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From: TSS (216-119-143-195.ipset23.wt.net)
Subject: BSE OFFICIAL NOTICE OF JOINT PRESS MEXICO AND CANADA México, D.F., to 20 of January of 2005
Date: January 22, 2005 at 7:24 pm PST

-------- Original Message --------
Subject: BSE OFFICIAL NOTICE OF JOINT PRESS MEXICO AND CANADA
Date: Sat, 22 Jan 2005 09:57:44 -0600
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
To: BSE-L@LISTSERV.KALIV.UNI-KARLSRUHE.DE


##################### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy #####################

NUM. 024/05

México, D.F., to 20 of January of 2005

Disclaimer:This is a computer translation of the original webpage. It is
provided for general information only and should not be regarded as
complete nor accurate.

OFFICIAL NOTICE OF JOINT PRESS


Minister of Agriculture and Feeding of Canada, Andy Mitchell and the
Secretary of Agriculture, Cattle ranch, Development Rural, Feeding of
México Fishes and, Javier Usabiaga Stream, authenticated the spirit of
collaboration and the good disposition that it exists between both nations.

Minister and the Secretary talked on the answer to the situation of
Encefalopatía Bovine Espongiforme (BSE) in Norteamérica and on the
importance of reestablishing beef product commerce, including cattle,
and explored options stops to reach this objective.

"At the moment we counted on a solid regulatory system in order to
protect the human health and animal and to eliminate to future any
incidence of BSE that can to exist in the Canadian cattle ranch ",
indicated Mr.. Mitchell. "I shared with Usabiaga Secretary Stream the
confidence that he has Canada in the integrity of the present regulation
that it prohibits to feed the cattle with proteins on rumiantes and
their effectiveness to protect human health animal and ".

During the meeting, Usabiaga Secretary it recognized the effective
answer and it is transparent of Canada in relation to cases of BSE.
Also, the Secretary and Minister reaffirmed the commitment of both
countries to establish based measures in scientific criteria.

México it expressed his confidence of which it exists a low prevalence
of BSE in the cattle of América north and that at the moment exists
effective measures to protect the human health and animal.

" cooperation between Canada and México I will still fortify més
relation between both countries ", I indicate Usabiaga Secretary. "the
previous thing it is reflected in the commerce between the two nations,
which has been increased significantly from the take effect of the NAFTA
(TLC) in 1994, reaching 4.5 billion dollars annual ".

Minister Mitchell and Usabiaga Secretary they talked on other
agricultural subjects and commercial in that both countries they share
interest common like the rural development and the biotechnology, and
they entrusted its civil employees so that they meet next stops to begin
to work in these subjects. "Like member of the NAFTA, México is one of
important commercial partners més of Canada, "he indicated Mr..
Mitchell. "We valued the commitment that we must to foment the
cooperation governmental and commercial for the benefit of our
respective farming industries.

This fruitful meeting reaffirms the quality of the relations between
both nations, which was recognized través in the agreement that signed
in October of the 2004 President de México Vicente Fox and Prime
minister of Canada Paul Martin, to create the México-Canada Alliance
(AMC). The AMC is a headed initiative by the Chiefs of State of both
nations in order to coordinate the bilateral activities between the
government, the industry and the sector académico, with the intention to
create opportunities of business and well-being socioeconomic.

Canada and México continuarén exploring new and greater opportunities to
take advantage of the mutual benefits that NAFTA offers, in order to
increase the prosperity in the region of Norteamérica.

****

http://www.sagarpa.gob.mx/cgcs/boletines/2005/enero/B024.htm


SOME FACTS PLEASE ;


Working Group Report on
the Assessment of the Geographical BSE-Risk (GBR) of
MEXICO
2004

snip...

- 11 -
4. CONCLUSION ON THE RESULTING RISKS
4.1 Interaction of stability and challenges
In conclusion, the stability of the Mexico BSE/cattle system in the past
and the
external challenges the system has coped with are summarized in the
table 5 below.
From the interaction of the two parameters stability and external
challenge a
conclusion is drawn on the level of internal challenge that emerged
and had to be
met by the system, in addition to external challenges that occurred.
INTERACTION OF STABILITY AND EXTERNAL CHALLENGE IN MEXICO
Period Stability External Challenge Internal challenge
1980 to 1985
1986 to 1990
Negligible Highly unlikely
1991 to 1995 Very high
1996 to 2000
2001 to 2003
Very unstable
Extremely high
Likely to be present and growing
since 1993
Table 5: Internal challenge resulting from the interaction of the
external challenge and stability.
The internal challenge level is determined according to guidance given
in the SSC - opinion on
the GBR of July 2000 (as updated in 2002).
An external challenge resulting from cattle import could only lead to an
internal
challenge once imported infected cattle were rendered for feed and this
contaminated
feed reached domestic cattle. Cattle imported for slaughter would
normally be
slaughtered at an age too young to harbour large amounts of BSE
infectivity or to
show signs, even if infected prior to import. Breeding cattle, however,
would
normally live much longer and only animals having problems would be
slaughtered
younger. If being 4 - 6 years old when slaughtered, they could suffer
from early signs
of BSE, being approaching the end of the BSE - incubation period. In
that case, they
Annex to the EFSA Scientific Report (2004) 4, 1-13 on the Assessment of the
Geographical BSE Risk of Mexico
would harbour, while being pre - clinical, as much infectivity as a
clinical BSE case.
Hence cattle imports could have led to an internal challenge about 3
years after the
import of breeding cattle (that are normally imported at 20 - 24 months
of age) that
could have been infected prior to import. In case of Mexico this implies
that an
internal challenge caused by live cattle imports (predominantly from USA
or Canada)
first occurred in the mid to late 1990s and continued to the present.
On the other hand imports of contaminated MBM would lead to an internal
challenge
in the year of import, if fed to cattle. The feeding system is of utmost
importance in
this context. If it could be excluded that imported, potentially
contaminated feed stuffs
reached cattle, such imports might not lead to an internal challenge at
all. In case of
Mexico this implies that an internal challenge caused by MBM imports
(predominantly from USA or Canada) first occurred around 1993 and
continued to the
present.
In view of the above - described consideration the combination of the
very / extremely
high external challenges with a very unstable system makes the
occurrence of an
internal challenge likely in Mexico from approximately 1993 onwards.
4.2 Risk that BSE infectivity entered processing
It is likely that BSE infectivity entered processing at the time of
imported at - risk
MBM (1993) and at the time of slaughter of imported live at - risk
cattle (mid to late
1990s). The high level of external challenge is maintained throughout
the reference
period, and the system has not been made stable, leading to increased
internal
challenge.
4.3 Risk that BSE infectivity was recycled and propagated
It is likely that BSE infectivity was recycled and propagated from
approximately
1993. The risk has since grown consistently due to a maintained internal
and external
challenge and lack of a stable system.
5. CONCLUSION ON THE GEOGRAPHICAL BSE - RISK
5.1 The current GBR as function of the past stability and challenge
The current geographical BSE risk (GBR) level is III, i.e. it is likely
but not confirmed
that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with
the BSE-agent.

snip...

MEXICO

http://www.efsa.eu.int/science/efsa_scientific_reports/gbr_assessments/scr_annexes/566/sr04_biohaz02_mexico_report_annex_en1.pdf

Working Group Report on
the Assessment of the Geographical BSE-Risk (GBR) of
CANADA
2004

snip...

- 13 -
4. CONCLUSION ON THE RESULTING RISKS
4.1 Interaction of stability and challenges
In conclusion, the stability of the Canada BSE/cattle system in the past
and the external
challenges the system has coped with are summarised in the table 6.
INTERACTION OF STABILITY AND EXTERNAL CHALLENGE IN CANADA
Period Stability External Challenge Internal challenge
1980 to 1990 Low Unlikely but not excluded
1991 to 1995 High
1996 to 2000 Extremely high
Likely and rapidly growing
2001 to 2003
Extremely
unstable
Very high Confirmed at a lower level
Table 6: Internal challenge resulting from the interaction of the
external challenge and stability. The
internal challenge level is determined according to guidance given in
the SSC-opinion on the GBR of
July 2000 (as updated in 2002).
From the interaction of the two parameters stability and external
challenge a
conclusion is drawn on the level of internal challenge that emerged
and had to be met
by the system, in addition to external challenges that occurred.
An external challenge resulting from cattle import could only lead to an
internal
challenge once imported infected cattle were rendered for feed and this
contaminated
feed reached domestic cattle. Cattle imported for slaughter would
normally be
slaughtered at an age too young to harbour plenty of BSE infectivity or
to show signs,
even if infected prior to import. Breeding cattle, however, would
normally live much
longer and only animals having problems would be slaughtered younger. If
being 4-6
years old when slaughtered, they could suffer from early signs of BSE, being
approaching the end of the BSE-incubation period. In that case, they
would harbour,
while being pre-clinical, as much infectivity as a clinical BSE case.
Hence cattle imports
could have led to an internal challenge about 3 years after the import
of breeding cattle
(that are normally imported at 20-24 months of age) that could have been
infected prior
to import. In case of Canada this implies that cattle imported in the
mid eighties could
have been rendered in the late eighties and therefore led to an internal
challenge in the
early 90s.
On the other hand imports of contaminated MBM would lead to an internal
challenge in
the year of import, if fed to cattle. The feeding system is of utmost
importance in this
context. If it could be excluded that imported, potentially contaminated
feed stuffs
reached cattle, such imports might not lead to an internal challenge at
all. In case of
Annex to the EFSA Scientific Report (2004) 2, 1-15 on the Assessment of the
Geographical BSE Risk of Canada
Canada this implies that it was possible that imported MBM reached
domestic cattle and
lead to an internal challenge in the early 90s.
4.2 Risk that BSE infectivity entered processing
A certain risk that BSE-infected cattle entered processing in Canada,
and were at least
partly rendered for feed, occurred in the early 1990s when cattle
imported from UK in
the mid 80s could have been slaughtered. This risk continued to exist,
and grew
significantly in the mid 90s when domestic cattle, infected by imported
MBM, reached
processing. Given the low stability of the system, the risk increased
over the years with
continued imports of cattle and MBM from BSE risk countries.
4.3 Risk that BSE infectivity was recycled and propagated
A risk that BSE-infectivity was recycled and propagated exists since a
processing risk
first appeared; i.e. in the early 90s. Until today this risk persists
and increases fast
because of the extremely unstable BSE/cattle system in Canada.
5. CONCLUSION ON THE GEOGRAPHICAL BSE-RISK
5.1 The current GBR as function of the past stability and challenge
The current geographical BSE-risk (GBR) level is III, i.e. it is
confirmed at a lower level
that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with
the BSE-agent.
This assessment deviates from the previous assessment (SSC opinion,
2000) because at
that time several exporting countries were not considered a potential risk.
into account.
GBR.

snip...


http://www.efsa.eu.int/science/efsa_scientific_reports/gbr_assessments/scr_annexes/563/sr02_biohaz02_canada_report_annex_en1.pdf

Working Group Report on
the Assessment of the Geographical BSE-Risk (GBR) of
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
2004

snip...

- 14 -
4. CONCLUSION ON THE RESULTING RISKS
4.1 Interaction of stability and challenges
In conclusion, the stability of the USA BSE/cattle system in the past
and the external
challenge the system has coped with, are summarised in table 5 below.
From the interaction of the two parameters stability and external
challenge a
conclusion is drawn on the level of internal challenge that emerged
and had to be
met by the system, in addition to external challenges that occurred.
Interaction of stability and external challenge in the USA
Period Stability External Challenge Internal challenge
1980 to
1985
1986 to
1990
Moderate Possibly present
1991 to
1995 Very high
1996 to
2000
2001 to
2003
Extremely
unstable
Extremely high
Likely to be present and
growing
Table 5: Internal challenge resulting from the interaction of the
external challenge and stability.
The internal challenge level is determined according to guidance given
in the SSC-opinion on
the GBR of July 2000 (as updated in 2002).
An external challenge resulting from cattle import could only lead to an
internal
challenge once imported infected cattle were rendered for feed and this
contaminated
feed reached domestic cattle. Cattle imported for slaughter would
normally be
slaughtered at an age too young to harbour plenty of BSE infectivity or
to show signs,
even if infected prior to import. Breeding cattle, however, would
normally live much
longer and only animals having problems would be slaughtered younger. If
being 4-6
years old when slaughtered, they could suffer from early signs of BSE, being
approaching the end of the BSE-incubation period. In that case, they
would harbour,
while being pre-clinical, as much infectivity as a clinical BSE case.
Hence cattle
imports could have led to an internal challenge about 3 years after the
import of
Annex to the EFSA Scientific Report (2004) 3, 1-17 on the Assessment of the
Geographical BSE Risk of USA
- 15 -
breeding cattle (that are normally imported at 20-24 months of age) that
could have
been infected prior to import.
In the case of the USA a few potentially infected cattle were imported
from the UK
and more from other BSE-risk countries. Furthermore, large numbers of
imported
animals came from Canada. This implies that cattle imported in the mid
eighties could
have been rendered in the late eighties and therefore led to an internal
challenge in the
early 90s.
On the other hand imports of contaminated MBM would lead to an internal
challenge
in the year of import, if fed to cattle. The feeding system is of utmost
importance in
this context. If it could be excluded that imported, potentially
contaminated feed stuffs
reached cattle, such imports might not lead to an internal challenge at all.
In case of the USA this implies that it was possible that imported MBM
reached
domestic cattle and lead to an internal challenge in the early 90s.
If Canadian imports would be excluded from this assessment, we find that
the USA
receives a moderate challenge for all 5-year intervals since 1980, a
high challenge
between 1985 and 2000 and a low challenge thereafter. If combining these
moderate
to high challenges due to imports with the extremely unstable system,
the conclusion
would still be that the occurrence of an internal challenge is possible
during the early
80s and likely in the late 80s.
4.2 Risk that BSE infectivity entered processing
A processing risk developed in the late 80s/early 90s when cattle
imports from BSE
risk countries were slaughtered or died and were processed (partly) into
feed, together
with some imports of MBM. This risk continued to exist, and grew
significantly in the
mid 90s when domestic cattle, infected by imported MBM, reached
processing. Given
the low stability of the system, the risk increased over the years with
continued
imports of cattle and MBM from BSE risk countries.
4.3 Risk that BSE infectivity was recycled and propagated
A risk that BSE-infectivity was recycled and propagated exists since a
processing risk
first appeared, i.e. in the early 90s. Until today this risk persists
and increases fast
because of the extremely/very unstable BSE/cattle system in the USA.
5. CONCLUSION ON THE GEOGRAPHICAL BSE-RISK
5.1 The current GBR as function of the past stability and challenge
" The current geographical BSE risk (GBR) level is III, i.e. it is
likely but not
confirmed that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically)
infected with the
BSE-agent.
Note1: It is also worth noting that the current GBR conclusions are not
dependent on
the large exchange of imports between USA and Canada. External challenge
due to
exports to the USA from European countries varied from moderate to high.
These
Annex to the EFSA Scientific Report (2004) 3, 1-17 on the Assessment of the
Geographical BSE Risk of USA
challenges indicate that it was likely that BSE infectivity was
introduced into the
North American continent.
Note2: This assessment deviates from the previous assessment (SSC
opinion, 2000)
because at that time several exporting countries were not considered a
potential risk.
include
feed,

snip...

http://www.efsa.eu.int/science/efsa_scientific_reports/gbr_assessments/scr_annexes/574/sr03_biohaz02_usa_report_annex_en1.pdf

From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. [flounder@wt.net]
Sent: Tuesday, July 29, 2003 1:03 PM
To: fdadockets@oc.fda.gov
Cc: ggraber@cvm.fda.gov; Linda.Grassie@fda.gov; BSE-L
Subject: Docket No. 2003N-0312 Animal Feed Safety System [TSS SUBMISSION
TO DOCKET 2003N-0312]

Greetings FDA,

snip...

PLUS, if the USA continues to flagrantly ignore the _documented_ science
to date about the known TSEs in the USA (let alone the undocumented TSEs
in cattle), it is my opinion, every other Country that is dealing with
BSE/TSE should boycott the USA and demand that the SSC reclassify the
USA BSE GBR II risk assessment to BSE/TSE GBR III 'IMMEDIATELY'. for the
SSC to _flounder_ any longer on this issue, should also be regarded with
great suspicion as well. NOT to leave out the OIE and it's terribly
flawed system of disease surveillance. the OIE should make a move on CWD
in the USA, and make a risk assessment on this as a threat to human
health. the OIE should also change the mathematical formula for testing
of disease. this (in my opinion and others) is terribly flawed as well.
to think that a sample survey of 400 or so cattle in a population of 100
million, to think this will find anything, especially after seeing how
many TSE tests it took Italy and other Countries to find 1 case of BSE
(1 million rapid TSE test in less than 2 years, to find 102 BSE cases),
should be proof enough to make drastic changes of this system. the OIE
criteria for BSE Country classification and it's interpretation is very
problematic. a text that is suppose to give guidelines, but is not
understandable, cannot be considered satisfactory. the OIE told me 2
years ago that they were concerned with CWD, but said any changes might
take years. well, two years have come and gone, and no change in
relations with CWD as a human health risk. if we wait for politics and
science to finally make this connection, we very well may die before any
decisions
or changes are made. this is not acceptable. we must take the politics
and the industry out of any final decisions of the Scientific community.
this has been the problem from day one with this environmental man made
death sentence. some of you may think i am exaggerating, but you only
have to see it once, you only have to watch a loved one die from this
one time, and you will never forget, OR forgive...yes, i am still very
angry... but the transmission studies DO NOT lie, only the politicians
and the industry do... and they are still lying to this day...TSS


http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/03n0312/03N-0312_emc-000001.txt

Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. BOX 42 Bacliff, TEXAS USA

######### https://listserv.kaliv.uni-karlsruhe.de/warc/bse-l.html ##########





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