year to Sept 30, 2005. The funds cutoff would apply to all meat products affected by COOL but not seafood, peanuts and fresh produce.

The delay will give lawmakers and USDA ample time to sort out objections to the labels by retailers, meatpackers and some livestock producers, says Bonilla. He acted on the "controversial, difficult" issue because the House Agriculture Committee wants to review the law, he says. It's essential that it provide time for Congress to properly evaluate this issue. "We will not jump blindly. We must consider all implications and make an educated decision," he says. At the same time, the chairman of the House Ag Committee, Bob Goodlatte, R-Va., announced a June 24 hearing on COOL.

Reaction to the vote was immediate. Recent discussions have brought to light serious concerns about the COOL, says Bryan Dierlam, NCBA's director of legislative affairs. NCBA strongly agrees that Rep. Bonilla's actions will stop the freight train of heated rhetoric out there and start a realistic debate, in front of Congress, about mandatory labeling. The Texas and Southwestern Cattle Raisers Association (TSCRA) and the Texas Cattle Feeders Association (TCFA) praised the actions in a joint statement. This law was adopted as part of the 2002 Farm Bill without adequate debate on cost and benefits, they say. Given the burdensome costs that will be associated with COOL, going forward with COOL at this time is premature. The long-term implications of mandatory COOL are too important to be considered anywhere other than through a full Congressional debate, they say.

However, House Rep. Marcy Kaptur, D-Ohio, says she intends to argue at the full committee level for letting USDA proceed with writing rules for mandatory labeling. The Appropriations Committee is expected to vote on agriculture funding next week. Consumers have the right to know where their food is coming from, she says.

http://www.farms.com/cool/mcool_article.htm

HOUSE BLOCKS FUNDING FOR MCOOL

The House yesterday rejected by a vote of 193-208, an amendment to the Fiscal Year 2004 Agriculture appropriations bill that Reps. Dennis Rehberg (R-Mont.) and Darlene Hooley (D-Ore.) introduced that would have mandated funding for implementation of the mandatory country-of-origin labeling (MCOOL) program for meat products. The amendment sought to strike language included in the underlying spending bill by Rep. Henry Bonilla (R-Texas) that would prohibit funding to implement mandatory COOL for meat and meat products until Oct. 1, 2005. "The country of origin labeling law as currently written clearly requires more Congressional attention," Caspers said. "NPPC is pleased that members have recognized that there are many concerns among producers over the tremendous potential for unintended consequences."

http://www.farms.com/cool/hbffm.htm

Greetings,

VOTES mean absolutely nothing to these folks. I thought COOL had already been voted on and passed?
NO matter, with this administration votes mean nothing and laws they change to suit themselves, and even
when laws have been passed (as with the Canadian beef that was illegally imported into the USA), they freely
break them. a bunch of renegade bandits i say. that's all they are.

WELL, we see what happened with the 1st _documented_ mad cow in the USA, it's cohorts, and the people
that were exposed to those products, from the secrecy that followed;



* GAO-05-51 October 2004 FOOD SAFETY (over 500 customers receiving
potentially BSE contaminated beef) - TSS 10/20/04


October 2004 FOOD SAFETY
USDA and FDA Need
to Better Ensure
Prompt and Complete
Recalls of Potentially
Unsafe Food

snip...

Page 38 GAO-05-51 Food Recall Programs
To examine the voluntary recall of beef products associated with the
December 2003 discovery of an animal infected with BSE, we analyzed the
distribution lists USDA collected from companies and the verification
checks it conducted to develop a diagram illustrating the location and
volume of recalled beef that reached different levels of the distribution
chain. We compared the distribution lists and verification checks to
identify how many customers listed on the distribution lists did not
receive
the recalled beef and the number of customers not listed on distribution
lists that received the recalled beef. We interviewed USDA and FDA staff
involved with the recall to understand the timing of recall actions and the
challenges encountered during the recall.
To develop information on the 2002 recall of ground beef by a ConAgra
plant in Greeley, Colorado, we reviewed USDAs recall file and other
documents on the recall. We also met with the departments Office of
Inspector General and reviewed the Inspector Generals September 2003
report.1
We conducted our review from May 2003 through August 2004 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
1U.S. Department of Agriculture, Office of Inspector General, Great
Plains Region Audit
Report: Food Safety and Inspection Service: Oversight of Production
Process and Recall at
ConAgra Plant (Establishment 969), Report No. 24601-2-KC (September 2003).
Page 39 GAO-05-51 Food Recall Programs
Appendix II
Federal Actions Associated with the
Discovery of an Animal in the United States
Infected with BSE Appendix II
On December 23, 2003, USDA announced that a cow in the state of
Washington had tested positive for BSEcommonly referred to as mad
cow disease. This appendix describes the actions USDA took to recall the
meat and the actions FDA took with respect to FDA-regulated products,
such as animal feed and cosmetics, made from rendered parts of the
animal.
Beef Recall Was
Triggered by a BSEPositive
Sample from
One Cow
On December 9, 2003, the recalling company slaughtered 23 cows. USDA,
in accordance with its BSE surveillance policy at the time, took a
sample of
1 cow that was unable to walk, although the condition of the tested cow is
now disputed. USDA did not process the sample in its Ames, Iowa National
Veterinary Services Laboratory in an expedited manner because the cow
did not show symptoms of neurological disorder. USDA test results
indicated a presumptive positive for BSE on December 23, 2003.
Recall Begun in
December 2003 Was
Completed in March
2004
On December 23, 2003, after learning about the positive BSE test, USDA
headquarters notified the Boulder District Office, which is the field
office
with jurisdiction over the recalling firm. The Boulder District began
gathering information about the recalling companys product distribution.
Field staff telephoned the recalling company and were on-site at 7:00 p.m.
The Boulder District initially thought 3 days of the recalling companys
production would have to be recalled, but further examination of facility
cleanup and shipping records revealed that it was only necessary to
recall 1
day of production. USDA recall staff convened at 9:15 p.m. and discussed
the science related to BSE and whether the recalling companys cleanup
practices were sufficient to limit the recall to 1 day of production.
Following USDAs determination to conduct a Class II recallthat is, the
beef posed a remote possibility of adverse health consequencesUSDA
contacted the recalling company to discuss recall details and the press
release. The press release and Recall Notification Report were released
that evening.
On December 24, 2003, USDAs Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS)
sent inspectors to the recalling companys primary customers to obtain
secondary customer distribution lists and product shipping records. USDA
conducted 100 percent verification checks for this recallit contacted
every customer that received the recalled meat. This level of verification
checks is well above the percentage of checks conducted by USDA district
offices for the Class I recalls we reviewed.
Appendix II
Federal Actions Associated with the
Discovery of an Animal in the United States
Infected with BSE
Page 40 GAO-05-51 Food Recall Programs
On December 26, 2003, USDA began checking the primary and secondary
customers of the recalling company that it was aware of, although the
entire product distribution chain was unknown. During the checks, USDA
tried to determine if the product was further distributed, and it used
verification checks to acquire distribution lists for secondary and
tertiary
customers of the recalling company.
Verification checks continued until February 25, 2004. Three USDA
districts conducted these verification checks. The Boulder District
coordinated the checks and assigned checks to the Minneapolis District
Office for customers in Montana and to the Alameda District Office for
customers in California. USDA required that 100 percent of the primary
checks, 50 percent of the secondary checks, and 20 percent of the tertiary
checks be conducted on-site. According to USDA, more than 50 percent of
the secondary checks were actually conducted on-site. FDA officials
helped conduct verification checks. According to USDA, the recall took a
long time to complete because USDA contacted each customer at least
twice. USDA first contacted each customer to conduct the check and again
to verify product disposition.
On February 25, 2004, the Boulder District concluded that the recall was
conducted in an effective manner. On March 1, 2004, USDAs Recall
Management Division recommended that the agency terminate the recall,
and USDA sent a letter to the recalling company to document that USDA
considered the recall to be complete.
Recall Was
Complicated by
Inaccurate Distribution
Lists and Mixing of
Potentially
Contaminated and
Noncontaminated Beef
USDA used distribution lists and shipping records to piece together where
the recalled product was distributed. According to USDA, one of the
recalling companys three primary customers was slow in providing its
customer list. USDA could not begin verification activities for that
primary
customer without this list. Furthermore, some customers of the recalling
company provided USDA with imprecise lists that did not specify which
customers received the recalled product. As a consequence, USDA could
not quickly determine the scope of product distribution and had to take
time conducting extra research using shipping invoices to determine which
specific customers received the product.
Even when USDA determined the amount and location of beef, the agency
still had trouble tracking the beef in certain types of establishments,
such
as grocery store distributors. USDA could not easily track the individual
stores where those distributors sent the beef because of product mixing
Appendix II
Federal Actions Associated with the
Discovery of an Animal in the United States
Infected with BSE
Page 41 GAO-05-51 Food Recall Programs
and the distributors record-keeping practices. Generally, distributors
purchase beef from multiple sources, mix it in their inventory, and lose
track of the source of the beef they send to the stores that they
supply. To
deal with this problem, USDA first identified the dates when recalled beef
was shipped to the distributors and then asked for a list of the stores
that
were shipped any beef after those dates. Consequently, some stores were
included in the recall that may never have received recalled beef.
The recall was also complicated by repeated mixing of recalled beef with
nonrecalled beef, thereby increasing the amount of meat involved in the
recall. The recalling company slaughtered 23 cows on December 9, 2003,
and shipped those and 20 other carcasses to a primary customer on
December 10, 2003. The recalling companys carcasses were tagged to
identify the slaughter date and the individual cow. The primary customer
removed the identification tags and mixed the 23 recalled carcasses with
the 20 nonrecalled carcasses. Because the carcasses could not be
distinguished, the recall included all 43 carcasses at the primary
customer.
After one round of processing at the primary customer, the meat from the
carcasses was shipped to two other processing facilities. Both
establishments further mixed the recalled meat from the 43 carcasses with
meat from other sources. In all, the mixing of beef from 1 BSE-positive cow
resulted in over 500 customers receiving potentially contaminated beef.
Imprecise distribution lists and the mixing of recalled beef combined to
complicate USDAs identification of where the product went. Specifically,
on December 23, 2003, USDAs initial press release stated that the
recalling
company was located in Washington State. Three days later, on December
26, 2003, USDA announced that the recalled beef was distributed within
Washington and Oregon. On December 27, 2003, USDA determined that one
of the primary customers of the recalling firm distributed beef to
facilities
in California and Nevada, in addition to Washington and Oregon, for a total
of four states. On December 28, 2003, USDA announced that some of the
secondary customers of the recalling company may also have distributed
the product to Alaska, Montana, Hawaii, Idaho, and Guam, for a total of
eight states and one territory.
On January 6, 2004, over 2 weeks from recall initiation, USDA determined
that the beef went to only six statesWashington, Oregon, California,
Nevada, Idaho, and Montanaand that no beef went to Alaska, Hawaii, or
Guam. To reach that conclusion, USDA used the distribution lists, shipping
records, and sales invoices that it received from companies to piece
together exactly where the recalled beef may have been sent. The lists
Appendix II
Federal Actions Associated with the
Discovery of an Animal in the United States
Infected with BSE
Page 42 GAO-05-51 Food Recall Programs
showed that 713 customers may have received the recalled beef; 6 of those
may have received beef from more than one source. USDA determined that
176 customers on the lists did not actually receive recalled beef,
including
the customers in Guam and Hawaii. USDAs review also indicated that
recalled beef was probably not shipped to Alaska or Utah, and USDA
checked 2 retailers in Alaska and 3 retailers in Utah to confirm that
was the
case. In total, USDA conducted verification checks on 537 of the 713
customers on the lists. USDAs initial checks identified an additional 45
customers that may have received the recalled beef that were not included
on the distribution lists, for a total of 582 verification checks. Figure 4
summarizes USDAs verification efforts during the recall.
Appendix II
Federal Actions Associated with the
Discovery of an Animal in the United States
Infected with BSE
Page 43 GAO-05-51 Food Recall Programs
Figure 4: USDAs Recall Verification Checks by Location and Customer
Type for Meat Associated with the Animal Infected with
BSE
Note: USDA checked 15 primary, 40 secondary, and 526 tertiary customers
plus the recalling
company, for a total of 582 verification checks.
USDAs press release stated that the recall involved 10,410 pounds of beef
products, and the USDA recall coordinator for this recall told us that
downstream processors mixed the recalled beef with nonrecalled beef, for
a total of more than 38,000 pounds of beef that was distributed at the
secondary customer level. According to USDA officials involved with the
D = Distributor
R = Retailer
SF = Storage facility
P = Processor
Primary customers
(15 total)
Recalling
slaughterhouse
(WA) 1 R
(OR)
1 P
(WA) 1 P
(OR)
1 P
(OR)
11 R
(WA)
Secondary customers
(40 total)
Tertiary customers
(526 total)
1 R
(OR)
1 SF
(OR)
3 D
(OR)
3 D
(WA)
2 dual D
(OR)
59 R
(OR)
79 R
(WA)
5 R
(ID)
3 R
(UT)
4 R
(MT)
161 R
(WA)
8 R
(ID)
15 R
(OR)
2 R
(AK)
31 R
(OR) 8 R
(WA)
10 R
(NV)
5 R
(ID)
10 R
(CA)
2 R
(CA)
17 R
(OR)
5 R
(WA)
1 D
(NV)
11 R
(CA)
85 R
(NV)
3 D
(OR) 11 R
(OR)
2 D
(CA) 26 R
(CA)
2 R
(WA)
( ) Acronyms in parentheses are postal abbreviations for each state.
Source: GAO analysis of USDA verification check documents.
Appendix II
Federal Actions Associated with the
Discovery of an Animal in the United States
Infected with BSE
Page 44 GAO-05-51 Food Recall Programs
recall, the precise amount of meat that was sold at the retail level is
unknown because retailers at the tertiary level further mixed nonrecalled
meat with potentially contaminated meat. USDA told us that more than
64,000 pounds of beef was ultimately returned or destroyed by customers,
and that, because of the mixing, it was not able to determine how much of
the original 10,410 pounds of recalled beef was contained in the 64,000
pounds that were recovered.
FDAs Role in USDAs
Recall
Parts of the BSE-infected animal slaughtered on December 9, 2003, were
not used for food, but they were sent to renderers to be separated into raw
materials, such as proteins and blood. Rendered materials are used for
many purposes, including cosmetics and vaccines. FDA has jurisdiction
over renderers.
When USDA learned of the BSE-infected cow on December 23, 2003, the
agency immediately notified FDA. On December 24, 2003, FDA sent an
inspection team to a renderer that handled materials from the BSE cow.
Inspectors confirmed that the parts of the slaughtered BSE positive cow
were on the premises. FDA later identified a second company that
potentially rendered material from the slaughtered BSE cow. Both
renderers agreed to voluntarily hold all product processed from the
diseased cow and dispose of the product as directed by FDA and local
authorities.
On January 7, 2004, 15 containers of potentially contaminated, rendered
material (meat and bone meal) were inadvertently loaded on a ship, and on
January 8, 2004, the ship left Seattle, Washington, for Asia. The renderer
initiated steps to recover the shipped material, so it could be disposed
of as
directed by FDA and local authorities. The ship carrying the material
returned to the United States on February 24, 2004, and the material was
disposed of in a landfill on March 2, 2004.
On January 12, 2004, FDA asked both renderers to expand their voluntary
holds to rendered materials processed from December 23, 2003, through
January 9, 2004, because they may have rendered some recalled meat or
trim that was recovered from retail establishments. Both renderers agreed
to the expanded product hold. In total, FDA requested that renderers
voluntarily hold approximately 2,000 tons of rendered material. FDA
confirmed that none of the potentially contaminated, rendered material
entered commerce, because FDA accounted for all rendered material. FDA
Appendix II
Federal Actions Associated with the
Discovery of an Animal in the United States
Infected with BSE
Page 45 GAO-05-51 Food Recall Programs
reported that no recall was necessary because no product was distributed
commercially by the rendering companies.
USDA and FDA
Worked Together on
the Recall
USDA and FDA worked together in two ways. First, both agencies notified
each other if their investigations yielded any information about products
within the jurisdiction of the other agency. For instance, when conducting
the second round of verification checks, USDA tracked the disposition of
the product to renderers and landfills and notified FDA when the product
went to renderers. Second, FDA officials helped conduct verification
checks. FDA conducted 32 of the 582 verification checks (approximately 5
percent) for the USDA recall. Officials from both agencies indicated they
regularly interacted and shared information. Table 3 outlines the agencies
actions.
Table 3: Detailed Timeline of USDA, FDA, and Company Actions Related to
the Discovery of an Animal Infected with BSE
Date USDA recall actions FDA actions Company actions
12/9/03 " USDA samples cow for BSE. " BSE cow is slaughtered.
12/11/03 " Sample is sent to Ames, Iowa, for BSE
testing.
" Recalling company sends
carcasses to primary customer for
processing.
12/12/03 " Primary customer sends meat
products to two other primary
customers for further processing.
12/12 -
12/23/03
" Other primary customers distribute
recalled product to secondary
customers.
" Secondary customers distribute
recalled product to tertiary
customers.
12/23/03 " BSE test results are presumptively
positive.
" Recall meeting.
" Initiation of voluntary recall.
" Press release.
" FDA notified of BSE test results.
" FDA dispatches investigation teams.
12/24/03 " FDA inspects Renderer 1.
" FDA determines some rendered
material from Renderer 1 is intended
for Indonesia.
" FDA discovers some material may
have been sent to Renderer 2.
" Renderer 1 agrees to hold remaining
rendered material.
" Recalling company contacts
primary customers.
" Primary customers contact their
customers.
Appendix II
Federal Actions Associated with the
Discovery of an Animal in the United States
Infected with BSE
Page 46 GAO-05-51 Food Recall Programs
12/25/03 " USDA receives confirmation from
reference lab in England that cow in
question is BSE positive.
12/26/03 " Verification checks begin
" USDA announces recalled product in
Washington State and Oregon.
" FDA begins process of comparing
records to ensure all products from
Renderers 1 and 2 are accounted for.
" Renderer 2 agrees to hold all material
that may have been derived from
BSE cow. None of the rendered
material has been distributed.
12/27/03 " USDA announces recalled product was
distributed in Washington State,
Oregon, California, and Nevada.
" FDA issues statement confirming that
the rendering plants that processed
all of the nonedible material from the
BSE cow have placed a voluntary
hold on all of the potentially infectious
product, none of which had left the
control of the companies and entered
commercial distribution.
12/28/03 " USDA announces recalled product was
distributed in Washington State,
Oregon, California, Nevada, Montana,
Idaho, Alaska, Hawaii, and Guam.
12/29/03 " Food Safety and Inspection Service
determines that the recalled meat
products were distributed to 42
locations, with 80 percent of the
products distributed to stores in
Oregon and Washington State.
12/31/03 " FDA offers assistance to USDA to
complete recall verification checks.
1/6/04 " USDA determines recalled product
was only distributed in Washington
State, Oregon, California, Nevada,
Montana, and Idaho.
1/8/04 " FDA is notified by the renderer that
some of the rendered material on
hold from Renderer 1 was
inadvertently shipped to Asia.
Renderer 1 commits to isolate and
return the rendered material.
" Rendering company notifies FDA of
shipment of product on hold.
(Continued From Previous Page)
Date USDA recall actions FDA actions Company actions
Appendix II
Federal Actions Associated with the
Discovery of an Animal in the United States
Infected with BSE
Page 47 GAO-05-51 Food Recall Programs
Source: GAO analysis of USDA and FDA information.
1/12/04 " FDA advises Renderers 1 and 2 that
they may have rendered meat or trim
subject to recall from retail stores.
" FDA requests Renderers 1 and 2 to
place all rendered material from
December 23 to January 9 on hold.
" FDA determines neither renderer had
shipped rendered material
manufactured after December 23,
2003.
2/9/04 " All rendered material was disposed of
in landfill, except material shipped to
Asia.
2/24/04 " Ship carrying rendered material
returns to U.S. port.
2/25/04 " Verification checks complete.
" USDA Boulder District Office
concludes recall is effective.
3/1/04 " Recall is closed.
3/2/04 " FDA observes disposal in landfill of
remaining rendered material...

snip...

REPORTS

1. Food Safety: USDA and FDA Need to Better Ensure Prompt and Complete
Recalls of Potentially Unsafe Food. GAO-05-51, October 7.tss
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-51
Highlights - http://www.gao.gov/highlights/d0551high.pdf


Greetings again,


WITH politicians like Rep. Henry Bonilla, R-Texas,
who needs assisted suicide law, his policy on COOL will
have us all exposed to the mad cow agent. Nothing like
being in the pockets of the packers and such, and dying
old and demented, or maybe young and demented.

WONDER how much the industry has donated to his
campaign fund?


I see here that the biggest contributor seems to be
(i will give you 3 guess and the first 2 don't count);


2004

Sector Total PACs Indivs

Agribusiness $440,516 $296,566 $ 143,950


http://www.opensecrets.org/politicians/sector.asp?CID=N00005985&cycle=2004


let's break this down a bit;



The top industries supporting Henry Bonilla are:


#1 Livestock $131,900

snip...

#3 Lobbyist $91,147

#4 Food Processing & Sales $90,140

snip...

#11 Agricultural Services/Products $60,800

snip...

#19 Dairy $36,750


http://www.opensecrets.org/politicians/indus.asp?CID=N00005985&cycle=2004



Henry Bonilla is a top House recipient from the following industries for the 2003-2004 election cycle:


Livestock (#1)


Meat processing & products:
Top 20 Members of the House


Election cycle: 2004
Rank

Candidate

Amount

#1

Bonilla, Henry (R-TX)

$32,250


http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/recips.asp?Ind=A06&cycle=2004&recipdetail=h&Mem=Y&sortorder=U


Meat processing & products:
Top 20 Members of the House


Election cycle: 20042002200019981996199419921990
List Top 20: All RecipientsPresidential CandidatesSenatorsMembers of the HouseSenate CandidatesHouse CandidatesAll Members of Congress
Rank
Candidate
Amount

1
Bonilla, Henry (R-TX)
$16,750

http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/recips.asp?Ind=G2300&Cycle=2002&recipdetail=H&Mem=Y&sortorder=U

Agricultural Svcs (#4)

http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/recips.asp?Ind=A07&cycle=2004&recipdetail=h&Mem=Y&sortorder=U

Dairy (#5)

http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/recips.asp?Ind=A04&cycle=2004&recipdetail=h&Mem=Y&sortorder=U

Food and kindred products manufacturing (#2)

http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/recips.asp?Ind=G2100&cycle=2004&recipdetail=h&Mem=Y&sortorder=U

Food Process/Sales (#2)

http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/recips.asp?Ind=A09&cycle=2004&recipdetail=h&Mem=Y&sortorder=U

Meat processing & products (#1)

http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/recips.asp?Ind=G2300&cycle=2004&recipdetail=h&Mem=Y&sortorder=U

Poultry & Eggs (#3)

http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/recips.asp?Ind=A05&cycle=2004&recipdetail=h&Mem=Y&sortorder=U

DO a search for his name ''Bonilla'' and then it gives you a bunch of different options to break down campaign contributions. His number 3 contributor is the National Cattleman's Beef Association at $16,000. Number 10 is a big beef company, Sam Kane Beef Processors and tied for number 13 is the American Meat Institute and the Texas Southwestern Cattle Raisers.

http://www.opensecrets.org/politicians/index.asp

NOT about human health. it's about commodities and futures and who can bribe or donate the most to whom$$$TSS


JUST look how the feed compounders handled things in the UK;


>DATA Charmaine's HD:BSE - AUGUST 95-fill in bse position paper spec<

FROM THE DIRECTOR GENERAL

24 August, 1995

STRICTLY PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL


Dear •salutation

UKASTA POLICY ON BSE

At the President's suggestion in the light of recent events, I have
reviewed the history of our policy on BSE so as to ensure that it fully
reflects the needs of our supporters In the feed Industry.

The paper enclosed with this letter is the result. For obvious reasons,
this is being circulated only to an extremely small circle within
UKASTA - basically, the National Executive Council.

If you have any comments on the policy, or the paper, I should be glad
to receive them under Private & Confidential cover.

Yours sincerely,

J.W. REED

JWR/cg

copied to SMT members - IJD; JN; JAS; REW


95/8.24/2.1


STRICTLY PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL

UKASTA INTERNAL POSITION STATEMENT
BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY

POLICY AIMS

1. These have been consistent, although unstated except In FEC discussions, since at least 1989:-

• To minimise the risk of farmers' claims for compensation from feed
compounders.

• To minimise the potential damage to compound feed markets
through adverse publicity.

• To maximise freedom of action for feed compounders. notably by
maintaining the availability of meat and bone meal as a raw
material in animal feeds, and ensuring time is available to make
any changes which may be required.


STRATEGY ADOPTED/SUCCESS ACHIEVED

2. Strategy has depended upon the situation at a particular time.
UKASTA has sought to anticipate criticism from other industry sectors
and action by Government/Brussels as the epidemic has developed
and knowledge of the disease increased. Through dose liaison with
MAFF. we have to date avoided public statements seriously damaging
to the feed Industry and the adoption of policies likely to lead to such
damage.

3. Successful examples of this strategy include:

• "Voluntary Ban" on SBO's In all MBM purchase contracts from
November 1989. matching the Government ban on SBO'S in
human food but anticipating the statutory ban on SBO's in feed
which came in only from September 1990;

• Pressing Government for full compensation to farmers, which was
finally conceded in February 1990;

• evidence (not Just on BSE) to the Lamming Committee in 1991/92
resulted in their recommending tighter controls over home
mixers/integrated operations, and over the processing of fallen
animals. Government eventually tightened the fallen animals
legislation in December 1992. Other Lamming recommendations
could yet be useful to us.

continued.....

95/8.24/2.2

2

• UKASTA pressure dissuaded MAFF from publicly linking voluntary
ELISA tests of feed on farms with BAB's to (possibly compulsory)
tests at compounders' premises in June/July 1994:

• in August 1995. while tightening the SBO Order and responding
to the EU Decision requiring introduction of a testing programme.
MAFF has accepted UKASTA proposals for the presentation of the
changes to a wider audience, including farmers, and accepted our
help in preparing for an EU Commission visit to inspect
procedures and controls.


THE FUTURE

4. BSE has for more than seven years posed the greatest single potential
threat to feed compounders' profitability. Although the epidemic is in
sharp decline (275 cases per week compared to 1000 at the peak).
MAFF remains under pressure in Brussels and is not skilled at
handling potentially explosive issues.

5. Tests may show that ruminant feeds have been sold which contain
illegal traces of ruminant protein. More likely, a few positive test
results will turn up but proof that a particular feed mill knowingly
supplied it to a particular farm will be difficult if not impossible.

6. The threat remains real and it will be some years before feed
compounders are free of it. The longer we can avoid any direct
linkage between feed milling practices and actual BSE cases, the more
likely it is that serious damage can be avoided. In issue management
terms, the aims and the strategy remain valid, but must be kept
under review in the light of further events.

JWR/cg/23.8.95

95/8.24/2.3

http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1995/08/24002001.pdf


95\08.01\7.1-7.2 01/08/95 T E D Eddy PS/Mrs Browning Confidential - BSE : SBOs

snip...

4. Subject to furhter clarification on the problem at the two plants we can no longer maintain publicly that our visits to slaughterhouses have shown no implications for human health. I would advise against an immediate response to Farming News. We need to investigate the two reports in greater detail to clarify whether the circumstances were such as to suggest there was a genuine risk to human health.

TED EDDY

http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1995/08/01007001.pdf

INDUSTRY NEWS

6. Although it normally occurs in elderly people, CJD has been found in young people - in the US, for example, where BSE does not exist...

http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1995/08/10004001.pdf

THEY EACH protect there own, to hell with human health$$$TSS

Although many observers anticipated amendments and heated debate on the controversial country-of-origin labeling law, there was little discussion. The bill includes a provision offered by Subcommittee Chairman Henry Bonilla (R-Texas) that would stop USDA from implementing the country-of-origin labeling law for meat and meat products.

http://www.vermontagriculture.com/Agriview%20Online/Agriview070103/agriviewonline1.htm

House Passes Amendment Blocking COOL

http://www.porknet.com/page.cfm?PageID=&PassLevel=&menu=&AppContinue=Articles%2FArticle&ID=99981&Newsletter=true


The House Agriculture Appropriations bill was passed in July," Katy Ziegler, of the National Farmers Union, said. "It contains language to prohibit (the) USDA from spending any more funds to implement COOL for meat products for one year. This rider was included by Rep. (Henry) Bonilla (R-Texas) via the request of meatpackers in Texas who hate COOL."

http://64.233.187.104/search?q=cache:ZzvXcUoDyGIJ:www.the-land.com/column.php%3Fstoryid%3D66+COOL+Bonilla-R-Texas+++PACKERS&hl=en


Rep. Henry Bonilla, R-Texas: "This country-of-origin labeling provision that was put in the Farm Bill last year is controversial and costly."

http://www.iptv.org/mtom/archivedfeature.cfm?Fid=220


News Release
USDA seeks comments on animal-ID plan, May 10, 2005
Last week Agriculture Secretary Mike Johanns unveiled a “thinking paper” and timeline on the National Animal Identification System and asked for feedback on the draft plan from industry stakeholders. The timeline calls for operational premises registration in all states by July 2005. Beginning in April 2007, the plan calls for the USDA to begin issuing “alerts” prior to premises registration and animal identification becoming mandatory in January 2008. The timeline calls for reporting of defined animal movements to become mandatory in January 2009. The agency will accept comments on the plan until June 6.

http://www.ezidavid.com/News%20Release%20USAHA%2010-02.htm

Gerald Wells: Report of the Visit to USA, April-May 1989

snip...

The general opinion of those present was that BSE, as an
overt disease phenomenon, _could exist in the USA, but if it did,
it was very rare. The need for improved and specific surveillance
methods to detect it as recognised...

snip...

It is clear that USDA have little information and _no_ regulatory
responsibility for rendering plants in the US...

snip...

3. Prof. A. Robertson gave a brief account of BSE. The US approach
was to accord it a _very low profile indeed_. Dr. A Thiermann showed
the picture in the ''Independent'' with cattle being incinerated and thought
this was a fanatical incident to be _avoided_ in the US _at all costs_...

snip...

http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m11b/tab01.pdf

To be published in the Proceedings of the
Fourth International Scientific Congress in
Fur Animal Production. Toronto, Canada,
August 21-28, 1988

Evidence That Transmissible Mink Encephalopathy
Results from Feeding Infected Cattle

R.F. Marsh* and G.R. Hartsough

•Department of Veterinary Science, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison,
Wisconsin 53706; and ^Emba/Creat Lakes Ranch Service, Thiensville, Wisconsin 53092

ABSTRACT
Epidemiologic investigation of a new incidence of
transmissible mink encephalopathy (TME) in Stetsonville, Wisconsin
suggests that the disease may have resulted from feeding infected
cattle to mink. This observation is supported by the transmission of
a TME-like disease to experimentally inoculated cattle, and by the
recent report of a new bovine spongiform encephalopathy in
England.

INTRODUCTION

Transmissible mink encephalopathy (TME) was first reported in 1965 by Hartsough
and Burger who demonstrated that the disease was transmissible with a long incubation
period, and that affected mink had a spongiform encephalopathy similar to that found in
scrapie-affecied sheep (Hartsough and Burger, 1965; Burger and Hartsough, 1965).
Because of the similarity between TME and scrapie, and the subsequent finding that the
two transmissible agents were indistinguishable (Marsh and Hanson, 1969), it was
concluded that TME most likely resulted from feeding mink scrapie-infecied sheep.
The experimental transmission of sheep scrapie to mink (Hanson et al., 1971)
confirmed the close association of TME and scrapie, but at the same time provided
evidence that they may be different. Epidemiologic studies on previous incidences of
TME indicated that the incubation periods in field cases were between six months and
one year in length (Harxsough and Burger, 1965). Experimentally, scrapie could not be
transmitted to mink in less than one year.
To investigate the possibility that TME may be caused by a (particular strain of
scrapie which might be highly pathogenic for mink, 21 different strains of the scrapie
agent, including their sheep or goat sources, were inoculated into a total of 61 mink.
Only one mink developed a progressive neurologic disease after an incubation period of
22 mon..s (Marsh and Hanson, 1979). These results indicated that TME was either caused
by a strain of sheep scrapie not yet tested, or was due to exposure to a scrapie-like agent
from an unidentified source.

OBSERVATIONS AND RESULTS

A New Incidence of TME. In April of 1985, a mink rancher in Stetsonville, Wisconsin
reported that many of his mink were "acting funny", and some had died. At this time, we
visited the farm and found that approximately 10% of all adult mink were showing
typical signs of TME: insidious onset characterized by subtle behavioral changes, loss of
normal habits of cleanliness, deposition of droppings throughout the pen rather than in a
single area, hyperexcitability, difficulty in chewing and swallowing, and tails arched over
their _backs like squirrels. These signs were followed by progressive deterioration of
neurologic function beginning with locomoior incoordination, long periods of somnolence
in which the affected mink would stand motionless with its head in the corner of the
cage, complete debilitation, and death. Over the next 8-10 weeks, approximately 40% of
all the adult mink on the farm died from TME.
Since previous incidences of TME were associated with common or shared feeding
practices, we obtained a careful history of feed ingredients used over the past 12-18
months. The rancher was a "dead stock" feeder using mostly (>95%) downer or dead dairy
cattle and a few horses. Sheep had never been fed.

Experimental Transmission. The clinical diagnosis of TME was confirmed by
histopaihologic examination and by experimental transmission to mink after incubation
periods of four months. To investigate the possible involvement of cattle in this disease
cycle, two six-week old castrated Holstein bull calves were inoculated intracerebrally
with a brain suspension from affected mink. Each developed a fatal spongiform
encephalopathy after incubation periods of 18 and 19 months.

DISCUSSION
These findings suggest that TME may result from feeding mink infected cattle and
we have alerted bovine practitioners that there may exist an as yet unrecognized
scrapie-like disease of cattle in the United States (Marsh and Hartsough, 1986). A new
bovine spongiform encephalopathy has recently been reported in England (Wells et al.,
1987), and investigators are presently studying its transmissibility and possible
relationship to scrapie. Because this new bovine disease in England is characterized by
behavioral changes, hyperexcitability, and agressiveness, it is very likely it would be
confused with rabies in the United Stales and not be diagnosed. Presently, brains from
cattle in the United States which are suspected of rabies infection are only tested with
anti-rabies virus antibody and are not examined histopathologically for lesions of
spongiform encephalopathy.
We are presently pursuing additional studies to further examine the possible
involvement of cattle in the epidemiology of TME. One of these is the backpassage of
our experimental bovine encephalopathy to mink. Because (here are as yet no agent-
specific proteins or nucleic acids identified for these transmissible neuropathogens, one
means of distinguishing them is by animal passage and selection of the biotype which
grows best in a particular host. This procedure has been used to separate hamster-
adapted and mink-udapted TME agents (Marsh and Hanson, 1979). The intracerebral
backpassage of the experimental bovine agent resulted in incubations of only four months
indicating no de-adaptation of the Stetsonville agent for mink after bovine passage.
Mink fed infected bovine brain remain normal after six months. It will be essential to
demonstrate oral transmission fiom bovine to mink it this proposed epidemiologic
association is to be confirmed.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
These studies were supported by the College of Agricultural and Life Sciences,
University of Wisconsin-Madison and by a grant (85-CRCR-1-1812) from the United
States Department of Agriculture. The authors also wish to acknowledge the help and
encouragement of Robert Hanson who died during the course of these investigations.

REFERENCES
Burger, D. and Hartsough, G.R. 1965. Encephalopathy of mink. II. Experimental and
natural transmission. J. Infec. Dis. 115:393-399.
Hanson, R.P., Eckroade, R.3., Marsh, R.F., ZuRhein, C.M., Kanitz, C.L. and Gustatson,
D.P. 1971. Susceptibility of mink to sheep scrapie. Science 172:859-861.
Hansough, G.R. and Burger, D. 1965. Encephalopathy of mink. I. Epizoociologic and
clinical observations. 3. Infec. Dis. 115:387-392.
Marsh, R.F. and Hanson, R.P. 1969. Physical and chemical properties of the
transmissible mink encephalopathy agent. 3. ViroL 3:176-180.
Marsh, R.F. and Hanson, R.P. 1979. On the origin of transmissible mink
encephalopathy. In Hadlow, W.J. and Prusiner, S.P. (eds.) Slow transmissible
diseases of the nervous system. Vol. 1, Academic Press, New York, pp 451-460.
Marsh, R.F. and Hartsough, G.R. 1986. Is there a scrapie-like disease in cattle?
Proceedings of the Seventh Annual Western Conference for Food Animal Veterinary
Medicine. University of Arizona, pp 20.
Wells, G.A.H., Scott, A.C., Johnson, C.T., Cunning, R.F., Hancock, R.D., Jeffrey, M.,
Dawson, M. and Bradley, R. 1987. A novel progressive spongiform encephalopathy
in cattle. Vet. Rec. 121:419-420.

MARSH

http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m09/tab05.pdf


WE need to vote these BOUGHT AND PAID FOR, CORPORATE OWNED @holes out of office,
NO MATTER WHAT PARTY THEY ARE WITH. IT should be about the people, for the people, but
it is just the opposite, it's about the industry and for the industry, to hell with human health...


1: J Infect Dis 1980 Aug;142(2):205-8


Oral transmission of kuru, Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, and scrapie to nonhuman primates.

Gibbs CJ Jr, Amyx HL, Bacote A, Masters CL, Gajdusek DC.

Kuru and Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease of humans and scrapie disease of sheep and goats were transmitted to squirrel monkeys (Saimiri sciureus) that were exposed to the infectious agents only by their nonforced consumption of known infectious tissues. The asymptomatic incubation period in the one monkey exposed to the virus of kuru was 36 months; that in the two monkeys exposed to the virus of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease was 23 and 27 months, respectively; and that in the two monkeys exposed to the virus of scrapie was 25 and 32 months, respectively. Careful physical examination of the buccal cavities of all of the monkeys failed to reveal signs or oral lesions. One additional monkey similarly exposed to kuru has remained asymptomatic during the 39 months that it has been under observation.

PMID: 6997404
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=6997404&dopt=Abstract



1: J Neurol Neurosurg Psychiatry 1994 Jun;57(6):757-8


Transmission of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease to a chimpanzee by electrodes contaminated during neurosurgery.

Gibbs CJ Jr, Asher DM, Kobrine A, Amyx HL, Sulima MP, Gajdusek DC.

Laboratory of Central Nervous System Studies, National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke, National Institutes of Health, Bethesda, MD 20892.

Stereotactic multicontact electrodes used to probe the cerebral cortex of a middle aged woman with progressive dementia were previously implicated in the accidental transmission of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) to two younger patients. The diagnoses of CJD have been confirmed for all three cases. More than two years after their last use in humans, after three cleanings and repeated sterilisation in ethanol and formaldehyde vapour, the electrodes were implanted in the cortex of a chimpanzee. Eighteen months later the animal became ill with CJD. This finding serves to re-emphasise the potential danger posed by reuse of instruments contaminated with the agents of spongiform encephalopathies, even after scrupulous attempts to clean them.

PMID: 8006664 [PubMed - indexed for MEDLINE]
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=8006664&dopt=Abstract


SCRAPIE USA MONTHLY REPORT 2005

AS of March 31, 2005, there were 70 scrapie infected source flocks (Figure 3). There were 11 new infected and source flocks reported in March (Figure 4) with a total of 51 flocks reported for FY 2005 (Figure 5). The total infected and source flocks that have been released in FY 2005 are 39 (Figure 6), with 1 flock released in March. The ratio of infected and source flocks released to newly infected and source flocks for FY 2005 = 0.76 : 1. IN addition, as of March 31, 2005, 225 scrapie cases have been confirmed and reported by the National Veterinary Services Laboratories (NVSL), of which 53 were RSSS cases (Figure 7). This includes 57 newly confirmed cases in March 2005 (Figure 8). Fourteen cases of scrapie in goats have been reported since 1990 (Figure 9). The last goat cases was reported in January 2005. New infected flocks, source flocks, and flocks released or put on clean-up plans for FY 2005 are depicted in Figure 10. ...

FULL TEXT ;

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/vs/nahps/scrapie/monthly_report/monthly-report.html


USDA CWD PROGRAM

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/vs/nahps/cwd/

USDA CWD MAP (slow to update)

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/vs/nahps/cwd/cwd-distribution.html


CWD NEW YORK

http://www.agmkt.state.ny.us/AI/cwd.html

http://www.nyhealth.gov/nysdoh/zoonoses/cwd.htm



Gerald Wells: Report of the Visit to USA, April-May 1989

snip...

The general opinion of those present was that BSE, as an
overt disease phenomenon, _could exist in the USA, but if it did,
it was very rare. The need for improved and specific surveillance
methods to detect it as recognised...

snip...

It is clear that USDA have little information and _no_ regulatory
responsibility for rendering plants in the US...

snip...

3. Prof. A. Robertson gave a brief account of BSE. The US approach
was to accord it a _very low profile indeed_. Dr. A Thiermann showed
the picture in the ''Independent'' with cattle being incinerated and thought
this was a fanatical incident to be _avoided_ in the US _at all costs_...

snip...

http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m11b/tab01.pdf

To be published in the Proceedings of the
Fourth International Scientific Congress in
Fur Animal Production. Toronto, Canada,
August 21-28, 1988

Evidence That Transmissible Mink Encephalopathy
Results from Feeding Infected Cattle

R.F. Marsh* and G.R. Hartsough

•Department of Veterinary Science, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison,
Wisconsin 53706; and ^Emba/Creat Lakes Ranch Service, Thiensville, Wisconsin 53092

ABSTRACT
Epidemiologic investigation of a new incidence of
transmissible mink encephalopathy (TME) in Stetsonville, Wisconsin
suggests that the disease may have resulted from feeding infected
cattle to mink. This observation is supported by the transmission of
a TME-like disease to experimentally inoculated cattle, and by the
recent report of a new bovine spongiform encephalopathy in
England.

INTRODUCTION

Transmissible mink encephalopathy (TME) was first reported in 1965 by Hartsough
and Burger who demonstrated that the disease was transmissible with a long incubation
period, and that affected mink had a spongiform encephalopathy similar to that found in
scrapie-affecied sheep (Hartsough and Burger, 1965; Burger and Hartsough, 1965).
Because of the similarity between TME and scrapie, and the subsequent finding that the
two transmissible agents were indistinguishable (Marsh and Hanson, 1969), it was
concluded that TME most likely resulted from feeding mink scrapie-infecied sheep.
The experimental transmission of sheep scrapie to mink (Hanson et al., 1971)
confirmed the close association of TME and scrapie, but at the same time provided
evidence that they may be different. Epidemiologic studies on previous incidences of
TME indicated that the incubation periods in field cases were between six months and
one year in length (Harxsough and Burger, 1965). Experimentally, scrapie could not be
transmitted to mink in less than one year.
To investigate the possibility that TME may be caused by a (particular strain of
scrapie which might be highly pathogenic for mink, 21 different strains of the scrapie
agent, including their sheep or goat sources, were inoculated into a total of 61 mink.
Only one mink developed a progressive neurologic disease after an incubation period of
22 mon..s (Marsh and Hanson, 1979). These results indicated that TME was either caused
by a strain of sheep scrapie not yet tested, or was due to exposure to a scrapie-like agent
from an unidentified source.

OBSERVATIONS AND RESULTS

A New Incidence of TME. In April of 1985, a mink rancher in Stetsonville, Wisconsin
reported that many of his mink were "acting funny", and some had died. At this time, we
visited the farm and found that approximately 10% of all adult mink were showing
typical signs of TME: insidious onset characterized by subtle behavioral changes, loss of
normal habits of cleanliness, deposition of droppings throughout the pen rather than in a
single area, hyperexcitability, difficulty in chewing and swallowing, and tails arched over
their _backs like squirrels. These signs were followed by progressive deterioration of
neurologic function beginning with locomoior incoordination, long periods of somnolence
in which the affected mink would stand motionless with its head in the corner of the
cage, complete debilitation, and death. Over the next 8-10 weeks, approximately 40% of
all the adult mink on the farm died from TME.
Since previous incidences of TME were associated with common or shared feeding
practices, we obtained a careful history of feed ingredients used over the past 12-18
months. The rancher was a "dead stock" feeder using mostly (>95%) downer or dead dairy
cattle and a few horses. Sheep had never been fed.

Experimental Transmission. The clinical diagnosis of TME was confirmed by
histopaihologic examination and by experimental transmission to mink after incubation
periods of four months. To investigate the possible involvement of cattle in this disease
cycle, two six-week old castrated Holstein bull calves were inoculated intracerebrally
with a brain suspension from affected mink. Each developed a fatal spongiform
encephalopathy after incubation periods of 18 and 19 months.

DISCUSSION
These findings suggest that TME may result from feeding mink infected cattle and
we have alerted bovine practitioners that there may exist an as yet unrecognized
scrapie-like disease of cattle in the United States (Marsh and Hartsough, 1986). A new
bovine spongiform encephalopathy has recently been reported in England (Wells et al.,
1987), and investigators are presently studying its transmissibility and possible
relationship to scrapie. Because this new bovine disease in England is characterized by
behavioral changes, hyperexcitability, and agressiveness, it is very likely it would be
confused with rabies in the United Stales and not be diagnosed. Presently, brains from
cattle in the United States which are suspected of rabies infection are only tested with
anti-rabies virus antibody and are not examined histopathologically for lesions of
spongiform encephalopathy.
We are presently pursuing additional studies to further examine the possible
involvement of cattle in the epidemiology of TME. One of these is the backpassage of
our experimental bovine encephalopathy to mink. Because (here are as yet no agent-
specific proteins or nucleic acids identified for these transmissible neuropathogens, one
means of distinguishing them is by animal passage and selection of the biotype which
grows best in a particular host. This procedure has been used to separate hamster-
adapted and mink-udapted TME agents (Marsh and Hanson, 1979). The intracerebral
backpassage of the experimental bovine agent resulted in incubations of only four months
indicating no de-adaptation of the Stetsonville agent for mink after bovine passage.
Mink fed infected bovine brain remain normal after six months. It will be essential to
demonstrate oral transmission fiom bovine to mink it this proposed epidemiologic
association is to be confirmed.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
These studies were supported by the College of Agricultural and Life Sciences,
University of Wisconsin-Madison and by a grant (85-CRCR-1-1812) from the United
States Department of Agriculture. The authors also wish to acknowledge the help and
encouragement of Robert Hanson who died during the course of these investigations.

REFERENCES
Burger, D. and Hartsough, G.R. 1965. Encephalopathy of mink. II. Experimental and
natural transmission. J. Infec. Dis. 115:393-399.
Hanson, R.P., Eckroade, R.3., Marsh, R.F., ZuRhein, C.M., Kanitz, C.L. and Gustatson,
D.P. 1971. Susceptibility of mink to sheep scrapie. Science 172:859-861.
Hansough, G.R. and Burger, D. 1965. Encephalopathy of mink. I. Epizoociologic and
clinical observations. 3. Infec. Dis. 115:387-392.
Marsh, R.F. and Hanson, R.P. 1969. Physical and chemical properties of the
transmissible mink encephalopathy agent. 3. ViroL 3:176-180.
Marsh, R.F. and Hanson, R.P. 1979. On the origin of transmissible mink
encephalopathy. In Hadlow, W.J. and Prusiner, S.P. (eds.) Slow transmissible
diseases of the nervous system. Vol. 1, Academic Press, New York, pp 451-460.
Marsh, R.F. and Hartsough, G.R. 1986. Is there a scrapie-like disease in cattle?
Proceedings of the Seventh Annual Western Conference for Food Animal Veterinary
Medicine. University of Arizona, pp 20.
Wells, G.A.H., Scott, A.C., Johnson, C.T., Cunning, R.F., Hancock, R.D., Jeffrey, M.,
Dawson, M. and Bradley, R. 1987. A novel progressive spongiform encephalopathy
in cattle. Vet. Rec. 121:419-420.

MARSH

http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m09/tab05.pdf


TSS



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