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From: TSS (216-119-144-8.ipset24.wt.net)
Subject: EFSA Scientific Report (2004) 3, 1-6 on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE Risk of Geographical BSE Risk of United States of America (USA)
Date: August 24, 2004 at 2:51 pm PST

-------- Original Message --------
Subject: EFSA Scientific Report (2004) 3, 1-6 on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE Risk of Geographical BSE Risk of United States of America (USA)
Date: Tue, 24 Aug 2004 16:30:11 -0500
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
To: BSE-L@UNI-KARLSRUHE.DE


######## Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy #########

EFSA Scientific Report (2004) 3, 1-6 on the Assessment of the
Geographical BSE Risk of
United States of America (USA).
http://www.efsa.eu.int
1 of 6
Scientific Report of the European Food Safety Authority
on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE-Risk (GBR) of
United States of America (USA).
Question N° EFSA-Q-2003-083
Adopted July 2004
Summary
The European Food Safety Authority and its Scientific Expert Working
Group on the
Assessment of the Geographical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE)
Risk (GBR)
were asked by the European Commission (EC) to provide an up-to-date
scientific report on
the GBR in the United States of America, i.e. the likelihood of the
presence of one or more
cattle being infected with BSE, pre-clinically as well as clinically, in
USA. This scientific
report addresses the GBR of USA as assessed in 2004 based on data
covering the period
1980-2003.
The BSE agent was probably imported into USA and could have reached
domestic cattle in
the middle of the eighties. These cattle imported in the mid eighties
could have been rendered
in the late eighties and therefore led to an internal challenge in the
early nineties. It is possible
that imported meat and bone meal (MBM) into the USA reached domestic
cattle and leads to
an internal challenge in the early nineties.
A processing risk developed in the late 80s/early 90s when cattle
imports from BSE risk
countries were slaughtered or died and were processed (partly) into
feed, together with some
imports of MBM. This risk continued to exist, and grew significantly in
the mid 90’s when
domestic cattle, infected by imported MBM, reached processing. Given the
low stability of
the system, the risk increased over the years with continued imports of
cattle and MBM from
BSE risk countries.
EFSA concludes that the current GBR level of USA is III, i.e. it is
likely but not confirmed
that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with
the BSE-agent. As long as
there are no significant changes in rendering or feeding, the stability
remains extremely/very
unstable. Thus, the probability of cattle to be (pre-clinically or
clinically) infected with the
BSE-agent persistently increases.
Key words: BSE, geographical risk assessment, GBR, USA, third countries
EFSA Scientific Report (2004) 3, 1-6 on the Assessment of the
Geographical BSE Risk of
United States of America (USA).
http://www.efsa.eu.int
2 of 6
Background
History
In 1998, the EC asked the Scientific Steering Committee (SSC) to perform
a risk assessment
in order to establish the GBR of a country. In July 2000 the SSC adopted
its final opinion on
"The Geographical Risk of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (GBR)" (as
updated in
January 2002). It describes a method and a process for the assessment of
the GBR and
summarises the outcome of its application. Detailed reports on the
GBR-assessments were
published on the Internet for each of these countries.
Determination of BSE status
In 2001, Regulation (EC) No 999/20011 established the rules for the
determination of BSE
status of a country. It determines certain measures concerning the
control of BSE and
concerning trade and importation of certain live animals and animal
products.
Annex II of this Regulation lays down the method for the determination
of BSE status. This
includes two steps: an initial risk assessment, and the evaluation of
additional criteria. The
method is similar to that laid down in the International Animal Health
Code of the
International Animal Health Organisation (OIE).
The categorisation of countries has been deferred until July 2005
awaiting a review of the OIE
categorisation system. In the meantime a number of transitional measures
are in place, in
particular concerning specified risk material and import conditions.
State of play
The Scientific Steering Committee issued an opinion on GBR (using the
methodology
established by the SSC in June 2000 and updated January 2002) for one
third of the countries
requesting the determination of their BSE status.
Prioritisation
The first priority is the re-assessment of GBR I countries, as currently
no TSE related import
restrictions (certification of absence of specific risk material (SRM))
apply to GBR I
countries.
If the preliminary re-assessment indicates that the current GBR I will
not be confirmed, any
delay might have negative consequences on consumer health protection.
Furthermore, the
GBR assessment of neighbouring countries with intensive trade contacts
should be dealt with
at the same time, because the outcomes are interdependent.
The major trading partners with a GBR II classification should be dealt
with as second
priority, in view of the SSC opinion on tallow derivatives and the draft
guidance note of
EMEA.
Terms of reference
In view of the above, the European Commission asks the EFSA to advice on
the risk
assessment for the appearance of BSE in USA.
1 Regulation (EC) No 999/2001 of the European Parliament and of the
Council laying down rules for the
prevention, control and eradication of certain transmissible spongiform
encephalopathies OJ L 147, 31.5.2001
and updates.
EFSA Scientific Report (2004) 3, 1-6 on the Assessment of the
Geographical BSE Risk of
United States of America (USA).
http://www.efsa.eu.int
3 of 6
Assessment
EFSA refers to the Working Group Report (annex) prepared by the EFSA
Scientific Expert
Working Group on GBR for full details on the assessment.
External Challenge
USA was exposed to a moderate external challenge for the period
1980-1990, a very high
external challenge for the period 1991-1995, and an extremely high
external challenge for
period 1996-2003.
Stability
For the overall assessment of the stability, the impact of the three
main stability factors, (i.e.
feeding, rendering and SRM-removal) and of the additional stability
factor surveillance has to
be estimated. Again, the guidance provided by the SSC in its opinion on
the GBR of July
2000 (as updated in 2002) is applied. On the basis of the available
information, it has to be
concluded that the country's BSE/cattle system was extremely unstable
until today, i.e., it
would have recycled and amplified BSE-infectivity very fast, should it
have entered the
system.
Feeding
Until August 1997, ruminant meat and bone meal (RMBM) was legally fed to
cattle. Feeding
was therefore "not OK". In August 1997, an RMBM-ban was introduced but
feeding of nonruminant
MBM to cattle remained legal as well as feeding of RMBM to non-ruminant
animals (farm animals and pets). An RMBM ban is difficult to maintain,
as only labels can
distinguish the various MMBMs. This makes control of the feed ban very
difficult because
analytical differentiation between ruminant and non-ruminant MBM is
difficult. Due to the
highly specialized production system in the USA, various mammalian MBM
streams can be
separated. Such a feed ban would therefore be assessed as "reasonably
OK", for all regions
where this highly specialized system exists. However, several areas in
the USA do have
mixed farming and mixed feed mills, and in such regions an RMBM ban
would not suffice.
Additionally, official controls for cattle feeds to control for
compliance with the ban started in
2002. Thus, for the whole country, the assessment of the feeding after
1997 remains "not
OK", but improving.
Rendering
The rendering industry is operating with processes that are not known to
reduce infectivity. It
is therefore concluded that rendering was and is "not OK".
SRM-removal
SRM were and are still rendered for feed, as are (parts of) the fallen
stock. SRM-removal is
therefore regarded as "not OK".
BSE surveillance
Before 1989, the ability of the system to identify (and eliminate)
BSE-cases was limited.
Since 1990 this ability is improved, thanks to a specific (passive) BSE
surveillance. The
initiated introduction of active surveillance in risk populations should
improve the system
significantly.
EFSA Scientific Report (2004) 3, 1-6 on the Assessment of the
Geographical BSE Risk of
United States of America (USA).
http://www.efsa.eu.int
4 of 6
Conclusions
The European Food Safety Authority concludes:
1. The BSE agent was probably imported into USA and could have reached
domestic
cattle in the middle of the eighties. This cattle imported in the mid
eighties could have
been rendered in the late eighties and therefore led to an internal
challenge in the early
nineties. It is possible that meat and bone meal (MBM) imported into the USA
reached domestic cattle and lead to an internal challenge in the early
nineties.
2. A processing risk developed in the late 80s/early 90s when cattle
imports from BSE
risk countries were slaughtered or died and were processed (partly) into
feed, together
with some imports of MBM. This risk continued to exist, and grew
significantly in the
mid 90’s when domestic cattle, infected by imported MBM, reached processing.
Given the low stability of the system, the risk increased over the years
with continued
imports of cattle and MBM from BSE risk countries.
3. The current geographical BSE risk (GBR) level is III, i.e. it is
likely but not confirmed
that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with
the BSE-agent.
4. This assessment deviates from the previous assessment (SSC opinion,
2000) because
at that time several exporting countries were not considered a potential
risk.
5. It is also worth noting that the current GBR conclusions are not
dependent on the large
exchange of imports between USA and Canada. External challenge due to
exports to
the USA from European countries varied from moderate to high. These
challenges
indicate that it was likely that BSE infectivity was introduced into the
North American
continent.
6. EFSA and its Scientific Expert Working group on GBR are concerned
that the
available information was not confirmed by inspection missions as
performed by the
Food and Veterinary office (FVO – DG SANCO) in Member States and other third
countries. They recommend including, as far as feasible, BSE-related
aspects in
future inspection missions.
Expected development of the GBR
As long as there are no significant changes in rendering or feeding, the
stability remains
extremely/very unstable. Thus, the probability of cattle to be
(pre-clinically or clinically)
infected with the BSE-agent persistently increases.
A table summarising the reasons for the current assessment is given in
the table below
Documentation provided to EFSA
• Letter with the ref D (2003) KVD/ip/420722 from the European Commission
requesting a geographical risk assessment for the appearance of BSE in a
country.
EFSA Scientific Report (2004) 3, 1-6 on the Assessment of the
Geographical BSE Risk of
United States of America (USA).
http://www.efsa.eu.int
5 of 6
• Country Dossier as prepared by the country in response to the EC and EFSA
data collection request.
• Other sources of data information i.e. exports from third countries
and Eurostat
data.
• SSC, July 2000. Final opinion on the Geographical Risk of Bovine
Spongiform
Encephalopathy (GBR).
• SSC, January 2002. Updated opinion on the Geographical Risk of Bovine
Spongiform Encephalopathy (GBR).
Acknowledgment
Members of the EFSA Scientific Working Group are acknowledged for their
valuable
contribution to this mandate. The members are: Didier Calavas, Aline De
Koeijer, Michael
Gravenor, John Griffin, Dagmar Heim, Matthias Kramer, Riitta Maijala, Mo
Salman, Vittorio
Silano, Emmanuel Vanopdenbosch, and Stig Widell.
Annex
Details of the assessment are presented in the report as prepared by the
EFSA Scientific
Expert Working Group on GBR:
http://www.efsa.eu.int/science/efsa_scientific_reports/gbr_assessments/scr_annexes/574_en.html
EFSA Scientific Report (2004) 3, 1-6 on the Assessment of the
Geographical BSE Risk of United States of America (USA).
http://www.efsa.eu.int
6 of 6
USA, Summary of the GBR Assessment, July 2004 GBR Level : III**
EXTERNAL CHALLENGE STABILITY INTERACTION of EXTERNAL
CHALLENGE and STABILITY
1980-1990: Moderate
1991-1995: Very High
1996-2003: Extremely high
1980-2003: Extremely unstable
Live Cattle imports MBM imports Feeding Rendering SRM-removal BSE
surveillance
Any external challenge would have met the
extremely unstable system and infectivity
would have been recycled.
INTERNAL CHALLENGE
An internal challenge was possibly present
from 1980 to 1990 and was likely to be present
and growing from 1991 to 2003
EXPECTED DEVELOPMENT OF THE
GBR
From UK:
323 (CD*)
or
327 (other sources of
data)
From other BSE risk
countries:
16.656.490 (CD)
or
15.496.449 (other
sources of data).
*CD: country dossier
From UK:
5 tons (CD)
or
101 tons (other
sources of data)
From other BSE risk
countries:
406.547 tons (CD)
or
229.701 tons (other
sources of data)
1980-2003:
Not OK.
Feeding of
ruminant MBM to
cattle legally
possible until
August 1997.
1980-2003:
Not OK.
No proof of an
effective process in
reducing BSEinfectivity
is given.
1980-2003:
Not OK.
SRM are still
rendered for feed.
Passive but
improving with
some testing of risk
groups.
As long as there are no significant changes in
rendering or feeding, the stability remains
extremely/very unstable. Thus, the probability
of cattle to be (pre-clinically or clinically)
infected with the BSE-agent persistently
increases.
** GBR level III: ‘it is likely but not confirmed’ that domestic cattle
are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with the BSE-agent.

http://www.efsa.eu.int/science/efsa_scientific_reports/gbr_assessments/573/sr03_biohaz02_usa_report_v2_en1.pdf

> USA, Summary of the GBR Assessment, July 2004 GBR Level : III**
> EXTERNAL CHALLENGE STABILITY INTERACTION of EXTERNAL
> CHALLENGE and STABILITY
> 1980-1990: Moderate
> 1991-1995: Very High
> 1996-2003: Extremely high
> 1980-2003: Extremely unstable
> Live Cattle imports MBM imports Feeding Rendering SRM-removal BSE
> surveillance
> Any external challenge would have met the
> extremely unstable system and infectivity
> would have been recycled.
> INTERNAL CHALLENGE
> An internal challenge was possibly present
> from 1980 to 1990 and was likely to be present
> and growing from 1991 to 2003


Greetings list members,

I find it extremely disturbing that our federal government has lied to
us for some 24 years about
BSE/TSE in the USA. I find it very disturbing that the American consumer
either does not give
a damn or is just to stupid to understand what really has taken place.
AS the demented mount,
they may get a chance to see first hand what some of us have been trying
to tell them. That
Harvard study was bought and paid for in whole are in part by the very
industry that it was
investigating. IT was a farce from the beginning, but the USDA et al
used it for the GOLD
STANDARD. I hope they pay big time for what they have done. How many of
us have become
exposed and or died from this agent because of there lies? How many of
us will go clinical in our lifetime
because of there lies? Only time will tell, but i still say there should
be an International Inquriy into this
nightmare, because the International Community is very much involved due
to the USA exporting
there tainted products all over the world. HOW many humans around the
globe have become
exposed to the TSE agent from the USA based on there lies of TRIPLE
firewalls and there lies
of the safest beef in the world for the past 24 years? THIS is an
outrage, and the USA Government
knew what they were doing the whole time they were doing it. SHAME ON THEM!

They must pay the fiddler now...

WITH MANY in the Gov. boasting of NO BSE for years (without checking
mind you),
I say they failed terribly. THEY put each and everyone of us at risk of
this horrible
disease, all in the name of money and save the industry at all cost. ITs
all documented.

> Today in America, its Linda Detwiler's job to keep beef safe, and
> she's certain she can do it. She's the chief of the USDA task force
> watching mad cow, which means she's watching 40 million head of
> cattle, which is one-fourth of the world's beef.
>
> Under the U.S. system, any cow showing signs of brain disease gets
> reported; most get destroyed and their brains are sent to the USDA
> lab. They've checked 12,000 brains. Zero mad cow.
>
> "We have done over a decade of preventive activities, a decade of
> surveillance with no evidence of the disease, " boasts Detwiler.


Corralling Mad Cow Disease
WASHINGTON, Jan. 29, 2001

http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2001/01/29/eveningnews/main267898.shtml

> McDonald's International Scientific Advisory Council adds further
> strength to our beef safety program by providing independent expert
> scientific and medical advice on bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE).
>
> COUNCIL MEMBERS
>
> snip...
>
> Dr. Dean Danilson. Vice President QAFS, Tyson Foods, Inc. Responsible
> for quality assurance and food safety programs for the retail division
> for fresh beef, pork, poultry and ready-to-eat meats.
>
> Dr. Linda Detwiler. Adjunct Professor, Virginia-Maryland Regional
> College of Veterinary Medicine, University of Maryland. Also provides
> private animal health consulting services, with specializations in
> transmissible spongiform encephalopathies, emergency preparedness, and
> animal product issues related to imports and exports. Formerly Senior
> Staff Veterinarian, Emergency Programs Staff, U.S. Department of
> Agriculture Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, the unit
> principally responsible for surveillance, prevention, and education
> activities related to BSE. Member of various international working
> groups and advisory committees on TSEs. Author of numerous articles on
> the issues.


http://www.mcdonalds.com/corp/values/socialrespons/resrecog/expert_advisors0/international_scientific.html


=========================================================

> Release No. 0071.02
>
> by
>
> Secretary of Agriculture Ann M. Veneman
>
> Regarding The GAO Report on BSE
>
> February 26, 2002
>
> “The U.S. Department of Agriculture and the Department of Health and
> Human Services have been aggressive and proactive for well over a
> decade to prevent BSE from entering the United States. No cases of BSE
> have been found in U.S. cattle nor have any cases of the human form,
> variant CJD, been detected.
>
> “While we support the GAO’s efforts to examine ways to strengthen the
> government’s ongoing efforts to prevent BSE, the report fails to
> appropriately recognize the conclusions and recommendations made last
> year by Harvard University in it’s comprehensive, 3-year study on BSE.
>
> “The Harvard Risk Analysis showed that the risk of BSE occurring the
> in United States is extremely low and that early government protection
> systems have been largely responsible for keeping BSE out of the
> United States. and would prevent it from spreading if it ever did
> enter the country.
>
> “We have concerns that despite extensive comments on the draft report,
> the GAO did not correct the scientific and technical errors that
> appear in the final report. As well, in examining recommendations, the
> GAO report does not appropriately consider the additional actions that
> have been taken by federal agencies to strengthen BSE programs.
>
> “This Administration has taken aggressive steps to strengthen BSE
> protection systems, including significant funding increases for
> inspection, testing and research programs. We have in place
> coordinated programs to ensure vigilance in protecting the public
> health and animals from disease.
>
> “We will remain steadfast in our efforts to prevent BSE from entering
> this country. As we examine this report, we will use scientific
> analysis as an important component in strengthening our protection
> systems.”
>
> #
>
> For more information about BSE, federal agency response to the
> disease, the Harvard Risk Analysis, and other related programs, visit
> http://www.aphis/usda.gov
>

http://www.usda.gov/news/releases/2002/02/0071.htm


> Release No. 0070.02
>
> Alisa Harrison (202) 720-4623
>
> HHS Public Affairs (202) 690-6343
>
> ADMINISTRATION CONTINUES TO STRENGTHEN BSE PROTECTION SYSTEMS
>
>
> Announces Status Report of Actions, Including Doubling of Testing
> for BSE in Cattle, Following the Harvard BSE Risk Assessment
>
> WASHINGTON, Feb. 26, 2002--The U.S. Department of Agriculture and the
> Department of Health and Human Services today reported the status of
> action steps designed to further prevent bovine spongiform
> encephalopathy (BSE) in U.S. cattle, including doubling the number of
> BSE tests it will conduct this fiscal year compared to the previous
> year. The USDA, HHS, as well as other federal and state agencies, are
> working together to continue strengthening protection systems to
> prevent BSE from entering the country.
>
> USDA and HHS are reporting the status of the action steps first
> outlined Nov. 30, 2001 following the release of the landmark risk
> analysis on BSE conducted by Harvard University. The report showed
> that the risk of BSE occurring in the United States is extremely low.
> The report showed that early protection systems put into place by the
> USDA and HHS have been largely responsible for keeping BSE out of the
> U.S. and would prevent it from spreading if it ever did enter the
> country.
>
> Even so, USDA Secretary Ann M. Veneman and HHS Secretary Tommy
> Thompson last year outlined a series of actions to continue
> strengthening programs to reduce the risk even further.
>
> “We will remain vigilant and are committed to taking the appropriate
> steps to keep BSE out of the United States,” said Veneman. “In
> addition to being on track to double our testing this year, we are
> moving forward on a series of action items to strengthen our
> prevention programs.”
>
> HHS Secretary Tommy Thompson added, “We continue to take strong
> actions and keep our vigilance high to prevent this disease from
> entering this country. If we ever did face a situation, we want to
> ensure that strong systems are in place to prevent its potential
> spread to the animal or human food chain.”
>
> The three-year Harvard study is the most comprehensive study of BSE
> and its potential risk factors done in the United States. It is the
> second comprehensive independent analysis conducted in recent years
> examining prevention measures being taken in the U.S. related to BSE.
>
> The series of recent actions by federal agencies include:
>
> · A peer review of the Harvard study by outside experts is underway by
> a team of independent scientists to determine the accuracy of the
> approaches and assumptions of the model.
>
> · As stated above, USDA’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
> (APHIS) is on track to double testing for BSE in cattle this year. The
> target for FY 2002 is 12,500 compared to approximately 5,200 sampled
> in FY 2001. The increase includes testing deceased cattle from farms.
>
> · The FY 2003 USDA budget includes record-level funding for pest and
> disease prevention and food safety programs, including $8 million for
> increased BSE surveillance and laboratory activities by APHIS, with $3
> million going directly to the states to help collect an increased
> number of samples. An additional $2 million is requested for USDA’s
> Agricultural Research Service to further study BSE.
>
> · USDA is on track to increase the number of inspectors at ports of
> entry with its FY 2003 budget, proposing to bring staffing levels to
> more than 4000, up from 2500 personnel at the beginning of FY 2001.
>
> · The Defense Appropriations Supplemental Act, approved by the
> President in January, provides $328 million for increased homeland
> security protections. These resources will strengthen the coordination
> and planning of federal programs by increasing overseas inspection
> capabilities, provide funding to integrate computer technologies among
> federal agencies, fund critical laboratory renovations to improve
> testing capabilities and invest in new detection systems, such as
> x-ray equipment, among other priorities.
>
> · USDA’s Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) published for
> comment a current thinking paper in the Jan. 17, 2002 Federal Register
> outlining additional regulatory actions it may take to further reduce
> the potential risk of BSE and to ensure that potentially infectious
> materials does not enter the U.S. food supply.
>
> · USDA is currently drafting a proposed rule to prohibit the use of
> certain stunning devices used to immobilize cattle during slaughter.
> As well, USDA is currently drafting an advance notice of proposed
> rulemaking, which will consider additional regulatory options for the
> disposal of dead stock from farms and ranches.
>
>
> · Last year, HHS outlined new steps to improve the scientific
> understanding of BSE in a detailed action plan that incorporates a
> comprehensive approach to further strengthen prevention, increase
> research resources and expand existing inspection efforts.
>
> · The HHS Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has significantly
> improved the database it uses to track inspection reports and monitor
> compliance with the animal feed rule that helps protect the U.S.
> against BSE. This improved database, expected to be fully operational
> in April, will allow FDA to record inspection results and track
> compliance more effectively.
>
> · FDA has been appropriated an additional $15 million for BSE efforts
> in the current fiscal year, bringing the total to $19 million. This
> year, FDA is hiring an additional 115 people to help protect the U.S.
> against BSE.
>
> FDA's inspections show a continued high rate of compliance with the
> feed rule. As of mid-December, initial inspections of all renderers,
> protein blenders and commercial feed mills had been completed. All but
> four percent of these entities were in compliance with feed rules,
> though the status of six percent of these firms is unknown because of
> incomplete inspection results.
>
> BSE has never been detected in U.S. cattle, nor has there been a case
> of the human form of the disease, variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease,
> detected in the United States. Since 1989, USDA has taken a series of
> preventive actions to protect against this animal disease. This
> includes banning the import of live ruminants, such as cattle, sheep
> and goats, and most ruminant products from the United Kingdom and
> other countries having BSE. The ban was extended to Europe in 1997. To
> stop the way the disease is thought to spread, in 1997, FDA prohibited
> the use of most mammalian protein in the manufacture of animal feed
> intended for cows and other ruminants.
>
> BSE is a chronic, degenerative neurological disorder of cattle. It
> belongs to a family of diseases known as transmissible spongiform
> encephalopathies. Also included in that family of illnesses is vCJD,
> which is believed to be caused by eating neural tissue, such as brain
> and spinal cord, from BSE-affected cattle.
>
> The latest information on BSE, copies of the Harvard Risk Assessment
> and related policy papers are available on USDA’s website at:
> http://www.aphis.usda.gov and on the HHS
> website at http://www.fda.gov .
>
> #
>

http://www.usda.gov/news/releases/2002/02/0070.htm


> U.S. beef is "safer than it was a year ago" because since December 30,
> 2003, high-risk materials from slaughtered cattle have been banned
> from entering the food system, says Secretary of Agriculture Ann Veneman.
>
> Testifying July 14 at a joint hearing of the House of Representatives
> Agriculture and Government Reform committees, Veneman said the World
> Organization for Animal Health has reported that banning the materials
> that could carry bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) is "the single
> most important action to protect public health" the United States has
> put in place since a sole case of the disease -- also known as "mad
> cow disease" -- was found in Washington state a week before the ban.
>
U.S. Beef Safer than Year Ago, Agriculture's Veneman Says

http://japan.usembassy.gov/e/p/tp-20040715-18.html

> VENEMAN ANNOUNCES ADDITIONAL PROTECTION
> MEASURES TO GUARD AGAINST BSE
> WASHINGTON, Dec. 30, 2003—Agriculture Secretary Ann M. Veneman today
> announced
> additional safeguards to bolster the U.S. protection systems against
> Bovine Spongiform
> Encephalopathy, or BSE, and further protect public health.
> “For more than a decade, the United States has had in place an
> aggressive surveillance,
> detection and response program for BSE,” said Veneman. “While we are
> confident that the
> United States has safeguards and firewalls needed to protect public
> health, these additional
> actions will further strengthen our protection systems.”

http://www.nasda.org/joint/BSE-USDA.pdf


==========================================

> WASHINGTON, D.C. (AP) - The United States has formally notified its
> trading partners that U.S. beef is safe to eat, a principal step
> toward negotiations to lift bans they imposed because of mad cow disease.
>
> The letters to his counterparts abroad from the Agriculture
> Department's chief veterinarian, Ron DeHaven, were accompanied by
> summaries of what the United States has done to protect beef safety
> and search for other cases of mad cow.


U.S. beef declared 'safe to eat'

Published: Monday, March 29, 2004

http://www.dailyvidette.org/news/2004/03/29/News/U.Beef.Declared.safe.To.Eat-643605.shtml

> DeHaven added, "Despite where this cow might have originated, U.S.
> beef remains safe. We have made some adjustments and further
> enhancements to that system based on this situation, but we had a feed
> ban in place that would preclude the transfer of this disease from
> animal to animal.


Came from Canada…: BSE cow heats up border debate

http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0HEE/is_3_61/ai_112350235

> In addition, USDA will sample up to 20,000 animals randomly from
> clinically normal but older slaughter cattle, DeHaven says. The random
> sampling will provide another assurance of the overall efficacy of
> U.S. preventive measures for BSE, he adds.
>
> DeHaven says the samples will be collected at state- or federally
> inspected slaughter plants, custom exempt slaughter plants, farms,
> rendering facilities, veterinary diagnostic laboratories, animal feed
> slaughter facilities, public health labs, vet clinics, and sale barns
> and livestock auctions. He estimates the total number of animals in
> that group to be approximately 446,000 on an annual basis.
>
> DeHaven emphasized the program is a one-time effort. Once concluded,
> results will be analyzed and an evaluation done on what other actions
> might be appropriate.
>

DONT HOLD YOUR BREATH...TSS

USDA Bolsters BSE Surveillance
Joe Roybal
Apr 1, 2004 12:00 PM

http://beef-mag.com/mag/beef_usda_bolsters_bse/

> DeHaven says BSE is a disease of old cows. It has an incubation period
> of between three and eight years, meaning an infected cow won't
> exhibit symptoms for at least three years after infection.

http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/madcow/testing.html

> DeHaven explained that USDA's catchphrase, "out of an abundance of
> caution," was created because BSE is not a food safety issue.
> Therefore, the cautious approach was targeted toward preserving
> consumer confidence in the food supply, which has remained high
> throughout this situation. He expressed concern, however, that some
> actions taken by USDA under the premise of consumer confidence could
> be misconstrued as being "inconsistent with the science".
>

http://www.amif.org/News2004/020304.htm


> George Gray, executive director of the Harvard Center for Risk Analysis,
> said the U.S. is resistant to BSE and that his model showed that "If the
> disease is introduced into the United States, it goes away. & We're on
> the downside of whatever has happened," he said.
>

5/6/2004 8:10:22 AM

BSE Summit Looks at Disease's Impact on Beef Industry

http://www.cattlenetwork.com/content.asp?contentid=1867

SUPPRESSED peer review of Harvard study October 31, 2002

http://www.fsis.usda.gov/oa/topics/BSE_Peer_Review.pdf

> But where science was uncertain, Veneman said: "I am pleased to report
> that using complex mathematical models, the study found that the risk
> of BSE entering this country is extremely low."
>

U.S. policy on mad cow in question
The agriculture secretary mischaracterized a study on the risk of the
disease entering the country
Monday, May 03, 2004
JIM BARNETT


http://www.oregonlive.com/news/oregonian/index.ssf?/base/front_page/108358536383690.xml

> Gray and his team from the Harvard Center for Risk Analysis couldn't
> find reliable data to measure the risk from illegal imports, so they
> made an educated guess that it was minimal. But the science was
> inconclusive. And the question remained open.
>
> In announcing the Harvard team's report, however, agency officials
> gave no hint of scientific uncertainty
>

Harvard study couldn't assess the risk of entry
The lead researcher told an official he couldn't rule out a chance
infected cattle had entered the U.S.
Monday, May 03, 2004

http://www.oregonlive.com/news/oregonian/index.ssf?/base/news/108358541283690.xml


================================================

> With respect to cattle or cattle feed imported from the United Kingdom
> (or other countries in which BSE has occurred), the United States led
> the way in taking measures to prevent or correct any such occurrences.
> During the years before the importation of live ruminants and ruminant
> products was banned (in 1989), 500 cattle and a single shipment of 12
> tons of meat and bone meal feed were imported from the United Kingdom.
> Almost all of the cattle were traced, and if still living, were
> slaughtered and destroyed. We can say today that any animal or animal
> feed that might have been contaminated did not transmit the infection
> because with an incubation period of approximately 5 years, BSE would
> already have spread through recycled carcass cattle feed to cause a
> recognizable outbreak of disease.
>
> Import barriers have since been extended to include all countries in
> which BSE exists or which have not convincingly demonstrated its
> nonexistence. Thus, the argument that undetected cases of BSE might be
> present in the United States, although impossible to disprove, is not
> supported by current evidence. Because of the everpresent risk for
> human error, vigilance is still required to see that all established
> preventive measures are properly and continuously monitored.
>

snip...

Paul Brown
Senior Investigator, National Institutes of Health, Bethesda, Maryland, USA


Afterthoughts about Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Variant
Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease

http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/vol7no3_supp/brown.htm
========================================

The officials' Washington meeting provided a "great opportunity" to
reinforce cooperation in maintaining the safety of North American beef,
said Mexico's Usabiaga. North American beef is the safest in the world,
he said.

U.S., Canada, Mexico Coordinating Response to BSE, Veneman Says By
Kathryn McConnell
Washington File Staff Writer

http://japan.usembassy.gov/e/p/tp-20040120-43.html

> INTERNAL CHALLENGE
> An internal challenge was possibly present
> from 1980 to 1990 and was likely to be present
> and growing from 1991 to 2003


THAT 'extensive' BSE/TSE surveillance program that was put into effect
in 1990 and that r-t-r feed ban (partial and voluntary 8/4/97) was nothing
more than a smoke screen. There was nothing 'extensive' about either one
of them. THE only thing 'extensive' about either one of them was the fraud
in it all...

still disgusted in Bacliff, TEXAS...

Terry S. Singeltary Sr.

######### http://mailhost-alt.rz.uni-karlsruhe.de/warc/bse-l.html ##########





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