SEARCH VEGSOURCE:

 

 

Follow Ups | Post Followup | Back to Discussion Board | VegSource
See spam or
inappropriate posts?
Please let us know.
  




From: TSS ()
Subject: JANUARY 2008 UPDATE ON FEED ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES TO LIMIT THE SPREAD OF BSE
Date: January 25, 2008 at 9:28 am PST

Friday, January 25, 2008

January 2008 Update on Feed Enforcement Activities to Limit the Spread of BSE

January 24, 2008


Friday, January 25, 2008
January 2008 Update on Feed Enforcement Activities to Limit the Spread of BSE

January 24, 2008

January 2008 Update on Feed Enforcement Activities to Limit the Spread of BSE

To help prevent the establishment and amplification of Bovine Spongiform Encephalophathy (BSE) through feed in the United States, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) implemented a final rule that prohibits the use of most mammalian protein in feeds for ruminant animals. This rule, Title 21 Part 589.2000 of the Code of Federal Regulations, here called the Ruminant Feed Ban, became effective on August 4, 1997.

The following is an update on FDA enforcement activities regarding the ruminant feed ban. FDA's Center for Veterinary Medicine (CVM) has assembled data from the inspections that have been conducted AND whose final inspection report has been recorded in the FDA's inspection database as of January 12, 2008. As of January 12, 2008, FDA had received over 59,000 inspection reports. The majority of these inspections (approximately 70%) were conducted by State feed safety officials, with the remainder conducted by FDA officials.

Inspections conducted by FDA or State investigators are classified to reflect the compliance status at the time of the inspection based upon the objectionable conditions documented. These inspection conclusions are reported as Official Action Indicated (OAI), Voluntary Action Indicated (VAI), or No Action Indicated (NAI).

An OAI inspection classification occurs when significant objectionable conditions or practices were found and regulatory sanctions are warranted in order to address the establishment's lack of compliance with the regulation. An example of an OAI inspection classification would be findings of manufacturing procedures insufficient to ensure that ruminant feed is not contaminated with prohibited material. Inspections classified with OAI violations will be promptly re-inspected following the regulatory sanctions to determine whether adequate corrective actions have been implemented.

A VAI inspection classification occurs when objectionable conditions or practices were found that do not meet the threshold of regulatory significance, but do warrant advisory actions to inform the establishment of findings that should be voluntarily corrected. Inspections classified with VAI violations are more technical violations of the Ruminant Feed Ban. These include provisions such as minor recordkeeping lapses and conditions involving non-ruminant feeds.

An NAI inspection classification occurs when no objectionable conditions or practices were found during the inspection or the significance of the documented objectionable conditions found does not justify further actions.

The results to date are reported here both by “segment of industry” and “in total”. NOTE – A single firm can operate as more than one firm type. As a result, the categories of the different industry segments are not mutually exclusive.

RENDERERS

These firms are the first to handle and process (i.e., render) animal proteins and to send these processed materials to feed mills and/or protein blenders for use as a feed ingredient.

Number of active firms whose initial inspection has been reported to FDA – 267

Number of active firms handling materials prohibited from use in ruminant feed – 165 (62 % of those active firms inspected)

Of the 165 active firms handling prohibited materials, their most recent inspection revealed that:

0 firms (0%) were classified as OAI

5 firms (3.0 %) were classified as VAI

LICENSED FEED MILLS

FDA licenses these feed mills to produce medicated feed products. The license is required to manufacture and distribute feed using certain potent drug products, usually those requiring some pre-slaughter withdrawal time. This licensing has nothing to do with handling prohibited materials under the feed ban regulation. A medicated feed license from FDA is not required to handle materials prohibited under the Ruminant Feed Ban.

Number of active firms whose initial inspection has been reported to FDA – 1,077

Number of active firms handling materials prohibited from use in ruminant feed – 473 (44 % of those active firms inspected)

Of the 473 active firms handling prohibited materials, their most recent inspection revealed that:

0 firms (0%) were classified as OAI

8 firms (1.7 %) were classified as VAI

FEED MILLS NOT LICENSED BY FDA

These feed mills are not licensed by the FDA to produce medicated feeds.

Number of active firms whose initial inspection has been reported to FDA – 5,207

Number of active firms handling materials prohibited from use in ruminant feed – 2,544 (49 % of those active firms inspected)

Of the 2,544 active firms handling prohibited materials, their most recent inspection revealed that:

0 firms (0%) were classified as OAI

43 firms (1.7 %) were classified as VAI

PROTEIN BLENDERS

These firms blend rendered animal protein for the purpose of producing quality feed ingredients that will be used by feed mills.

Number of active firms whose initial inspection has been reported to FDA – 398

Number of active firms handling materials prohibited from use in ruminant feed – 191 (48 % of those active firms inspected)

Of the 191 active firms handling prohibited materials, their most recent inspection revealed that:

0 firm (0%) was classified as OAI

3 firms (1.6 %) were classified as VAI

RENDERERS, FEED MILLS, AND PROTEIN BLENDERS MANUFACTURING WITH PROHIBITED MATERIAL

This category includes only those firms that actually use prohibited material to manufacture, process, or blend animal feed or feed ingredients.

Total number of active renderers, feed mills, and protein blenders whose initial inspection has been reported to FDA – 6,628

Number of active renderers, feed mills, and protein blenders processing with prohibited materials – 505 (7.6 %)

Of the 505 active renderers, feed mills, and protein blenders processing with prohibited materials, their most recent inspection revealed that:

0 firms (0%) were classified as OAI

22 firms (4.4 %) were classified as VAI

OTHER FIRMS INSPECTED

Examples of such firms include ruminant feeders, on-farm mixers, pet food manufacturers, animal feed salvagers, distributors, retailers, and animal feed transporters.

Number of active firms whose initial inspection has been reported to FDA – 19,481

Number of active firms handling materials prohibited from use in ruminant feed – 6,275 (32 % of those active firms inspected)

Of the 6,275 active firms handling prohibited materials, their most recent inspection revealed that:


0 firms (0%) were classified as OAI

155 firms (2.5 %) were classified as VAI

TOTAL FIRMS

Note that a single firm can be reported under more than one firm category; therefore, the summation of the individual OAI/VAI firm categories will be more than the actual total number of OAI/VAI firms, as presented below.

Number of active firms whose initial inspection has been reported to FDA – 21,630

Number of active firms handling materials prohibited from use in ruminant feed – 6,927 (32 % of those active firms inspected)

Of the 6,927 active firms handling prohibited materials, their most recent inspection revealed that:

0 firms (0%) were classified as OAI

162 firms (2.3 %) were classified as VAI

http://www.fda.gov/cvm/BSE0108.htm


SEE FULL TEXT ;

http://madcowspontaneousnot.blogspot.com/


Greetings,

VAI violations can consist of many breaches, that in the end, could cause tainted product to be distributed.

im just goint to pick out one from last year, and i just ponder how they would have classified this ;


10,000,000+ LBS. of PROHIBITED BANNED MAD COW FEED I.E. MBM IN COMMERCE USA
2007


Date: March 21, 2007 at 2:27 pm PST
RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINES -- CLASS II
___________________________________
PRODUCT
Bulk cattle feed made with recalled Darling’s 85% Blood Meal, Flash Dried,
Recall # V-024-2007
CODE
Cattle feed delivered between 01/12/2007 and 01/26/2007
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Pfeiffer, Arno, Inc, Greenbush, WI. by conversation on February 5, 2007.
Firm initiated recall is ongoing.
REASON
Blood meal used to make cattle feed was recalled because it was
cross-contaminated with prohibited bovine meat and bone meal that had been
manufactured on common equipment and labeling did not bear cautionary BSE
statement.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
42,090 lbs.
DISTRIBUTION
WI

___________________________________
PRODUCT
Custom dairy premix products: MNM ALL PURPOSE Pellet, HILLSIDE/CDL
Prot-Buffer Meal, LEE, M.-CLOSE UP PX Pellet, HIGH DESERT/ GHC LACT Meal,
TATARKA, M CUST PROT Meal, SUNRIDGE/CDL PROTEIN Blend, LOURENZO, K PVM DAIRY
Meal, DOUBLE B DAIRY/GHC LAC Mineral, WEST PIONT/GHC CLOSEUP Mineral, WEST
POINT/GHC LACT Meal, JENKS, J/COMPASS PROTEIN Meal, COPPINI – 8# SPECIAL
DAIRY Mix, GULICK, L-LACT Meal (Bulk), TRIPLE J – PROTEIN/LACTATION, ROCK
CREEK/GHC MILK Mineral, BETTENCOURT/GHC S.SIDE MK-MN, BETTENCOURT #1/GHC
MILK MINR, V&C DAIRY/GHC LACT Meal, VEENSTRA, F/GHC LACT Meal, SMUTNY,
A-BYPASS ML W/SMARTA, Recall # V-025-2007
CODE
The firm does not utilize a code - only shipping documentation with
commodity and weights identified.
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Rangen, Inc, Buhl, ID, by letters on February 13 and 14, 2007. Firm
initiated recall is complete.
REASON
Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross
contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not
bear cautionary BSE statement.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
9,997,976 lbs.
DISTRIBUTION
ID and NV

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR MARCH 21, 2007


http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2007/ENF00996.html


FC5.5.1

BASE Transmitted to Primates and MV2 sCJD Subtype Share PrP27-30 and PrPSc

C-terminal Truncated Fragments Zanusso, G1; Commoy, E2; Fasoli, E3; Fiorini, M3; Lescoutra, N4; Ruchoux,
MM4; Casalone, C5; Caramelli, M5; Ferrari, S3; Lasmezas, C6; Deslys, J-P4; Monaco, S3
1University of Verona, of Neurological and Visual Sciences, Italy; 2CEA, IMETI/SEPIA,
France; 3University of Verona, Neurological and Visual Sciences, Italy; 4IMETI/SEPIA,
France; 5IZSPLVA, Italy; 6The Scripps Research Insitute, USA


The etiology of sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (sCJD), the most frequent human
prion disease, remains still unknown. The marked disease phenotype heterogeneity
observed in sCJD is thought to be influenced by the type of proteinase K-resistant
prion protein, or PrPSc (type 1 or type 2 according to the electrophoretic mobility of
the unglycosylated backbone), and by the host polymorphic Methionine/Valine (M/V)
codon 129 of the PRNP. By using a two-dimensional gel electrophoresis (2D-PAGE)
and imunoblotting we previously showed that in sCJD, in addition to the PrPSc type,
distinct PrPSc C-terminal truncated fragments (CTFs) correlated with different sCJD
subtypes. Based on the combination of CTFs and PrPSc type, we distinguished three
PrPSc patterns: (i) the first was observed in sCJD with PrPSc type 1 of all genotypes,;
(ii) the second was found in M/M-2 (cortical form); (iii) the third in amyloidogenic M/V-
2 and V/V-2 subtypes (Zanusso et al., JBC 2004) . Recently, we showed that sCJD
subtype M/V-2 shared molecular and pathological features with an atypical form of
BSE, named BASE, thus suggesting a potential link between the two conditions. This
connection was further confirmed after 2D-PAGE analysis, which showed an identical
PrPSc signature, including the biochemical pattern of CTFs. To pursue this issue, we
obtained brain homogenates from Cynomolgus macaques intracerebrally inoculated
with brain homogenates from BASE. Samples were separated by using a two
dimensional electrophoresis (2D-PAGE) followed by immunoblotting. We here show
that the PrPSc pattern obtained in infected primates is identical to BASE and sCJD
MV-2 subtype. These data strongly support the link, or at least a common ancestry,
between a sCJD subtype and BASE.

This work was supported by Neuroprion (FOOD-CT-2004-506579)

FC5.5.2

Transmission of Italian BSE and BASE Isolates in Cattle Results into a Typical
BSE Phenotype and a Muscle Wasting Disease


Zanusso, G1; Lombardi, G2; Casalone, C3; D’Angelo, A4; Gelmetti, D2;
Torcoli, G2; Barbieri, I2; Corona, C3; Fasoli, E1; Farinazzo, A1; Fiorini, M1; Gelati,
M1; Iulini, B3; Tagliavini, F5; Ferrari, S1; Monaco, S1; Caramelli, M3; Capucci, L2
1University of Verona, Neurological and Visual Sciences, Italy; 2IZSLER, Italy; 3IZSPLVA,
Italy; 4University of Turin, Animal Pathology, Italy; 5Isituto Carlo Besta, Italy


The clinical phenotype of bovine spongiform encephalopathy has been extensively
reported in early accounts of the disorder. Following the introduction of statutory active
surveillance, almost all BSE cases have been diagnosed on a pathological/molecular
basis, in a pre-symptomatic clinical stage. In recent years, the active surveillance
system has uncovered atypical BSE cases, which are characterized by distinct
conformers of the PrPSc, named high-type (BSE-H) and low-type (BSE-L), whose
clinicopathological phenotypes remain unknown. We recently reported two
Italian atypical cases with a PrPSc type similar to BSE-L, pathologically characterized
by PrP amyloid plaques. Experimental transmission to TgBov mice has recently
disclosed that BASE is caused by a distinct prion strain which is extremely virulent. A
major limitation of transmission studies to mice is the lack of reliable information on
clinical phenotype of BASE in its natural host. In the present study, we experimentally
infected Fresian/Holstein and Alpine/Brown cattle with Italian BSE and BASE isolates
by i.c. route. BASE infected cattle showed survival times significantly shorter than
BSE, a finding more readily evident in Fresian/Holstein, and in keeping with previous
observations in TgBov mice. Clinically, BSE-infected cattle developed a disease
phenotype highly comparable with that described in field BSE cases and in
experimentally challenged cattle. On the contrary, BASE-inoculated cattle
developed an amyotrophic disorder accompanied by mental dullness.
The molecular and neuropathological profiles, including PrP deposition pattern, closely
matched those observed in the original cases. This study further confirms that BASE
is caused by a distinct prion isolate and discloses a novel disease phenotype in cattle,
closely resembling the phenotype previous reported in scrapie-inoculated cattle and in
some subtypes of inherited and sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease.


P04.27

Experimental BSE Infection of Non-human Primates: Efficacy of the Oral Route


Holznagel, E1; Yutzy, B1; Deslys, J-P2; Lasmézas, C2; Pocchiari, M3; Ingrosso, L3;
Bierke, P4; Schulz-Schaeffer, W5; Motzkus, D6; Hunsmann, G6; Löwer, J1
1Paul-Ehrlich-Institut, Germany; 2Commissariat à l´Energie Atomique, France;
3Instituto Superiore di Sanità, Italy; 4Swedish Institute for Infectious Disease
control, Sweden; 5Georg August University, Germany; 6German Primate Center,
Germany


Background:

In 2001, a study was initiated in primates to assess the risk for humans
to contract BSE through contaminated food. For this purpose, BSE brain was
titrated in cynomolgus monkeys.


Aims:

The primary objective is the determination of the minimal infectious dose (MID50)
for oral exposure to BSE in a simian model, and, by in doing this, to assess the risk for
humans. Secondly, we aimed at examining the course of the disease to identify
possible biomarkers.


Methods:


Groups with six monkeys each were orally dosed with lowering amounts of
BSE brain: 16g, 5g, 0.5g, 0.05g, and 0.005g. In a second titration study,
animals were intracerebrally (i.c.) dosed (50, 5, 0.5, 0.05, and 0.005 mg).


Results:


In an ongoing study, a considerable number of high-dosed macaques already
developed simian vCJD upon oral or intracerebral exposure or are at the
onset of the clinical phase. However, there are differences in the clinical course
between orally and intracerebrally infected animals that may influence the detection
of biomarkers.


Conclusions:


Simian vCJD can be easily triggered in cynomolgus monkeys on the oral
route using less than 5 g BSE brain homogenate. The difference in the
incubation period between 5 g oral and 5 mg i.c. is only 1 year (5 years versus 4
years). However, there are rapid progressors among orally dosed monkeys that
develop simian vCJD as fast as intracerebrally inoculated animals.


The work referenced was performed in partial fulfilment of the study “BSE in
primates“ supported by the EU (QLK1-2002-01096).


http://www.prion2007.com/pdf/Prion%20Book%20of%20Abstracts.pdf

ALSO, look at the table and you'll see that as little as 1 mg (or 0.001 gm)
caused 7% (1 of 14) of the cows to come down with BSE;


Risk of oral infection with bovine spongiform encephalopathy agent in
primates

Corinne Ida Lasmézas, Emmanuel Comoy, Stephen Hawkins, Christian Herzog,
Franck Mouthon, Timm Konold, Frédéric Auvré, Evelyne Correia, Nathalie
Lescoutra-Etchegaray, Nicole Salès, Gerald Wells, Paul Brown, Jean-Philippe
Deslys

Summary

The uncertain extent of human exposure to bovine spongiform
encephalopathy (BSE)--which can lead to variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease
(vCJD)--is compounded by incomplete knowledge about the efficiency of oral
infection and the magnitude of any bovine-to-human biological barrier to
transmission. We therefore investigated oral transmission of BSE to
non-human primates. We gave two macaques a 5 g oral dose of brain homogenate
from a BSE-infected cow. One macaque developed vCJD-like neurological
disease 60 months after exposure, whereas the other remained free of disease
at 76 months. On the basis of these findings and data from other studies, we
made a preliminary estimate of the food exposure risk for man, which
provides additional assurance that existing public health measures can
prevent transmission of BSE to man.


snip...


BSE bovine brain inoculum

100 g 10 g 5 g 1 g 100 mg 10 mg 1 mg 0·1 mg 0·01 mg

Primate (oral route)* 1/2 (50%)

Cattle (oral route)* 10/10 (100%) 7/9 (78%) 7/10 (70%) 3/15 (20%) 1/15 (7%)
1/15 (7%)

RIII mice (ic ip route)* 17/18 (94%) 15/17 (88%) 1/14 (7%)

PrPres biochemical detection

The comparison is made on the basis of calibration of the bovine inoculum
used in our study with primates against a bovine brain inoculum with a
similar PrPres concentration that was

inoculated into mice and cattle.8 *Data are number of animals
positive/number of animals surviving at the time of clinical onset of
disease in the first positive animal (%). The accuracy of

bioassays is generally judged to be about plus or minus 1 log. ic
ip=intracerebral and intraperitoneal.

Table 1: Comparison of transmission rates in primates and cattle infected
orally with similar BSE brain inocula


Published online January 27, 2005

http://www.thelancet.com/journal/journal.isa

It is clear that the designing scientists must

also have shared Mr Bradley’s surprise at the results because all the dose

levels right down to 1 gram triggered infection.


http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/ws/s145d.pdf

6. It also appears to me that Mr Bradley’s answer (that it would take less
than say 100 grams) was probably given with the benefit of hindsight; particularly
if one considers that later in the same answer Mr Bradley expresses his surprise
that it could take as little of 1 gram of brain to cause BSE by the oral route
within the same species. This information did not become available until the "attack
rate" experiment had been completed in 1995/96. This was a titration experiment
designed to ascertain the infective dose. A range of dosages was used to
ensure that the actual result was within both a lower and an upper limit within the
study and the designing scientists would not have expected all the dose levels to
trigger infection. The dose ranges chosen by the most informed scientists at that
time ranged from 1 gram to three times one hundred grams. It is clear that the
designing scientists must have also shared Mr Bradley’s surprise at the results
because all the dose levels right down to 1 gram triggered infection.


http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/ws/s147f.pdf


FULL TEXT ;


http://madcowspontaneousnot.blogspot.com/

Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
P.O. Box 42
Bacliff, Texas USA 77518




Follow Ups:



Post a Followup

Name:
E-mail: (optional)
Subject:

Comments:

Optional Link URL:
Link Title:
Optional Image URL:

Unknown