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From: TSS ()
Subject: Re: USDA RELEASES TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CANADIAN FEED BAN
Date: February 26, 2005 at 9:36 am PST

In Reply to: USDA RELEASES TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CANADIAN FEED BAN posted by TSS on February 25, 2005 at 12:35 pm:

130 more pages of BSeee from USDA et al ;

ASSESSMENT OF THE CANADIAN FEED BAN FEBRUARY 2005

ASSESSMENT OF THE CANADIAN FEED BAN FEBRUARY 2005
Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary .................................................................................................................2
2 Background ..............................................................................................................................5
2.1 Overview of BSE in Canada ............................................................................................5
2.2 Animal Industry and Feeding Practices............................................................................5
2.3 Feed Industry....................................................................................................................7
2.4 Canadian Feed Ban...........................................................................................................8
2.4.1 Comparison to the U.S. System..............................................................................10
3 Addressing the Effectiveness of Feed Bans ...........................................................................12
3.1 Non-traditional Feeds.....................................................................................................14
4 U.S. Audit of the Canadian Feed Ban ....................................................................................15
4.1 Scope and Methodology.................................................................................................15
4.2 Results ............................................................................................................................16
4.2.1 U.S. Review of the CFIA Verification Program and Processes.............................16
4.2.1.1 CFIA Verification Activities at Rendering Facilities.........................................17
4.2.1.2 Verification Activities at Commercial Feed Mills and on Farms ......................18
4.2.2 Program Reviews by the CFIA Feed Inspection Group.........................................19
4.2.3 Validation of Database Records .............................................................................20
4.2.4 Summary of Electronic Inspection Reports............................................................20
4.2.4.1 Commercial Feed Mills ......................................................................................21
4.2.4.2 Rendering Plants.................................................................................................29
4.2.4.3 On-Farm Feed Mills ...........................................................................................31
5 Summary of the On-Site Inspection Review..........................................................................32
5.1 Commercial Feed Mills ..................................................................................................32
5.2 Rendering Plants.............................................................................................................33
5.3 Feed Testing Laboratory ................................................................................................34
6 Conclusions ............................................................................................................................36
Appendix 1 — Feed Ban Rule .......................................................................................................39
Appendix 2 — Inspection Form for Commercial Feed Mills (tasks related to feed ban)..............42
Appendix 3 -- Inspection Form for Rendering Facilities (tasks related to feed ban).....................62
Appendix 4 -- Inspection Forms for On-Farms…………………………………………………..83
ASSESSMENT OF THE CANADIAN FEED BAN FEBRUARY 2005
1
Abbreviations
APHIS Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
BSE Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
CFIA Canadian Food Inspection Agency
FDA Food and Drug Administration
HACCP Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point
MCAP Multi-Commodity Activity Program
NAI No Action Indicated
OAI Official Action Indicated
SRM Specified Risk Material
UK United Kingdom
USDA U.S. Department of Agriculture
VAI Voluntary Action Indicated
Definitions
Flushing: To follow a batch of feed through mixers or other equipment with a sufficient volume
of a non-prohibited ingredient, usually bulk grain or oilseed products, to flush residual material
out of the system.
Prohibited Material: Protein, or any material that contains such protein, that originated from a
mammal, other than pure porcine or equine. This does not include milk, blood, gelatin, rendered
animal fat or their products.
Sequencing: To predetermine the order of manufacturing different feed products so that any
residual prohibited material is flushed into a feed product intended for non-ruminant species.
Specified Risk Material (SRM): Tissues that, in BSE-infected cattle, contain the agent that may
transmit the disease. In diseased animals, the infective agent is concentrated in certain tissues.
SRM are defined as the skull, brain, trigeminal ganglia (nerves attached to the brain), eyes,
tonsils, spinal cord, and dorsal root ganglia (nerves attached to the spinal cord) of cattle aged 30
months or older (scientific research has shown that these tissues, in cattle younger than 30
months, do not contain the infective agent); and the distal ileum (portion of the small intestine) of
cattle of all ages.
ASSESSMENT OF THE CANADIAN FEED BAN FEBRUARY 2005
2
1 Executive Summary
On January 24, 2005, the U.S. Department of Agriculture sent a team to Canada to assess
Canada’s current feed ban and their feed inspection program to determine if the control measures
put in place by the Government of Canada are achieving compliance with these regulations.
Based on their review of inspection records and on-site observations, the inspection team found
that Canada has a robust inspection program, that overall compliance with the feed ban is good,
and that the feed ban is reducing the risk of transmission of bovine spongiform encephalopathy
(BSE) in the Canadian cattle population.
The Canadian feed ban is not substantially different than the U.S. feed ban. Both feed bans
prohibit the use of mammalian protein in ruminant feeds, with exceptions for milk products,
blood products, gelatin, and protein derived solely from porcine or equine sources. Two minor
differences between U.S. and Canadian feed regulations are that the United States allows plate
waste and poultry litter to be used in ruminant feed, whereas Canadian feed regulations make no
such allowances.
The Canadian feed ban has been implemented in stages since it was first proposed in 1996.
Leading up to Canada’s feed ban implementation in 1997, the Canadian Food Inspection Agency
(CFIA) began educating the feed industry, livestock producers, and their own inspectors with
regard to the impending regulations. All feed mills received an initial inspection between August
1997 and March 1998. At that time, none of the feed mills were found to be formulating
ruminant feeds that contained prohibited material. From 1997 to 2000, the CFIA continued to
educate, but also continued to conduct inspections to bring the feed industry into compliance with
the feed ban. Rendering facilities were required to pass an annual inspection before renewing
their permit to operate from 1998 onward. In 2000 and 2001, the CFIA modified its compliance
programs by increasing the frequency of inspections of commercial feed mills from once every
three years to every year, and they continued the annual inspection and permitting of all rendering
facilities. Since 2002, the CFIA has been conducting annual inspections of all rendering and
commercial feed mill facilities, as well as conducting inspections of some ruminant feeders and
retail feed distributors. Verification activities for Canada’s feed ban continue to be focused
primarily on inspecting commercial feed mills and rendering facilities.
In conducting feed mill inspections, CFIA’s inspectors evaluate each firm on its compliance with
86 tasks, of which, 13 are directly related to the feed ban. An unsatisfactory rating is given for
each task in which the firm is not meeting the standard. Managers of a facility with an
unsatisfactory rating must provide a plan to the inspection staff within 30 days that identifies
corrective actions to be carried out to remedy the situation. The inspectors then re-inspect the
facility within 30 days of the reported correction to verify that the corrective action has been
taken.
ASSESSMENT OF THE CANADIAN FEED BAN FEBRUARY 2005
3
Based on the U.S. evaluation of CFIA’s data, the percentage of commercial feed mills in Canada
that had unsatisfactory ratings on individual tasks has declined from 24.9 percent to 14.8 percent
between 2002 and 2004, and that most of the non-compliant tasks were related to documentation
and record-keeping. The team’s review also indicated that the overall percentage of tasks rated as
unsatisfactory for rendering facilities (excluding instances where the task was not applicable)
across the 3 years of data, declined from 9.7 percent to 2.7 percent. The review of both types of
firms identified that most of the unsatisfactory tasks were related to needed improvements for
record-keeping and documentation of procedures.
There has been a movement toward dedicated processing lines in the rendering facilities or fully
dedicated facilities. Also, since the feed ban’s inception in 1997, the industry has moved toward
dedicated feed manufacturing facilities, such that fewer commercial feed mills handle prohibited
material and manufacture feeds for ruminants.
Moreover, approximately one-third of the commercial feed mills (producing at least 60 percent of
the feed produced in commercial mills) have voluntarily become Hazard Analysis Critical
Control Point (HACCP) -certified. The HACCP program provides a framework wherein feed
mills can incorporate training of employees, developing standard operating procedures, and
maintaining appropriate records relevant to the feed ban. This proactive measure is further
evidence that the feed industry is increasing their efforts to comply with the feed ban.
The CFIA continues to revise and update their procedures to further enhance the effectiveness of
the feed ban. The CFIA intends to revise some of the inspection forms to increase the objectivity
of the standards, and to carry out additional training for the inspectors to improve standardization
in the inspection and rating process. Moreover, the CFIA has proposed the complete removal of
specified risk material (SRM) from animal feeds as an added safeguard to enhance the
effectiveness of the feed ban.
The Canadian government, feed industry, and livestock producers have substantially increased
their efforts to implement and comply with the Canadian feed ban. Based on the U.S. team’s
review of the inspection records for the past three years and on-site inspections of a sampling of
commercial feed mills and rendering facilities, it is evident that considerable effort is being
dedicated in all sectors to carry out the intent of the Canadian feed ban. It is the U.S. Inspection
Team’s determination that these efforts have reduced the risk of transmission of the BSE agent in
feed to ruminant animals.
3
Canadian Feed Ban Risk Analysis
The information in this report was considered in light of the assumptions and conclusions of the
original risk analysis conducted to support the minimal risk rule. That risk analysis documented
the regulatory basis for the Canadian feed ban and summarized compliance efforts as reported by
the CFIA. The risk analysis assumed that compliance with the feed ban was good, and that the
ASSESSMENT OF THE CANADIAN FEED BAN FEBRUARY 2005
feed ban was effectively enforced. The risk analysis also considered other epidemiological
information as evidence of the effectiveness of the feed ban.
It should be noted that the risk analysis did not assume 100 percent compliance with the feed ban,
as that is not realistic in any situation. However, it also noted that effects on disease control can
be expected, even with an imperfect feed ban. Specifically, a feed ban exerts significant
downward pressure on the prevalence of BSE, even with incomplete compliance.
The information provided by the U.S. team verifies the information cited in the risk analysis, and
supports the conclusion in the risk analysis that the feed ban is effective. The risk analysis
included references that the CFIA reported a high level of compliance as noted in inspections.
This report supports the same conclusion, noting that overall greater than 90 percent of individual
tasks evaluated in inspections over the last 3 years were rated as satisfactory or not applicable. It
also notes that the majority of the unsatisfactory ratings related to minor record-keeping
infractions, such as not including full name and address information on invoices. Another
common reason a facility might receive an unsatisfactory rating is because written standard
operating procedures need additional detail. The report also confirms what is known from
experience in the United States regarding feed ban enforcement – that compliance can not be
immediately perfect upon implementation, and that compliance continues to increase as the
program evolves.

snip...

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/lpa/issues/bse/CAN-FeedBanReview.pdf

i guess all these global experts are just full of it then ???

Working Group Report on
the Assessment of the Geographical BSE-Risk (GBR) of
CANADA

snip...

Annex to the EFSA Scientific Report (2004) 2, 1-15 on the Assessment of the
Geographical BSE Risk of Canada
- 11 -

snip...


In 1990, when BSE was made notifiable, this awareness was extended to
suspicions of BSE.
" Since 1993 the number of brains examined per year did exceed the number
recommended by OIE (300 - 336 for countries with a cattle population over 24
months of age of 5.0 to 7.0 Million)

PLEASE NOTE BEFORE GOING ANY FURTHER THAT MOST EVERY COUNTRY THAT WENT BY THOSE SAME OIE BSE GUIDELINES HAVE BSE NOW. THE ONLY REASON IT WAS NOT DETECTED SOONER
IN THESE COUNTRIES WERE BECAUSE OF THESE SAME OIE GUIDELINES. SIMPLY PUT,
THEY ARE WRONG IN RELATIONS TO TSEs. IT'S NOTHING MORE THAN AN EXCUSE,
ONE THAT FLIES ABOUT LIKE A COW WOULD...TSS


in all years, except in 1995 (table 4).
year 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
samples 225 645 426 269 454 759 940 895 1´020 1´581 3´377 3´361
Table 4: Number of bovine brains annually examined for CNS diseases, including BSE.
" According to the CD approx. 98% of the examined cattle were older than 24 months
and approx. 90% exhibited neurological symptoms. Although the identification
system of Canada does not document the birth date or age of the animals, according
to the CD, examination of the dentition is used to ascertain the maturity of the
animals.
" The list of neurological differential diagnoses for the 754 brains examined in 1997
included encephalitis (70 cases), encephalomalacia (19), hemophilus (7),
hemorrhage (2), listeriosis (38), meningoencephalitis (36), rabies (22), tumors (2),
other conditions (135) and no significant findings (423).
" Compensation is paid for suspect BSE cases as well as for animals ordered to be
destroyed (90-95% of market value with a maximum of 2,500 Can$ per cow).
" Diagnostic criteria developed in the United Kingdom are followed at ADRI,
Nepean. According to the very detailed protocol for the collection, fixation and
submission of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) specimens at abattoirs
under inspection by the Canadian Food Inspection Agency, the specimen shall be
shipped to National Center for Foreign Animal Disease, Winnipeg, Manitoba.
" In 2003, around 3000 animals from risk populations have been tested.
" According to the CD, it is aimed to test a minimum of 8000 risk animals (animals
with clinical signs consistent with BSE, downer cows, animals died on farm animals
diseased or euthanized because of serious illness) in 2004 and then continue to
progressively increase the level of testing to 30,000.
" In May 2003, Canada reported its first case of domestic BSE. A second case was
detected in the US on 23 December 2003 and traced back to Canadian origin. Both
were born before the feed ban and originated from Western Canada.
3.3 Overall assessment of the stability
For the overall assessment of the stability, the impact of the three main stability factors
(i.e. feeding, rendering and SRM-removal) and of the additional stability factor,
surveillance, has to be estimated. Again, the guidance provided by the SSC in its
opinion on the GBR of July 2000 (as updated January 2002) is applied.
Until 1997, it was legally possible to feed ruminant MBM to cattle and a certain fraction of
cattle feed (for calves and dairy cattle) is assumed to have contained MBM. Therefore
feeding was Not OK. In August 1997 a ruminant MBM ban was introduced but feeding
of non-ruminant MBM to cattle remained legal as well as feeding of ruminant MBM to
non-ruminant animals. This makes control of the feed ban very difficult because laboratory
differentiation between ruminant and non ruminant MBM is difficult if not impossible.
Annex to the EFSA Scientific Report (2004) 2, 1-15 on the Assessment of the
Geographical BSE Risk of Canada
- 12 -
Due to the highly specialised production system in Canada, various mammalian MBM
streams can be separated. Such a feed ban would therefore be assessed as "reasonably
OK", for all regions where this highly specialised system exists. However, several areas
in Canada do have mixed farming and mixed feed mills, and in such regions, an RMBM
ban would not suffice. Additionally, official controls for cattle feeds to control for the
compliance with the ban were not started until the end of 2003. Thus, for the whole
country, the assessment of the feeding after 1997 remains "Not OK".
Rendering
The rendering industry is operating with processes that are not known to reduce infectivity.
It is therefore concluded that the rendering was and is Not OK.
SRM-removal
SRM and fallen stock were and are rendered for feed. Therefore SRM-removal is assessed
as Not OK
BSE surveillance
Before 1989, the ability of the system to identify (and eliminate) BSE-cases was limited.
Since 1990 this ability is improved, thanks to a specific (passive) BSE surveillance.
Today the surveillance should be able to detect clinical BSE-cases within the limits set
by an essentially passive surveillance system.
" Passive surveillance has been carried out since 1990. In 1993 surveillance was
intensified and has considerably improved with mandatory reporting and basic
compensation ensured, awareness raising measures and education of veterinarians, and
a specific BSE-surveillance programme targeting cattle showing clinical signs that
could be compatible with BSE.
" The initiated introduction of active surveillance should improve the system
significantly.
Stability of the BSE/cattle system in CANADA over time
Stability Reasons
Period Level Feeding Rendering SRM
removal
BSE
surveillance
1980 to 2000 Mainly
passive
2001 to 2003
Extremely
unstable Not OK Not OK Not OK
Improving
with some
testing of
risk groups
Table 5: Stability resulting from the interaction of the three main stability factors and the BSE
surveillance. The stability level is determined according to the SSC-opinion on the GBR of July 2000 (as
updated in 2002).
Annex to the EFSA Scientific Report (2004) 2, 1-15 on the Assessment of the
Geographical BSE Risk of Canada
- 13 -
On the basis of the available information, it has to be concluded that the country's
BSE/cattle system was extremely unstable until today, i.e., it would have recycled and
amplified BSE-infectivity very fast, should it have entered the system. The stability of the
BSE/cattle system in Canada overtime is as given in table 5 above.
4. CONCLUSION ON THE RESULTING RISKS
4.1 Interaction of stability and challenges
In conclusion, the stability of the Canada BSE/cattle system in the past and the external
challenges the system has coped with are summarised in the table 6.
INTERACTION OF STABILITY AND EXTERNAL CHALLENGE IN CANADA
Period Stability External Challenge Internal challenge
1980 to 1990 Low Unlikely but not excluded
1991 to 1995 High
1996 to 2000 Extremely high
Likely and rapidly growing
2001 to 2003
Extremely
unstable
Very high Confirmed at a lower level
Table 6: Internal challenge resulting from the interaction of the external challenge and stability. The
internal challenge level is determined according to guidance given in the SSC-opinion on the GBR of
July 2000 (as updated in 2002).

From the interaction of the two parameters stability and external challenge a

conclusion is drawn on the level of internal challenge that emerged and had to be met
by the system, in addition to external challenges that occurred.
An external challenge resulting from cattle import could only lead to an internal
challenge once imported infected cattle were rendered for feed and this contaminated
feed reached domestic cattle. Cattle imported for slaughter would normally be
slaughtered at an age too young to harbour plenty of BSE infectivity or to show signs,
even if infected prior to import. Breeding cattle, however, would normally live much
longer and only animals having problems would be slaughtered younger. If being 4-6
years old when slaughtered, they could suffer from early signs of BSE, being
approaching the end of the BSE-incubation period. In that case, they would harbour,
while being pre-clinical, as much infectivity as a clinical BSE case. Hence cattle imports
could have led to an internal challenge about 3 years after the import of breeding cattle
(that are normally imported at 20-24 months of age) that could have been infected prior
to import. In case of Canada this implies that cattle imported in the mid eighties could
have been rendered in the late eighties and therefore led to an internal challenge in the
early 90s.
On the other hand imports of contaminated MBM would lead to an internal challenge in
the year of import, if fed to cattle. The feeding system is of utmost importance in this
context. If it could be excluded that imported, potentially contaminated feed stuffs
reached cattle, such imports might not lead to an internal challenge at all. In case of
Annex to the EFSA Scientific Report (2004) 2, 1-15 on the Assessment of the
Geographical BSE Risk of Canada
- 14 -
Canada this implies that it was possible that imported MBM reached domestic cattle and
lead to an internal challenge in the early 90s.
4.2 Risk that BSE infectivity entered processing
A certain risk that BSE-infected cattle entered processing in Canada, and were at least
partly rendered for feed, occurred in the early 1990s when cattle imported from UK in
the mid 80s could have been slaughtered. This risk continued to exist, and grew
significantly in the mid 90s when domestic cattle, infected by imported MBM, reached
processing. Given the low stability of the system, the risk increased over the years with
continued imports of cattle and MBM from BSE risk countries.
4.3 Risk that BSE infectivity was recycled and propagated
A risk that BSE-infectivity was recycled and propagated exists since a processing risk
first appeared; i.e. in the early 90s. Until today this risk persists and increases fast
because of the extremely unstable BSE/cattle system in Canada.
5. CONCLUSION ON THE GEOGRAPHICAL BSE-RISK
5.1 The current GBR as function of the past stability and challenge
The current geographical BSE-risk (GBR) level is III, i.e. it is confirmed at a lower level
that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with the BSE-agent.
This assessment deviates from the previous assessment (SSC opinion, 2000) because at
that time several exporting countries were not considered a potential risk.
5.2 The expected development of the GBR as a function of the past and
present stability and challenge
" As long as the system remains unstable, it is expected that the GBR continues to
grow, even if no additional external challenges occur.
" Since recent improvements in the safety of MBM production in many countries or
significant recent reductions in the incidence of BSE are not taken into account for
the assessment of the external challenge, the external challenge assessed after 2001
could be overestimated and is the worst case assumption. However all current GBR
conclusions are not dependent on these assumptions in any of the countries assessed.
For future assessments and when the impact of the production, surveillance and true
incidence changes has been fully quantified, these developments should be taken
into account.
5.3 Recommendations for influencing the future GBR
" Enhancing the stability of the system, in particular by ensuring that cattle have no
access to mammalian MBM in combination with appropriate rendering and exclusion of
SRM and fallen stock from any feed chain could lead, over time, to a reduction of the
GBR.
" Improved passive and active surveillance, i.e. sampling of animals not showing
signs compatible with BSE from at-risk cattle populations, such as adult cattle in
Annex to the EFSA Scientific Report (2004) 2, 1-15 on the Assessment of the
Geographical BSE Risk of Canada
- 15 -
fallen stock and emergency slaughter, by means of rapid screening, would allow
monitoring the efficiency of stability enhancing measures.
Documentation provided to EFSA
" Letter with the ref D(2003)KVD/ip/420722 from the European Commission
requesting a geographical risk assessment for the appearance of BSE in a
country.
" Country Dossier as prepared by the country in response to the EC and EFSA
data collection request.
" Other sources of data information i.e. exports from third countries and
Eurostat data.
" SSC, July 2000. Final opinion on the Geographical Risk of Bovine
Spongiform Encephalopathy (GBR).
" SSC, January 2002. Updated opinion on the Geographical Risk of Bovine
Spongiform Encephalopathy (GBR).
Acknowledgment
Members of the EFSA Scientific Expert Working Group on GBR are acknowledged for
their valuable contribution to this mandate. The members are: Didier Calavas, Aline De
Koeijer, Michael Gravenor, John Griffin, Dagmar Heim, Matthias Kramer, Riitta
Maijala, Mo Salman, Vittorio Silano, Emmanuel Vanopdenbosch, and Stig Widell.

CANADA

http://www.efsa.eu.int/science/efsa_scientific_reports/gbr_assessments/scr_annexes/563/sr02_biohaz02_canada_report_annex_en1.pdf

every country out there that has fought to eradicate this agent the last 15 years would be very wise
to boycott North American beef, sheep, goat, deer and elk, until they comply with science...

Docket No, 04-047-l Regulatory Identification No. (RIN) 091O-AF46 NEW BSE SAFEGUARDS (comment submission)

https://web01.aphis.usda.gov/regpublic.nsf/0/eff9eff1f7c5cf2b87256ecf000df08d?OpenDocument

Docket No. 03-080-1 -- USDA ISSUES PROPOSED RULE TO ALLOW LIVE ANIMAL
IMPORTS FROM CANADA

https://web01.aphis.usda.gov/BSEcom.nsf/0/b78ba677e2b0c12185256dd300649f9d?OpenDocument&AutoFramed


Docket No. 2003N-0312 Animal Feed Safety System [TSS SUBMISSION]

http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/03n0312/03N-0312_emc-000001.txt

Docket Management Docket: 02N-0273 - Substances Prohibited From Use in

Animal Food or Feed; Animal Proteins Prohibited in Ruminant Feed

Comment Number: EC -10

Accepted - Volume 2


http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/03/Jan03/012403/8004be07.html

PART 2


http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/03/Jan03/012403/8004be09.html

PDF]Freas, William TSS SUBMISSION

File Format: PDF/Adobe Acrobat -

Page 1. J Freas, William From: Sent: To: Subject: Terry S. Singeltary

Sr. [flounder@wt.net] Monday, January 08,200l 3:03 PM freas ...

http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/01/slides/3681s2_09.pdf

Asante/Collinge et al, that BSE transmission to the 129-methionine

genotype can lead to an alternate phenotype that is indistinguishable

from type 2 PrPSc, the commonest _sporadic_ CJD;

http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/03/slides/3923s1_OPH.htm

Docket Management Docket: 96N-0417 - Current Good Manufacturing Practice
in Manufacturing, Packing, or Holding Dietary Ingredients a
Comment Number: EC -2
Accepted - Volume 7

http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/03/Mar03/031403/96N-0417-EC-2.htm


[PDF] Appendices to PL107-9 Inter-agency Working Group Final Report 1-1
File Format: PDF/Adobe Acrobat - View as HTML
Agent, Weapons of Mass Destruction Operations Unit Federal Bureau of
those who provided comments in response to Docket No. ...
Meager 8/18/01 Terry S. Singeltary Sr ...


www.aphis.usda.gov/lpa/pubs/pubs/PL107-9_Appen.pdf

Docket No. 2003N-0312 Animal Feed Safety System [TSS SUBMISSION
TO DOCKET 2003N-0312]

http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/03n0312/03N-0312_emc-000001.txt

# Docket No: 02-088-1 RE-Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of
2002; [TSS SUBMISSION ON POTENTIAL FOR BSE/TSE & FMD 'SUITCASE BOMBS'] -
TSS 1/27/03 (0)

Docket Management

Docket: 02N-0276 - Bioterrorism Preparedness; Registration of Food Facilities, Section 305
Comment Number: EC-254 [TSS SUBMISSION]

http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/02n0276/02N-0276-EC-254.htm

Dockets Entered On October 2, 2003 Table of Contents, Docket #,
Title, 1978N-0301,

OTC External Analgesic Drug Products, ... EMC 7, Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
Vol #: 1, ...

www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/03/oct03/100203/100203.htm


Daily Dockets Entered on 02/05/03

DOCKETS ENTERED on 2/5/03. ... EMC 4 Terry S. Singeltary Sr. Vol#: 2.
... Vol#: 1.

03N-0009 Federal Preemption of State & Local Medical Device Requireme. ...


www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/03/Feb03/020503/020503.htm


Docket Management

Docket: 02N-0370 - Neurological Devices; Classification of Human Dura Mater

Comment Number: EC -1

Accepted - Volume 1


http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/03/Jan03/012403/8004be11.html


http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/03/Jan03/012403/8004bdfe.html


http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/03/Jan03/012403/8004bdfc.html


Daily Dockets - 04/10/03
... 00D-1662 Use of Xenotransplantation Products in Humans.
EMC 98 Terry S. Singeltary Sr. Vol#: 3. 01F ...
www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/03/Apr03/041003/041003.htm - 05-20-2003 - Cached

2003D-0186
Guidance for Industry: Use of Material From Deer and Elk In Animal Feed


EMC 1
Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
Vol #:
1

http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/03/Jun03/060903/060903.htm


2003D-0186
Guidance for Industry: Use of Material From Deer and Elk In Animal Feed


EMC 7
Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
Vol #:
1

2003D-0186
Guidance for Industry: Use of Material From Deer and Elk In Animal Feed


EMC 7
Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
Vol #:
1


http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/03/oct03/100203/100203.htm

01N-0423 Substances Prohibited from use in animal food/Feed Ruminant

APE 5 National Renderers Association, Inc. Vol#: 2

APE 6 Animal Protein Producers Industry Vol#: 2

APE 7 Darling International Inc. Vol#: 2

EMC 1 Terry S. Singeltary Sr. Vol#: 3

http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/01/Oct01/101501/101501.htm

TSS




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