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From: TSS (216-119-143-226.ipset23.wt.net)
Subject: Mad cow rules need a second look, expert says, Deadly proteins may infect more organs than was previously known
Date: January 24, 2005 at 5:10 pm PST

-------- Original Message --------
Subject: Mad cow rules need a second look, expert says, Deadly proteins may infect more organs than was previously known
Date: Mon, 24 Jan 2005 12:57:11 -0600
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
To: BSE-L@LISTSERV.KALIV.UNI-KARLSRUHE.DE


##################### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy #####################

Jan. 20, 2005, 8:19PM


Mad cow rules need a second look, expert says


Deadly proteins may infect more organs than was previously known

By RANDOLPH E. SCHMID
Associated Press

WASHINGTON - Rogue proteins like those that cause mad cow disease 
found previously only in brain, nerve and lymph tissues  have now been
located in the liver, kidney and pancreas in a study of rodents.


While the discovery raises the possibility that similar proteins could
move into unanticipated parts of farm animals that have similar
diseases, it is not a reason for alarm, said researcher Adriano Aguzzi
of the University Hospital of Zurich, Switzerland.

But, he added, "There is reason to reappraise critically the way
regulations that are already in place" are enforced.

Sick animals such as sheep and cows should not enter the human food
chain, said Aguzzi, the lead researcher in the study.

"I think what is probably worth doing is to recheck whether all these
regulations are implemented properly," he said. "But I think this is
nothing that should provoke a wave of panic."

Rogue proteins called prions are blamed for several brain-wasting
diseases, including mad cow disease, scrapie in sheep and variant
Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans.

These proteins had only been found in the brains, spinal cord and lymph
tissues of infected people and animals. But Aguzzi's report, published
online Thursday by the journal Science, indicates that in at least some
cases they can move to other parts of the body.

Inflammation, characterized by swelling, redness and pain, occurs in a
number of diseases, such as hepatitis, which affects the liver.

"I think it certainly raises questions as to the current classification
of risk organs, which essentially says the brain and lymphatic tissue is
at risk, whereas everything else is rather safe," Aguzzi said. "So, I
think that in the case of an inflammatory condition, I think that is no
longer valid."

The finding "reinforces that you never say never," said Dr. William
Hueston, director of the University of Minnesota's Center for Animal
Health and Food Safety.

Hueston, who was not part of Aguzzi's research team, agreed that the
finding isn't cause for alarm, saying it reinforces the reasons for
inspecting animals in the food chain.

Dr. Robert B. Petersen, a professor of neuropathology at Case Western
Reserve University in Cleveland, agreed that any risk is low since
screening procedures would identify infected animals.

In addition, considering the low incidence of prion diseases, "it is
unlikely that you would find an animal with chronic viral or bacterial
infection and prion infection simultaneously," said Petersen, who was
not involved in Aguzzi's research.

Jim Rogers, of the Agriculture Department's Animal and Plant Health
Inspection Service, said the agency already targets high-risk animals
and won't need to change its procedures.

http://www.chron.com/cs/CDA/ssistory.mpl/health/3001995

Greetings list members,

> it is not a reason for alarm, said researcher Adriano Aguzzi of the
> University Hospital of Zurich, Switzerland.


> But, he added, "There is reason to reappraise critically the way
> regulations that are already in place" are enforced.
>


FAMOUS last words. more false reassurances from the very people
that are suppose to be protecting us. IF there was no alarm needed,
then why all the fuss, and why are people still dying...

> In addition, considering the low incidence of prion diseases, "it is
> unlikely that you would find an animal with chronic viral or bacterial
> infection and prion infection simultaneously," said Petersen, who was
> not involved in Aguzzi's research.
>

Neuropathology
Volume 21 Issue 4 Page 294 - December 2001
doi:10.1046/j.1440-1789.2001.00407.x

An atypical case of sporadic Creutzfeldt- Jakob disease with Parkinson's
disease
Takashi Iida1

Katsumi Doh-ura1

Toshiro Kawashima2

Hirofumi Abe3

and Toru Iwaki1

We report here an autopsy case of a 64-year-old female with slowly
progressive dementia and parkinsonism in a 4-year-long clinical course.
Post-mortem examination revealed a severely atrophic brain with
spongiform degeneration, neuronal loss and gliosis in the gray matter.
Many prion protein plaque deposits were present in the occipital lobe,
amygdala and cerebellum. Additionally, Lewy bodies were observed in the
brainstem. Prion protein gene analysis of the patient revealed
polymorphism at the codon-129 valine heterozygote. This genotype is
known to sometimes accompany a missense mutation of the gene in uncommon
hereditary prion diseases, but no mutation was found in the open reading
frame. Thus, it might be suggested that this case showed simultaneously
the features of both sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) with
codon-129 valine and Parkinson's disease. However, the predisposing
factors for contracting both diseases simultaneously remain to be
determined, because the incidence of Parkinson's disease accompanied by
CJD is very low.


http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1046%2Fj.1440-1789.2001.00407.x

Neuropathology
Volume 24 Issue 1 Page 46 - March 2004
doi:10.1111/j.1440-1789.2003.00513.x

Coexistence of CJD and Alzheimer's disease: An autopsy case showing
typical clinical features of CJD


snip...

Based on these clinicopathological findings and a review of the
published literature, it is concluded that there were two forms of
coexistence of CJD and Alzheimer's disease in the same patient.

snip...

http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/openurl?genre=article&sid=nlm:pubmed&issn=0919-6544&date=2004&volume=24&issue=1&spage=46

Acta Neuropathol (Berl). 1998 Aug;96(2):116-22. Related Articles,

Links

Click here to read


Coexistence of Alzheimer-type neuropathology in Creutzfeldt-Jakob
disease.

Hainfellner JA, Wanschitz J, Jellinger K, Liberski PP, Gullotta F,
Budka H.

Institute of Neurology, University of Vienna, and Austrian Reference
Center for Human Prion Diseases, AKH, Wien.

Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) and Alzheimer's disease (AD) share
clinical, neuropathological, and pathogenetic features. To
investigate eventual mutual influences, we screened prominently
affected neocortex from 110 neuropathologically proven CJD patients
for Alzheimer-type pathology with anti-beta/A4, Bielschowsky and
anti-tau (immuno)stains. The neuropathological classification of
Alzheimer-type pathology was made according to the CERAD criteria.
Results were controlled by comparison with Alzheimer-type changes in
sections from the same cortical areas in 110 sex- and age-matched
non-demented control patients. For comparison, the control patients
were also classified according to the CERAD neuropathology criteria
as if they had been demented. Alzheimer-type tissue changes as in
definite and probable CERAD AD occur in 10.9% of the CJD patients
and 19.1% of control patients (P=0.11). The median age of CJD and
control patients with CERAD AD is 72 and 68 years, respectively,
which differs significantly from the median ages of 64 and 63 years,
respectively, in the non-AD/CJD and non-AD control patients. Since
CERAD criteria include "presence of other neuropathological lesions
likely to cause dementia", an AD diagnosis in CJD patients (all of
whom are demented) is solely based on densities of neuritic plaques.
Similar Alzheimer-type changes in even higher frequency, however,
are also present in elderly non-demented controls. Thus, the
coexistence of Alzheimer-type pathology in CJD most likely
represents an age-related change. Deposits of prion protein (PrP)
frequently accumulate at the periphery of beta/A4 plaques. The
presence of beta/A4 amyloid in the brain may influence PrP
morphogenesis.

PMID: 9705125 [PubMed - indexed for MEDLINE]

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=9705125&dopt=Abstract

> Jim Rogers, of the Agriculture Department's Animal and Plant Health
> Inspection Service, said the agency already targets high-risk animals
> and won't need to change its procedures.


r i g h t, we sure can count on old jim to be up front about all this
BSeee in the USA too ;

WASHINGTON, May 11 (UPI) -- The U.S. Department of Agriculture has
issued an order instructing its inspectors in Texas, where federal mad
cow disease testing policies recently were violated, not to talk about
the cattle disorder with outside parties, United Press International has
learned.

The order, sent May 6 by e-mail from the USDA's Dallas district office,
was issued in the wake of the April 27 case at Lone Star Beef in San
Angelo, in which a cow displaying signs of a brain disorder was not
tested for mad cow disease despite a federal policy to screen all such
animals.

The deadly illness also is known as bovine spongiform encephalopathy.
Both the USDA and its Inspector General -- amid allegations that an
offsite supervisor overruled the opinion of the inspectors onsite and
made the final decision not to test the animal -- have opened up
investigations to determine why agency policy was violated.
The order, which was obtained by UPI, was issued by Ijaz Qazi, circuit
supervisor for the USDA's Food Safety and Inspection Service's Dallas
district, which covers the entire state. It reads: "All BSE inquiries
MUST be directed to Congressional Public Affairs Phone #202-720-9113
attention Rob Larew OR Steve Khon. This is an urgent message. Any
question contact me. Ijaz Qazi."
Although the language might sound innocuous, experienced inspectors
familiar with USDA parlance have taken to referring to the notice as a
"gag order."

The National Joint Council of Food Inspection Locals -- the national
inspectors union -- considers the order a violation of inspectors' free
speech rights and is considering legal action against the USDA for
breaching the labor agreement they have with the agency.
Inspectors alleged the order also suggests the agency is concerned about
its personnel leaking damaging information about either the Texas case
or the USDA's overall mad cow disease surveillance program, which has
come under fire since the discovery of an infected cow in Washington
state last December.

"Anytime the government suppresses an individual's freedom of speech,
that's unconstitutional," Gary Dahl, president of Local 925, the
Colorado inspectors union, told UPI.
Stanley Painter, chairman of the National Joint Council, said the USDA
has sent out notices in the past stating inspectors cannot talk to
reporters.
"It's an intimidation thing," Painter told UPI. Inspectors have the
right to talk to anybody about any subject, as long as they clarify they
are not speaking on behalf of the USDA and they are not doing it on
government time, he said.

USDA spokesman Steven Cohen said he was not familiar with the notice
from the Dallas office. He said he would look into it, but did not
respond by UPI's publication time. In general, Cohen said, "There's an
expectation any statement on behalf of the agency would come from the
office of communications (in Washington.)"

Asked if employees could speak freely as long as they clarified that
their views did not reflect those of the agency, Cohen said, "We'd
rather that agency policy be communicated by those in a position to
speak for the agency."

Qazi told UPI the notice was not issued in conjunction with the Texas
case and it was routine agency practice that outside inquiries be
referred to the Washington office. He said inspectors are free to talk
to outside parties, including reporters, and he did not consider the
e-mail a violation of the labor agreement with the inspectors.
Painter said the USDA's efforts to keep its employees from talking about
mad cow would be better spent "with issues like protecting the consuming
public instead of trying to hide things." He added he would "just about
bet his last nickel" agency management was attempting to suppress
information about the Texas case.
"To keep federal employees from reporting government waste, misuse of
appropriations -- those types of things -- that's not a good thing
either," Dahl said. "If there is something wrong, let's get it out in
the open -- let's get it fixed. We're working for the public, the
American consumers. I think they have the right to know this," he said.

"And believe me there's so many indicators saying that the USDA's mad
cow testing program is broken," Dahl added.

At least one member of Congress, Sen. Tom Harkin, D-Iowa, agrees.
Harkin, a long-time critic of the USDA, sent a letter to Agriculture
Secretary Ann Veneman on Monday, saying the Texas incident "calls into
question the effectiveness and reliability of USDA's current and
proposed surveillance system."

The USDA has proposed testing more than 200,000 cows -- or 10 times its
current rate -- in an expanded program scheduled to begin June 1. Harkin
wrote in the five-page letter, however, that given the realities of the
cattle industry, it is "quite doubtful" the USDA will be able to test
that many cows, particularly because it had difficulty finding 20,000
last year.

"We simply cannot tolerate a BSE testing system that fails to give valid
answers to critical questions for U.S. consumers and foreign customers,"
Harkin said in the letter, which sharply criticizes the agency's failure
to address explicitly how its new surveillance program will be implemented.
"We look forward to receiving (Harkin's) letter and having the
opportunity to review it and respond to him," USDA spokesman Ed Loyd
told UPI. "USDA has acknowledged there was a failure in not testing that
cow in Texas for BSE, so we are all working to ensure that does not
occur again."

Jim Rogers, a spokesman for USDA's Animal and Plant Health Inspection
Service, which oversees the agency's mad cow surveillance program, told
UPI the agency has tested about 15,500 animals since fiscal year 2004
began, on Oct. 1, 2003. However, the agency has refused to identify the
states and facilities from which the cows originated. Rogers said UPI
would have to seek that information through the Freedom of Information Act.
The question is central to the USDA's implementation of its expanded
surveillance program. Downer cows -- those unable to stand or walk --
made up the bulk of the animals the agency tested for mad cow in
previous years, but these were banned from being slaughtered for human
consumption in December. This means the agency inspectors no longer can
obtain brain samples from these cows at slaughterhouses as they could in
the past.
Furthermore, the USDA has not provided any evidence it has worked out
agreements with rendering facilities or ranchers, where downers and dead
cows are now most likely to be found, to obtain the extra animals for
testing.
Loyd said the agency is "working very hard to get animals on the farm
that would never show up in a processing facility," and he was "not
aware of any issues" that would delay the launch of the new program.

However, he was unable to provide the names or locations of the
rendering facilities where the agency will be obtaining cow brains for
BSE testing. He said he would look into it but did not return two
follow-up phone calls from UPI before publication.
--

Steve Mitchell is UPI's Medical Correspondent. E-mail sciencemail@upi.com

http://disc.server.com/discussion.cgi?disc=167318;article=1377;title=CJD%20WATCH

PLEASE see full text pdf below and see why this administration
decided to not test mad cows that are stumbling and staggering in
TEXAS;

- Letter to USDA

http://www.house.gov/reform/min/pdfs_108_2/pdfs_inves/pdf_food_usda_mad_cow_may_13_let.pdf

http://www.house.gov/reform/min/pdfs_108_2/pdfs_inves/pdf_food_usda_mad_cow_may_13_let.pdf


FDA STATEMENT ON THE COVER UP OF THIS COW ;

http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/news/2004/NEW01061.html


MORE on old jim's BSeee here ;


http://www.google.com/search?num=30&hl=en&lr=&scoring=d&as_qdr=d&edition=us&q=bse+jim+rogers+&btnG=Search


http://www.google.com/search?num=30&hl=en&lr=&scoring=d&as_qdr=d&edition=us&q=bse+jim+rogers+TSS&btnG=Search


MORE on the facts of BSE in North America here ;

Working Group Report on
the Assessment of the Geographical BSE-Risk (GBR) of
MEXICO
2004

snip...

- 11 -
4. CONCLUSION ON THE RESULTING RISKS
4.1 Interaction of stability and challenges
In conclusion, the stability of the Mexico BSE/cattle system in the past
and the
external challenges the system has coped with are summarized in the
table 5 below.
From the interaction of the two parameters stability and external
challenge a
conclusion is drawn on the level of internal challenge that emerged
and had to be
met by the system, in addition to external challenges that occurred.
INTERACTION OF STABILITY AND EXTERNAL CHALLENGE IN MEXICO
Period Stability External Challenge Internal challenge
1980 to 1985
1986 to 1990
Negligible Highly unlikely
1991 to 1995 Very high
1996 to 2000
2001 to 2003
Very unstable
Extremely high
Likely to be present and growing
since 1993
Table 5: Internal challenge resulting from the interaction of the
external challenge and stability.
The internal challenge level is determined according to guidance given
in the SSC - opinion on
the GBR of July 2000 (as updated in 2002).
An external challenge resulting from cattle import could only lead to an
internal
challenge once imported infected cattle were rendered for feed and this
contaminated
feed reached domestic cattle. Cattle imported for slaughter would
normally be
slaughtered at an age too young to harbour large amounts of BSE
infectivity or to
show signs, even if infected prior to import. Breeding cattle, however,
would
normally live much longer and only animals having problems would be
slaughtered
younger. If being 4 - 6 years old when slaughtered, they could suffer
from early signs
of BSE, being approaching the end of the BSE - incubation period. In
that case, they
Annex to the EFSA Scientific Report (2004) 4, 1-13 on the Assessment of the
Geographical BSE Risk of Mexico
would harbour, while being pre - clinical, as much infectivity as a
clinical BSE case.
Hence cattle imports could have led to an internal challenge about 3
years after the
import of breeding cattle (that are normally imported at 20 - 24 months
of age) that
could have been infected prior to import. In case of Mexico this implies
that an
internal challenge caused by live cattle imports (predominantly from USA
or Canada)
first occurred in the mid to late 1990s and continued to the present.
On the other hand imports of contaminated MBM would lead to an internal
challenge
in the year of import, if fed to cattle. The feeding system is of utmost
importance in
this context. If it could be excluded that imported, potentially
contaminated feed stuffs
reached cattle, such imports might not lead to an internal challenge at
all. In case of
Mexico this implies that an internal challenge caused by MBM imports
(predominantly from USA or Canada) first occurred around 1993 and
continued to the
present.
In view of the above - described consideration the combination of the
very / extremely
high external challenges with a very unstable system makes the
occurrence of an
internal challenge likely in Mexico from approximately 1993 onwards.
4.2 Risk that BSE infectivity entered processing
It is likely that BSE infectivity entered processing at the time of
imported at - risk
MBM (1993) and at the time of slaughter of imported live at - risk
cattle (mid to late
1990s). The high level of external challenge is maintained throughout
the reference
period, and the system has not been made stable, leading to increased
internal
challenge.
4.3 Risk that BSE infectivity was recycled and propagated
It is likely that BSE infectivity was recycled and propagated from
approximately
1993. The risk has since grown consistently due to a maintained internal
and external
challenge and lack of a stable system.
5. CONCLUSION ON THE GEOGRAPHICAL BSE - RISK
5.1 The current GBR as function of the past stability and challenge
The current geographical BSE risk (GBR) level is III, i.e. it is likely
but not confirmed
that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with
the BSE-agent.

snip...

MEXICO

http://www.efsa.eu.int/science/efsa_scientific_reports/gbr_assessments/scr_annexes/566/sr04_biohaz02_mexico_report_annex_en1.pdf

Working Group Report on
the Assessment of the Geographical BSE-Risk (GBR) of
CANADA
2004

snip...

- 13 -
4. CONCLUSION ON THE RESULTING RISKS
4.1 Interaction of stability and challenges
In conclusion, the stability of the Canada BSE/cattle system in the past
and the external
challenges the system has coped with are summarised in the table 6.
INTERACTION OF STABILITY AND EXTERNAL CHALLENGE IN CANADA
Period Stability External Challenge Internal challenge
1980 to 1990 Low Unlikely but not excluded
1991 to 1995 High
1996 to 2000 Extremely high
Likely and rapidly growing
2001 to 2003
Extremely
unstable
Very high Confirmed at a lower level
Table 6: Internal challenge resulting from the interaction of the
external challenge and stability. The
internal challenge level is determined according to guidance given in
the SSC-opinion on the GBR of
July 2000 (as updated in 2002).
From the interaction of the two parameters stability and external
challenge a
conclusion is drawn on the level of internal challenge that emerged
and had to be met
by the system, in addition to external challenges that occurred.
An external challenge resulting from cattle import could only lead to an
internal
challenge once imported infected cattle were rendered for feed and this
contaminated
feed reached domestic cattle. Cattle imported for slaughter would
normally be
slaughtered at an age too young to harbour plenty of BSE infectivity or
to show signs,
even if infected prior to import. Breeding cattle, however, would
normally live much
longer and only animals having problems would be slaughtered younger. If
being 4-6
years old when slaughtered, they could suffer from early signs of BSE,
being
approaching the end of the BSE-incubation period. In that case, they
would harbour,
while being pre-clinical, as much infectivity as a clinical BSE case.
Hence cattle imports
could have led to an internal challenge about 3 years after the import
of breeding cattle
(that are normally imported at 20-24 months of age) that could have been
infected prior
to import. In case of Canada this implies that cattle imported in the
mid eighties could
have been rendered in the late eighties and therefore led to an internal
challenge in the
early 90s.
On the other hand imports of contaminated MBM would lead to an internal
challenge in
the year of import, if fed to cattle. The feeding system is of utmost
importance in this
context. If it could be excluded that imported, potentially contaminated
feed stuffs
reached cattle, such imports might not lead to an internal challenge at
all. In case of
Annex to the EFSA Scientific Report (2004) 2, 1-15 on the Assessment of the
Geographical BSE Risk of Canada
Canada this implies that it was possible that imported MBM reached
domestic cattle and
lead to an internal challenge in the early 90s.
4.2 Risk that BSE infectivity entered processing
A certain risk that BSE-infected cattle entered processing in Canada,
and were at least
partly rendered for feed, occurred in the early 1990s when cattle
imported from UK in
the mid 80s could have been slaughtered. This risk continued to exist,
and grew
significantly in the mid 90s when domestic cattle, infected by imported
MBM, reached
processing. Given the low stability of the system, the risk increased
over the years with
continued imports of cattle and MBM from BSE risk countries.
4.3 Risk that BSE infectivity was recycled and propagated
A risk that BSE-infectivity was recycled and propagated exists since a
processing risk
first appeared; i.e. in the early 90s. Until today this risk persists
and increases fast
because of the extremely unstable BSE/cattle system in Canada.
5. CONCLUSION ON THE GEOGRAPHICAL BSE-RISK
5.1 The current GBR as function of the past stability and challenge
The current geographical BSE-risk (GBR) level is III, i.e. it is
confirmed at a lower level
that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with
the BSE-agent.
This assessment deviates from the previous assessment (SSC opinion,
2000) because at
that time several exporting countries were not considered a potential risk.
into account.
GBR.

snip...


http://www.efsa.eu.int/science/efsa_scientific_reports/gbr_assessments/scr_annexes/563/sr02_biohaz02_canada_report_annex_en1.pdf

Working Group Report on
the Assessment of the Geographical BSE-Risk (GBR) of
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
2004

snip...

- 14 -
4. CONCLUSION ON THE RESULTING RISKS
4.1 Interaction of stability and challenges
In conclusion, the stability of the USA BSE/cattle system in the past
and the external
challenge the system has coped with, are summarised in table 5 below.
From the interaction of the two parameters stability and external
challenge a
conclusion is drawn on the level of internal challenge that emerged
and had to be
met by the system, in addition to external challenges that occurred.
Interaction of stability and external challenge in the USA
Period Stability External Challenge Internal challenge
1980 to
1985
1986 to
1990
Moderate Possibly present
1991 to
1995 Very high
1996 to
2000
2001 to
2003
Extremely
unstable
Extremely high
Likely to be present and
growing
Table 5: Internal challenge resulting from the interaction of the
external challenge and stability.
The internal challenge level is determined according to guidance given
in the SSC-opinion on
the GBR of July 2000 (as updated in 2002).
An external challenge resulting from cattle import could only lead to an
internal
challenge once imported infected cattle were rendered for feed and this
contaminated
feed reached domestic cattle. Cattle imported for slaughter would
normally be
slaughtered at an age too young to harbour plenty of BSE infectivity or
to show signs,
even if infected prior to import. Breeding cattle, however, would
normally live much
longer and only animals having problems would be slaughtered younger. If
being 4-6
years old when slaughtered, they could suffer from early signs of BSE,
being
approaching the end of the BSE-incubation period. In that case, they
would harbour,
while being pre-clinical, as much infectivity as a clinical BSE case.
Hence cattle
imports could have led to an internal challenge about 3 years after the
import of
Annex to the EFSA Scientific Report (2004) 3, 1-17 on the Assessment of the
Geographical BSE Risk of USA
- 15 -
breeding cattle (that are normally imported at 20-24 months of age) that
could have
been infected prior to import.
In the case of the USA a few potentially infected cattle were imported
from the UK
and more from other BSE-risk countries. Furthermore, large numbers of
imported
animals came from Canada. This implies that cattle imported in the mid
eighties could
have been rendered in the late eighties and therefore led to an internal
challenge in the
early 90s.
On the other hand imports of contaminated MBM would lead to an internal
challenge
in the year of import, if fed to cattle. The feeding system is of utmost
importance in
this context. If it could be excluded that imported, potentially
contaminated feed stuffs
reached cattle, such imports might not lead to an internal challenge at
all.
In case of the USA this implies that it was possible that imported MBM
reached
domestic cattle and lead to an internal challenge in the early 90s.
If Canadian imports would be excluded from this assessment, we find that
the USA
receives a moderate challenge for all 5-year intervals since 1980, a
high challenge
between 1985 and 2000 and a low challenge thereafter. If combining these
moderate
to high challenges due to imports with the extremely unstable system,
the conclusion
would still be that the occurrence of an internal challenge is possible
during the early
80s and likely in the late 80s.
4.2 Risk that BSE infectivity entered processing
A processing risk developed in the late 80s/early 90s when cattle
imports from BSE
risk countries were slaughtered or died and were processed (partly) into
feed, together
with some imports of MBM. This risk continued to exist, and grew
significantly in the
mid 90s when domestic cattle, infected by imported MBM, reached
processing. Given
the low stability of the system, the risk increased over the years with
continued
imports of cattle and MBM from BSE risk countries.
4.3 Risk that BSE infectivity was recycled and propagated
A risk that BSE-infectivity was recycled and propagated exists since a
processing risk
first appeared, i.e. in the early 90s. Until today this risk persists
and increases fast
because of the extremely/very unstable BSE/cattle system in the USA.
5. CONCLUSION ON THE GEOGRAPHICAL BSE-RISK
5.1 The current GBR as function of the past stability and challenge
" The current geographical BSE risk (GBR) level is III, i.e. it is
likely but not
confirmed that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically)
infected with the
BSE-agent.
Note1: It is also worth noting that the current GBR conclusions are not
dependent on
the large exchange of imports between USA and Canada. External challenge
due to
exports to the USA from European countries varied from moderate to high.
These
Annex to the EFSA Scientific Report (2004) 3, 1-17 on the Assessment of the
Geographical BSE Risk of USA
challenges indicate that it was likely that BSE infectivity was
introduced into the
North American continent.
Note2: This assessment deviates from the previous assessment (SSC
opinion, 2000)
because at that time several exporting countries were not considered a
potential risk.
include
feed,

snip...

http://www.efsa.eu.int/science/efsa_scientific_reports/gbr_assessments/scr_annexes/574/sr03_biohaz02_usa_report_annex_en1.pdf


From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. [flounder@wt.net]
Sent: Tuesday, July 29, 2003 1:03 PM
To: fdadockets@oc.fda.gov
Cc: ggraber@cvm.fda.gov; Linda.Grassie@fda.gov; BSE-L
Subject: Docket No. 2003N-0312 Animal Feed Safety System [TSS SUBMISSION
TO DOCKET 2003N-0312]

Greetings FDA,

snip...

PLUS, if the USA continues to flagrantly ignore the _documented_ science
to date about the known TSEs in the USA (let alone the undocumented TSEs
in cattle), it is my opinion, every other Country that is dealing with
BSE/TSE should boycott the USA and demand that the SSC reclassify the
USA BSE GBR II risk assessment to BSE/TSE GBR III 'IMMEDIATELY'. for the
SSC to _flounder_ any longer on this issue, should also be regarded with
great suspicion as well. NOT to leave out the OIE and it's terribly
flawed system of disease surveillance. the OIE should make a move on CWD
in the USA, and make a risk assessment on this as a threat to human
health. the OIE should also change the mathematical formula for testing
of disease. this (in my opinion and others) is terribly flawed as well.
to think that a sample survey of 400 or so cattle in a population of 100
million, to think this will find anything, especially after seeing how
many TSE tests it took Italy and other Countries to find 1 case of BSE
(1 million rapid TSE test in less than 2 years, to find 102 BSE cases),
should be proof enough to make drastic changes of this system. the OIE
criteria for BSE Country classification and it's interpretation is very
problematic. a text that is suppose to give guidelines, but is not
understandable, cannot be considered satisfactory. the OIE told me 2
years ago that they were concerned with CWD, but said any changes might
take years. well, two years have come and gone, and no change in
relations with CWD as a human health risk. if we wait for politics and
science to finally make this connection, we very well may die before any
decisions
or changes are made. this is not acceptable. we must take the politics
and the industry out of any final decisions of the Scientific community.
this has been the problem from day one with this environmental man made
death sentence. some of you may think i am exaggerating, but you only
have to see it once, you only have to watch a loved one die from this
one time, and you will never forget, OR forgive...yes, i am still very
angry... but the transmission studies DO NOT lie, only the politicians
and the industry do... and they are still lying to this day...TSS


http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/03n0312/03N-0312_emc-000001.txt


Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. BOX 42 Bacliff, TEXAS USA

######### https://listserv.kaliv.uni-karlsruhe.de/warc/bse-l.html ##########





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