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From: TSS (216-119-143-70.ipset23.wt.net)
Subject: INDUSTRY STILL BLINDED BY GREED, STILL FIGHTING SRM BAN THAT IS NOT EVEN IN PLACE YET $
Date: August 20, 2004 at 6:52 am PST

-------- Original Message --------
Subject: FDA's 'solution' to SRMs in feed only increases problems
Date: Fri, 20 Aug 2004 08:56:15 -0500
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
To: mtgeditors@meatingplace.com
CC: cjdvoice@yahoogroups.com, dmurphy@meatingplace.com, bmcdowell@meatingplace.com, jfranklin@meatingplace.com, amcguire@meatingplace.com


The Vocal Point
FDA's 'solution' to SRMs in feed only increases problems
by Dan Murphy on 8/20/04 for
Meatingplace.com

As a columnist who's supposed to weigh both sides of an issue, I have to
pretend that this is a tough call.

On one hand, the public relations value of industry agreeing to support
FDA's proposed rule banning specified risk materials (SRMs) from the
feed chain is significant. Without resorting to that overused cliché —
"an abundance of caution" — beef producers, packers and renderers can
honestly project a positive, proactive image of an industry going to
extraordinary lengths to protect the public if they line up behind FDA's
proposal.

Except blocking the processing of SRMs into feed ingredients isn't a
public health issue, much as a handful of professional agitators would
love to have the media treat FDA's proposal as a scare story.

That reality didn't stop federal officials from positioning this new
proposal strictly in terms of public health, however.

"Today's actions continue our strong commitment to public health
protections against BSE," said Health and Human Services Secretary Tommy
Thompson.

"With these additional measures, we will make a strong system even
stronger," added FDA Acting Commissioner Lester M. Crawford.

Crawford's quote has an eerie echo of the "added layer of protection"
theme that surrounded Homeland Security's recent rollout of the
controversial biometric check-out process required of foreign visitors
entering the United States. Nevertheless, it's tough to argue that
government shouldn't continue to advance its measures to protect public
health or ensure national security.

On the other hand, however, the economic impact of having to divert
millions of tons of valuable meat and bone meal (MBM) from its current
applications as feed supplements would inflict severe economic damage on
the beef industry without improving public health one bit.

"As a protein ingredient, MBM is worth about $230 a ton," explains Tom
Cook, president of the National Renderers Association. "As a source of
energy (fuel), it's worth only $35. If this material cannot be used in
livestock feed, there simply is no alternative market."

So let's officially stop pretending this ban is good idea, because the
tidal wave of red ink that will wash over the industry isn't the only
problem that would arise if this new prohibition goes into effect.

Despite FDA's 1997 ban on ruminant-to-ruminant feeding, bovine MBM is
still allowed as an ingredient in feed for other species. That provides
renderers with the economic incentive to pick up and process cattle that
die before slaughter.

FDA's new proposal, however, would likely terminate the use of rendering
as a disposal option for dead stock and force producers to either bury
them on site or transport them to a landfill.

And you know that all those rural landfills across cattle country will
just be waiting with open arms for the arrival of millions of dead
animal carcasses.

Just how big of a problem is dead stock disposal? In case you haven't
had the pleasure of wading through USDA's livestock mortality estimates
lately, more than 4.5 million cattle (beef and dairy) die on farms or at
feedlots annually. Of those, nearly 45 percent are picked up by
renderers, according to a study completed this month by Informa
Economics of McLean, Va.

"[But] if SRMs and/or cattle and calf mortalities cannot be used to
produce livestock feed, the economic value to the rendering industry
will be reduced below the cost of processing this material," the report
stated. "Economics dictates this material will not be rendered."

The potential loss from sales of MBM and tallow derived from the 1.42
billion pounds of SRMs currently collected at packing plants would
exceed $91 million annually, the report estimated. More importantly,
those losses would be felt not only by renderers, but also by producers
in the form of higher livestock feed costs and by packers in the form of
higher costs for SRM segregation and disposal.

"The burden [of these proposed regulations] falls on the whole beef
industry," Tom Cook, president of the National Renders Association, told
Meatingplace.com. "Everyone would pay higher costs for feed and higher
fees to dispose of dead and downer stock."

Added to that is an estimated $100 million-plus shortfall the rendering
industry would absorb due to the loss of sales of MBM and tallow from
dead stock and the loss of fees currently charged to cover the costs of
transporting these carcasses to a rendering plant.

If no significant value can be gained from processing dead stock, the
fees charged to dispose of them would soar, and producers would likely
opt for another method of disposal.

Which brings us back to a key aspect of this discussion that carries
some traction with the public: the negative environmental impact of
banning SRMs in all livestock feed.

If modern, high-tech rendering were no longer an option, let's be
honest: The idea that "other disposal methods" could deal with those
1.46 billion pounds of SRMs from healthy cattle at packing plants and
the 4.6 million carcasses of dead stock is about as plausible as
assuming that Paris Hilton will settle down and start pursuing a career
any day now.

There is no regulatory oversight for on-farm burial, which leaves wide
open the possibility of groundwater contamination and the spread of
disease, and composting — even under the most careful, labor-intensive
management — doesn't work very well for 1,400-pound animals with thick,
tough hides. And keep in mind one other consideration regarding
composting: The net effect of FDA's new rule could end up being exactly
the opposite of what is intended — namely, keeping cattle from being
exposed to BSE prions — if the material from carcasses that are
composted are spread out on pastures and feed crops that are then fed to
cattle.

The scenarios likely to follow imposition of FDA's proposed ban add up
to a nothing less than a massive set of new problems that will likely
exceed the challenges already imposed on producers, packers and
renderers by the initial wave of BSE-related restrictions imposed
earlier this year.

Does that mean industry should dig in and fight this new rule?

Sorry it took so long to get here, but in a word: Yes!

The bottom line message is this: No matter whether FDA bans SRMs in the
feed chain or not, the amount of BSE infectivity that the beef-eating
public would ever be exposed to is, as the Harvard Risk Assessment
characterized it, "almost immeasurably small."

In fact, the only measurement of interest in any regulations affecting
BSE prevention is its impact on public health, and in this case, the net
effect on public health of banning SRMs in feed is zero.

Nobody's going to succumb to the human form of BSE because cattle are
eating rendered proteins derived from other livestock. And no one's life
will be spared if they're not. The current feed-chain firewall is
working quite well, and that fact shouldn't be dismissed.

Secretary Thompson put it this way in trying to sell the new rule: "We
cannot be content with the status quo."

Note to the secretary: Status quo left town on Dec. 23, 2003.

Dan Murphy is a freelance writer and former editor of MMT magazine based
in the Pacific Northwest . His column, THE VOCAL POINT, appears in this
space each Friday.

Greetings,

hey there dan, you just dont get it do ya???

1: J Infect Dis 1980 Aug;142(2):205-8


Oral transmission of kuru, Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, and scrapie to
nonhuman primates.

Gibbs CJ Jr, Amyx HL, Bacote A, Masters CL, Gajdusek DC.

Kuru and Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease of humans and scrapie disease of
sheep and goats were transmitted to squirrel monkeys (Saimiri
sciureus) that were exposed to the infectious agents only by their
nonforced consumption of known infectious tissues. The asymptomatic
incubation period in the one monkey exposed to the virus of kuru was
36 months; that in the two monkeys exposed to the virus of
Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease was 23 and 27 months, respectively; and
that in the two monkeys exposed to the virus of scrapie was 25 and
32 months, respectively. Careful physical examination of the buccal
cavities of all of the monkeys failed to reveal signs or oral
lesions. One additional monkey similarly exposed to kuru has
remained asymptomatic during the 39 months that it has been under
observation.

PMID: 6997404

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=6997404&dopt=Abstract

Adaptation of the bovine spongiform encephalopathy agent to primates and
comparison with Creutzfeldt-- Jakob disease: implications for human health.

Lasmezas CI, Fournier JG, Nouvel V, Boe H, Marce D, Lamoury F, Kopp N,
Hauw JJ, Ironside J, Bruce M, Dormont D, Deslys JP.

Commissariat a l'Energie Atomique, Service de Neurovirologie, Direction
des Sciences du Vivant/Departement de Recherche Medicale, Centre de
Recherches du Service de Sante des Armees 60-68, Fontenay-aux-Roses,
France. lasmezas@cea.fr

There is substantial scientific evidence to support the notion that
bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) has contaminated human beings,
causing variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD). This disease has
raised concerns about the possibility of an iatrogenic secondary
transmission to humans, because the biological properties of the
primate-adapted BSE agent are unknown. We show that (i) BSE can be
transmitted from primate to primate by intravenous route in 25 months,
and (ii) an iatrogenic transmission of vCJD to humans could be readily
recognized pathologically, whether it occurs by the central or
peripheral route. Strain typing in mice demonstrates that the BSE agent
adapts to macaques in the same way as it does to humans and confirms
that the BSE agent is responsible for vCJD not only in the United
Kingdom but also in France. The agent responsible for French iatrogenic
growth hormone-linked CJD taken as a control is very different from vCJD
but is similar to that found in one case of sporadic CJD and one sheep
scrapie isolate. These data will be key in identifying the origin of
human cases of prion disease, including accidental vCJD transmission,
and could provide bases for vCJD risk assessment.

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=pubmed&dopt=Abstract&list_uids=11259641

Adaptation of the bovine spongiform encephalopathy agent to primates
and comparison with Creutzfeldt- Jakob disease: Implications for
human health

THE findings from Corinne Ida Lasmézas*, [dagger] , Jean-Guy Fournier*,
Virginie Nouvel*,

Hermann Boe*, Domíníque Marcé*, François Lamoury*, Nicolas Kopp [Dagger

] , Jean-Jacques Hauw§, James Ironside¶, Moira Bruce [||] , Dominique

Dormont*, and Jean-Philippe Deslys* et al, that The agent responsible
for French iatrogenic growth hormone-linked CJD taken as a control is
very different from vCJD but is similar to that found in one case of
sporadic CJD and one sheep scrapie isolate;

http://www.pnas.org/cgi/content/full/041490898v1

Here is the link for EFSAs most recent GBR reports


You will find the final BSE risk assessments for the USA, Canada, Mexico, South Africa (all in category III)
and Norway and Sweden (both in category II) and Australia (category I).
For each country there is a summary (1 page) - a short report (6 pages) and they seem to have trouble with the links for the full reports (15-20 pages) but they are 'working on it'. The links to these more complete working group reports (referred to as "annex") are usually found on page 5 of the 6-page reports.
I have until now only managed to get the link of the long report for the USA.


USA

EFSA Scientific Report on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE-Risk (GBR) of the United States of America (USA)
Publication date: 20 August 2004

short report USA (6 pages)


Annex = full report, 17 pages


snip...
...EFSA concludes that the current GBR level of USA is III, i.e. it is likely but not confirmed that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with the BSE-agent. As long as there are no significant changes in rendering or feeding, the stability remains extremely/very unstable. Thus, the probability of cattle to be (pre-clinically or clinically) infected with the BSE-agent persistently increases
__

MEXICO

...EFSA concludes that the current geographical BSE risk (GBR) level is III, i.e. it is likely but not confirmed that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with the BSE-agent. The GBR is likely to increase due to continued internal and external challenge, coupled with a very unstable system. ...

__

CANADA

...EFSA concludes that the current GBR level of Canada is III, i.e. it is confirmed at a lower level that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with the BSE-agent. As long as the system remains unstable, it is expected that the GBR continues to grow, even if no additional external challenges occur.

__

SOUTH AFRICA

...EFSA concludes that the current GBR level of South Africa is III, i.e. it is likely but not confirmed that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with the BSE-agent. As long as there are no serious changes in rendering or feeding, the stability remains very unstable. Thus, the probability of cattle to be (pre-clinically or clinically) infected with the BSE-agent persistently increases even if no additional external challenges occur. ..

__


SWEDEN


...EFSA concludes that the current geographical BSE-risk (GBR) level is II, i.e. it is unlikely but can not be excluded that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with the BSE-agent. The Swedish BSE/cattle system is now regarded to be optimally stable. This implies that the probability of cattle to become newly infected with the BSE-agent is extremely low.

__

NORWAY

...EFSA concludes that the current geographical BSE-risk (GBR) level is II, as it is unlikely but can not be excluded that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with the BSE-agent. The Norwegian BSE/cattle system is now regarded to be very stable....


__

AUSTRALIA

...EFSA concludes that the current GBR Australia level is I, i.e., it is highly unlikely that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with the BSE-agent. As long as the possibility of cross-contamination exists and there are no serious changes in rendering, the system will continue to be very unstable. Thus, the possibility of cattle being (pre-clinically or clinically) infected with the BSE-agent will remain at a low level.

GBR assessments:
There were some problems with the links for the full "working group reports"- Here are all the links for the 7 countries GBR-assessments published on August 20th.
Best regards
Karin Irgens
__
USA

CANADA

MEXICO

NORWAY

SOUTH AFRICA

SWEDEN

AUSTRALIA


######### http://mailhost-alt.rz.uni-karlsruhe.de/warc/bse-l.html ##########


Docket No. 03-080-1 -- USDA ISSUES PROPOSED RULE TO ALLOW LIVE ANIMAL

IMPORTS FROM CANADA [takes a few minutes to load]

https://web01.aphis.usda.gov/BSEcom.nsf/BSEFrameset?OpenFrameSet&Frame=BottomFrame&Src=_25t156hb3dtmisrjjconjcc9n6ph6ccr66oqjgdpo74qm6e1l68qjcp9hc4o30dhgckq34phfc8rjgoj16orjep9ic8o66c9i64s3achl6pi68cpg60r38eb675i3ujrgcln48rr3elmmarjk4p0nat3f8pp62rb5cg0_

Docket No. 2003N-0312 Animal Feed Safety System [TSS SUBMISSION]

http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/03n0312/03N-0312_emc-000001.txt

Docket Management Docket: 02N-0273 - Substances Prohibited From Use in

Animal Food or Feed; Animal Proteins Prohibited in Ruminant Feed

Comment Number: EC -10

Accepted - Volume 2

http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/03/Jan03/012403/8004be07.html

PART 2

http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/03/Jan03/012403/8004be09.html

PDF]Freas, William TSS SUBMISSION

File Format: PDF/Adobe Acrobat -

Page 1. J Freas, William From: Sent: To: Subject: Terry S. Singeltary

Sr. [flounder@wt.net] Monday, January 08,200l 3:03 PM freas ...

http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/01/slides/3681s2_09.pdf

Asante/Collinge et al, that BSE transmission to the 129-methionine

genotype can lead to an alternate phenotype that is indistinguishable

from type 2 PrPSc, the commonest _sporadic_ CJD;

http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/03/slides/3923s1_OPH.htm

Docket Management Docket: 96N-0417 - Current Good Manufacturing Practice

in Manufacturing, Packing, or Holding Dietary Ingredients a

Comment Number: EC -2

Accepted - Volume 7

http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/03/Mar03/031403/96N-0417-EC-2.htm

[PDF] Appendices to PL107-9 Inter-agency Working Group Final Report 1-1

File Format: PDF/Adobe Acrobat - View as HTML

Agent, Weapons of Mass Destruction Operations Unit Federal Bureau of

those who provided comments in response to Docket No. ...

Meager 8/18/01 Terry S. Singeltary Sr ...

www.aphis.usda.gov/lpa/pubs/pubs/PL107-9_Appen.pdf

Docket No. 2003N-0312 Animal Feed Safety System [TSS SUBMISSION

TO DOCKET 2003N-0312]

http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/03n0312/03N-0312_emc-000001.txt

# Docket No: 02-088-1 RE-Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of

2002; [TSS SUBMISSION ON POTENTIAL FOR BSE/TSE & FMD 'SUITCASE BOMBS'] -

TSS 1/27/03 (0)

Docket Management

Docket: 02N-0276 - Bioterrorism Preparedness; Registration of Food Facilities, Section 305

Comment Number: EC-254 [TSS SUBMISSION]

http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/02n0276/02N-0276-EC-254.htm


Dockets Entered On October 2, 2003 Table of Contents, Docket #,

Title, 1978N-0301,

OTC External Analgesic Drug Products, ... EMC 7, Terry S. Singeltary Sr.

Vol #: 1, ...

www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/03/oct03/100203/100203.htm

Daily Dockets Entered on 02/05/03

DOCKETS ENTERED on 2/5/03. ... EMC 4 Terry S. Singeltary Sr. Vol#: 2.

... Vol#: 1.

03N-0009 Federal Preemption of State & Local Medical Device Requireme. ...

www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/03/Feb03/020503/020503.htm

Docket Management

Docket: 02N-0370 - Neurological Devices; Classification of Human Dura Mater

Comment Number: EC -1

Accepted - Volume 1

http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/03/Jan03/012403/8004be11.html

http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/03/Jan03/012403/8004bdfe.html

http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/03/Jan03/012403/8004bdfc.html

Daily Dockets - 04/10/03


... 00D-1662 Use of Xenotransplantation Products in Humans.

EMC 98 Terry S. Singeltary Sr. Vol#: 3. 01F ...

www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/03/Apr03/041003/041003.htm - 05-20-2003
- Cached


2003D-0186

Guidance for Industry: Use of Material From Deer and Elk In Animal Feed

EMC 1

Terry S. Singeltary Sr.

Vol #:

1

http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/03/Jun03/060903/060903.htm

2003D-0186

Guidance for Industry: Use of Material From Deer and Elk In Animal Feed

EMC 7

Terry S. Singeltary Sr.

Vol #:

1

2003D-0186

Guidance for Industry: Use of Material From Deer and Elk In Animal Feed

EMC 7

Terry S. Singeltary Sr.

Vol #:

1

http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/03/oct03/100203/100203.htm

01N-0423 Substances Prohibited from use in animal food/Feed Ruminant

APE 5 National Renderers Association, Inc. Vol#: 2

APE 6 Animal Protein Producers Industry Vol#: 2

APE 7 Darling International Inc. Vol#: 2

EMC 1 Terry S. Singeltary Sr. Vol#: 3

http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/01/Oct01/101501/101501.htm

Send Post-Publication Peer Review to journal:

Re: RE-Monitoring the occurrence of emerging forms of Creutzfeldt-Jakob

disease in the United States

Email Terry S. Singeltary:

flounder@wt.net

I lost my mother to hvCJD (Heidenhain Variant CJD). I would like to

comment on the CDC's attempts to monitor the occurrence of emerging

forms of CJD. Asante, Collinge et al [1] have reported that BSE

transmission to the 129-methionine genotype can lead to an alternate

phenotype that is indistinguishable from type 2 PrPSc, the commonest

sporadic CJD. However, CJD and all human TSEs are not reportable

nationally. CJD and all human TSEs must be made reportable in every

state and internationally. I hope that the CDC does not continue to

expect us to still believe that the 85%+ of all CJD cases which are

sporadic are all spontaneous, without route/source. We have many TSEs in

the USA in both animal and man. CWD in deer/elk is spreading rapidly and

CWD does transmit to mink, ferret, cattle, and squirrel monkey by

intracerebral inoculation. With the known incubation periods in other

TSEs, oral transmission studies of CWD may take much longer. Every

victim/family of CJD/TSEs should be asked about route and source of this

agent. To prolong this will only spread the agent and needlessly expose

others. In light of the findings of Asante and Collinge et al, there

should be drastic measures to safeguard the medical and surgical arena

from sporadic CJDs and all human TSEs. I only ponder how many sporadic

CJDs in the USA are type 2 PrPSc?

http://www.neurology.org/cgi/eletters/60/2/176#535

LANCET INFECTIOUS DISEASE JOURNAL

Volume 3, Number 8 01 August 2003

Newsdesk

Tracking spongiform encephalopathies in North America

Xavier Bosch

My name is Terry S Singeltary Sr, and I live in Bacliff, Texas. I lost

my mom to hvCJD (Heidenhain variant CJD) and have been searching for

answers ever since. What I have found is that we have not been told the

truth. CWD in deer and elk is a small portion of a much bigger problem.

49-year-old Singeltary is one of a number of people who have remained

largely unsatisfied after being told that a close relative died from a

rapidly progressive dementia compatible with spontaneous

Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD). So he decided to gather hundreds of

documents on transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSE) and

realised that if Britons could get variant CJD from bovine spongiform

encephalopathy (BSE), Americans might get a similar disorder from

chronic wasting disease (CWD)the relative of mad cow disease seen among

deer and elk in the USA. Although his feverish search did not lead him

to the smoking gun linking CWD to a similar disease in North American

people, it did uncover a largely disappointing situation.

Singeltary was greatly demoralised at the few attempts to monitor the

occurrence of CJD and CWD in the USA. Only a few states have made CJD

reportable. Human and animal TSEs should be reportable nationwide and

internationally, he complained in a letter to the Journal of the

American Medical Association (JAMA 2003; 285: 733). I hope that the CDC

does not continue to expect us to still believe that the 85% plus of all

CJD cases which are sporadic are all spontaneous, without route or source.

Until recently, CWD was thought to be confined to the wild in a small

region in Colorado. But since early 2002, it has been reported in other

areas, including Wisconsin, South Dakota, and the Canadian province of

Saskatchewan. Indeed, the occurrence of CWD in states that were not

endemic previously increased concern about a widespread outbreak and

possible transmission to people and cattle.

To date, experimental studies have proven that the CWD agent can be

transmitted to cattle by intracerebral inoculation and that it can cross

the mucous membranes of the digestive tract to initiate infection in

lymphoid tissue before invasion of the central nervous system. Yet the

plausibility of CWD spreading to people has remained elusive.

Part of the problem seems to stem from the US surveillance system. CJD

is only reported in those areas known to be endemic foci of CWD.

Moreover, US authorities have been criticised for not having performed

enough prionic tests in farm deer and elk.

Although in November last year the US Food and Drug Administration

issued a directive to state public-health and agriculture officials

prohibiting material from CWD-positive animals from being used as an

ingredient in feed for any animal species, epidemiological control and

research in the USA has been quite different from the situation in the

UK and Europe regarding BSE.

Getting data on TSEs in the USA from the government is like pulling

teeth, Singeltary argues. You get it when they want you to have it,

and only what they want you to have.

Norman Foster, director of the Cognitive Disorders Clinic at the

University of Michigan (Ann Arbor, MI, USA), says that current

surveillance of prion disease in people in the USA is inadequate to

detect whether CWD is occurring in human beings; adding that, the

cases that we know about are reassuring, because they do not suggest the

appearance of a new variant of CJD in the USA or atypical features in

patients that might be exposed to CWD. However, until we establish a

system that identifies and analyses a high proportion of suspected prion

disease cases we will not know for sure. The USA should develop a

system modelled on that established in the UK, he points out.

Ali Samii, a neurologist at Seattle VA Medical Center who recently

reported the cases of three hunterstwo of whom were friendswho died

from pathologically confirmed CJD, says that at present there are

insufficient data to claim transmission of CWD into humans; adding that

[only] by asking [the questions of venison consumption and deer/elk

hunting] in every case can we collect suspect cases and look into the

plausibility of transmission further. Samii argues that by making both

doctors and hunters more aware of the possibility of prions spreading

through eating venison, doctors treating hunters with dementia can

consider a possible prion disease, and doctors treating CJD patients

will know to ask whether they ate venison.

CDC spokesman Ermias Belay says that the CDC will not be investigating

the [Samii] cases because there is no evidence that the men ate

CWD-infected meat. He notes that although the likelihood of CWD

jumping the species barrier to infect humans cannot be ruled out 100%

and that [we] cannot be 100% sure that CWD does not exist in humans&

the data seeking evidence of CWD transmission to humans have been very

limited.

http://infection.thelancet.com/journal/journal.isa

he complained in a letter to the Journal of the American Medical

Association (JAMA 2003; 285: 733). I hope that the CDC does not

continue to expect us to still believe that the 85% plus of all CJD

cases which are sporadic are all spontaneous, without route or source.<<<

actually, that quote was from a more recent article in the Journal of

Neurology (see below), not the JAMA article...

Full Text

Diagnosis and Reporting of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease

Singeltary, Sr et al. JAMA.2001; 285: 733-734.

http://jama.ama-assn.org/cgi/content/full/285/6/733?maxtoshow=&HITS=10&hits=10&RESULTFORMAT=&fulltext=dignosing+and+reporting+creutzfeldt+jakob+disease&searchid=1048865596978_1528&stored_search=&FIRSTINDEX=0&journalcode=jama

BRITISH MEDICAL JOURNAL

SOMETHING TO CHEW ON

BMJ

http://www.bmj.com/cgi/eletters/319/7220/1312/b#EL2

BMJ

http://www.bmj.com/cgi/eletters/320/7226/8/b#EL1

THE PATHOLOGICAL PROTEIN

BY Philip Yam

Yam Philip Yam News Editor Scientific American www.sciam.com
http://www.thepathologicalprotein.com/

IN light of Asante/Collinge et al findings that BSE transmission to the

129-methionine genotype can lead to an alternate phenotype that is

indistinguishable from type 2 PrPSc, the commonest _sporadic_ CJD;

-------- Original Message -------- Subject: re-BSE prions propagate as

either variant CJD-like or sporadic CJD Date: Thu, 28 Nov 2002 10:23:43

-0000 From: "Asante, Emmanuel A" To:

"'flounder@wt.net'"

Dear Terry,

I have been asked by Professor Collinge to respond to your request. I am

a Senior Scientist in the MRC Prion Unit and the lead author on the

paper. I have attached a pdf copy of the paper for your attention. Thank

you for your interest in the paper.

In respect of your first question, the simple answer is, yes. As you

will find in the paper, we have managed to associate the alternate

phenotype to type 2 PrPSc, the commonest sporadic CJD.

It is too early to be able to claim any further sub-classification in

respect of Heidenhain variant CJD or Vicky Rimmer's version. It will

take further studies, which are on-going, to establish if there are

sub-types to our initial finding which we are now reporting. The main

point of the paper is that, as well as leading to the expected new

variant CJD phenotype, BSE transmission to the 129-methionine genotype

can lead to an alternate phenotype which is indistinguishable from type

2 PrPSc.

I hope reading the paper will enlighten you more on the subject. If I

can be of any further assistance please to not hesitate to ask. Best wishes.

Emmanuel Asante

<> ____________________________________

Dr. Emmanuel A Asante MRC Prion Unit & Neurogenetics Dept. Imperial

College School of Medicine (St. Mary's) Norfolk Place, LONDON W2 1PG

Tel: +44 (0)20 7594 3794 Fax: +44 (0)20 7706 3272 email:

e.asante@ic.ac.uk (until 9/12/02)

New e-mail: e.asante@prion.ucl.ac.uk (active from now)

____________________________________

snip...

full text ;

http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/03/slides/3923s1_OPH.htm

AND the new findings of BASE in cattle in Italy of Identification of a

second bovine amyloidotic spongiform encephalopathy: Molecular

similarities with sporadic

Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease

http://www.pnas.org/cgi/content/abstract/0305777101v1

Adaptation of the bovine spongiform encephalopathy agent to primates

and comparison with Creutzfeldt- Jakob disease: Implications for

human health

THE findings from Corinne Ida Lasmézas*, [dagger] , Jean-Guy Fournier*,

Virginie Nouvel*,

Hermann Boe*, Domíníque Marcé*, François Lamoury*, Nicolas Kopp [Dagger

] , Jean-Jacques Hauw§, James Ironside¶, Moira Bruce [||] , Dominique

Dormont*, and Jean-Philippe Deslys* et al, that The agent responsible

for French iatrogenic growth hormone-linked CJD taken as a control is

very different from vCJD but is similar to that found in one case of

sporadic CJD and one sheep scrapie isolate;

http://www.pnas.org/cgi/content/full/041490898v1

ALL animals for human/animal consumption must be tested for TSE.

ALL human TSEs must be made reportable Nationally and Internationally...

Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
P.O. Box 42
Bacliff, Texas USA 77518





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