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From: TSS ()
Date: October 22, 2007 at 3:12 pm PST

Accomplished this day, Wednesday, December 11, 2003, Denver, Colorado

Completely Edited Version


pages 36 -53. ...tss


Dr. Linda Detwiler: I'm going to take a different approach. I'm going to talk about scientific findings and how they're pertinent and why they're important to regulatory policy. We know there have been about 150 deaths from variant CJD from 1986. These are very tragic indeed, however, there are a lot more deaths from the flu and other diseases, yet this is what's made headlines and created a panic.

The objective is to review the research significant to regulatory issues and what's know and—equally important—what's not known. We'll look at the BSE case in Canada and what happened there and what may have happened in their feed cycle. We'll look at implications for the US and possible next steps.

It's important for us to know the similarities, and equally important to know the differences. The differences between species for control purposes, eradication, and prevention are so critical. If you don't know the differences in regards to transmission, pathogenesis, etc., you won't be able to control the diseases appropriately. For example you cannot control Scrapie like you do BSE with a feed ban.

My mantra is that you have to remember these long incubation diseases with limits to the pre-clinical. You have to be thinking. If you knew the disease was going to be here tomorrow, what should you have done yesterday? If you wait until the first time you find the disease, you are years too late. You might be one incubation cycle too late or multiple incubation cycles too late. The population you're concerned with, be it cows or sheep or elk or humans, it's already been infected and you're just going to live out the clinical manifestation of the disease.

Prevention is best, but if you know it’s been introduced, what can you do to limit the transmission? Europe has had to play it out.
The UK in 1988 put the ruminant-to-ruminant feed ban on, but they did not ban the total use. It's banned only for ruminants, so they had too much to use. It's not prohibited to go other places, so the meat and bone meal is sold to the continent. It dumps into France and starts to move throughout Europe. Add another five years incubation period, plus surveillance, and you see the manifestation of clinical detection in the Benelux countries.

Europe then started to restrict the use of meat and bone meal, and sale of it went on to other countries.
There are a lot of countries that probably have received product, but are not doing surveillance. This is something the US needs to watch out for. We don't classify countries like we do for other diseases, like foot and mouth. For BSE, we'll stop trade if a country is not okay, which is just the opposite from the policy for foot and mouth. This is something the US needs to change. We need to evaluate the countries of the world. Canada has done this and Canada will trade only if the BSE risk is at an acceptable level.

We can't forget other animal species are susceptible, such as cats. Domestic cats and large zoo cats are susceptible to the BSE agent, as well as TSEs of exotic ruminants. If exposed to the BSE agent, bison are susceptible.

Why is the distribution of infectivity important for us? There are several reasons from a regulatory standpoint. If you know where the infectivity is, it helps you eliminate high risk tissue, especially ones that might be a zoonotic risk. That is, What tissues might be more infectious to humans if it’s a zoonotic disease or out of the rations of other animlas if they’re susceptible. Also, it provides direction as to what tissues you might target for diagnostic purposes.
In natural cases of BSE, infectivity was in retina, brain and the spinal cord.

In the experimental challenges, calves were fed 100 grams of BSE-infected brain tissue. At certain intervals, some were sacrificed. Forty-some tissues from these calves were put into mice to be bio-assayed. The British were criticized, saying the mouse bio-assay is not as sensitive because of the species barrier, and that you should go back and repeat this in cattle—at least for the most important tissues. This study in cattle had actually generated some additional data { that is additional tissues where infectivity has been found}. The trigeminal ganglia, the dorsal ganglia, the distal ileum and the bone marrow were all from the original mouse pathogenesis study. Recently, tonsil has been found to have infectivity by a calf bio-assay.

Pre-clinically, the distal ileum was six months post-inoculation, and the tonsil was about 10 months post-inoculation. To date, cattle muscle samples have been put into mice and also back into cattle, and no infectivity has been found.

Scrapie infectivity has been identified in brain, spinal cord, tonsil, the peripheral lymph nodes, nasal mucosa, placenta, liver, and the length of the intestine from the esophagus to the rectum. Nora Hunter has published work where both whole blood and buffy coat were taken from sheep and inoculated back into sheep from New Zealand, and those sheep did come down with TSE.

Dr. Spraker: How did they demonstrate nasal mucosa?

Dr. Detwiler: Bill Hadwell collected nasal mucosa from Suffolk sheep and inoculated it into mice.

In baby ruminants, the cells of the distal ileum are a different cell type up until about nine months of age. The cell type is such that they allow the passage of large molecules to transported across the intestine. By about nine months, that function wanes. It's probably for colostral purposes, for colostral antibodies to transfer over. But some have asked if that's why there's an ease of transmission across the gut at a younger age. Horrigan's work at Mission, Texas, showed that after nine months, it appeared to be more difficult to transmit Scrapie. It may be there's a correlation with the change of cell types.

This is a chart I made for the OIE, the Office of International Epizootics to look at secretions and excretions in sheep and goats where, to date, no infectivity had been found in feces, urine, saliva, colostrum, milk and semen. Intra-cranial inoculation into mice resulted in no infectivity. But I want to point out that I don't think we should stop looking. Even with the blood. If you had asked someone prior to 2000 if infectivity was ever found in sheep's blood, he would have said "no," because work done to that time had not shown infectivity in sheep blood. But that work was all blood intra-cranially into mice. How much blood, feces and saliva can you put intra-cranially into a mouse?

Dr. Bartz: With BSE into mice, they estimated a 104 difference in sensitivity between the cow and the mouse.

Dr. Detwiler: How about nasal discharge? Is that a possibility for shed of the agent? We have to keep asking these questions, even for cattle. If it's in the lymphoid tissue of the distal ileum, the tonsil, or the lymphoid tissue of the third eyelid, would it not make sense that, at least at some low level, there might be some lymphoreticular distribution similar to the other animals with TSE. I think that's a valid question to ask, and the calf pathogenesis studies are not finished. I think we have to be careful definitively in saying it's limited to only two three peripheral tissues.

Dr. Detwiler: Dr. Prusiner is examing muscle from cattle with BSE, and looking for presence of PRP and probably infectivity.

Dr. Thornsberry: He's very concerned about muscle tissue.

Dr. Bartz: There's one comment I'd like to make on the muscle infectivity studies. We need to remember that a lot of these are taking a biopsy. If you take a biopsy of muscle, what's in that? It's obviously muscle cells, but it's also nervous tissue and LRS tissue. It's in a muscle homogenate, which is consumed, but the question remains what cell type in that homogenate is the agent really in?

Dr. Detwiler: I asked that of Dr. Prusiner. How did they ascertain that it was muscle cells versus nerve tissue, etc. He said they were very careful in how they took the biopsy.

Dr. Thornsberry: Doesn't every muscle biopsy have some neural tissue in it?

Dr. Detwiler: There's some innervation going to those muscle groups.

Dr. Detwiler: Parenterally, BSE does go into pigs. It was through three routes: intra-cranial, IV and IP with incubation times of 69 to 150 weeks. Seven out of 10 came down with BSE. Orally, it did not go after 84 months. It's important to note that infectivity was not confined only to the CNS, but also in stomach, jejunum, distal ileum and pancreas.

With chickens, both parenterally and orally, they did not find evidence of disease. They tried to sub-passage the chickens by taking brain from animals that had been exposed, to see if it adapted. I think you may have to do this multiple times. What the research in the UK did do was look at high-risk tissues from pigs and chickens that had been exposed to BSE, and put them into susceptible mice. Again, we have to be careful to say there's no residual infectivity at all. If continually fed to a species over time , there may be some kind of passage or adaptation over time. That's why, in other countries, they take out high-risk tissues and don't allow them to be fed at all. In Europe, they've gone to the extreme of taking out all animal tissue being fed to food-producing animals, to break this cycle.

Lateral Transmission

Scrapie and CWD spread animal to animal. In both embryo and semen studies, infectivity for transmission of BSE was not detected.
Two cases of disease with fairly significant numbers have been caused by making vaccines from tissues from animals incubating the disease. Just recently, a Mycoplasma aglacia vaccine that was given to sheep and goats in Italy caused infection in 600 to 700 premises.

Contaminated feed appears to be the primary if not sole source of infectivity. Animals that are incubating the disease get slaughtered, rendered, and fed back to other cattle, and they get sick in an average of three to six years.

This is significant to me when we talk about the British attack rate studies. In this experiment, infected brain was given orally. One gram killed seven of 10, so the British knew that had to go down to lower doses. They've now looked at a tenth of a gram and a hundredth and a thousandth of a gram. This is still underway, but at about 60 months, a tenth of gram has killed three of 15 animals affected with BSE, and a hundredth of a gram has killed one of 15 thus far at a 50-plus-month incubation. It doesn’t take too much brain material. The British message is to not underestimate the possibility of cross-contamination in the feed cycle. In the United States we allow mills and plant to use the same equipment when processing ruminant and non-ruminant material. Although a system of cleaning is required by the FDA, the science questions how effective the flush methodologies could really be. The same trucks may haul ruminant and non-ruminant feeds. Those are potentials for cross-contamination.

Dr. Keller: What about risk from feather meal/poultry litter?

Dr. Detwiler: Feather meal can pick up infectivity from other feeds.

Dr. Keller: Whenever you feed a ruminant product to chickens and then the feathers/litter are collected, they're collecting the ruminant material directly in the spillage.

Dr. Detwiler: Hold on to that thought and I'll address it later.
A big unknown for the whole world but important to answer involves sheep. BSE goes into sheep orally and maintains BSE characteristics. In research, it looks like Scrapie clinically and histologically. To date, the only valid way to differentiate BSE and Scrapie in sheep is a mouse bio-assay. Would it spread? If it does go naturally into sheep, would it spread like Scrapie through some kind of contagious nature?
So far, the distribution of infectivity is looking identical to Scrapie. The significance of this is that the worst case scenario would be BSE in sheep naturally. You would have a potentially zoonotic disease that could spread from sheep to sheep and could not be differentiated from a common endemic disease, would have a widespread tissue distribution, peripheral nerve, blood, so no tissue of the sheep would really be safe. What would countries do if they found this? That's about 40 million sheep.

Dr. Bartz: Do you know if anyone is taking material from the BSE-infected sheep and inoculating non-human primates, to see if it looks like variant CJD?

Dr. Detwiler: It seems a good idea, but I'm not aware of it.

Another important thing to get across to the public is that the negatives do not guarantee absence of infectivity. The animal could be early in the disease and the incubation period. Even sample collection is so important. If you're not collecting the right area of the brain in sheep, or if collecting lymphoreticular tissue, and you don't get a good biopsy, you could miss the area with the PRP in it and come up with a negative test.

There's a new, unusual form of Scrapie that's been detected in Norway. We have to be careful that we don’t get so set in the way we do things that we forget to look for different emerging variations of disease. We've gotten away from collecting the whole brain in our systems. We're using the brain stem and we're looking in only one area. In Norway, they were doing a project and looking at cases of Scrapie, and they found this where they did not find lesions or PRP in the area of the obex. They found it in the cerebellum and the cerebrum. It's a good lesson for us. Ames had to go back and change the procedure for looking at Scrapie samples. In the USDA, we had routinely looked at all the sections of the brain, and then we got away from it. They've recently gone back.

Dr. Keller: Tissues are routinely tested, based on which tissue provides an ‘official’ test result as recognized by APHIS

Dr. Detwiler: That's on the slaughter. But on the clinical cases, aren’t they still asking for the brain? But even on the slaughter, they're looking only at the brainstem. We may be missing certain things if we confine ourselves to one area.

Why Do We Do Surveillance?

Is the disease present? You absolutely have to do surveillance to find out if the disease is present. It will also tell you if your prevention has been successful. If you have the disease, it will also give you indication that your controls are working. That's how Britain knew the feed ban had a big effect. They continued to monitor disease and they saw it peak and they saw it come down about five years after the implementation of the feed ban.

You also need surveillance for buyer confidence and for trade confidence with our international partners. BSE is found in older animals, over 24 months of age, high risk, those exposed to contaminated feed, neurologically ill cattle, any fallen stock and emergency slaughter. This is important to collect samples through active surveillance as owners will sometimes miss subtle signs.

In regards to inactivation, Paul Brown did some work and had to repeat it because people didn't believe it. He found that, at 600˚ degrees Celius, there was survival in the ash. However, there was none in air emission or the residue. At 1000˚ Celius, he found no survival.

Canada has actually had two cases of BSE. The first was an imported case in 1993—a UK import. This animal had a broken leg, but because it was a UK import, the owner called the government veterinary staff and they had it looked it. The Canadians had to do extensive tracings on all their UK imports because of this case.

The native case was, of course, in May 2003. This animal was six years old, an Angus type, presented for slaughter as down with signs of pneumonia. It was condemned at slaughter, so it did not go for human consumption. The head was taken for BSE surveillance, and the rest of the carcass went to rendering.
The 2003 animal was not related to any of the imports. Was it spontaneous, or was it a case of chronic wasting disease Epidemiologically, the animal was born in the spring of 1997 and was most likely infected at that time. Canada did import 182 head of cattle from the United Kingdom between 1981 and 1990, and there were 11 in the high-risk period, possibly incorporated into the animal feed chain. They also did a risk assessment, which showed they had a low risk of introduction.

They did trace-backs, and that helped to keep the public calm. There was no crisis. In fact, beef consumption went up in Canada. But they tried to find the herd of birth, which is really key in BSE. They narrowed it down to three herds, and all of these were put under quarantine. The cattle in those groups were pretty much depopulated.

When the positive animal was identified, CFIA did trace-backs, and that helped to keep the public calm. There was no crisis. In fact, beef consumption went up in Canada. But they tried to find the herd of birth, which is really key in BSE. They narrowed it down to three herds, and all of these were put under quarantine. The cattle in those groups were pretty much depopulated.

They do have a national ID system, but it had been in place for only two years. So they had to use other types of identification to trace back the animal. Subsequent to the depopulations, one herd was identified as the herd of birth.

One thing the OIE requires is that, for a country to resume trade in animals and animal products, they should depopulate progeny if it's a BSE-infected cow, along with birth cohorts. They had to depopulate over 100 head in these trace-forward herds.

The positive cow itself went to the slaughter plant and was condemned. The head went to the lab and the remaining carcass went to a renderer. From the renderer, the material could have gone to three farms. Two of these were poultry farms. The poultry farms also had cattle, and there was an admission that the cattle were fed the same material as the poultry. Again this is prohibited by the feed ban, but it happens on the farm. These three farms were depopulated in their eintirety.

This renderer did not have dedicated lines, so he made ruminant feed and non-ruminant, prohibited and non-prohibited. They used a barley flush. After the positive cow was processed, the barley flush went to one of these farms and could have been fed to cattle. That was another breakdown in the feed system. That's not supposed to happen, but it did.

It went to two pet-food plants. Material from the renderer at the time the animal might have been processed also went to a feed mill that had 1800 clients, but none of these was depopulated. There were violations. The message is that there are not a lot of resources for checking on-farm compliance with the feed ban. The rubber hits the road on the farm.

I already talked about the epidemiological investigation, the trace-forwards and the trace-backs. CFIA depopulated 2700 animals. They tested approximately 2000 of those. They also brought in an international review team made up of scientists from Switzerland, the US and New Zealand, who reviewed the epi investigation and found it to be thorough and complete. They made recommendations that Canada really had to get an SRM ban to take the high-risk materials out of the human good chain now. Canada has done that.

The committee told CFIA they needed to increase surveillance which examined high risk cattle in large numbers. The review team also said they had to find mechanisms to prevent this cross contamination in the animal food chain. Take out high-risk materials from the animal food chain period. Have dedicated mills, plants, etc.

The media was kind. There was no panic. However, rendering, slaughter and the producer level impacts are still significant. Initially, there was no place for the meat and bonemeal to go. The whole system started to back up. The renderers couldn’t sell it, so they filled their silos. The feed-mills filled their silos. They stopped slaughtering older cows because the system couldn’t take any more. The government started to help, and some things started to go to landfill.
Canada did put the SRM ban in place for public protection, but not yet for animals. CFIA is working on increasing surveillance, and they need to look at changes in the feed rule.

More Surveillance

North America needs Canada to increase surveillance. Right now, it's a black box. We need to know if it's a single, isolated case or not. With the way BSE works, that's not likely. Or are the ones that were exposed dead and long gone? If there were to be more cases, how many? And very important, if there are additional cases, how old are they? If they were all born prior to the feed ban, that lets us know the feed ban has been very effective. If not, we have had leaks.
This year (2003) for surveillance in Canada, they'll come to about the same level they had last year, about 3700 brains tests. They really need to kick this up. The recommendation by the international committee and even by their own government is up to the level of about 40,000.

Think about the whole task of on-farm compliance. You have hundreds of thousands of farms. How do you get 100% compliance? That's very difficult. You can’t be on all farms at all times. My philosophy is choke infectivity out high. If you take your infectivity out of the system at the highest point, what leaks through on the farm won’t matter. Take your high-risk material, your brains and spinal cords and your deads and downs, and get them completely out of the animal food chain. If people inadvertently feed the wrong material on the farm, it won't have the infectivity to keep the cycle going.

It doesn’t take much to introduce BSE into a country. Identification is extremely important. We don’t have a national ID system in place. We're moving in that direction, but how about if tomorrow we found a case of BSE here and we couldn't trace it back? We couldn’t stand up in front of the American public and say, "We don’t know where this animal came from." What would be the reaction?

Disposal itself can cause emergency situations and we need an infrastructure—not only for TSEs but for all animal diseases. The US and Canada both need some kind of infrastructure for proper animal disposal, for animal health and public health reasons.

Can it happen here in the US? Would we find it? To me, we could not have been more fortunate. We got a warning shot right in our neighbor's back yard. We now know that before May 20, we thought we had escaped the bullet of the agent coming to North America. May 20 showed us we were wrong. We know the agent entered North America in the indigenous population. We now have time to re-evaluate the risk, to look the lessons not only in Canada, but around the world. We can do it without having this crisis upon us.

We have import regulations, feed bans, etc. We've had import regulations in place since 1989 on live ruminants and ruminant products. This shouldn't be down-played. This is significant. Look at the way it spread through Europe. That was from imports of high-risk products.

Surveillance: We've looked at all the groups you're supposed to look at for BSE in all the high-risk categories of the downers, etc. We've looked at about 20,000 for the last two years. We should go higher. We've had the same feed ban date as Canada. We do have a few different exceptions.

We've done formal risk assessments—one by the USDA, one by the European Union, and one by Harvard. Harvard's assessment was the most extensive. They looked at the potential pathways. They found that ,although US is resistant to BSE, there is still a potential for a low animal and human exposure. We still allow the use of high-risk material in the US—brain, spinal cord, and advanced meat recovery. Advanced meat recovery is the process where the bones will go through a machine to remove more muscle tissue. The allows some potential exposure if you have BSE infectivity in the system because the spinal column (even if you remove the spinal cord) still has dorsal ganglia that could be incorporated into AMR. That can still introduce infectivity into the AMR product.

Harvard found the feed ban is key to protection and that the leaks will allow amplification, at least in pockets. Why is the risk not zero? Science, trading patterns, existing regulations and human error all constitute a risk. The US, like Canada, does not have dedicated facilities or transport.

The UK imports into the US. There were 496 total, and 173 of the UK imports could have entered the US feed system. People don't like to hear this, but it's possible that one of the UK imports in the US entered the animal feed system and was exported to Canada. That's a possibility, because they import 50% of their feed from the US.

From 1994, we imported 11 million head of cattle from Canada. Most of these were feedlot animals for slaughter, but there were about 500,000 breeding animals. A number of Canada’s cull cows were slaughtered here and could have introduced infectivity into our system. Even today we have Canadian imports in the country, breeding animals that were brought in prior to the ban and reside here.

We have feed ban exemptions: plate waste, poultry litter. We still allow that if it comes off a human plate, or if it's trimmings, it can be palletized and fed to ruminants. That might be a small amount, but it could allow spinal cord in certain cuts to be fed back to ruminants. Poultry litter or feather meal could be significant. Poultry is getting quite a bit of ruminant material in the US because it cannot go back to ruminants. Poultry and pigs are getting a substantial amount. Poultry litter is not only what passes through the chicken, but think about how chickens eat. They spill a lot on the floor. That stuff is still allowed to be fed back to cattle. That's a direct break in the ban, except that it's legal. Ruminants are getting ruminant material.

Unfiltered tallow: tallow is a lipid material. However, if it's not filtered, there are protein residues. That's meat and bone meal. That's allowed to be fed, so that's another legal exception where you can feed ruminant meat and bone meal through unfiltered tallow. We don't have an SRM ban and the 40 animals are the ones that if you have the agent, they introduce the most infectivity back into the animal food chain when they're rendered.

What's our on-farm compliance? We really don't know.

Dr. Thornsberry: What about blood meal?

Dr. Detwiler: Although there's not been infectivity found in cattle blood, the one thing we have to be concerned about is the stunning method. You can have micro-emboli of brain material in blood, and we do allow the legal feeding of blood meal. You could have a contamination from these emboli. Also the brain drips into the blood.

In the past a stun gun that injected air into the cranium had been used. It was so high pressure that it scrambled the brain, pushed it through the foramen magnum, rippled the spinal cord and went down into the azygous venous system. Big parts of the brain and spinal cord were being found in the heart, the lungs, the liver. The industry has gone away from using this stun gun, but there's no regulation that prohibits it.


Identification and traceability aren’t going to stop the disease, but they are essential for locating herd cohorts and identifying other animals that may have been exposed. OIE requires birth cohorts and progeny of a BSE positive cow to be removed.

Canada implemented what the international scientific committee told them to do: they're taking all these tissues out of the food supply for people. You can't remove the dorsal ganglia, the trigeminal ganglia out of the bony tissues so you have both the skull and veretabral column be SRM. The distal ileum is coming out of all ages.

AMR is one thing the US needs to look at. It's a wide dissemination of nervous tissue in the meat product, especially if the process is not done correctly. Even if you remove the spinal cord, you still have the dorsal ganglia associated with the vertebral column and the dura that protects the spinal cord. It would be prudent for the government to move now on restricting ARM.

Harvard's first model did 1000 runs and found the mean ID-50s to humans was 35. Eleven of these were from brain and spinal cord. Twenty—more than half—were from AMR. In the recent runs with Canada, they had some where the ID-50s were up in the hundreds and, in the worst-case scenario- over 1000. Half of those were from AMR. So even if you remove brain and spinal cord from the human food chain, AMR will still deliver more potential doses of infectivity to the public than brain and spinal cord combined.

Dr. Bartz: Exactly what is AMR? Why does it increase infectivity?

Dr. Detwiler: You put the vertebral column through a machine that beats everything off of it.

Dr. Bartz: So you’re saying that if you pull out the spinal cord, when it goes through the ARM, it's pulling off DRGs and the dura.

Dr. Detwiler: And then that gets incorporated into ground beef and it's widely disseminated. In the United States, food has to be labeled. You wouldn't go to a store and buy something that had brain and spinal cord in it. It would have to be labeled so you would know you were eating it.

Dr. Thornsberry: I don't remember the percentage, but it was over half of all advanced meat recovery material we were manufacturing was going into the commodity-type systems.

Dr. Detwiler: That doesn't have to be labeled AMR, so you don’t know what's in and what's not. That could be incorporated into any mixed meat product. The public would feel betrayed and they wouldn't know what products to avoid because of the labeling requirements.
McDonald's has never allowed it in their product, even before BSE risk. They continue to not allow it. I don’t know about the other fast-food chains.

Dr. Thornsberry: It looks like a paste. It doesn't have a consistency and it's got a lot of water in it. It's a paste of junk. You combine that and make a sausage or a salami. The average person wouldn't get a piece of AMR meat, but might get some specialty meat that had AMR in it.

Dr. Detwiler: If it's in ground beef, it has to be done in a smaller percentage. It technically could, in a lower percent, go into some ground beef.
Some of these large dairies are looking for protein sources and they mix their own on-farm. Two practitioners in California told me their dairies are feeding pet food. What goes into pet food? A lot of the down cows. It never crosses their mind that this could be ruminant material.

The 4D risk is significant. In the Harvard study the model showed that if BSE was circulating in the cattle production system, 1500 ID-50s would come from healthy cattle at slaughter, and 37,000 from the 4D. Think about it. If a cow dies from BSE it is at the end stage disease where the level of infectivity is highest. If there are leaks in the feed ban, this population re-introduce the highest level of infectivity back to your cattle population.

Dr. Spraker: What are the four Ds?

Dr. Detwiler: Dead, dying, down, diseased. They're a lump sum of the
animals that don’t make it for human consumption.


We have to be careful that the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence, and when we say there's absolutely no scientific evidence. We need to be very careful when we talk to the public, and even producers, to make sure there is scientific evidence, and if there's not, to tell that to the public. A case in point is the UK with the link to human disease. In 1989, some experts said that there was absolutely no scientific evidence that the disease could go to humans. That was a correct statement then, however, it was not the entire story. What should have followed was that there is no evidence to definitively state that BSE could not cross species. The bottom line was that we don’t have much evidence period. We have to be careful of predictions from TSE’s in other species, as these long incubations dieeases are like wolves in sheep’s clothing.

Prevention with adverse action or significant cost is very difficult to sell. I spent my whole career with APHIS trying to sell prevention—first with Scrapie and then with BSE. If BSE didn't go to humans, I don't think we'd ever have sold the feed ban. Now the industry is glad we did. Failure to prevent is an easy target, but how do you measure success? Regulations: if people believe it will protect them, you don't need much compliance. If people aren't cognizant or don't realize how it will protect them, you need a lot of compliance. Driving is a good example. People believe seat belts will at least reduce fatality. You don't need a cop in your car to wear your seatbelt. But speeding is a different story. How many people drive the speed limit? By statistics, the higher the speed limit, the more you increase your chance of fatality. We need to know how much your producers and clients believe in the feed ban.

Disposal: positive solutions for one problem may create more expensive problems. It's easy to say "ban everything," but then what do you do with it? That's something we need to educate the public on. It's not as easy as it appears. You create environmental problems.

Dr. Keller: Do you know what they're doing with the rendered product? We heard at one time they were using it in the UK to make asphalt.

Dr. Detwiler: There are a lot of different things now. Some places are combining it with concrete and asphalt because it's a binder. Most of it gets rendered first and then the rendered material is used. They're using it as a fuel source—the meat and bone meal and the tallow. The tallow, apparently, burns well. Some of the rendering plants in California converted their systems when energy prices rose and ran off their own tallow.
There's a cement company in the US that wants to burn meat and bone meal in their kilns. Temperatures will go up into the thousands of degrees.
Regaining scientific credibility and public confidence may require extreme measures. That's why I think it's so important for the countries not to lose public confidence. Japan lost it, and they've had to take extreme measures, like testing every cow for human consumption.

Dr. Thornsberry: Two years ago, I worked as a consultant in Missouri and I had a couple of clients who owned large swine operations. They were cleaning out their swine feed bins and feeding it to their cows. They were feeding for a large corporate entity, and that entity would remove a group of hogs and they might leave two or three tons of hog feed. The hog feed contained meat and bone meal. It wasn't a real high level. Sometimes it was porcine meal and sometimes it was bovine, but it was in there. I got in contact with the state veterinarian and it went up to the FDA level concerning the feeding of this and the feeding of poultry litter. I asked if they'd made any rulings about the feeding of poultry litter because I knew that 5% of our feed is lost without ever being consumed. The FDA veterinarian’s comment to me was, "Dr. Thornsberry, until there are dead bodies lying in the street, you will not see a change made on the feeding of poultry litter."
I said, "You know there's a potential epidemiological link between the spread of this disease and the feeding of poultry litter, and you're telling me you have to have dead bodies before you make a ruling on it."

He said yes. What's going on with our government?

Dr. Thornsberry: We need to put the pressure on.

Dr. Detwiler: That's right, and there are different entities that are saying this to the government. The Food Marketing Institute, the chain restaurants, do have a position statement they've put together that say they'd like to see the exemptions gone. They feel there are reasons to close the loopholes.

Dr. Thornsberry: I got a memo this summer that Canada agreed not to use AMR from that point on, but it is not prohibited in Canada.

Dr. Detwiler: Right, and that's crucial. Vertebral column is considered a risk material and it cannot be used. The United States has not done that. We're testing products to see if evidence of nervous tissue can be found, but that's not every product. It's done on a random basis by FSIS. We are still allowing AMR.


Dr. Keller: My focus is mainly on questions I have from a state perspective. Although I had about 10 years of veterinary practice experience, my education, with respect to prions, began when I started working for the State of North Dakota in ~1997. Serving as ND’s Designated Scrapie Epidemiologist (DSE) and working with their mandatory Chronic Wasting Disease (CWD) surveillance program, has further increased my appreciation for regulatory challenges associated with TSEs.

Recently, state animal health officials have had the task of drafting comments for the proposed BSE rule, which attempts to address ‘minimal risk countries.’

Background: In ND, the North Dakota Board of Animal Health is charged with protecting the health of domestic animals and also non-traditional livestock. In our state, that includes everything from captive birds to farmed cervids, to lions and tigers and bears. When in a state regulatory position, these responsibilities are not optional, they are required of animal health officials by statute. We are also to prevent escape and release of animals injurious or competitive with agriculture, horticulture, forestry, and other natural resource interests; thereby addressing potential environmental concerns.

We're also charged with taking any steps necessary to control, suppress, eradicate, any and all contagious and infectious diseases. Since prion diseases are indeed considered infectious, they fall under that statute. The State Veterinarian also has the responsibility, if warranted, to quarantine domestic animals and non-traditional livestock. He is to regulate and prohibit arrival or departure from our state of any animals that may be exposed or infected with the disease. Where this could get interesting, is when a state doesn't think the federal regulations are protecting the state’s animal health or is not responsive enough in addressing urgent concerns.
Also, it is very difficult trying to regulate prion diseases when you have limited ‘official live animal tests’ available, such as are available for TB and Brucellosis where you can get more definitive answers quickly. In that situation, prevention is always the best policy.

The industry groups and state agencies need to have a clearer understanding of the prion agent, its pathogenicity, and how it's transmitted so that more useful comments can be submitted on proposed rules.

We need to be concerned about what is an ‘acceptable risk’ of having possible disease transmission to other animals. We also cannot over look the economic damage done by diseases. Look at what one case of BSE did to Canada from an economic standpoint! Another area of responsibility we are charged with, is addressing zoonotic diseases. BSE is one prion disease that is currently considered to be zoonotic.

We have zero tolerance in this country for fecal contamination of our food, so what are we going to determine is an ‘acceptable risk’ for BSE contamination? And if we do allow animals in from countries where there is a risk, what are the mitigating factors or measures that need to be taken? It is my opinion that we need to have extensive measures in place to prevent the introduction of the disease and to maintain the identity of animals from other countries, even if they are only considered to be of ‘minimal risk’.

When we talk about identifying a country as minimal risk because they've had only one case, could this then be extrapolated to other countries? We may end up comparing apples and oranges though. For example, if we have a country in Europe that has one case of BSE, it's not really the same because it's on a different continent with different neighbors. We may not even be fully familiar with the extent of their country’s animal movements or the quality of their surveillance.

Dr. Detwiler: That's a very good point. This rule will allow other countries to apply for minimal-risk status, and I can tell you there are countries other than Canada that have only one case—Greece, Austria, Finland—that have much higher surveillance levels and have had measures in place a lot longer. So this is a reality that this situation could happen.

Dr. Keller: Those countries are watching the situation closely and may be waiting to make their application should the proposed BSE rule be approved as is.
So what would happen if the US found one case of BSE? In our department, there would be immediate attention to what we would say to the producers and to the consuming public. We would need to have factual information available to address food safety concerns. How would we do that? We would need to be able to say we were doing a thorough epidemiologic investigation, and quickly get information back to consumers and our international trading partners as it became available. Two critical actions need to be done: country of origin labeling through maintenance of import identification of live animal and products and identification of individual animals. Another question that needs to be posed is which is easier and more cost effective to do first? There is identity on animals that come into this country, but when we've looked into that, there's no requirement for anyone to maintain that identity. In the past, this country has relied on the use of the brucellosis tags, auction-market back tags and brand inspection. But this does not allow for complete tracking of animals. Especially as the Brucellosis program winds down. There is an obvious need for individual animal identification.

The tattoos that have been suggested as a way to track animals long-term are not a fail-safe method. Everyone has their own idea of what a tattoo should be, what type of ink to use, etc. The reality is, you could have a very good tattoo but it’s not user-friendly. We'd have trouble getting compliance if we asked feedlots to rely on running every animal through a chute to read a tattoo. Running multiple animals down an alley and using RFID readers to collect their information as they run by, might be a workable system. A second form of ID will be needed in case of ID failure.

What's the international standard when we talk about BSE? OIE does not necessarily require seven years since the last case before you can move animals, but OIE has certain requirements for regions to qualify as minimal-risk regions in countries where BSE was identified fewer than seven years ago. For a minimal-risk zone or in a country, these are the things that have to be done: It has to have been based on fewer than one case per million during each of the last four consecutive 12-month periods, within the cattle population that’s over 24 months. These are very specific requirements. Whenever we talk about being consistent with OIE, we really need to consider that, since other countries usually recognize the status assigned by the OIE.

What are the consequences of being more lenient than international standards? It could be used in the marketplace against us and thus lead to a loss of consumer confidence. Other countries would be quick to speak up if they have more stringent standards in avoiding SRMs. When we have a case, it may become a marketing tool for another country.

When our standards are lower, we tend to be the country that would be exposed to the movement of animals that are at risk for bringing in BSE. We could have a ripple effect where we would have loss of consumer confidence, loss of markets, and devastation to the US cattle industry.
If we have another country that's not using SRM and we're looking at identifying that country as a minimal risk area, but we bring in animals that they're not using SRMs from, and the US is still allowing use of SRMS, will that not possibly affect consumer confidence in this country or give our trading partners a reason to question the rationale?

Dr. Detwiler: How about the animals we have now? As I mentioned, if breeding animals were north of the border and they went to slaughter like the cull dairy cows, they'd have their SRMs removed to protect the Canadian public. Below the border, those same animals do not have their SRMs removed.

Dr. Keller: I agree. The number of Canadian birth cohorts you refer to that have entered the US is significant and has not yet been addressed by APHIS. There again, another country could be quick to point out the lack of attention by our epidemiologists to that group of animals, should we ever have a case of BSE in a US born and raised bovine. The main point is that we need to have a standard. The list of SRMs has expanded through research, and I think we’re hearing today that it’s possible even more SRMs may be added. Whatever the list of SRMs is, it needs to be consistent among countries, and the OIE needs to define what the SRMs are.

Obviously there's going to be resistance to taking additional precautions due to costs, but the costs will be even greater and farther reaching if we don’t. We need to be proactive on this issue, not reactive.

The feeding of feather meal is also a major concern. Does feather meal risk increase when you’re moving animals in that are from minimal-risk countries? I believe it would be a potential route of amplification of the prion in our ruminant feed supply. The Harvard Risk Assessment warned against it.

Dr. Schuler, the ND State Veterinarian discovered that in the proposed BSE rule, where they use the terminology "designated feedlot," that it means only the feedlot name listed on a health certificate. It does not mean that the animals going to a designated feedlot are actually going to go to slaughter immediately under a verified protocol. When animals from another country go to a designated feedlot, there's nothing to prevent their tags from being removed and animals being deviated out of the slaughter channel they were originally intended for.

Dr. Detwiler: How did they ever identify what animals ___________________

Dr. Keller: That's a very good question, and it goes back to "what is a designated feedlot?" and "why doesn’t the ID have to be maintained on those animals?" Actions must be taken to address the need for maintenance of ID.

Dr. Thornsberry: We're required in the state of Nebraska to write on the health certificate that these animals are for feeding purposes only and must go to slaughter. But that doesn’t mean that they do.

Dr. Detwiler: A lot of the feedlots will come in and remove the ear-tags and put their own lot tags in order to make a consistent lot, so you lose that ID. That was a problem when the US wanted to investigate what animals were already in feedlots. There's no regulation for that animal to retail that ID.

Dr. Thornsberry: I thought there was, for disease control.

Dr. Detwiler: There might be for Mexican steers, but not others.

Dr. Keller: Most people are not aware that all state animal health officials know from the health certificates, is the first point of destination. For example, feedlot heifers might be brought in from another country and when the feedlot manager discovers some of them are bred, they may be pulled out to be sold as breeding animals and no one may ever know.



Completely Edited Version

Accomplished this day, Wednesday, December 11, 2003, Denver, Colorado

The roundtable presentations and discussions
were recorded. A transcript will be made available
to the Academy of Veterinary Consultants, the
American Association of Bovine Practitioners, and
the Colleges of Veterinary Medicine throughout the
United States and Canada. A condensed version
translated for the livestock industry will be made
available to educate livestock producers about
prion related diseases.


National Veterinary Services Laboratory (NVSL) Immunohistochemistry (IHC) Testing Summary

The BSE enhanced surveillance program involves the use of a rapid screening test, followed by confirmatory testing for any samples that come back "inconclusive." The weekly summary below captures all rapid tests conducted as part of the enhanced surveillance effort. It should be noted that since the enhanced surveillance program began, USDA has also conducted approximately 9,200 routine IHC tests on samples that did not first undergo rapid testing.

*** Suppressed peer review of Harvard study October 31, 2002 ***

Owens, Julie
From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. []
Sent: Monday, July 24, 2006 1:09 PM
To: FSIS RegulationsComments
Subject: [Docket No. FSIS-2006-0011] FSIS Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE)
Page 1 of 98

Greetings FSIS,

I would kindly like to comment on the following ;

[Federal Register: July 12, 2006 (Volume 71, Number 133)]
[Page 39282-39283]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access []
Food Safety and Inspection Service
[Docket No. FSIS-2006-0011]
Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE)
Update; Notice of Availability and Technical Meeting


MY comments/questions are as follows ;

1. SINCE the first Harvard BSE Risk Assessment was so flawed and fraught with error after the PEER REVIEW
assessment assessed this fact, how do you plan on stopping this from happening again, will there be another peer
review with top TSE Scientist, an impartial jury so-to-speak, to assess this new and updated Harvard BSE/TSE risk
assessment and will this assessment include the Atypical TSE and SRM issues ?

*** Suppressed peer review of Harvard study October 31, 2002 ***

2. WITH A RECENT NATION WIDE MAD COW FEED BAN RECALL in the past few months that consisted of
some 10,878.06 TONS, then another Mad Cow feed ban warning letter in May, IT should seem prudent to ask why our
feed bans continue to fail in 2006, and continue to fail today ?


full text 98 pages ;


PLEASE NOTE IN USA CJD UPDATE AS AT JUNE 2007, please note steady increase

1 Acquired in the United Kingdom; 2 Acquired in Saudi Arabia; 3 Includes 17 inconclusive and 9 pending (1 from 2006, 8
from 2007); 4 Includes 17 non-vCJD type unknown (2 from 1996, 2 from 1997, 1 from 2001, 1 from 2003, 4 from 2004, 3
from 2005, 4 from 2006) and 36 type pending (2 from 2005, 8 from 2006,
*** 26 from 2007)


18 January 2007 - Draft minutes of the SEAC 95 meeting (426 KB) held on 7
December 2006 are now available.


64. A member noted that at the recent Neuroprion meeting, a study was
presented showing that in transgenic mice BSE passaged in sheep may be more
virulent and infectious to a wider range of species than bovine derived BSE.

Other work presented suggested that BSE and bovine amyloidotic spongiform
encephalopathy (BASE) MAY BE RELATED. A mutation had been identified in the


3:30 Transmission of the Italian Atypical BSE (BASE) in Humanized Mouse

Models Qingzhong Kong, Ph.D., Assistant Professor, Pathology, Case Western Reserve

Bovine Amyloid Spongiform Encephalopathy (BASE) is an atypical BSE strain
discovered recently in Italy, and similar or different atypical BSE cases
were also reported in other countries. The infectivity and phenotypes of
these atypical BSE strains in humans are unknown. In collaboration with
Pierluigi Gambetti, as well as Maria Caramelli and her co-workers, we have
inoculated transgenic mice expressing human prion protein with brain
homogenates from BASE or BSE infected cattle. Our data shows that about half
of the BASE-inoculated mice became infected with an average incubation time
of about 19 months; in contrast, none of the BSE-inoculated mice appear to
be infected after more than 2 years.

***These results indicate that BASE is transmissible to humans and suggest that BASE is more virulent than
classical BSE in humans.***

6:30 Close of Day One

1997 TO 2006. SPORADIC CJD CASES TRIPLED, with phenotype
of 'UNKNOWN' strain growing. ...

There is a growing number of human CJD cases, and they were presented last
week in San Francisco by Luigi Gambatti(?) from his CJD surveillance

He estimates that it may be up to 14 or 15 persons which display selectively
SPRPSC and practically no detected RPRPSC proteins.

or this ;

May 4, 2004
Media Inquiries: 301-827-6242
Consumer Inquiries: 888-INFO-FDA

Statement on Texas Cow With Central Nervous System Symptoms
On Friday, April 30 th , the Food and Drug Administration learned that a cow with central nervous system symptoms had been killed and shipped to a processor for rendering into animal protein for use in animal feed.

FDA, which is responsible for the safety of animal feed, immediately began an investigation. On Friday and throughout the weekend, FDA investigators inspected the slaughterhouse, the rendering facility, the farm where the animal came from, and the processor that initially received the cow from the slaughterhouse.

FDA's investigation showed that the animal in question had already been rendered into "meat and bone meal" (a type of protein animal feed). Over the weekend FDA was able to track down all the implicated material. That material is being held by the firm, which is cooperating fully with FDA.

Cattle with central nervous system symptoms are of particular interest because cattle with bovine spongiform encephalopathy or BSE, also known as "mad cow disease," can exhibit such symptoms. In this case, there is no way now to test for BSE. But even if the cow had BSE, FDA's animal feed rule would prohibit the feeding of its rendered protein to other ruminant animals (e.g., cows, goats, sheep, bison).

FDA is sending a letter to the firm summarizing its findings and informing the firm that FDA will not object to use of this material in swine feed only. If it is not used in swine feed, this material will be destroyed. Pigs have been shown not to be susceptible to BSE. If the firm agrees to use the material for swine feed only, FDA will track the material all the way through the supply chain from the processor to the farm to ensure that the feed is properly monitored and used only as feed for pigs.

To protect the U.S. against BSE, FDA works to keep certain mammalian protein out of animal feed for cattle and other ruminant animals. FDA established its animal feed rule in 1997 after the BSE epidemic in the U.K. showed that the disease spreads by feeding infected ruminant protein to cattle.

Under the current regulation, the material from this Texas cow is not allowed in feed for cattle or other ruminant animals. FDA's action specifying that the material go only into swine feed means also that it will not be fed to poultry.

FDA is committed to protecting the U.S. from BSE and collaborates closely with the U.S. Department of Agriculture on all BSE issues. The animal feed rule provides crucial protection against the spread of BSE, but it is only one of several such firewalls. FDA will soon be improving the animal feed rule, to make this strong system even stronger.


What Do We Feed to Food-Production Animals? A Review of Animal Feed

Ingredients and Their Potential Impacts on Human Health

Amy R. Sapkota,1,2 Lisa Y. Lefferts,1,3 Shawn McKenzie,1 and Polly Walker1
1Johns Hopkins Center for a Livable Future, Bloomberg School of Public
Health, Baltimore, Maryland, USA; 2Maryland Institute for
Applied Environmental Health, College of Health and Human Performance,
University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland, USA;
3Lisa Y. Lefferts Consulting, Nellysford, Virginia, USA


Table 1. Animal feed ingredients that are legally used in U.S. animal feeds


Rendered animal protein from Meat meal, meat meal tankage, meat and bone
meal, poultry meal, animal the slaughter of food by-product meal, dried
animal blood, blood meal, feather meal, egg-shell production animals and
other meal, hydrolyzed whole poultry, hydrolyzed hair, bone marrow, and
animal animals digest from dead, dying, diseased, or disabled animals
including deer and elk Animal waste Dried ruminant waste, dried swine waste,
dried poultry litter, and undried processed animal waste products



Food-animal production in the United States has changed markedly in the past
century, and these changes have paralleled major changes in animal feed
formulations. While this industrialized system of food-animal production may
result in increased production efficiencies, some of the changes in animal
feeding practices may result in unintended adverse health consequences for
consumers of animal-based food products. Currently, the use of animal feed
including rendered animal products, animal waste, antibiotics, metals, and
fats, could result in higher levels of bacteria, antibioticresistant
bacteria, prions, arsenic, and dioxinlike compounds in animals and resulting
animal-based food products intended for human consumption. Subsequent human
health effects among consumers could include increases in bacterial
infections (antibioticresistant and nonresistant) and increases in the risk
of developing chronic (often fatal) diseases
such as vCJD. Nevertheless, in spite of the wide range of potential human
health impacts that could result from animal feeding practices, there are
little data collected at the federal or state level concerning the amounts
of specific ingredients that are intentionally included in U.S. animal feed.
In addition, almost no biological or chemical testing is conducted on
complete U.S. animal feeds; insufficient testing is performed on retail meat
products; and human health effects data are not appropriately linked to this
information. These surveillance inadequacies make it difficult to conduct
rigorous epidemiologic studies and risk assessments
that could identify the extent to which specific human health risks are
ultimately associated with animal feeding practices. For example, as noted
above, there are insufficient data to determine whether other human
foodborne bacterial illnesses besides those caused by S. enterica serotype
Agona are associated with animal feeding practices. Likewise, there are
insufficient data to determine the percentage of antibiotic-resistant human
bacterial infections that are attributed to the nontherapeutic use of
antibiotics in animal feed. Moreover, little research has been conducted to
determine whether the use of organoarsenicals in animal feed, which can lead
to elevated levels of arsenic in meat products (Lasky et al. 2004),
contributes to increases in cancer risk. In order to address these research
gaps, the following principal actions are necessary within the United
States: a) implementation of a nationwide reporting system of the specific
amounts and types of feed ingredients of concern to public health that are
incorporated into animal feed, including antibiotics, arsenicals, rendered
animal products, fats, and animal waste; b) funding and development of
robust surveillance systems that monitor biological, chemical, and other
etiologic agents throughout the animal-based food-production chain “from
farm to fork” to human health outcomes; and c) increased communication and
collaboration among feed professionals, food-animal producers, and
veterinary and public health officials.


Sapkota et al.
668 VOLUME 115 | NUMBER 5 | May 2007 • Environmental Health Perspectives

Brief review on the epidemiology of transmissible
spongiform encephalopathies (TSE)
Marcus G. Doherr
Department of Clinical Veterinary Medicine, Vetsuisse Faculty, University of
Bern, Bremgartenstrasse 109a,
P.O. Box 8466, 3001 Bern, Switzerland
Received 25 June 2006; accepted 30 October 2006
Available online 13 November 2006


As a consequence of the studies linkingMBM use in cattle
feed to BSE, the inclusion of MBM into ruminant feed was
banned in the UK in July 1988, and in Switzerland in December
1990. These bans in both countries resulted in a significant
reduction of new infections in cattle born after their implementation,
thereby highlighting the importance of controlling
this exposure route [34].However, the relatively large number
of BSE cases born after those bans indicated that, despite the
feed ban in place, BSE infectivity — to some extent – was
still reaching cattle. These cases, subsequently denoted as
born-after-the-ban (BAB) and born-after-the-reinforced (UK
in 1996) ban (BARB), documented the presence of other
infection routes besides direct (legal) inclusion of MBM in
cattle concentrates. Cross-contamination of cattle feed with
feed for pigs and poultry during production, transportation
or storage, and cross-exposure of cattle to pig or poultry
feed on mixed-species farms were suspected as additional
routes [35–37]. More recently, insufficiently heated bone
meal and tallow used in concentrate feeds and milk replacers
has been suggested as an additional source of BSE infectivity
The measures such as the MBM bans currently implemented
in Europe, as shown by intensive surveillance
with over 40 million animals (clinical suspects, emergencyslaughtered
and fallen cattle as well as healthy-slaughtered
adult cattle) tested between January 2002 and September
2005, have resulted in a constant decline of the BSE epidemic
at least in the old EU member states (Fig. 2) [18]. It is
to be expected that the epidemic will phase out in countries
with sufficiently implemented control measures. This, due to
the long incubation time of the disease, will require time.


October 2007 Update on Feed Enforcement Activities to Limit the Spread of

* GAO-05-51 October 2004 FOOD SAFETY (over 500 customers receiving
potentially BSE contaminated beef) - TSS 10/20/04

October 2004 FOOD SAFETY
USDA and FDA Need
to Better Ensure
Prompt and Complete
Recalls of Potentially
Unsafe Food


Page 38 GAO-05-51 Food Recall Programs
To examine the voluntary recall of beef products associated with the
December 2003 discovery of an animal infected with BSE, we analyzed the
distribution lists USDA collected from companies and the verification
checks it conducted to develop a diagram illustrating the location and
volume of recalled beef that reached different levels of the distribution
chain. We compared the distribution lists and verification checks to
identify how many customers listed on the distribution lists did not
the recalled beef and the number of customers not listed on distribution
lists that received the recalled beef. We interviewed USDA and FDA staff
involved with the recall to understand the timing of recall actions and the
challenges encountered during the recall.
To develop information on the 2002 recall of ground beef by a ConAgra
plant in Greeley, Colorado, we reviewed USDA s recall file and other
documents on the recall. We also met with the department s Office of
Inspector General and reviewed the Inspector General s September 2003
We conducted our review from May 2003 through August 2004 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
1U.S. Department of Agriculture, Office of Inspector General, Great
Plains Region Audit
Report: Food Safety and Inspection Service: Oversight of Production
Process and Recall at
ConAgra Plant (Establishment 969), Report No. 24601-2-KC (September 2003).
Page 39 GAO-05-51 Food Recall Programs
Appendix II
Federal Actions Associated with the
Discovery of an Animal in the United States
Infected with BSE Appendix II
On December 23, 2003, USDA announced that a cow in the state of
Washington had tested positive for BSE commonly referred to as mad
cow disease. This appendix describes the actions USDA took to recall the
meat and the actions FDA took with respect to FDA-regulated products,
such as animal feed and cosmetics, made from rendered parts of the
Beef Recall Was
Triggered by a BSEPositive
Sample from
One Cow
On December 9, 2003, the recalling company slaughtered 23 cows. USDA,
in accordance with its BSE surveillance policy at the time, took a
sample of
1 cow that was unable to walk, although the condition of the tested cow is
now disputed. USDA did not process the sample in its Ames, Iowa National
Veterinary Services Laboratory in an expedited manner because the cow
did not show symptoms of neurological disorder. USDA test results
indicated a presumptive positive for BSE on December 23, 2003.
Recall Begun in
December 2003 Was
Completed in March
On December 23, 2003, after learning about the positive BSE test, USDA
headquarters notified the Boulder District Office, which is the field
with jurisdiction over the recalling firm. The Boulder District began
gathering information about the recalling company s product distribution.
Field staff telephoned the recalling company and were on-site at 7:00 p.m.
The Boulder District initially thought 3 days of the recalling company s
production would have to be recalled, but further examination of facility
cleanup and shipping records revealed that it was only necessary to
recall 1
day of production. USDA recall staff convened at 9:15 p.m. and discussed
the science related to BSE and whether the recalling company s cleanup
practices were sufficient to limit the recall to 1 day of production.
Following USDA s determination to conduct a Class II recall that is, the
beef posed a remote possibility of adverse health consequences USDA
contacted the recalling company to discuss recall details and the press
release. The press release and Recall Notification Report were released
that evening.
On December 24, 2003, USDA s Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS)
sent inspectors to the recalling company s primary customers to obtain
secondary customer distribution lists and product shipping records. USDA
conducted 100 percent verification checks for this recall it contacted
every customer that received the recalled meat. This level of verification
checks is well above the percentage of checks conducted by USDA district
offices for the Class I recalls we reviewed.
Appendix II
Federal Actions Associated with the
Discovery of an Animal in the United States
Infected with BSE
Page 40 GAO-05-51 Food Recall Programs
On December 26, 2003, USDA began checking the primary and secondary
customers of the recalling company that it was aware of, although the
entire product distribution chain was unknown. During the checks, USDA
tried to determine if the product was further distributed, and it used
verification checks to acquire distribution lists for secondary and
customers of the recalling company.
Verification checks continued until February 25, 2004. Three USDA
districts conducted these verification checks. The Boulder District
coordinated the checks and assigned checks to the Minneapolis District
Office for customers in Montana and to the Alameda District Office for
customers in California. USDA required that 100 percent of the primary
checks, 50 percent of the secondary checks, and 20 percent of the tertiary
checks be conducted on-site. According to USDA, more than 50 percent of
the secondary checks were actually conducted on-site. FDA officials
helped conduct verification checks. According to USDA, the recall took a
long time to complete because USDA contacted each customer at least
twice. USDA first contacted each customer to conduct the check and again
to verify product disposition.
On February 25, 2004, the Boulder District concluded that the recall was
conducted in an effective manner. On March 1, 2004, USDA s Recall
Management Division recommended that the agency terminate the recall,
and USDA sent a letter to the recalling company to document that USDA
considered the recall to be complete.
Recall Was
Complicated by
Inaccurate Distribution
Lists and Mixing of
Contaminated and
Noncontaminated Beef
USDA used distribution lists and shipping records to piece together where
the recalled product was distributed. According to USDA, one of the
recalling company s three primary customers was slow in providing its
customer list. USDA could not begin verification activities for that
customer without this list. Furthermore, some customers of the recalling
company provided USDA with imprecise lists that did not specify which
customers received the recalled product. As a consequence, USDA could
not quickly determine the scope of product distribution and had to take
time conducting extra research using shipping invoices to determine which
specific customers received the product.
Even when USDA determined the amount and location of beef, the agency
still had trouble tracking the beef in certain types of establishments,
as grocery store distributors. USDA could not easily track the individual
stores where those distributors sent the beef because of product mixing
Appendix II
Federal Actions Associated with the
Discovery of an Animal in the United States
Infected with BSE
Page 41 GAO-05-51 Food Recall Programs
and the distributors record-keeping practices. Generally, distributors
purchase beef from multiple sources, mix it in their inventory, and lose
track of the source of the beef they send to the stores that they
supply. To
deal with this problem, USDA first identified the dates when recalled beef
was shipped to the distributors and then asked for a list of the stores
were shipped any beef after those dates. Consequently, some stores were
included in the recall that may never have received recalled beef.
The recall was also complicated by repeated mixing of recalled beef with
nonrecalled beef, thereby increasing the amount of meat involved in the
recall. The recalling company slaughtered 23 cows on December 9, 2003,
and shipped those and 20 other carcasses to a primary customer on
December 10, 2003. The recalling company s carcasses were tagged to
identify the slaughter date and the individual cow. The primary customer
removed the identification tags and mixed the 23 recalled carcasses with
the 20 nonrecalled carcasses. Because the carcasses could not be
distinguished, the recall included all 43 carcasses at the primary
After one round of processing at the primary customer, the meat from the
carcasses was shipped to two other processing facilities. Both
establishments further mixed the recalled meat from the 43 carcasses with
meat from other sources. In all, the mixing of beef from 1 BSE-positive cow
resulted in over 500 customers receiving potentially contaminated beef.
Imprecise distribution lists and the mixing of recalled beef combined to
complicate USDA s identification of where the product went. Specifically,
on December 23, 2003, USDA s initial press release stated that the
company was located in Washington State. Three days later, on December
26, 2003, USDA announced that the recalled beef was distributed within
Washington and Oregon. On December 27, 2003, USDA determined that one
of the primary customers of the recalling firm distributed beef to
in California and Nevada, in addition to Washington and Oregon, for a total
of four states. On December 28, 2003, USDA announced that some of the
secondary customers of the recalling company may also have distributed
the product to Alaska, Montana, Hawaii, Idaho, and Guam, for a total of
eight states and one territory.
On January 6, 2004, over 2 weeks from recall initiation, USDA determined
that the beef went to only six states Washington, Oregon, California,
Nevada, Idaho, and Montana and that no beef went to Alaska, Hawaii, or
Guam. To reach that conclusion, USDA used the distribution lists, shipping
records, and sales invoices that it received from companies to piece
together exactly where the recalled beef may have been sent. The lists
Appendix II
Federal Actions Associated with the
Discovery of an Animal in the United States
Infected with BSE
Page 42 GAO-05-51 Food Recall Programs
showed that 713 customers may have received the recalled beef; 6 of those
may have received beef from more than one source. USDA determined that
176 customers on the lists did not actually receive recalled beef,
the customers in Guam and Hawaii. USDA s review also indicated that
recalled beef was probably not shipped to Alaska or Utah, and USDA
checked 2 retailers in Alaska and 3 retailers in Utah to confirm that
was the
case. In total, USDA conducted verification checks on 537 of the 713
customers on the lists. USDA s initial checks identified an additional 45
customers that may have received the recalled beef that were not included
on the distribution lists, for a total of 582 verification checks. Figure 4
summarizes USDA s verification efforts during the recall.
Appendix II
Federal Actions Associated with the
Discovery of an Animal in the United States
Infected with BSE
Page 43 GAO-05-51 Food Recall Programs
Figure 4: USDA s Recall Verification Checks by Location and Customer
Type for Meat Associated with the Animal Infected with
Note: USDA checked 15 primary, 40 secondary, and 526 tertiary customers
plus the recalling
company, for a total of 582 verification checks.


USDA s press release stated that the recall involved 10,410 pounds of beef
products, and the USDA recall coordinator for this recall told us that
downstream processors mixed the recalled beef with nonrecalled beef, for
a total of more than 38,000 pounds of beef that was distributed at the
secondary customer level. According to USDA officials involved with the
recall, the precise amount of meat that was sold at the retail level is
unknown because retailers at the tertiary level further mixed nonrecalled
meat with potentially contaminated meat. USDA told us that more than
64,000 pounds of beef was ultimately returned or destroyed by customers,
and that, because of the mixing, it was not able to determine how much of
the original 10,410 pounds of recalled beef was contained in the 64,000
pounds that were recovered.


snip... end


1. Food Safety: USDA and FDA Need to Better Ensure Prompt and Complete
Recalls of Potentially Unsafe Food. GAO-05-51, October 7.tss
Highlights -

QFC sued over mad cow case

Grocer negligently exposed them to beef, family claims

Friday, March 5, 2004


An Eastside family who says they ate beef linked to the nation's only
known case of mad cow disease yesterday filed a class-action lawsuit
against QFC, claiming the grocery store chain negligently exposed them
and others to "highly hazardous" meat and did not properly notify them
that they had bought it.

Attorneys for Jill Crowson, a 52-year-old interior designer from Clyde
Hill, filed the lawsuit in King County Superior Court on behalf of her
family and possibly hundreds of other customers who unwittingly bought
and consumed beef potentially exposed to mad cow disease.

"I was pretty upset about it," Crowson said. "I've spent all of my kids'
lives trying to be a responsible parent for them to keep them safe. I
felt badly that the food I served could be harmful to their health."

The lawsuit is believed to be the first stemming from this country's
only confirmed case of mad cow disease, or bovine spongiform
encephalopathy, which was detected in a slaughtered Holstein from a
Yakima Valley ranch on Dec. 23.

Neither officials at Quality Food Centers' Bellevue headquarters, or
Kroger -- the company's Ohio-based corporate parent -- could be reached
for comment about the lawsuit yesterday.

The suit contends the family bought and later ate ground beef from their
local QFC that was part of a batch processed at Vern's Moses Lake Meats
on Dec. 9 and included meat from the diseased Holstein.

The beef was later shipped to wholesalers and retailers in Washington,
Oregon, California, Idaho, Montana and Nevada.

On Dec. 23 -- after government scientists confirmed the Holstein was
infected with BSE -- businesses began pulling potentially affected beef
from store shelves under a voluntary recall.

But the family's suit claims that, although QFC was aware of the recall
on Dec. 23, the store did not begin pulling the recalled beef from about
40 of its stores that carried it until Dec. 24.

The company also did not try to warn customers about the recalled beef
until Dec. 27 -- and only then with small, inconspicuous signs inside
the stores, the suit claims.

Steve Berman, the family's attorney, said the company had "a duty to
warn" consumers who bought the beef under terms of the Washington
Product Liability Act.

QFC could've easily notified customers by taking out TV, radio or
newspaper ads, or by tracking and notifying those who bought the beef
through customers' QFC Advantage Cards, Berman said.

At Berman's downtown Seattle firm yesterday, Crowson described how on
Dec. 22 and Dec. 23 -- the day of the recall -- she bought single
packages of "9 percent leanest ground beef" from her local QFC store at
Bellevue Village.

Crowson took the beef home, cooked it and made tacos one night and
spaghetti the next -- serving the dinners to herself; her daughter,
Laura, 22; son, Nicholas, 19; and her niece, Claire De Winter, 23.
Members of the family also ate leftovers from those meals for the next
several days, Crowson said.

"When the news about mad cow came out, I instantly became concerned,"
Crowson said. "But the initial stories didn't mention anything about
QFC, so I thought we were OK."

While shopping at the grocery store a few days later, Crowson said she
asked a store butcher whether QFC stores had sold any of the recalled
beef. The butcher assured her they had not, she said.

The family only learned QFC had sold any of the beef in question after
reading a news story Jan. 10 about a Mercer Island man who discovered
his family had eaten affected beef that he bought at a local QFC store,
Crowson said.

Crowson later called QFC and faxed the company a signed letter asking
that it track purchases made on her QFC Advantage Card -- a store
discount card issued to customers. On Jan. 12, the company notified
Crowson that the beef she bought and served to her family was, in fact,
part of the recalled batch, she said.

Scientists believe people who eat beef from infected cows can contract a
fatal form of the disease.

The family is "now burdened with the possibility that they presently
carry (the disease) that may have an incubation period of up to 30
years," the lawsuit says.

Lawyers for the family say they believe hundreds, if not thousands, of
QFC customers, and those of other stores, likely ate beef from the
recalled batch -- the reason why Berman filed their legal claim as a
class-action lawsuit. A USDA official this week said that up to 17,000
pounds of meat affected by the recall likely was eaten or thrown out by

Berman added that an investigator from his firm learned that QFC buys
beef for its "9 percent leanest ground beef" products in large tubs that
can weigh several hundred pounds, and then regrinds and packages the
meat for sale.

Because QFC stores regrind the beef before selling it, Berman contends
that makes the store a manufacturer responsible under the Washington
Product Liability Act for not selling any unsafe product.

Scientists believe people who eat beef from cows infected with BSE can
contract variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob, a fatal brain-wasting disease that
has been detected in about 150 people worldwide.

However, officials with the U.S. Agriculture Department have repeatedly
said the risk from eating muscle cuts from an infected cow -- the likely
cut of meat processed and sold for hamburger in the recalled batch -- is
extremely low.

Although Crowson said she tries not to "obsess over it," she is fearful
that her family could one day become sick.

"It's pretty scary," she said.

Because no medical test is available to determine whether a living
person is infected with the disease, the couple's "stress and fear
cannot be allayed," the lawsuit said.

The family seeks unspecified damages for emotional distress and medical
monitoring costs.

Crowson said her reason for bringing the lawsuit isn't about money. "The
more I've thought about this, the angrier I've gotten," she said.


QFC s Delayed Mad Cow Response Draws Lawsuit
Family claims QFC should have used customer database to warn those at
risk sooner

March 05, 2004

SEATTLE A Bellevue, Wash. family today filed a proposed class-action
lawsuit against Quality Food Centers (QFC), a subsidiary of Kroger
(NYSE: KR), claiming the grocery store chain should have used
information gathered through its customer loyalty program to warn those
who purchased beef potentially tainted with mad cow disease.

The suit, filed in King County Superior Court, seeks to represent all
Washington residents who purchased the potentially tainted meat, and
asks the court to establish a medical monitoring fund.

Jill Crowson purchased the potentially tainted beef from a Bellevue QFC
on Dec. 22 and 23, and used her Advantage Card, QFC s customer loyalty
program. She served the meat to her husband over Dec. 25 and 26, and
later heard of the recall in the newspaper.

Steve Berman, the attorney representing the Crowsons, asserts that since
the company tracks purchases, it should have warned the Crowsons and
many other customers who purchased the beef at approximately 40 stores
across Washington.

If you lose your keys with an Advantage Card attached, QFC will return
them to you free of charge, said Berman. If they can contact you over
a lost set of car keys, why couldn t they contact you and tell you that
the beef you purchased could kill you?

QFC is among the large number of grocers that track customer purchases
through loyalty cards like the Advantage Card. Once a customer shares
contact information including name, address and phone number they
are given discounts on certain items.

Regardless of any discounts offered, the loyalty card tracks customers
every purchase and stores them in a central database, the complaint states.

We contend that QFC knew which Advantage Card customers purchased the
suspect meat, and could have easily called to warn them, said Berman.
Instead, QFC used a series of spurious excuses to hide their failure to

On Dec. 23, the U.S. Department of Agriculture ordered the recall of
approximately 10,410 pounds of raw beef that may have been infected with
bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), which if consumed by humans can
lead to the always-fatal Cruetzfeldt-Jakobs Disease (vCJD).

According to the complaint, QFC at first mistakenly believed it did not
have any of the affected beef and took no action to remove the product
from its shelves. The store later removed the beef on Dec. 24, but then
did little to warn those who earlier purchased the meat, the suit claims.

It wasn t until Dec. 27 that the grocery chain posted small signs with
information about the recall, the complaint alleges.

The Crowsons contacted QFC when they suspected they had purchased the
potentially tainted meat, but QFC would not confirm their suspicions for
two more weeks, the suit states. According to Berman, the family had to
file a written request before QFC would confirm their fears.

According to health experts, Cruetzfeldt-Jakobs Disease can have an
incubation period of as long as 30 years. There is no test to determine
if infection took place after possible exposure, nor is there any
treatment once one is infected. The condition is always fatal.

If the court grants the suit class-action status, QFC would likely be
compelled to turn over the names of those who purchased the potentially
tainted beef.

The proposed class-action claims QFC violated provisions of the
Washington Product Liability Act by failing to give adequate warning to
consumers about the potentially dangerous meat.

The suit seeks unspecified damages for the plaintiffs, as well as the
establishment of a medical monitoring fund.

QFC's Delayed Mad Cow Response Draws Lawsuit

... subsidiary of Kroger , claiming the grocery store chain should ...
beef potentially tainted with "mad cow disease ... beef at approximately
40 stores across Washington. ... - 9k -

040307 Woman Sues QFC Over Mad-Cow Recall
... Jakob disease, the
human form of mad-cow, from eating ... QFC is subject to the Washington
Product Liability ... been found in a slaughtered Yakima County dairy
cow. ... - 6k

Date: October 1, 2004 at 2:22 pm PST


Schwarzenegger Vetoes Meat Recall Disclosure Bill

Legislation Would Have Identified Stores that Received Contaminated Meat
and Poultry

Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger (R-CA) vetoed a bill yesterday that would
have let Californians know whether they ve purchased contaminated meat
or poultry. The bill, SB 1585, would have ended a secrecy agreement
between the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and California that
prevents the state from disclosing the names and locations of stores
that receive shipments of recalled meat.

Consumers have a right to know if they purchased recalled meat or
poultry, said Ken Kelly, Staff Attorney at the Center for Science in
the Public Interest (CSPI). Why force families to roll the dice when
they put food on the table? Governor Schwarzenegger prefers a
get-sick-first, ask-questions-later policy.

Earlier this year, California was one of several states that received
meat from the Washington State cow that tested positive for mad cow
disease. But because California is one of 12 states that have signed a
secrecy agreement with USDA, state health officials were prohibited from
identifying stores or restaurants that may have received beef from the
infected cow. Even recalled meat tainted with deadly E. coli 0157:H7
bacteria would be subject to the secrecy agreement, leaving consumers
uncertain as to whether the ground beef in their refrigerator were safe
to eat.

In his veto message, Governor Schwarzenegger indicated he would instruct
the state s health department to renegotiate an agreement that would
allow USDA to share recall information with local public health
officials. But according to CSPI, even if USDA agreed to share recall
information with local officials, the local officials would be similarly
prohibited from disclosing names of retail outlets with consumers. In
August, CSPI urged USDA not to force states to sign any such secrecy
Federal and state government should be more concerned with protecting
consumers from unnecessary hospitalizations and deaths associated with
food-borne illness, and less concerned with protecting grocers and meat
producers from bad publicity, Kelly said.




QUALITY FOOD CENTERS, INC., an Ohio corporation Defendent

NO. 04-2-05608-0 SEA


The Court hereby GRANTS the defendant's motion to dismiss the plaintiff's
claims based on a manufacturer's strict liability (Counts I and II) and
DENIES the defendant's motion to dismiss the plaintiff's claim of negligence
by a product seller (Count III).

DATED this 14th day of June, 2004


Date Filed: March 5, 2004
Court: King County Superior Court (Washington)
Location: Seattle
Ticker Symbol: NYSE:KR

Join This Suit
Tell a Friend

Consumers filed a proposed class-action lawsuit against Quality Food Centers
(QFC), a subsidiary of Kroger (NYSE: KR), claiming the grocery store chain
should have used information gathered through its customer loyalty program
to warn those who purchased beef potentially tainted with �mad cow disease.�
The USDA issued a recall notice for the meat on December 23, 2003. QFC sold
the meat through its approximately 40 stores across Washington.

The suit claims that even though QFC had the ability to quickly warn every
customer who purchased the potentially deadly meat if they used the QFC
Advantage Card at the time of purchase, the grocery store neglected to do

The suit seeks to represent every consumer in Washington state who purchased
the recalled meat from QFC.

Recent Updates

June 14, 2004 - the King County Superior Court gave the green light to a
suit claiming QFC didn't do enough to warn customers about beef potentially
tainted with 'mad cow disease,' finding enough questions about the beef and
QFC's responsibility to explore in the courtroom.

Read the court order.

QFC - 'Mad Cow' Frequently Asked Questions

The Suit

What is the key issue in this suit?
On December 23, 2003, the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA)
recalled more than 10,000 pounds of raw beef that could have been exposed to
bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE). Humans consuming BSE-tainted meat
can contract Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD), an always-fatal condition.

QFC sold this meat throughout its stores in Washington. Even though QFC had
the ability to quickly warn every customer who purchased the potentially
deadly meat if they used the QFC advantage card at the time of purchase, the
grocery store neglected to do so, the suit alleges.

Who does the suit seek to represent?
The suit seeks to represent all persons who purchased recalled meat from any
QFC store in the state of Washington.

Who are the defendants?
Quality Food Centers, or QFC. Once a local, Northwest company, QFC is now a
wholly owned subsidiary of the grocery chain giant, Kroger.

What does the suit seek?
The suit asks the court to order QFC to establish a medical monitoring fund
which would allow those who purchased and consumed the meat to seek medical
care, checking for � and if necessary, treating --- the infection of vCJD.
The suit also seeks the creation of a medical notification system, allowing
those who may have been exposed to the disease to receive periodic updates
on research and treatment of vCJD. The suit also seeks unspecified damages
for the plaintiffs.

Does the suit claim QFC violated specific laws?
Yes. The lawsuit claims QFC violated the Washington Product Liability Act.
In addition, the suit claims QFC was negligent by not warning consumers of
the dangers associated with the affected meat.

Where was the lawsuit filed?
The suit was filed in King County Superior Court on March 4, 2004.

How do I determine if I qualify to join the lawsuit?
If you have a QFC Advantage card and believe that you bought recalled meat
from a QFC store, you may be eligible to join the lawsuit. Click here to
fill out the sign-up request form, or you can contact Hagens Berman


What is the QFC Advantage Card?
The Advantage Card is known in the grocery industry as a Customer Loyalty
Card. Customers who sign up for QFC�s Advantage Card receive special
discounts on selected items, but gives the grocery store chain the ability
to track consumers� purchases in order to enhance their marketing efforts.
In addition, grocery chains which offer affinity card programs often use the
database and shopping pattern data to send users coupons and other marketing
material. According to the complaint, QFC tracks every purchase made by
consumers presenting the Advantage Card, including product description, date
of purchase, store of purchase and the price, and saves that data with
customer contact information.

What was QFC�s response to the meat recall?
On Dec. 23, 2003, QFC received notice from the U.S. Department of
Agriculture (USDA) of a recall of approximately 10,410 lbs. of raw meat that
may have been contaminated with the infectious agent that causes �mad cow�
disease. QFC did not act immediately on the recall notice but initially
responded by denying that it had any of the tainted meat. On December 24 QFC
pulled the meat from its shelves, but the company took no steps to directly
warn consumers. It was not until Dec. 27 that QFC posted small signs in its
stores recalling the tainted beef, according to the complaint. During that
four day period when QFC was silent hundreds of consumers may have eaten the

Can QFC determine if an Advantage Card holder purchased the potentially
dangerous meat?
Yes. In fact, consumers can now contact QFC directly and the company will
provide information about meat purchases � but only if you ask. Hundreds of
other consumers who purchased the meat and are unaware of the situation have
not heard from QFC, the complaint states.

Why was QFC sued even though they pulled the meat?
Under Washington law since QFC ground the meat it is deemed a manufacturer
and is strictly liable for any unsafe product. In addition QFC possessed
specific and easily obtainable information on which customers purchased the
recalled meat, but did not act to inform customers, the suit states.
Considering the potential danger and risk of worry for consumers, and the
ease of contacting consumers using database information, simply pulling the
meat from the shelves and belatedly posting small signs was not an adequate
response, according to the complaint.

What information on customer purchases does QFC track with the Advantage
QFC tracks every purchase that a customer with an Advantage Card makes,
regardless of whether discounts are offered or not, according to the

Does the recently announced larger-than-expected recall of beef affect the
No. Regardless of the size of the beef recall, attorneys believe the facts
in the case remain the same.

How can I find out if I bought recalled meat from QFC?
If you believe that you may have purchased recalled meat from a QFC store,
and you have an Advantage Card, you can contact QFC and ask if your record
shows you purchased recalled beef. You can contact QFC at 866-221-4141.

Isn�t QFC prohibited by privacy laws from contacting consumers with warnings
like this?
No � the suit notes that the company will return car keys returned to the
store if the keys have an Advantage Card attached. According the complaint,
If QFC can return car keys by mail, why can�t they send a notice saying the
meat a customer purchased in their store could cause an incurable, fatal
disease? Further privacy laws would prevent QFC from disclosing information
to third parties, disclosing the information to the customer whose card it
is does not violate privacy laws. For example, if a trade group wanted to
know the names of consumers who purchased a given drug sold at QFC,
disclosure of that private information might be a privacy concern. However,
disclosure to a consumer of his own records is not.

�Mad Cow� Disease

What is Mad Cow disease?
In cows, mad cow disease is defined as bovine spongiform encephalopathy
(BSE), and is a progressive neurological disease. The human disease variant
is know as Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD), which is a rare brain disorder
that causes a rapid, progressive dementia and is always fatal, according to
the complaint.

Where can I get more information on Mad Cow disease?
The USDA provides information on the disease at

What should I do if I believe that I�ve eaten recalled meat?
According to the complaint, no screening tests or treatments have been found
for Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease. Those who suspect they�ve eaten recalled meat
should contact their physician for more information.

Do Stores That Offer Loyalty Cards Have a Duty to Notify Customers of
Product Safety Recalls?
A Recent Suit Raises This Novel Question

Thursday, Aug. 05, 2004

An interesting new Washington state court suit raises an important question:
If a retailer benefits from collecting personally identifiable information
about its customers, does it have a corresponding duty to use such data to
alert its customers that products they've bought have been recalled for
health or safety reasons? And if so, could turning over private data to
companies actually create benefits, as well as privacy risks, for the

In the suit, consumer Jill Crowson is suing her grocery store -- Quality
Food Center (QFC), a subsidiary of Kroger -- for negligent infliction of
emotional distress and disregard of a "duty to warn" under the Washington
Product Liability Act. Crowson alleges in her complaint that QFC failed to
alert her family that ground beef it had sold them had been recalled in
December's mad-cow scare.

Yet, Crowson says, QFC easily could have done so through information it
maintained connected with her Advantage card - a "loyalty card" that meant
QFC had Crowson's name, address and purchasing information. According to her
complaint, QFC tracks every purchase made by consumers presenting the
Advantage Card, including product description, date of purchase, store of
purchase and the price, and saves that data alongside customer contact

Now, Crowson says, her family members "feel like walking time bombs" knowing
they may be infected with the human form of mad-cow disease which the
complaint states may have an up-to-30-year incubation period. And they are
not the only ones: Crowson is seeking class action status for herself and
what she believes are "hundreds" of similarly-situated Washington customers
at QFC's approximately 40 stores in the state.

Some lawyers think Crowson's suit is a stretch. Federal law does not impose
on companies a specific duty to notify consumers when tainted meat is
recalled under the direction of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA),
as was the case here. Also, Crowson and her family, and the class she seeks
to represent, are suing based on fear (and possible future harm), not
current illness. Moreover, the chance they will actually get Mad Cow Disease
some time in the future are apparently remote.

Nevertheless, the lawsuit has strong intuitive appeal: QFC could have saved
the Crowsons and others like them a lot of worry, and perhaps sleepless
nights, with what appears would have been minimal effort, using information
at its digital fingertips. And the court has already once refused to dismiss
it - finding that there were sufficient factual questions about the beef and
about QFC's responsibility to the Crowsons, to merit further exploration of
the evidence, through discovery and in the courtroom.

Regardless of the outcome of Crowson's suit, it underscores the need for
retailers and policymakers to examine what sort of responsibilities come
with private data gathering under loyalty card schemes.

The Lawsuit: The Chronology of Facts Alleged, and the Loyalty Card at Issue

On December 22 and 23, 2003, Crowson bought ground beef from a QFC store.
Also on December 23, 2003, the USDA recalled Washington beef after it
confirmed that a cow slaughtered in Washington had been infected with Mad
Cow Disease. But Crowson says QFC did not pull the affected meat from its
shelves until December 24, and did not post signs in its stores announcing
the recall until December 27. By then, the Crowson family had eaten the

Crowson states that she only learned of the recall by reading an article in
her local newspaper. She said she subsequently called the supermarket chain,
then faxed QFC a letter asking that her purchase be traced through her QFC
Advantage card. On January 10, she was notified that her ground beef
purchase was indeed from the recalled batch.

Crowson says that what QFC allegedly did in response to the recall - pulling
the beef from shelves the next day, and posting signs three days after
that -- was far from enough. She says it should have immediately warned
customers who had bought possibly tainted meat through newspaper, radio and
television advertising -- and by contacting individually those who, like
her, had Advantage cards. Its failure to do so, she says, is what makes the
company liable to her and other shoppers.

The Advantage Card is known in the retail industry as a customer "loyalty
card" - providing discounts on specific items, in exchange for consumer
information that will aid in better tailoring the company's marketing
efforts. Combining the data from one's loyalty card application with data
from other commercial databases or public records (for examples, mortgage
records, or court filings) can often allow a very specific profile of each

Some states limit the types of information that a grocery store can collect
from you when you register for a loyalty card. For example, California state
law prohibits a grocery store from requiring that you turn over your social
security or your driver's license number.

Companies, of course, stress the potential savings that might result from
use of a loyalty card. Consider, for instance, the sales pitch on the QFC
website it reads: "If you don't have a QFC Advantage Card, you're missing
out! The Advantage Card is a powerful new way to save on the groceries you
buy every day. It gives you the best of all possible worlds: premium
quality, superb service and lower prices. That's something no other grocery
store can match. So make sure you take advantage of the big savings."

Privacy advocates complain that loyalty cards result in the improper use -
and, often, sale to third parties - of customers' private information. QFC
apparently doesn't sell customers' data to third parties, however. Its
website promises that "QFC will not release your name to any list service or
manufacturer, and that such information will be held in the strictest of
confidence-even within our company."

Privacy advocates also warn, however, that even if third-party sales of data
are not allowed, the data compiled can always be accessed with a subpoena or
warrant and used against the customer in court proceedings. Meanwhile,
consumer advocates claim that certain loyalty cards don't really offer the
savings they promise. Nevertheless, numerous stores employ loyalty cards.

Turning the Privacy Debate on Its Head: With Great Information, Comes Great

The Crowson lawsuit turns the privacy debate on its head. Typically, privacy
advocates ask retailers to safeguard the personal information they collect
about their shoppers. In this case, in contrast, plaintiff is asking that
QFC delve into its database to notify her about a meat recall.

QFC does this very thing if a consumer loses his or her keys with an
Advantage Card attached to them - returning the keys free of charge. So
Crowson's attorney, Steve Berman, asks: "If they can contact you over a lost
set of car keys, why couldn't they contact you and tell you that the beef
you purchased could kill you?"

According to some news reports, QFC was reluctant to call customers
regarding the recall based on privacy concerns. But in this case, the
concerns seem misplaced. No privacy law is violated when a consumer
communicates with the customer herself regarding private information -
indeed, every offer the customer receives is, in a sense, this kind of
communication. When the customer is receiving personalized discounts based
on her purchase history, why can't she receive personalized health and
safety warnings based on that history, too?

Was There a Duty to Warn Here?

From the law's perspective, the question will be not whether QFC ideally
should have warned the Crowsons - of course it should have. The question
will be if it had a legal duty to do so. Such a duty would come from either
the common law of torts, which allows claims where there is a duty to behave
reasonably to prevent foreseeable harm to others. . Or it might come from
the Washington product liability statute - which, as noted above, creates a
"duty to warn" in certain situations.

And of course, if there is no current duty, the legislature may see fit to
pass a statute creating such a duty. :It may seem more prudent, however, for
retailers to voluntarily assume such a responsibility. When companies
benefit from collecting customer information, shouldn't they also assume a
duty to protect customers from known risks associated with that very
information? Some risks, of course, may be a matter of opinion. But this one
was not: The fact of the risk was acknowledged by the USDA recall of the
meat. With this kind of clear notice of the risk, it seems that QFC either
does - or ought to - have a duty to protect customers from this risk.

Of course, should a retailer not wish to take on this responsibility, it can
also change its loyalty program. QFC and other retailers could still track
consumer purchases without asking them for personally identifiable

FindLaw's Writ - Ramasastry: Mad Cow in the USA

Family to sue grocery chain

A Seattle family that ate beef linked to the US's only known case of BSE has filed a classaction

lawsuit against the grocery chain QFC, claiming the company negligently exposed

them and others to "highly hazardous" meat and did not properly notify them that they had

bought it.34 The suit contends that Jill Crowson and her family bought and later ate ground

beef from their local QFC that was part of a batch processed at Vern's Moses Lake Meats on

9 December 2003 and included meat from the diseased Holstein. The beef was later shipped

to wholesalers and retailers in Washington, Oregon, California, Idaho, Montana and Nevada.

After government scientists confirmed on 23 December that the Holstein was infected with

BSE, businesses began pulling potentially affected beef from store shelves under a voluntary

recall. But, the family's suit claims, although QFC was aware of the recall, the store did not

begin pulling the beef from about 40 of its stores until 24 December. The company also did

not try to warn customers about the recalled beef until 27 December – and only then with

small, inconspicuous signs inside the stores, the suit claims. The family only learned QFC had


sold any of the beef in question after reading a news story on 10 January about a man who

discovered his family had eaten affected beef that he bought at a local QFC store, Crowson

said. She later called QFC and faxed the company a signed letter asking that it track

purchases made on her QFC Advantage Card, and on 12 January the company notified

Crowson that the beef she bought and served to her family was, in fact, part of the recalled

batch, she said.

The family seeks unspecified damages for emotional distress and medical monitoring costs.

Crowson said her reason for bringing the lawsuit is not about money. "The more I've thought

about this, the angrier I've gotten," she said. Neither the company nor its parent corporation,

Kroger, have commented.

2006 - 2007 still feeding ban mad cow SRM protein to cows in USA




Date: September 6, 2006 at 7:58 am PST

a) EVSRC Custom dairy feed, Recall # V-130-6;
b) Performance Chick Starter, Recall # V-131-6;
c) Performance Quail Grower, Recall # V-132-6;
d) Performance Pheasant Finisher, Recall # V-133-6.
Donaldson & Hasenbein/dba J&R Feed Service, Inc., Cullman, AL, by telephone
on June 23, 2006 and by letter dated July 19, 2006. Firm initiated recall is
Dairy and poultry feeds were possibly contaminated with ruminant based
477.72 tons
a) Dairy feed, custom, Recall # V-134-6;
b) Custom Dairy Feed with Monensin, Recall # V-135-6.
None. Bulk product
Recalling Firm: Burkmann Feed, Greeneville, TN, by Telephone beginning on
June 28, 2006.
Manufacturer: H. J. Baker & Bro., Inc., Albertville, AL. Firm initiated
recall is complete.
Possible contamination of dairy feeds with ruminant derived meat and bone
1,484 tons
TN and WV

MS, AL, GA, AND TN 11,000+ TONS
Date: August 16, 2006 at 9:19 am PST

Bulk custom made dairy feed, Recall # V-115-6
Hiseville Feed & Seed Co., Hiseville, KY, by telephone and letter on or
about July 14, 2006. FDA initiated recall is ongoing.
Custom made feeds contain ingredient called Pro-Lak which may contain
ruminant derived meat and bone meal.
Approximately 2,223 tons

Bulk custom made dairy feed, Recall # V-116-6
Rips Farm Center, Tollesboro, KY, by telephone and letter on July 14, 2006.
FDA initiated recall is ongoing.
Custom made feeds contain ingredient called Pro-Lak which may contain
ruminant derived meat and bone meal.
1,220 tons

Bulk custom made dairy feed, Recall # V-117-6
Kentwood Co-op, Kentwood, LA, by telephone on June 27, 2006. FDA initiated
recall is completed.
Possible contamination of animal feed ingredients, including ingredients
that are used in feed for dairy animals, with ruminant derived meat and bone
40 tons
LA and MS

Bulk Dairy Feed, Recall V-118-6
Cal Maine Foods, Inc., Edwards, MS, by telephone on June 26, 2006. FDA
initiated recall is complete.
Possible contamination of animal feed ingredients, including ingredients
that are used in feed for dairy animals, with ruminant derived meat and bone
7,150 tons

Bulk custom dairy pre-mixes, Recall # V-119-6
Walthall County Co-op, Tylertown, MS, by telephone on June 26, 2006. Firm
initiated recall is complete.
Possible contamination of dairy animal feeds with ruminant derived meat and
bone meal.
87 tons

Bulk custom dairy pre-mixes, Recall # V-120-6
Ware Milling Inc., Houston, MS, by telephone on June 23, 2006. Firm
initiated recall is complete.
Possible contamination of dairy animal feeds with ruminant derived meat and
bone meal.
350 tons
AL and MS

a) Tucker Milling, LLC Tm 32% Sinking Fish Grower, #2680-Pellet,
50 lb. bags, Recall # V-121-6;
b) Tucker Milling, LLC #31120, Game Bird Breeder Pellet,
50 lb. bags, Recall # V-122-6;
c) Tucker Milling, LLC #31232 Game Bird Grower,
50 lb. bags, Recall # V-123-6;
d) Tucker Milling, LLC 31227-Crumble, Game Bird Starter, BMD
Medicated, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-124-6;
e) Tucker Milling, LLC #31120, Game Bird Breeder, 50 lb bags,
Recall # V-125-6;
f) Tucker Milling, LLC #30230, 30 % Turkey Starter, 50 lb bags,
Recall # V-126-6;
g) Tucker Milling, LLC #30116, TM Broiler Finisher,
50 lb bags, Recall # V-127-6
All products manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/20/2006
Recalling Firm: Tucker Milling LLC, Guntersville, AL, by telephone and visit
on June 20, 2006, and by letter on June 23, 2006.
Manufacturer: H. J. Baker and Brothers Inc., Stamford, CT. Firm initiated
recall is ongoing.
Poultry and fish feeds which were possibly contaminated with ruminant based
protein were not labeled as "Do not feed to ruminants".
7,541-50 lb bags
AL, GA, MS, and TN



COMMERCE 27,694,240 lbs
Date: August 6, 2006 at 6:14 pm PST
Bulk custom dairy feds manufactured from concentrates, Recall # V-113-6
All dairy feeds produced between 2/1/05 and 6/16/06 and containing H. J.
Baker recalled feed products.
Vita Plus Corp., Gagetown, MI, by visit beginning on June 21, 2006. Firm
initiated recall is complete.
The feed was manufactured from materials that may have been contaminated
with mammalian protein.
27,694,240 lbs



TONS Products manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/06/2006
Date: August 6, 2006 at 6:16 pm PST
a) CO-OP 32% Sinking Catfish, Recall # V-100-6;
b) Performance Sheep Pell W/Decox/A/N, medicated,
net wt. 50 lbs, Recall # V-101-6;
c) Pro 40% Swine Conc Meal -- 50 lb, Recall # V-102-6;
d) CO-OP 32% Sinking Catfish Food Medicated,
Recall # V-103-6;
e) "Big Jim's" BBB Deer Ration, Big Buck Blend,
Recall # V-104-6;
f) CO-OP 40% Hog Supplement Medicated Pelleted,
Tylosin 100 grams/ton, 50 lb. bag, Recall # V-105-6;
g) Pig Starter Pell II, 18% W/MCDX Medicated 282020,
Carbadox -- 0.0055%, Recall # V-106-6;
Feed for Chickens from Hatch to 20 Weeks, Medicated,
Bacitracin Methylene Disalicylate, 25 and 50 Lbs,
Recall # V-107-6;
i) CO-OP LAYING PELLETS, Complete Feed for Laying
Chickens, Recall # 108-6;
j) CO-OP LAYING CRUMBLES, Recall # V-109-6;
net wt 50 Lbs, Recall # V-110-6;
Recall # V-111-6;
Recall # V-112-6
Product manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/06/2006
Alabama Farmers Cooperative, Inc., Decatur, AL, by telephone, fax, email and
visit on June 9, 2006. FDA initiated recall is complete.
Animal and fish feeds which were possibly contaminated with ruminant based
protein not labeled as "Do not feed to ruminants".
125 tons
AL and FL



Date: August 6, 2006 at 6:19 pm PST
Bulk custom made dairy feed, Recall # V-114-6
Burkmann Feeds LLC, Glasgow, KY, by letter on July 14, 2006. Firm initiated
recall is ongoing.
Custom made feeds contain ingredient called Pro-Lak, which may contain
ruminant derived meat and bone meal.


Sun Jul 16, 2006 09:22

a) PRO-LAK, bulk weight, Protein Concentrate for Lactating Dairy Animals,
Recall # V-079-6;
b) ProAmino II, FOR PREFRESH AND LACTATING COWS, net weight 50lb (22.6 kg),
Recall # V-080-6;
FEED, Recall # V-081-6;
d) Feather Meal, Recall # V-082-6
a) Bulk
b) None
c) Bulk
d) Bulk
H. J. Baker & Bro., Inc., Albertville, AL, by telephone on June 15, 2006 and
by press release on June 16, 2006. Firm initiated recall is ongoing.
Possible contamination of animal feeds with ruminent derived meat and bone
10,878.06 tons



Date: June 27, 2006 at 7:42 am PST
Public Health Service
Food and Drug Administration

New Orleans District
297 Plus Park Blvd.
Nashville, TN 37217

Telephone: 615-781-5380
Fax: 615-781-5391

May 17, 2006



Mr. William Shirley, Jr., Owner
Louisiana.DBA Riegel By-Products
2621 State Street
Dallas, Texas 75204

Dear Mr. Shirley:

On February 12, 17, 21, and 22, 2006, a U.S. Food & Drug Administration
(FDA) investigator inspected your rendering plant, located at 509 Fortson
Street, Shreveport, Louisiana. The inspection revealed significant
deviations from the requirements set forth in Title 21, Code of Federal
Regulations, Part 589.2000 [21 CFR 589.2000], Animal Proteins Prohibited in
Ruminant Feed. This regulation is intended to prevent the establishment and
amplification of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE). You failed to
follow the requirements of this regulation; products being manufactured and
distributed by your facility are misbranded within the meaning of Section
403(a)(1) [21 USC 343(a)(1)] of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
(the Act).

Our investigation found you failed to provide measures, including sufficient
written procedures, to prevent commingling or cross-contamination and to
maintain sufficient written procedures [21 CFR 589.2000(e)] because:

You failed to use clean-out procedures or other means adequate to prevent
carryover of protein derived from mammalian tissues into animal protein or
feeds which may be used for ruminants. For example, your facility uses the
same equipment to process mammalian and poultry tissues. However, you use
only hot water to clean the cookers between processing tissues from each
species. You do not clean the auger, hammer mill, grinder, and spouts after
processing mammalian tissues.

You failed to maintain written procedures specifying the clean-out
procedures or other means to prevent carryover of protein derived from
mammalian tissues into feeds which may be used for ruminants.

As a result . the poultry meal you manufacture may contain protein derived
from mammalian tissues prohibited in ruminant feed. Pursuant to 21 CFR
589.2000(e)(1)(i), any products containing or may contain protein derived
from mammalian tissues must be labeled, "Do not feed to cattle or other
ruminants." Since you failed to label a product which may contain protein
derived from mammalian tissues with the required cautionary statement. the
poultry meal is misbranded under Section 403(a)(1) [21 USC 343(a)(1)] of the

This letter is not intended as an all-inclusive list of violations at your
facility. As a manufacturer of materials intended for animal feed use, you
are responsible for ensuring your overall operation and the products you
manufacture and distribute are in compliance with the law. You should take
prompt action to correct these violations, and you should establish a system
whereby violations do not recur. Failure to promptly correct these
violations may result in regulatory action, such as seizure and/or
injunction, without further notice.

You should notify this office in writing within 15 working days of receiving
this letter, outlining the specific steps you have taken to bring your firm
into compliance with the law. Your response should include an explanation of
each step taken to correct the violations and prevent their recurrence. If
corrective action cannot be completed within 15 working days, state the
reason for the delay and the date by which the corrections will be
completed. Include copies of any available documentation demonstrating
corrections have been made.

Your reply should be directed to Mark W. Rivero, Compliance Officer, U.S.
Food and Drug Administration, 2424 Edenborn Avenue, Suite 410, Metairie,
Louisiana 70001. If you have questions regarding any issue in this letter,
please contact Mr. Rivero at (504) 219-8818, extension 103.



Carol S. Sanchez
Acting District Director
New Orleans District


Subject: Experimental BSE Infection of Non-human Primates: Efficacy of the
Oral Route
Date: September 29, 2007 at 12:50 pm PST


Experimental BSE Infection of Non-human Primates: Efficacy of the Oral Route

Holznagel, E1; Yutzy, B1; Deslys, J-P2; Lasmézas, C2; Pocchiari, M3;
Ingrosso, L3;
Bierke, P4; Schulz-Schaeffer, W5; Motzkus, D6; Hunsmann, G6; Löwer, J1
1Paul-Ehrlich-Institut, Germany; 2Commissariat à l´Energie Atomique, France;
Superiore di Sanità, Italy; 4Swedish Institute for Infectious Disease
control, Sweden;
5Georg August University, Germany; 6German Primate Center, Germany


In 2001, a study was initiated in primates to assess the risk for humans
to contract BSE through contaminated food. For this purpose, BSE brain was
titrated in cynomolgus monkeys.


The primary objective is the determination of the minimal infectious dose
for oral exposure to BSE in a simian model, and, by in doing this, to assess
the risk for
humans. Secondly, we aimed at examining the course of the disease to
possible biomarkers.


Groups with six monkeys each were orally dosed with lowering amounts of
BSE brain: 16g, 5g, 0.5g, 0.05g, and 0.005g. In a second titration study,
animals were intracerebrally (i.c.) dosed (50, 5, 0.5, 0.05, and 0.005 mg).


In an ongoing study, a considerable number of high-dosed macaques already
developed simian vCJD upon oral or intracerebral exposure or are at the
onset of the
clinical phase. However, there are differences in the clinical course
between orally and
intracerebrally infected animals that may influence the detection of


Simian vCJD can be easily triggered in cynomolgus monkeys on the oral
route using less than 5 g BSE brain homogenate. The difference in the
period between 5 g oral and 5 mg i.c. is only 1 year (5 years versus 4
years). However,
there are rapid progressors among orally dosed monkeys that develop simian
vCJD as
fast as intracerebrally inoculated animals.

The work referenced was performed in partial fulfilment of the study “BSE in
supported by the EU (QLK1-2002-01096).

look at the table and you'll see that as little as 1 mg (or 0.001 gm) caused
7% (1 of 14) of the cows to come down with BSE;

Risk of oral infection with bovine spongiform encephalopathy agent in

Corinne Ida Lasmézas, Emmanuel Comoy, Stephen Hawkins, Christian Herzog,
Franck Mouthon, Timm Konold, Frédéric Auvré, Evelyne Correia, Nathalie
Lescoutra-Etchegaray, Nicole Salès, Gerald Wells, Paul Brown, Jean-Philippe
Summary The uncertain extent of human exposure to bovine spongiform
encephalopathy (BSE)--which can lead to variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease
(vCJD)--is compounded by incomplete knowledge about the efficiency of oral
infection and the magnitude of any bovine-to-human biological barrier to
transmission. We therefore investigated oral transmission of BSE to
non-human primates. We gave two macaques a 5 g oral dose of brain homogenate
from a BSE-infected cow. One macaque developed vCJD-like neurological
disease 60 months after exposure, whereas the other remained free of disease
at 76 months. On the basis of these findings and data from other studies, we
made a preliminary estimate of the food exposure risk for man, which
provides additional assurance that existing public health measures can
prevent transmission of BSE to man.


BSE bovine brain inoculum

100 g 10 g 5 g 1 g 100 mg 10 mg 1 mg 0·1 mg 0·01 mg

Primate (oral route)* 1/2 (50%)

Cattle (oral route)* 10/10 (100%) 7/9 (78%) 7/10 (70%) 3/15 (20%) 1/15 (7%)
1/15 (7%)

RIII mice (ic ip route)* 17/18 (94%) 15/17 (88%) 1/14 (7%)

PrPres biochemical detection

The comparison is made on the basis of calibration of the bovine inoculum
used in our study with primates against a bovine brain inoculum with a
similar PrPres concentration that was

inoculated into mice and cattle.8 *Data are number of animals
positive/number of animals surviving at the time of clinical onset of
disease in the first positive animal (%). The accuracy of

bioassays is generally judged to be about plus or minus 1 log. ic
ip=intracerebral and intraperitoneal.

Table 1: Comparison of transmission rates in primates and cattle infected
orally with similar BSE brain inocula

Published online January 27, 2005

LETS start with the UKBSEnvCJD only theory, lets look at UK exports to USA,
Canada, and Mexico.
the imported only theory. ...

other Countries list in PDF file)

USA -------- TOTALS ''8'' TONS


USA ------- TOTALS ''358'' TONS



USA-------- TOTALS ''10'' TONS (i think this is part of the 358 tons


1986 TO 1996 USA TOTAL = 1297

1986 TO 1996 CAN TOTAL = 299


CANADA -- 64,526 KG


USA -- 45,943 KG


CANADA -- 4,163 KG

TO DEC 1988

USA -------- 28,609 KG
CANADA -- 22,044 KG


USA -------- 17,880 KG
MEXICO---- 33,444 KG


USA --------111,953 KG
CANADA---1,800 KG
MEXICO --- 1,143,387 KG


USA -------- 19,980 KG
MEXICO--- 31,244 KG



USA 146,443

UK Exports of Live Cattle by Value 1986-96



UK TABLE of Exports of meal of meat and meat offal; greaves 1979 - 1995



HOWEVER, my files show 44 tons of greaves for USA. ...TSS

Subject: Re: exports from the U.K. of it's MBM to U.S.???
Date: Tue, 8 Feb 2000 14:03:16 +0000
To: (Receipt Notification Requested) (Non Receipt
Notification Requested)

Terry Meat and bonemeal is not specifically classified for overseas trade
purposes. The nearest equivalent
is listed as flours and meals of meat or offals (including tankage), unfit
for human consumption; greaves.
UK exports of this to the US are listed below:

Country Tonnes

1981 12
1984 10
1985 2
1989 20

Data for exports between 1975 and 1979 are not readily available. These can
be obtained (at a charge)
from data retailers appointed by HM Customs and Excise: BTSL (Tel: 01372
463121) or Abacus (01245 252222).

Best wishes Simon Pearsall Overseas trade statistics Stats (C&F)C

====================================== END...TSS


EFSA Scientific Report on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE-Risk (GBR)
of the United States of America (USA)

Summary of the Scientific Report

The European Food Safety Authority and its Scientific Expert Working Group
on the Assessment of the Geographical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE)
Risk (GBR) were asked by the European Commission (EC) to provide an
up-to-date scientific report on the GBR in the United States of America,
i.e. the likelihood of the presence of one or more cattle being infected
with BSE, pre-clinically as well as clinically, in USA. This scientific
report addresses the GBR of USA as assessed in 2004 based on data covering
the period 1980-2003.

The BSE agent was probably imported into USA and could have reached domestic
cattle in the middle of the eighties. These cattle imported in the mid
eighties could have been rendered in the late eighties and therefore led to
an internal challenge in the early nineties. It is possible that imported
meat and bone meal (MBM) into the USA reached domestic cattle and leads to
an internal challenge in the early nineties.

A processing risk developed in the late 80s/early 90s when cattle imports
from BSE risk countries were slaughtered or died and were processed (partly)
into feed, together with some imports of MBM. This risk continued to exist,
and grew significantly in the mid 90’s when domestic cattle, infected by
imported MBM, reached processing. Given the low stability of the system, the
risk increased over the years with continued imports of cattle and MBM from
BSE risk countries.

EFSA concludes that the current GBR level of USA is III, i.e. it is likely
but not confirmed that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically)
infected with the BSE-agent. As long as there are no significant changes in
rendering or feeding, the stability remains extremely/very unstable. Thus,
the probability of cattle to be (pre-clinically or clinically) infected with
the BSE-agent persistently increases.

EFSA Scientific Report on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE-Risk (GBR)
of Canada

Summary of the Scientific Report

The European Food Safety Authority and its Scientific Expert Working Group
on the Assessment of the Geographical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE)
Risk (GBR) were asked to provide an up-to-date scientific report on the GBR
in Canada, i.e. the likelihood of the presence of one or more cattle being
infected with BSE, pre-clinically as well as clinically, in Canada. This
scientific report addresses the GBR of Canada as assessed in 2004 based on
data covering the period 1980-2003.

The BSE agent was probably imported into the country middle of the eighties
and could have reached domestic cattle in the early nineties. These cattle
imported in the mid eighties could have been rendered in the late eighties
and therefore led to an internal challenge in the early 90s. It is possible
that imported meat and bone meal (MBM) into Canada reached domestic cattle
and led to an internal challenge in the early 90s.

A certain risk that BSE-infected cattle entered processing in Canada, and
were at least partly rendered for feed, occurred in the early 1990s when
cattle imported from UK in the mid 80s could have been slaughtered. This
risk continued to exist, and grew significantly in the mid 90’s when
domestic cattle, infected by imported MBM, reached processing. Given the low
stability of the system, the risk increased over the years with continued
imports of cattle and MBM from BSE risk countries.

EFSA concludes that the current GBR level of Canada is III, i.e. it is
confirmed at a lower level that domestic cattle are (clinically or
pre-clinically) infected with the BSE-agent. As long as the system remains
unstable, it is expected that the GBR continues to grow, even if no
additional external challenges occur.

EFSA Scientific Report on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE-Risk (GBR)
of Mexico

Last updated: 8 September 2004 Publication Date: 20 August 2004

Adopted July 2004 (Question N° EFSA-Q-2003-083)

Summary of the Scientific Report

The European Food Safety Authority and its Scientific Expert Working Group
on the Assessment of the Geographical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE)
Risk (GBR) were asked by the European Commission (EC) to provide an
up-to-date scientific report on the GBR in Mexico, i.e. the likelihood of
the presence of one or more cattle being infected with BSE, pre-clinically
as well as clinically, in Mexico. This scientific report addresses the GBR
of Mexico as assessed in 2004 based on data covering the period 1980-2003.

The BSE agent was probably imported into Mexico and could have reached
domestic cattle. These cattle imported could have been rendered and
therefore led to an internal challenge in the mid to late 1990s. It is
possible that imported meat and bone meal (MBM) into Mexico reached domestic
cattle and leads to an internal challenge around 1993.

It is likely that BSE infectivity entered processing at the time of imported
‘at - risk’ MBM (1993) and at the time of slaughter of imported live ‘at -
risk’ cattle (mid to late 1990s). The high level of external challenge is
maintained throughout the reference period, and the system has not been made
stable. Thus it is likely that BSE infectivity was recycled and propagated
from approximately 1993. The risk has since grown consistently due to a
maintained internal and external challenge and lack of a stable system.

EFSA concludes that the current geographical BSE risk (GBR) level is III,
i.e. it is likely but not confirmed that domestic cattle are (clinically or
pre-clinically) infected with the BSE-agent. The GBR is likely to increase
due to continued internal and external challenge, coupled with a very
unstable system.


vCJD case study highlights blood transfusion risk



Tuesday, October 9, 2007



Date: Mon, 24 Sep 2007 21:31:55 -0500

I suggest that you all read the data out about h-BASE and sporadic CJD, GSS,
blood, and some of the other abstracts from the PRION2007. ...


USA BASE CASE, (ATYPICAL BSE), AND OR TSE (whatever they are calling it
today), please note that both the ALABAMA COW, AND THE TEXAS COW, both were
''H-TYPE'', personal communication Detwiler et al Wednesday, August 22, 2007
11:52 PM. ...TSS

From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
Subject: CWD UPDATE 88 AUGUST 31, 2007

Date: Wed, 29 Aug 2007 21:13:08 -0500
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
Subject: CWD NEW MEXICO RECORDS IT'S 19 CASE (near Texas border again)

Monitoring the Potential Transmission of Chronic Wasting Disease to Humans
Using a Hunter Registry Database in Wyoming (405 lines)
From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. <[log in to unmask]>
Date: Thu, 30 Aug 2007 21:23:42 -0500

Subject: Cross-sequence transmission of sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease
creates a new prion strain

Date: August 25, 2007 at 12:42 pm PST

Subject: Cross-sequence transmission of sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease
creates a new prion strain
Date: August 25, 2007 at 12:42 pm PST

J Biol Chem. 2007 Aug 20; : 17709374

Cross-sequence transmission of sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease creates a
new prion strain.

[My paper] Atsushi Kobayashi , Masahiro Asano , Shirou Mohri , Tetsuyuki

The genotype (methionine or valine) at polymorphic codon 129 of the human
prion protein (PrP) gene and the type (type 1 or type 2) of abnormal isoform
of PrP (PrP(Sc)) are major determinants of the clinicopathological
phenotypes of sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (sCJD). Here we found that
transmission of sCJD prions from a patient with valine homozygosity (129V/V)
and type 2 PrP(Sc) (sCJD-VV2 prions) to mice expressing human PrP with
methionine homozygosity (129M/M) generated unusual PrP(Sc) intermediate in
size between type 1 and type 2. The intermediate type PrP(Sc) was seen in
all examined dura mater graft-associated CJD cases with 129M/M and
plaque-type PrP deposits (p-dCJD). p-dCJD prions and sCJD-VV2 prions
exhibited similar transmissibility and neuropathology, and the identical
type of PrP(Sc) when inoculated into PrP-humanized mice with 129M/M or
129V/V. These findings suggest that p-dCJD could be caused by cross-sequence
transmission of sCJD-VV2 prions.


In this study, the strain-dependent traits of sCJDMM1
prions were inherited through cross-sequence
transmission without any modification. The
humanized mice with 129V/V produced type 1 PrPres
after inoculation with sCJD-MM1 prions. Because
sCJD-VV1 cases are extremely rare (at most 1-2%
of the total number of sCJD cases) and characterized
by early onset (mean age at onset: 39.3 years) (5),


our results raise the possibility that CJD cases
classified as VV1 may include cases caused by
iatrogenic transmission of sCJD-MM1 prions or
food-borne infection by type 1 prions from animals,
e.g., chronic wasting disease prions in cervid. In fact,
two CJD-VV1 patients who hunted deer or
consumed venison have been reported (40, 41). The
results of the present study emphasize the need for
traceback studies and careful re-examination of the
biochemical properties of sCJD-VV1 prions.


In conclusion, cross-sequence transmission of
sCJD-VV2 prions generates a new prion strain with
altered conformational properties and disease
phenotypes as p-dCJD prions. Furthermore, the
newly generated prions have unique transmissibility
including the traceback phenomenon. In the future, if
atypical prion strains emerge through cross-sequence
transmission, especially from animals, traceback
studies will enable us to identify the origin of the



Re: Colorado Surveillance Program for Chronic Wasting Disease
Transmission to Humans (TWO SUSPECT CASES)


Date: August 23, 2007 at 11:30 am PST

October 2007 Update on Feed Enforcement Activities to Limit the Spread of

Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy UPDATE USA OCTOBER 2007

Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
P.O. Box 42
Bacliff, Texas USA 77518

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