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From: TSS ()
Subject: Re: Draft position of the Community on the report of the meeting of the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Standards Commission [Paris January 2005] BSe
Date: May 29, 2005 at 7:12 am PST
----- Original Message -----
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
To:
Sent: Sunday, May 29, 2005 9:10 AM
Subject: Re: Draft position of the Community on the report of the meeting of the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Standards Commission [Paris January 2005] to be submitted for consideration and possible adoption in the 73rd General Session to be held in May 2005 in Pa
> ##################### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy #####################
>
> Perplexed by the USDA
>
> I am perplexed by the United States Department of Agriculture, Animal and
> Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS). At Cattlemen's Day, in Billings,
> Montana, on November 13, 2004, Dr. Jose Diez, Director Western Region,
> Veterinary Services, made a presentation to the Montana Cattlemen's
> Association concerning the Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE-Mad Cow
> Disease) situation in the United States and Canada. Dr. Diez told the large
> group of cattlemen, cattlewomen, press, including press from Japan, and four
> practicing veterinarians, that the USDA was pursuing a "Risk Based Trade"
> with Canada.
>
> This Risk Based Trade is actually an attempt to negotiate down guidelines
> set in place by the Office of International Epizootics (OIE). The OIE is an
> international group of scientists and veterinarians that set guidelines and
> regulations that attempt to control and limit the spread of diseases that
> could potentially spread from animals to humans. The OIE has very specific
> guidelines concerning countries that have had BSE identified within their
> borders. Countries that have identified natural cases of BSE, but have not
> completed at least 7 years of Risk Assessment, are classified as BSE
> Moderate Risk Countries. Since BSE is a disease with an extremely long
> incubation period, the 7-year waiting period is utilized to protect a BSE
> free country from receiving animals from a known infected country that could
> be harboring the disease. Potentially infected cattle could be exhibiting
> no symptoms of BSE, but could be incubating the disease while shedding the
> infective agent.
>
> The OIE issued these complex guidelines in response to a severe outbreak of
> BSE in Europe, which resulted in the death or destruction of several million
> head of cattle. The object of the OIE guidelines is to contain the prions
> that cause BSE in a known geographical location and prevent their
> contamination to areas known to be free of BSE, while establishing
> guidelines for future trade in live cattle and beef. Canada is a country
> with five known cases of BSE: One case in the early 1990's, one case in May
> 2003, and one case in December 2003. Two more cases have been identified in
> 2004 and early 2005. Although the number of known cases is small, Canada is
> classified as a BSE infected country, either with Moderate or High Risk.
> Prions that cause BSE have potentially contaminated areas of the country of
> Canada. These prions probably made their way to Canada in cattle imported
> from Europe in the 1980's and early 1990's. Several head of cattle were
> imported into Canada during the hottest period of the European BSE epidemic.
> Fortunately, the United States did not import many cattle from Europe. The
> United States was capable of identifying the few head that were imported
> from Europe and destroyed those cattle quickly or studied them until their
> natural death. Canada has a much closer trading relationship with Europe,
> and as a result, has reaped the harvest.
>
> Knowing all this, the USDA has taken a leading role in discussions with
> other countries to lower the standards of classification for medium and low
> risk BSE infected countries. In other words, instead of following closely
> the guidelines and regulations that have kept BSE out of the United States
> in the past, the USDA has proposed a new set of guidelines that would
> shorten the BSE code allowing three new classifications, based on what they
> term as acceptable risk. The process is designed to allow Canadian beef and
> live cattle into the United States without satisfying the 7-year waiting
> period. The USDA has determined that the risk of spreading BSE to the
> United States is minimal. In addition, the USDA has determined that the
> risk of spreading BSE into the United States is acceptable. This means they
> recognize the possibility of spreading BSE into the United States exists,
> but they believe the USDA proposed rules for dealing with Specified Risk
> Materials, such as bovine meat and bone meal, will contain it.
>
> If this disease were Brucellosis, Tuberculosis, or Foot and Mouth Disease,
> the USDA would require several years of negative tests before allowing
> cattle into the US from Canada. Even within the United States itself, a
> state cannot be considered Brucellosis free until it has satisfied a
> rigorous series of tests, and several years of no reported cases. If
> Brucellosis was known to exist in a state, cattle would have to be tested
> negative before interstate movement would be allowed. In most cases,
> another test would be required on live animals 60 to 90 days later, and then
> again at 1 year. In the case of BSE and Canada, the USDA wants to
> reclassify Canada as a country with Proposed Negligible BSE Risk or Proposed
> Controlled BSE Risk. This decision is based on Canada's proposed control
> program. Remember that Canada discovered a case of BSE in a cow in May of
> 2003. After convincing the USDA that control measures were adequate, the
> USDA reopened trade in beef with Canada. Then another case was identified
> in a Canadian cow in December of 2003, which had been exported into the
> State of Washington. When this second case in 2003 was discovered, the USDA
> was supposed to shut off all beef trade with Canada until new trading rules
> had been established. They failed to do so.
>
> Surveillance is an important measure for determining if a particular disease
> contaminates a given population of cattle. The United States has tested
> nearly 130,000 cattle since January 1, 2004 for BSE, and has plans to test
> over 200,000 higher risk animals. No positive cases have been identified.
> During the same time period, Canada has tested less than 10,000 head of
> high-risk cattle. Several countries have pressured Canada to step up
> surveillance. Only recently has Canada issued press releases stating the
> country intends to step up surveillance in 2005. In those press releases,
> the Canadian Agricultural officials state they expect to find more cases of
> BSE in Canada. If that is the case, why would the USDA be attempting to get
> the border open and risk contamination of US soil with BSE prions? Even if
> a natural case of BSE was identified within the borders of the Untied
> States, why would the USDA be willing to allow additional cases to enter the
> US from Canada? Let's put out one fire at a time, thank you.
>
> The prions that cause BSE are basically indestructible. Research has
> determined that Scrapie prions buried for three years are still capable of
> causing disease when injected into laboratory animals. Cattle with BSE
> could potentially shed prions in their feces, nasal discharges, saliva, and
> reproductive discharges. Mirror image diseases, like Scrapie in sheep and
> goats and Chronic Wasting Disease in deer and elk, have been identified to
> spread prions to negative sheep, goats, deer, and elk by these bodily
> discharges. These prions could contaminate soil in paddocks, lots, feeding
> pens, and pastures. In Europe, it has been demonstrated that less than one
> intake of 10 milligrams of neural tissue can spread Mad Cow Disease from one
> animal to another. That is why keeping meat and bone meal out of cattle
> diets is so very important. Prions are ingested and replicate in lymphatic
> tissues in the intestinal tract before making their way to the central
> nervous system. There they cause the destruction of brain tissue, which
> results in the typical symptoms of Mad Cow Disease. The truly scary thing
> about all this is new variant Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease (nvCJD). The prions
> that cause BSE are the same prions that cause nvCJD. Although the most
> common mode of infection is oral ingestion of contaminated beef or beef
> byproducts, prions in the environment are considered biological hazards by
> many governments and research facilities. Patients that ingest BSE prions
> and develop nvCJD die a horrible death. There is no treatment for BSE or
> nvCJD. Dr. Stanley Prusiner, the medical researcher who discovered and
> identified the structure of BSE prions, has told the USDA that any exposure
> to BSE prions is potentially dangerous. Although consumers cannot consume
> enough prions to cause BSE, the prions they do consume may trigger an
> irreversible conversion process that converts normal cellular prions into
> the prions that cause nvCJD. Dr. Prusiner does not know how many exposures
> it takes to cause this conversion process, but some individuals with a
> particular genetic code are known to be extremely susceptible to developing
> nvCJD.
>
> It is the mandate of USDA APHIS to protect the health of cattle and
> livestock within the borders of the United States. It is not their mandate
> to lower the standards so Canada may export cattle into the US. If this was
> any other disease that had three cases identified within the last 10 years,
> one case less than 12 months ago, the USDA would not consider allowing
> possibly infected cattle to cross the border into the United States. As a
> veterinarian I have been trained to assist the USDA in maintaining the
> health of the US cattle population. I have been accredited by APHIS to
> assist in disease control, cattle testing, and containment of disease
> outbreaks. I would have never guessed that USDA APHIS would be considering
> "Risk Based Trade". The risk is there, and it is not acceptable. The
> answer to the Canadian BSE problem cannot be found by potentially spreading
> the disease into the United States. Let's solve this disease problem in one
> country at a time.
>
> Researchers are feverishly working to develop a live animal test to identify
> cattle carrying BSE prions. Why not wait a few months, or even a few years,
> until this test is available? Once Canada has performed the proper
> surveillance and satisfied OIE guidelines, then test each animal being
> imported. If the animal is negative, permanently identify the animal when
> it enters the US, and continue surveillance until the animal dies or is
> slaughtered. This method would reduce the risk of introduction of BSE
> prions into the United States to a minimum. At the least, proper
> identification would allow for trace back, slaughter of exposed animals, and
> control of a potentially dangerous disease.
>
> In Europe and Japan, BSE is being identified in younger and younger animals.
> Mad Cow Disease prions apparently become more virulent when they are passed
> down to successive generations. Countries all over Europe are currently
> identifying new cases of BSE, even though those countries have not fed any
> meat and bone meal since the early 1990's. Early cases were identified in
> older animals. Presently, 2 or 3 generations removed, cases are being
> identified in animals less than 2 years of age. At least one case has even
> been identified in an animal less than one year of age. This phenomenon is
> consistent with what researchers have discovered about BSE in laboratory
> animals. As the disease is transferred down several generations, the
> incubation period becomes shorter.
>
> No one has given an acceptable explanation as to how cattle are being
> exposed to BSE prions in countries where the feeding of meat and bone meal
> has been outlawed for over 15 years!!! The unfortunate victims of BSE are
> coming into contact with the prions somewhere. Knowing the fact that prions
> are indestructible, knowing the fact that prions may seed down the
> environment, knowing there is no method of satisfactory disinfection for BSE
> prions, and knowing there is no treatment for animals that contract BSE, why
> would the USDA consider allowing such a horrendous disease to enter the
> United States of America? The real answer will surprise you:
>
> 1) The USDA subscribes to the idea that BSE can arise in a particular
> population of cattle spontaneously. In other words, the USDA believes BSE
> may, in fact, already infect cattle in the United States through the process
> of spontaneous generation of the abnormal prions that cause BSE. I have
> heard with my own ears this theory espoused by a USDA veterinarian at the
> January 2003 annual Kansas Cattlemen's Association convention at Dodge City,
> Kansas. This USDA veterinarian even expressed his view that the US may have
> exported BSE to Canada in the early 1990's with the exportation of US meat
> and bone meal to the Canadian feed industry.
> 2) The USDA has determined that the US beef cattle industry is part of a
> North American system. Beef cattle in Canada, the United States, and Mexico
> are all part of one big integrated system. Chandler Keys, a National
> Cattlemen's Association spokesman has stated this concept in this manner,
> and I quote, "It's a good lesson for all of us," said Keys. "We've got to
> strive to work together. We're a North American system." The last time I
> looked, no Canadian has offered to pay my income taxes, property taxes, or
> veterinary inspection fees. When I called the Canadian Embassy and asked
> about exporting cattle from Missouri to Alberta, I was told Canada would not
> accept cattle from Missouri because of the possibility of Missouri cattle
> being infected with Blue Tongue and Anaplasmosis. So much for a North
> American cattle industry.
> 3) The USDA is convinced that by boning out meat and removing certain
> Specified Risk Materials (brain, spinal chord, lymph nodes, ileum, etc), the
> risk of spreading BSE prions is minimal. This may well be an acceptable
> method to reduce spread of BSE prions associated with raw meat, but what
> about live cattle? Live cattle harboring BSE prions, like live deer and elk
> that harbor Chronic Wasting Disease prions, shed BSE prions into their
> environment and may take months or years to actually die of this dread
> disease. Italy, England, Ireland, and Spain all have discovered many new
> cases of BSE in live cattle during this past year. They have had control
> measures in place since the late 1980's and early 1990's. Japan continues
> to discover new cases of BSE in younger and younger animals. We cannot
> afford to have consumer confidence in beef potentially undermined by
> continually finding new, and unexplained, cases of BSE in the United States.
>
> As a practicing veterinarian who has taken an oath to protect the health of
> humans and the animals that feed, clothe, and provide emotional comfort for
> humans, I am disturbed that the agency charged with protecting the United
> States cattle industry seems to have their judgment swayed by free trade
> issues. In the past, both Canada and the United States have maintained the
> hard line of no trade in beef with any country that has identified a case of
> Mad Cow Disease, even to the point of prohibiting importation of embryo's or
> semen from a country with a known natural case of BSE. This hard line of
> defense has kept BSE out of the United States. I cannot understand why this
> line of defense, which has served the United States so well, should be
> relaxed before a live animal test has been developed to identify BSE
> positive cattle. Relaxing such standards may result in the same
> circumstances that Europe and Japan find themselves in currently. I have
> just attended a day-long seminar on Epizootic Diseases conducted by the USDA
> and the Missouri Department of Agriculture and the Missouri Department of
> Health. Mad Cow Disease has been identified as a political disease. Where
> countries with Foot and Mouth Disease virus cases are prevented to trade
> with the United States, countries with Mad Cow Disease (BSE) will be allowed
> to trade with the United States. Canada is not the only BSE positive
> country that wants to trade with the United States. When this Pandora's Box
> is opened, the United States will be required to receive beef and live
> animals from any BSE positive country that has satisfied the new OIE
> qualifications. Basically, any country that can prove it has developed a
> satisfactory BSE control program will be allowed to export beef into the
> United States.
>
> I know that I am not the only perplexed practicing veterinarian in the
> United States. Our education and training have not prepared us to
> understand a political disease. Canada has been forbidden to trade beef
> with most of her former trading partners except Mexico. There is no doubt
> that Canada has suffered immensely because of BSE. Because the USDA APHIS
> failed to announce that the positive cow in December 2003 was a Canadian
> cow, all of the US trading partners have forbidden beef trade. By not
> announcing that fact immediately, our trading partners consolidated their
> resistance to trade with the United States. That trade has not resumed, and
> opening the border to a know BSE infected country will not improve those
> severed trade relationships. Thus, the desire by the USDA to reclassify OIE
> guidelines, and reclassify Canada as a Moderate to Minimal Risk BSE country.
> Go figure!!!
>
> =================
>
> TSS
>
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
> To:
> Sent: Wednesday, May 25, 2005 3:53 PM
> Subject: Draft position of the Community on the report of the meeting of the
> OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Standards Commission [Paris January 2005] to
> be submitted for consideration and possible adoption in the 73rd General
> Session to be held in May 2005 in Paris
>
>
> ##################### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
> #####################
>
> Draft position of the Community on the report of the meeting of the OIE
> Terrestrial Animal Health Standards Commission [Paris January 2005] to be
> submitted for consideration and possible adoption in the 73rd General
> Session to be held in May 2005 in Paris
>
>
>
> 2
>
> COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT
>
> Draft position of the Community on the report of the meeting of the OIE
> Terrestrial
>
> Animal Health Standards Commission [Paris January 2005] to be submitted for
>
> consideration and possible adoption in the 73rd General Session to be held
> in May 2005
>
> in Paris
>
> UNION EUROPEENNE
>
> Bruxelles, le
>
> D(2005) 520441 HLB
>
> Subject : General session of the OIE
>
> Dear Director General,
>
> Please find attached as Annex I the position of the Community concerning the
> report of the
>
> Terrestrial Animal Health Standards Commission in view of the preparation of
> the General
>
> Session to be held in May 2005 in Paris. In addition the Community positions
> on revisions to
>
> the OIE diagnostic manual are included as Annex II and the Community has
> also attached a
>
> list of BSE tests which it would like included in the OIE Diagnostic Manual
> at Annex III.
>
> Relating to the proposed amendments to the BSE chapter and the Appendix on
> surveillance
>
> the Member States expressed unanimously the position that any amendment of
> the three key
>
> topics i.e. list of tradeable products, number of categories and
> surveillance is seen as a
>
> package. Therefore the endorsement of the list of tradeable products will
> only be possible if
>
> the proposed amendments on the BSE chapter and the Appendix on surveillance
> can be
>
> supported by the Member States
>
> Furthermore the Community supports the new designations of (1) Switzerland
> as a country
>
> free from CBPP without vaccination, (2)a zone in Peru free from FMD without
> vaccination,
>
> (3) a zone and certain municipalities in Brazil free from FMD with
> vaccination, (4) certain
>
> zones of Colombia free from FMD with vaccination, (5)Lebanon, Nigeria and
> Tanzania as
>
> free from rinderpest disease, (6) Benin, Bhutan, Eritrea, Mongolia, Senegal,
> Togo and Turkey
>
> free from rinderpest infection, (7) a described zone in Ethiopia and one in
> Sudan free from
>
> rinderpest disease.
>
> I trust you will take the Community points on board prior to or during the
> meeting
>
> Thank you for your continued cooperation
>
> Kind regards
>
> Dr. Arthur Besch Jaana Husu-Kallio
>
> Directeur Deputy Director General
>
> Administration des Services Vétérinaires
>
> Luxembourg
>
> Enclosures: 2
>
> Copy: CVOs all Member States
>
> CVOs Andorra, Bulgaria, Iceland, Norway, Romania and Switzerland
>
> Dr. B. Vallat
>
> Directeur général OIE
>
> 12 rue de Prony
>
> F-75017 Paris
>
>
>
> 4
>
> Original: English
>
> January 2005
>
> PRELIMINARY VERSION OF THE REPORT OF THE MEETING OF THE
>
> OIE TERRESTRIAL ANIMAL HEALTH STANDARDS COMMISSION
>
> Paris, 17-28 January 2005
>
> ______
>
> The OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Standards Commission (hereafter referred
> to as the
>
> Terrestrial Code Commission) met at the OIE Headquarters in Paris from 17-28
> January 2005,
>
> and discussed some common issues with the Scientific Commission for Animal
> Diseases
>
> (hereafter referred to as the Scientific Commission) on 18 January 2005. The
> President of the
>
> Terrestrial Code Commission also met with the Aquatic Animal Health
> Standards
>
> Commission (hereafter referred to as the Aquatic Animals Commission).
>
> The members of the Terrestrial Code Commission are listed in Appendix I. The
> agenda
>
> adopted is given in Appendix II.
>
> The Director General of the OIE, Dr B. Vallat, welcomed the members and
> thanked them all
>
> for their willingness to participate in this important OIE work. He
> emphasised his strong
>
> commitment towards progress on some important texts, especially those
> concerning bovine
>
> spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) and avian influenza, as a result of the
> discussions at the
>
> 72nd General Session:
>
> - regarding BSE, Dr Vallat was confident that the Member Countries would
> support a three
>
> category approach but the level of surveillance required remained an issue
> for many
>
> Member Countries; he supported the Terrestrial Code Commission's emphasis on
> safe
>
> commodities and considered that 'boneless skeletal muscle meat' was an
> important
>
> commodity which needed to be discussed in this regard;
>
> - Dr Vallat considered that it was important for the Terrestrial Code
> Commission to
>
> harmonise the work done by experts and the Scientific Commission in revising
> the
>
> chapters and in drafting surveillance appendices for foot and mouth disease
> (FMD), BSE
>
> and avian influenza; .....
>
>
>
> snip...
>
>
>
> 12
>
> 9. Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (Chapter 2.3.13. and Appendix 3.8.4.)
>
> Community position:
>
> The Community welcomes the action taken by the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health
>
> Standards Commission to draft a new text reflecting a simplified
> categorisation system for
>
> BSE but would like the detailed comments made in the Appendices taken on
> board.
>
> 13
>
> a) Chapter 2.3.13.
>
> The report of the April 2004 meeting of the ad hoc Group on the BSE chapter
> (which
>
> was included in the report of the July 2004 meeting of the Bureau) is
> attached for
>
> completeness (Appendix XXIV).
>
> The Terrestrial Code Commission was very appreciative of the detailed
> submissions
>
> received in support of its work on the proposed three category system, from
> the
>
> USA, the EU, Australia, New Zealand, Japan and Chile. The OIE Regional
>
> Commissions for Europe and the Americas also supported this approach. In
> addition,
>
> other Member Countries made comment on specific articles in this version
> (Peru, the
>
> Southern Cone countries of South America, Norway and Switzerland). An
> invited
>
> submission was also received from the gelatin manufacturing industries in
> Europe,
>
> South America, and Asia and the Pacific. Invited OIE experts also provided
>
> comments.
>
> As a result of the outcome of the discussion on BSE at the 72nd General
> Session, the
>
> universal support in comments received and the endorsement from the
> Scientific
>
> Commission, the Terrestrial Code Commission decided to prepare for adoption
> a
>
> revised BSE chapter based on the three category system. Because of the
> significant
>
> time spent on BSE during its meeting (on the chapter and surveillance
> appendix), the
>
> Terrestrial Code Commission did no further work on the five category chapter
> which
>
> was an alternative proposal in the July report.
>
> Within this support for a three category system, while Japan preferred a
> prevalencebased
>
> approach, most countries explicitly or implicitly supported a risk-based
>
> approach. The latter approach formed the basis for the changes proposed
> below by
>
> the Terrestrial Code Commission.
>
> 14
>
> The Terrestrial Code Commission was of the view that the concern over hides
> and
>
> skins from the head has arisen from a potential for surface contamination of
> the hide
>
> by brain material following penetrative stunning methods. However, it
> believed that
>
> there were many conditions which would have to be met before the
> hypothetical
>
> likelihood of contamination translated into an actual risk to human health.
> Surface
>
> contamination of the hide would be eliminated through the routine industry
> processes
>
> of soaking of the hides for hair removal and subsequent washing. In
> addition, further
>
> processing steps, e.g. for extraction and conversion into gelatin, would
> help ensure
>
> the safety of the final product. The Terrestrial Code Commission has
> proposed that
>
> the exception for hides and skins from the head be removed.
>
> With regard to blood and blood products, the Terrestrial Code Commission
> recalled
>
> the views of the BSE ad hoc Group which met in April 2004, that the
> information
>
> available indicated that bovine blood and blood by-products would be safe,
> subject to
>
> stunning having been carried out in accordance with Article 2.3.13.15.
> Accordingly,
>
> it has recommended that blood and blood products be placed in the first list
> of
>
> commodities (those which require no BSE-specific risk mitigation measures).
> (See
>
> Article 1, paragraph 1.)
>
> The Terrestrial Code Commission was of the view that there was no scientific
> basis
>
> for considering that boneless skeletal muscle meat (excluding mechanically
> derived
>
> meat) was likely to contain BSE infectivity. Mouse and calf bioassays
> conducted on
>
> muscle tissue collected from clinical cases had not detected BSE
> infectivity. The
>
> Terrestrial Code Commission recommended that boneless skeletal muscle meat
> also
>
> be placed in the first list of commodities.
>
> The Terrestrial Code Commission did not make changes to the factors to be
>
> considered in a risk assessment. The Terrestrial Code Commission followed
> the
>
> views of the BSE ad hoc Group in considering that the changes proposed by
>
> Australia and New Zealand (replacing TSEs with BSE) would have unnecessarily
>
> narrowed the scope of the risk assessment.
>
> The Terrestrial Code Commission discussed the criteria listed in Article 2
> for the
>
> determination of the BSE risk status of a country, zone or compartment.
> After
>
> considering submissions from several Member Countries that the surveillance
>
> burdens be commensurate with the BSE risk determined through a structured,
> formal
>
> science-based risk assessment, the Terrestrial Code Commission proposed that
> the
>
> formal surveillance requirements specified in Appendix 3.8.4. should not
> apply to
>
> those Member Countries where the BSE risk has been assessed as negligible.
>
> However, criteria 2, 3 and 4 of Article 2 would still apply, in particular
> the
>
> compulsory notification and investigation of all cattle showing clinical
> signs
>
> consistent with BSE. This is consistent with requirements for many other OIE
> listed
>
> diseases. The paragraphs in Article 2 on release and exposure assessments
> were
>
> modified at the recommendation of an OIE expert.
>
> Several Member Countries requested that the text on the feed ban be
> strengthened
>
> and this was done in Articles 3 and 4. In addition, in Articles 3 and 4, the
> Terrestrial
>
> Code Commission has placed more emphasis on the risk assessment and less on
>
> prevalence. In Article 4, it could not identify any significant difference
> in final risk
>
> presented regarding whether indigenous BSE had occurred more or less than 7
> years
>
> ago; accordingly, it has deleted paragraph 3) of Article 4 and reworded
> paragraph 2)
>
> to cover all circumstances in which there had been an indigenous case. The
>
> 15
>
> Terrestrial Code Commission considered that the significant difference
> between the
>
> requirements of Articles 3 and 4 was whether a Member Country could
> demonstrate
>
> that the appropriate generic measures had been in place for the relevant
> period of
>
> time.
>
> The Terrestrial Code Commission recalled that the reason for the inclusion
> of a
>
> requirement for post mortem inspection was to ensure a minimum standard of
>
> professional involvement, particularly in countries where the removal of
> specified
>
> risk materials (SRMs) was required.
>
> Comments from Member Countries which were essential to the revision of the
> three
>
> category approach were addressed by the Terrestrial Code Commission and have
>
> been included in the revised chapter; matters requiring consideration by BSE
> experts
>
> will be addressed after the 73rd General Session.
>
> 16
>
> The articles in the proposed three category chapter have been temporarily
> numbered
>
> from 1 to 16 for ease of reference. The chapter (Appendix XI) is proposed
> for
>
> adoption.
>
> b) Appendix 3.8.4.
>
> The report of the ad hoc Group on surveillance for BSE is at Appendix XXIV
> for the
>
> information of Member Countries.
>
> The Terrestrial Code Commission examined the appendix proposed by the
> experts
>
> and made some changes in line with the explanations below. The Appendix on
>
> surveillance for BSE (Appendix XII) is proposed for adoption.
>
> A commonality among submissions received was that the current surveillance
>
> requirements should be modified. However, there were also significant
> differences
>
> among submissions. Some Member Countries recommended that high levels of
>
> surveillance and risk mitigation measures be applied in all countries while
> others
>
> recommended a more balanced approach between the level of risk identified
> through
>
> the process described in Article 2 of the proposed chapter, and the severity
> of
>
> mitigating measures and the intensity of surveillance. In this latter
> category were
>
> Member Countries (New Zealand, Chile and the Southern Cone countries of
> South
>
> America) recommending a significant reduction in surveillance burdens in
> countries
>
> which had already demonstrated negligible risk.
>
> The Terrestrial Code Commission thanked Japan for its detailed submission.
> The
>
> calculations provided showed that, to prove a prevalence of less than one
> case in
>
> one million adult cattle, a greatly increased test load would need to be
> implemented.
>
> The EU also provided a detailed submission in which it reiterated its
> support for the
>
> BSurvE computer model. The Terrestrial Code Commission noted that the ad hoc
>
> Group had been reluctant to recommend the use, without adaptation, of this
> model by
>
> Member Countries. The Terrestrial Code Commission also noted that the EU had
>
> requested that the OIE assist the EU to undertake a peer-review of the
> model.
>
> The Terrestrial Code Commission noted that the 'point values' used in the
> approach
>
> recommended by the ad hoc Group had not been selected arbitrarily but were
> derived
>
> from an in-depth statistical analysis of all EU (other than the United
> Kingdom [UK])
>
> data on BSE cases detected by all methods of surveillance. The detailed
> submission
>
> received from the USA and comments from Norway supported this approach.
>
> The Terrestrial Code Commission noted that the ad hoc Group on BSE
> surveillance
>
> would need to meet again after the 73rd General Session to further consider
>
> 'maintenance surveillance'.
>
> 10. Transmissible spongiform encephalopathy agents inactivation procedures
>
> (Appendix 3.6.3.)
>
> Community position:
>
> The Community can support the amendments proposed in Appendix XIII.
>
> The revised text circulated for Member Countries' comment in July 2004
>
> (Appendix XIII) is proposed for adoption.
>
>
>
> snip... FULL TEXT SOME 594 PAGES...TSS
>
>
>
> http://europa.eu.int/comm/food/international/organisations/ah_pcad_oie17_en.
> pdf
>
>
>
> http://europa.eu.int/comm/food/international/organisations/ah_pcad_oie17_en.
> pdf
>
>
>
> Greetings list members,
>
> LIKE i said, they should hang up there jock strap, they have caved in to
> industry demands over public health. I cannot stand to read anymore of this
> crap now. i was in too good a mood before coming back to this machine to
> read junk science. they threw some 2+ decades of trying to erradicate a
> disease out the window if they adopt these standards and the TSE agent will
> spread, ALL STRAINS. some 20+ strains of sheep scrapie, with new atypical
> strains like the NOR98 emerging. BSE came from one of those strains (which
> one?), NOW we have BSE back to goat documented in natural field conditions,
> and BSE to sheep in the lab. THE old theory that BSE would not transmit to
> man was a joke, it did as nvCJD. THEN we have the old theory that blood
> would not transmit to man, that was a joke to, because it did transmit to
> man. NOW we are hearing that blood from a BSE infected cow is O.K.? there
> kidding right? hmm, what about the new strain of TSE in cattle 'BaSE'? what
> about that blood? this TSE in cattle NOT similar to nvCJD in humans but very
> similar to sporadic CJD. too early to tell exactly which one of the 6
> documented phenotypes of sporadic CJD. WHAT about the atypical TSE cow in
> Japan that showed the TSE agent in the peripheral nerve (11th BSE case of
> Japan)? what about that?
>
>
> THEN, we have the USA in a very unique situation with all kinds of
> human/animal TSEs. WE have plenty of CJD/TSE in humans, TME in mink, CWD in
> deer and elk, Scrapie in sheep and goat, BSE in VERMONT sheep imported from
> BELGUIM i will probably not live long enough to know the final out come of
> that DECLARATION OF EMERGENCY FOR AN ATYPICAL TSE IN THOSE SHEEP, that was
> declared here in the USA. WHAT about all those imported UK sheep and goat
> that were imported here to the USA, wonder if any BSE or BaSE was in any of
> those imports to the USA? most all this rendered and fed back to animals for
> human consumption and has been for decades here in the USA. the mink that
> were fed 95%+ dead stock downer cattle that came down with TME meant
> nothing?
>
> all this and the USA has no home grown TSE in there cattle and no CJD from
> any of the above?
>
> all this will be exported throughout the globe?
>
> the TSE agent continues to amplify and spread, while more humans and animals
> become exposed and die.
>
> good luck.
>
> the BSE GBR RISK ASSESSMENTS should NOT be abandoned for GWs BSE MRR policy
> or this OIE policy.
>
> the BSE GBR RISK ASSESSMENTS should be changed to the GLOBAL TSE GBR RISK
> ASSESSMENTS and this policy should be strengthened even more than the old
> BSE GBR risk assessments. ...
>
>
>
> still very disgusted in Bacliff, Texas USA
>
> Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> #################### https://lists.aegee.org/bse-l.html
> ####################
>
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>
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