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From: TSS ()
R-CALF SINGING THE MAD COW BLUES 6/20/2007 12:13:00 PM Billings, Mont. – After months of see-sawing with the United States on U.S. beef exports, South Korea announced yet again that it would ban products from a major U.S. meatpacker. “The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) still isn’t taking appropriate steps to restore the global competitiveness of the U.S. cattle industry,” said R-CALF USA Trade Committee Chair Eric Nelson. “Today, total U.S. beef exports remain well below 2003 volumes. “Rather than allow the U.S. to capitalize on the fact that U.S. cattle are produced under the strictest production standards, the agency sought and obtained a BSE (bovine spongiform encephalopathy) risk classification from the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) that puts the U.S. on par with Canada, a country with a heightened BSE problem,” Nelson pointed out. “And now, with its proposed rule to allow the importation of Canadian cattle over 30 months (OTM) of age, the agency is trying to further integrate the U.S. cattle herd with the Canadian herd.” Nelson said these recent actions by USDA do nothing to further the interests of the U.S. cattle industry. He explained that R-CALF USA consistently has encouraged USDA to take steps that would strengthen U.S. import controls for Canada and other countries with ongoing animal disease problems such as BSE, foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) and bovine tuberculosis (TB). Instead of heeding R-CALF USA’s advice – and with encouragement from the beef-processing industry – USDA moved swiftly to dismantle its long-standing BSE import controls soon after BSE was detected in Canada on May 20, 2003. After USDA’s initial relaxation in 2003, which was found to be unlawful when R-CALF USA filed and received an injunction against the agency in early 2004, the United States detected BSE within its borders in December 2003 in an imported Canadian cow. The world reacted immediately, with more than 50 export markets closing their borders to U.S. beef. “USDA believed that world markets would follow the United States’ lead and reopen if the U.S. were to demonstrate that it was unconcerned with Canada’s BSE problem by continuing to import both live cattle and beef from Canada,” Nelson said. “This policy has not been successful at restoring our markets. In fact, this grand experiment by USDA is a colossal failure. “Even before the U.S. detected its first ‘atypical’ case of BSE in a Texas cow in mid-2005, our export markets largely remained closed,” he continued. “Now, after more than three years of insisting that all is well with Canadian beef and cattle, U.S. beef export volumes remain at less than half their 2003 levels.” (See note.) In 2003, South Korea and Japan first informed USDA of their concerns regarding the commingling of Canadian cattle and beef in the United States. In mid-2004, Japan expressed its concern that the United States’ feed ban, BSE testing program, and specified risk material (SRM) removal policies all were inferior to their respective mitigation programs, which they believed were effective at controlling their BSE epidemic. Today, three years later, the U.S. continues its practice of commingling Canadian cattle and beef in the United States, while Canada has a weaker feed ban, less inclusive testing programs, and less stringent SRM removal policies than any other country, including Japan, the European Union, and Great Britain, all of which are working to control their respective BSE problems. “The fact that we’ve not restored confidence to our lost export markets should not be a surprise,” Nelson noted. “USDA’s insistence that it is doing enough to mitigate Canada’s BSE problem when it actually is doing less than the rest of the world has severely damaged the agency’s credibility, resulting in ongoing financial harm to U.S. cattle producers. “The USDA is simply not listening to the legitimate concerns raised by South Korea and other countries – concerns that have been repeatedly expressed by R-CALF USA,” Nelson asserted. “We would not be in this situation today if USDA would have strengthened our BSE mitigation measures in accordance with the requests made by both U.S. cattle producers and beef export customers. “USDA’s resistance to restoring reasonable BSE import restrictions, implementing country-of-origin labeling (COOL), allowing voluntary BSE testing, and strengthening the U.S. feed ban – all of which would improve our ability to restore lost export markets – makes me question what the agency’s actual agenda is concerning restoration of lost export markets,” Nelson concluded. http://www.cattlenetwork.com/content.asp?contentid=139041 >>>Today, three years later, the U.S. continues its practice of commingling Canadian cattle and beef in the United States, while Canada has a weaker feed ban, less inclusive testing programs, and less stringent SRM removal policies than any other country, including Japan, the European Union, and Great Britain, all of which are working to control their respective BSE problems.<<< Report The European Food Safety Authority and its Scientific Expert Working Group on the Assessment of the Geographical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Risk (GBR) were asked by the European Commission (EC) to provide an up-to-date scientific report on the GBR in the United States of America, i.e. the likelihood of the presence of one or more cattle being infected with BSE, pre-clinically as well as clinically, in USA. This scientific report addresses the GBR of USA as assessed in 2004 based on data covering the period 1980-2003. The BSE agent was probably imported into USA and could have reached domestic cattle in the middle of the eighties. These cattle imported in the mid eighties could have been rendered in the late eighties and therefore led to an internal challenge in the early nineties. It is possible that imported meat and bone meal (MBM) into the USA reached domestic cattle and leads to an internal challenge in the early nineties. A processing risk developed in the late 80s/early 90s when cattle imports from BSE risk countries were slaughtered or died and were processed (partly) into feed, together with some imports of MBM. This risk continued to exist, and grew significantly in the mid 90’s when domestic cattle, infected by imported MBM, reached processing. Given the low stability of the system, the risk increased over the years with continued imports of cattle and MBM from BSE risk countries. EFSA concludes that the current GBR level of USA is III, i.e. it is likely but not confirmed that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with the BSE-agent. As long as there are no significant changes in rendering or feeding, the stability remains extremely/very unstable. Thus, the probability of cattle to be (pre-clinically or clinically) infected with the BSE-agent persistently increases. Publication date: 20 August 2004 http://www.efsa.eu.int/science/tse_assessments/gbr_assessments/573/sr03_biohaz02_usa_report_summary_en1.pdf http://www.fsis.usda.gov/oa/topics/BSE_Peer_Review.pdf USDA Testing Protocols and Quality Assurance Procedures In November 2004, USDA announced that its rapid screening test produced an inconclusive BSE test result. A contract laboratory ran its rapid screening test on a brain sample collected for testing and produced three high positive reactive results. As required, the contract laboratory forwarded the inconclusive sample to APHIS’ National Veterinary Services Laboratories (NVSL) for confirmation. NVSL repeated the rapid screening test, which again produced three high positive reactive results. Following established protocol, NVSL ran its confirmatory test, an immunohistochemistry (IHC) test, which was interpreted as negative for BSE. Faced with conflicting results between the rapid screening and IHC tests, NVSL scientists recommended additional testing to resolve the discrepancy but APHIS headquarters officials concluded that no further testing was necessary since testing protocols were followed and the confirmatory test was negative. In our discussions with APHIS officials, they justified their decision to not do additional testing because the IHC test is internationally recognized as the "gold standard" of testing. Also, they believed that USDA/OIG-A/50601-10-KC/ Page iv conducting additional tests would undermine confidence in USDA’s testing protocols. OIG obtained evidence that indicated additional testing was prudent. We came to this conclusion because the rapid screening tests produced six high positive reactive results, the IHC tests conflicted, and various standard operating procedures were not followed. Also, our review of the relevant scientific literature, other countries’ protocols, and discussions with experts led us to conclude that additional confirmatory testing should be considered in the event of conflicting test results. To maintain objectivity and independence, we requested that USDA’s Agricultural Research Service (ARS) perform the Office International des Epizooties (OIE) Scrapie-Associated Fibrils (SAF) immunoblot test. The additional testing produced positive results. To confirm, the Secretary of Agriculture requested that an internationally recognized BSE laboratory in Weybridge, England (Weybridge) perform additional testing. Weybridge conducted various tests, including their own IHC tests and three Western blot tests. The tests confirmed that the cow was infected with BSE. The Secretary immediately directed USDA scientists to work with international experts to develop new protocols that include performing dual confirmatory tests in the event of an inconclusive BSE screening test. We attribute the failure to identify the BSE positive sample to rigid protocols, as well as the lack of adequate quality assurance controls over its testing program. Details of our concerns are discussed in Findings 3 and 4. snip... Section 2. Testing Protocols and Quality Assurance Controls In November 2004, USDA announced that its rapid screening test, Bio-Rad Enzyme Linked Immunosorbent Assay (ELISA), produced an inconclusive BSE test result as part of its enhanced BSE surveillance program. The ELISA rapid screening test performed at a BSE contract laboratory produced three high positive reactive results.40 As required,41 the contract laboratory forwarded the inconclusive sample to the APHIS National Veterinary Services Laboratories (NVSL) for confirmatory testing. NVSL repeated the ELISA testing and again produced three high positive reactive results.42 In accordance with its established protocol, NVSL ran its confirmatory test, an immunohistochemistry (IHC) test, which was interpreted as negative for BSE. In addition, NVSL performed a histological43 examination of the tissue and did not detect lesions44 consistent with BSE. Faced with conflicting results, NVSL scientists recommended additional testing to resolve the discrepancy but APHIS headquarters officials concluded no further testing was necessary because testing protocols were followed. In our discussions with APHIS officials, they justified their decision not to do additional testing because the IHC is internationally recognized as the “gold standard.” Also, they believed that conducting additional tests would undermine confidence in USDA’s established testing protocols. However, OIG obtained evidence that indicated additional testing was prudent to ensure that USDA’s testing protocols were effective in detecting BSE and that confidence in USDA’s testing procedures was maintained. OIG came to this conclusion because the rapid tests produced six high positive reactive results, confirmatory testing conflicted with the rapid test results, and various standard operating procedures were not followed. Also, our review of scientific literature, other country protocols, as well as discussions with internationally recognized experts led us to conclude that confirmatory testing should not be limited when conflicting test results are obtained. To maintain objectivity and independence in our assessment, we requested the USDA Agricultural Research Service (ARS) perform the Office International des Epizooties (OIE) Scrapie-Associated Fibrils (SAF) 40 ELISA test procedures require two additional (duplicate) tests if the initial test is reactive, before final interpretation. If either of the duplicate tests is reactive, the test is deemed inconclusive. 41 Protocol for BSE Contract Laboratories to Receive and Test Bovine Brain Samples and Report Results for BSE Surveillance Standard Operating Procedure (SOP), dated October 26, 2004. 42 The NVSL conducted an ELISA test on the original material tested at the contract laboratory and on two new cuts from the sample tissue. 43 A visual examination of brain tissue by a microscope. 44 A localized pathological change in a bodily organ or tissue. immunoblot.45 ARS performed the test at the National Animal Disease Center because NVSL did not have the necessary equipment46 (ultracentrifuge) to do the test. APHIS scientists observed and participated, as appropriate, in this effort. The additional tests conducted by ARS produced positive results. To confirm this finding, the Secretary requested the internationally recognized BSE reference laboratory in Weybridge, England, (Weybridge) to perform additional confirmatory testing. Weybridge conducted various tests, including their own IHC methods, as well as three Western blot methods. The tests confirmed that the suspect cow was infected with BSE. Also, Weybridge confirmed this case as an unequivocal positive case of BSE on the basis of IHC. As a result of this finding, the Secretary immediately directed USDA scientists to work with international experts to develop a new protocol that includes performing dual confirmatory tests in the event of another inconclusive BSE screening test. Finding 3 Rigid Protocols Reduced the Likelihood BSE Could be Detected APHIS relied on a single test method, as well as a histological examination of tissue for lesions consistent with BSE, to confirm the presence of BSE even though discrepant test results indicated further testing may be prudent. When IHC test results were interpreted as negative, APHIS concluded the sample tested negative for BSE. Subsequent independent tests initiated by OIG using a different testing method, as well as confirmatory testing by Weybridge, determined that the suspect sample was a positive case of BSE. APHIS Declares BSE Sample Negative Despite Conflicting Results When the tissue sample originally arrived at NVSL in November 2004 from the contract lab, NVSL scientists repeated the ELISA screening test and again produced three high positive reactive results. NVSL scientists cut out two sections of the brain sample for IHC testing. One section was used for an experimental procedure that was not part of the confirmatory testing protocol, and the other cut was for normal IHC testing using scrapie for a positive control.47 According to NVSL scientists, the experimental test results were inconclusive but the IHC test was interpreted as negative. The NVSL scientists were concerned with the inconsistencies and conducted 45 The OIE SAF immunoblot is an internationally recognized confirmatory test, often referred to as a Western blot test. There are different types of Western blots; the OIE SAF immunoblot includes enrichment steps taken with the sample prior to the standard Western blot steps. 46 APHIS has now ordered the necessary equipment for NVSL. USDA/OIG-A/50601-10-KC Page 32 47 A positive control is a sample that is known to contain a given disease or react in the test. The sample then can be used to make sure that the test for that disease works properly. In the case of BSE, tissue infected with either scrapie or BSE can serve as a positive control for an IHC test for BSE since both are different forms of the same disease (transmissible spongiform encephalopathy or TSE). another IHC test using BSE as a positive control.48 The test result was also interpreted as negative. Also, according to the NVSL scientists, the histological examination of the tissue did not detect lesions consistent with BSE. After the second negative IHC test, NVSL scientists supported doing additional testing. They prepared a plan for additional tests; if those tests had been conducted, BSE may have been detected in the sample. The additional tests recommended by NVSL scientists, but not approved by APHIS Headquarters officials, were the IHC using other antibodies (IHC testing using different antibodies ultimately produced positive results); IHC testing of additional regions of the brain (the cerebellum tested positive); regular and enriched (OIE-like) Western blots (the obex and cerebellum tested positive); and variable rapid tests (the obex and cerebellum tested positive with two different rapid tests). NVSL officials also recommended that the sample be sent to Weybridge for confirmatory testing (to conduct IHC and OIE Western blot tests). In June 2005, Weybridge conducted IHC testing with three different antibodies, including the antibody used in the United States (tested positive), the OIE Western blot (tested positive), a modified commercial kit Western blot (negative) and the NaPTA49 Western blot (tested positive). We obtained information as to the differing protocols used by other countries. We found that while APHIS determined that additional testing was unnecessary after the IHC test, other countries have used multiple tests to confirm positives. In Japan, for example, all reactive screening test samples are examined by both IHC and a Western blot (different from the OIE SAF immunoblot). In the United Kingdom (U.K.), IHC and Western blot (different from the OIE SAF immunoblot) tests are used for all animals that test positive with a screening test. When IHC and the Western blot fail to confirm a positive rapid test, the U.K. resorts to a third test, the OIE SAF immunoblot. With these procedures in place, both Japan and the U.K. have found BSE cases that were rapid test reactive, IHC negative, and finally confirmed positive with a Western blot. Evidence Indicated Additional Testing Would Be Prudent We also spoke with an internationally recognized BSE expert regarding the advisability of limiting confirmatory testing when conflicting results are obtained. This official expressed concern about limiting confirmatory tests to the IHC despite its status as one of the “gold standard” tests. He advised that the IHC is not one test; it is a test method that can vary significantly in sensitivity from laboratory to laboratory. New antibodies can improve or USDA/OIG-A/50601-10-KC Page 33 48 The NVSL uses scrapie as the positive control as part of its normal IHC testing procedures. Due to the conflicting results between the ELISA and IHC tests, the NVSL conducted another IHC test with BSE as the positive control. Subsequently, the NVSL modified the Confirming Inconclusive Results from BSE Testing Laboratories at the NVSL SOP to show that all IHC tested BSE inconclusive samples from contract laboratories will use BSE as the positive control. 49 Sodium phosphotungstic acid. USDA/OIG-A/50601-10-KC Page 34 reduce sensitivity, as can variations in many of the reagents50 used. He explained that his laboratory had experienced cases where an initial confirmatory IHC test was challenged by either a more extensive IHC test or “…applying a more sensitive immunoblot.” He emphasized the importance of having additional confirmatory testing to resolve discrepant results since there are many variables, and most of the variability appears to be due to test performance of the laboratory. OIG became concerned that APHIS relied on its confirmatory test methods when rapid screening tests produced high positive reactive results six times.51 Also, we found that APHIS did not pursue and/or investigate why the ELISA produced high reactive positives. An official from the manufacturer of the ELISA test kit told us that they requested, but did not receive, information on the inconclusive reported by USDA in November 2004. These officials requested this information in order to understand the reasons for the discrepant results. The Bio-Rad ELISA rapid screening test is internationally recognized as a highly reliable test and is the rapid screening test used for USDA’s surveillance effort. According to APHIS officials, they felt it would be inappropriate to collaborate on the one sample because Bio-Rad is a USDA-APHIS regulated biologics company and only one of several competing manufacturers. To maintain confidence in USDA’s test protocols, it would have been a prudent course of action for USDA to determine why such significant differing results were obtained. The fact that they did not pursue this matter caused concerns relating to testing quality assurance procedures. In this regard, we found lack of compliance with SOPs relating to laboratory proficiency and quality assurance (see Finding 4), and, in this case, the storage of sampled material and reporting of test results. We found that the NVSL did not prepare a report to document its confirmatory testing of the November 2004 sample. The SOP52 states that the BSE network laboratory initiating the inconclusive will receive a report of the case. NVSL officials could not explain why a final report had not been prepared. We also found that the inconclusive sample was frozen prior to IHC confirmatory testing. APHIS protocols state that samples are not to be frozen prior to laboratory submission. The OIE Manual of Diagnostic Tests and Vaccines for Terrestrial Animals states that the tissues for histological or IHC examination are not to be frozen as this will provide artefactual53 lesions that may compromise the identification of vacuolation,54 and/or target site location. Although the sample was frozen, APHIS did not conduct a Western 50 A substance used in a chemical reaction to detect, measure, examine, or produce other substances. 51 The six high positive reactive results were from three tests of the submitted sample (multiple runs of the same test). 52 Confirming Inconclusive Results from Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Testing Laboratories at the NVSL SOP, dated August 13, 2004. 53 A structure or feature not normally present but visible as a result of an external agent or action, such as one seen in a microscopic specimen after fixation. 54 A small space or cavity in a tissue. USDA/OIG-A/50601-10-KC Page 35 blot test on the sample. An NVSL official said freezing the sample does not make it unsuitable for IHC. APHIS determined that the sample was suitable for IHC and therefore, in accordance with its SOP, did not conduct a Western blot test. APHIS also handled the December 2003 BSE positive differently than the November 2004 sample. For the December 2003 BSE positive sample, APHIS conducted several confirmatory tests in addition to the IHC testing and histological examination (unlike the November 2004 sample tests, both of these were interpreted as positive). ARS performed two Western blots (Prionics Check Western blot and an ARS developed Western blot). When we questioned why the samples were handled differently, APHIS officials stated that the Western blots were done because the IHC in December 2003 was positive. The additional testing was done to further characterize the case, because it was the first U.S. case; the additional testing was not done to decide whether the case was positive or negative. We discussed our concerns with limiting confirmatory testing, particularly given conflicting results, with the APHIS Administrator and staff in May 2005. He explained that international standards recognized more than one “gold standard” test. In setting up its testing protocols, USDA had chosen one as the confirming test, the IHC test, and stayed with it. APHIS protocols only allow a Western blot in cases where the sample has become unsuitable for IHC tests (e.g., in cases where the brainstem architecture is not evident). International standards, he continued, accept a tissue sample as negative for BSE if its IHC test is negative. Once the test is run in accordance with protocols, additional tests undermine the USDA testing protocol and the surveillance program. He concluded that since APHIS’ protocols accepted the IHC test as confirming the presence or absence of BSE, no further testing was necessary. According to protocol, the tissue sample was determined to have tested negative for BSE. On June 24, 2005, USDA announced that the additional testing by the BSE reference laboratory in England confirmed the presence of BSE in the tissue sample. To obviate the possibility that a future sample would be declared negative and then found positive, the Secretary of Agriculture announced a change to APHIS’ testing protocols that same day. He called for “dual confirmatory tests in the event of another ‘inconclusive’ [reactive] BSE screening test.” He also indicated that he would reinforce proper procedures so that samples will not be frozen, and to spot-check the laboratories to see that they complete reports as required. APHIS issued a SOP on the new confirmatory testing protocols on November 30, 2005. http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/50601-10-KC.pdf Statement on Texas Cow With Central Nervous System Symptoms FDA, which is responsible for the safety of animal feed, immediately began an investigation. On Friday and throughout the weekend, FDA investigators inspected the slaughterhouse, the rendering facility, the farm where the animal came from, and the processor that initially received the cow from the slaughterhouse. FDA's investigation showed that the animal in question had already been rendered into "meat and bone meal" (a type of protein animal feed). Over the weekend FDA was able to track down all the implicated material. That material is being held by the firm, which is cooperating fully with FDA. Cattle with central nervous system symptoms are of particular interest because cattle with bovine spongiform encephalopathy or BSE, also known as "mad cow disease," can exhibit such symptoms. In this case, there is no way now to test for BSE. But even if the cow had BSE, FDA's animal feed rule would prohibit the feeding of its rendered protein to other ruminant animals (e.g., cows, goats, sheep, bison). FDA is sending a letter to the firm summarizing its findings and informing the firm that FDA will not object to use of this material in swine feed only. If it is not used in swine feed, this material will be destroyed. Pigs have been shown not to be susceptible to BSE. If the firm agrees to use the material for swine feed only, FDA will track the material all the way through the supply chain from the processor to the farm to ensure that the feed is properly monitored and used only as feed for pigs. To protect the U.S. against BSE, FDA works to keep certain mammalian protein out of animal feed for cattle and other ruminant animals. FDA established its animal feed rule in 1997 after the BSE epidemic in the U.K. showed that the disease spreads by feeding infected ruminant protein to cattle. Under the current regulation, the material from this Texas cow is not allowed in feed for cattle or other ruminant animals. FDA's action specifying that the material go only into swine feed means also that it will not be fed to poultry. FDA is committed to protecting the U.S. from BSE and collaborates closely with the U.S. Department of Agriculture on all BSE issues. The animal feed rule provides crucial protection against the spread of BSE, but it is only one of several such firewalls. FDA will soon be improving the animal feed rule, to make this strong system even stronger. #### FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Note: On Dec. 23, 2003, the U.S. Department of Agriculture reported that a cow in Washington state had tested positive for bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE, or mad cow disease). As a result, information on this Web page stating that no BSE cases had been found in the United States is now incorrect. However, because other information on this page continues to have value, the page will remain available for viewing. FDA ANNOUNCES TEST RESULTS FROM TEXAS FEED LOT FDA has determined that each animal could have consumed, at most and in total, five-and-one-half grams - approximately a quarter ounce -- of prohibited material. These animals weigh approximately 600 pounds. It is important to note that the prohibited material was domestic in origin (therefore not likely to contain infected material because there is no evidence of BSE in U.S. cattle), fed at a very low level, and fed only once. The potential risk of BSE to such cattle is therefore exceedingly low, even if the feed were contaminated. According to Dr. Bernard Schwetz, FDA's Acting Principal Deputy Commissioner, "The challenge to regulators and industry is to keep this disease out of the United States. One important defense is to prohibit the use of any ruminant animal materials in feed for other ruminant animals. Combined with other steps, like U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) ban on the importation of live ruminant animals from affected countries, these steps represent a series of protections, to keep American cattle free of BSE." Despite this negligible risk, Purina Mills, Inc., is nonetheless announcing that it is voluntarily purchasing all 1,222 of the animals held in Texas and mistakenly fed the animal feed containing the prohibited material. Therefore, meat from those animals will not enter the human food supply. FDA believes any cattle that did not consume feed containing the prohibited material are unaffected by this incident, and should be handled in the beef supply clearance process as usual. FDA believes that Purina Mills has behaved responsibly by first reporting the human error that resulted in the misformulation of the animal feed supplement and then by working closely with State and Federal authorities. This episode indicates that the multi-layered safeguard system put into place is essential for protecting the food supply and that continued vigilance needs to be taken, by all concerned, to ensure these rules are followed routinely. FDA will continue working with USDA as well as State and local officials to ensure that companies and individuals comply with all laws and regulations designed to protect the U.S. food supply. IT IS A FRONT TO THE PUBLIC THAT YOU WOULD ON YOUR OWN ACCORD, IN THAT KIND OF SECRECY, AND CALL THAT THAT'S NOT WHAT WERE HERE FOR, WERE HERE FOR TRANSPARENCY, WERE NOT HERE TO ''WERE NOT THE CIA'' !!! THERE ARE OTHER WAYS TO GET TO THE GOAL OF REACHING THE CONSUMER WITHOUT http://maddeer.org/video/embedded/02snip.rpm STANLEY PRUSINER NOBEL PEACE PRIZE WINNER ON THE PRION SLAMS USDA ON BSE US AG SEC AND LAYCRAFT "nothing ELSE matters, except beef from canada under 30 months bones beef question for stan ; is this a demonstrated threat to public health safety ? stan states ; yes i think they (prions) are bad to eat, and you can die from them. "The fact the Texas cow showed up fairly clearly implied the existence of Brown, who is preparing a scientific paper based on the latest two mad cow USDA officials finally retested the cow and confirmed it was infected seven "Everything they did on the Texas cow makes everything USDA did before 2005 http://www.upi.com/ConsumerHealthDaily/view.php?StoryID=20060315-055557-1284r http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/vol7no1/brown.htm Tuesday, September 12, 2006 11:10 AM "Actually, Terry, I have been critical of the USDA handling of the mad cow CVM Update May 2007 Update on Feed Enforcement Activities to Limit the Spread of BSE Note that a single firm can be reported under more than one firm category; therefore, the summation of the individual OAI/VAI firm categories will be more than the actual total number of OAI/VAI firms, as presented below. Number of active firms whose initial inspection has been reported to FDA - Number of active firms handling materials prohibited from use in ruminant feed - 6,146 (31 % of those active firms inspected) Of the 6,146 active firms handling prohibited materials, their most recent inspection revealed that: 3 firms (0.05 %) were classified as OAI 200 firms (3.3 %) were classified as VAI Issued by: Date: March 21, 2007 at 2:27 pm PST ___________________________________ END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR MARCH 21, 2007 Subject: Calf Claimer Powder with prohibited bovine blood meal which did not RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINE - CLASS II REASON VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE DISTRIBUTION Nationwide http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2007/ENF01008.html someone pointed out to me that this is probably an error; The finished product was manufactured with prohibited bovine blood meal and did not bear the cautionary BSE statement that the product should not be fed to ruminants Blood meal used to make cattle feed was recalled because it was prohibited bovine meat and bone meal that had been manufactured on common labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement. http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2007/ENF00996.html WE do know that it is perfectly legal to feed blood to livestock for meal, poultry meal, animal the slaughter of food by-product meal, dried snip...end 18 January 2007 - Draft minutes of the SEAC 95 meeting (426 KB) held on 7 December 2006 are now available. 64. A member noted that at the recent Neuroprion meeting, a study was presented showing that in transgenic mice BSE passaged in sheep may be more virulent and infectious to a wider range of species than bovine derived BSE. Other work presented suggested that BSE and bovine amyloidotic spongiform encephalopathy (BASE) MAY BE RELATED. A mutation had been identified in the prion protein gene in an AMERICAN BASE CASE THAT WAS SIMILAR IN NATURE TO A MUTATION FOUND IN CASES OF SPORADIC CJD. http://www.seac.gov.uk/minutes/95.pdf Models Qingzhong Kong, Ph.D., Assistant Professor, Pathology, Case Western Reserve University Bovine Amyloid Spongiform Encephalopathy (BASE) is an atypical BSE strain discovered recently in Italy, and similar or different atypical BSE cases were also reported in other countries. The infectivity and phenotypes of these atypical BSE strains in humans are unknown. In collaboration with Pierluigi Gambetti, as well as Maria Caramelli and her co-workers, we have inoculated transgenic mice expressing human prion protein with brain homogenates from BASE or BSE infected cattle. Our data shows that about half of the BASE-inoculated mice became infected with an average incubation time of about 19 months; in contrast, none of the BSE-inoculated mice appear to be infected after more than 2 years. ***These results indicate that BASE is transmissible to humans and suggest that BASE is more virulent than classical BSE in humans.*** There is a growing number of human CJD cases, and they were presented last week in San Francisco by Luigi Gambatti(?) from his CJD surveillance collection. He estimates that it may be up to 14 or 15 persons which display selectively SPRPSC and practically no detected RPRPSC proteins. (Adopted by the International Committee of the OIE on 23 May 2006) 11. Information published by the OIE is derived from appropriate declarations made by the official Veterinary Services of Member Countries. http://www.oie.int/eng/Session2007/RF2006.pdf The enhanced feed ban will accelerate Canada’s progress toward the eradication of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) from the national herd, and serves to protect producers by reducing opportunities for cross contamination in the feed supply. It will also help to increase market access opportunities and is critical to maintain Canada’s status as a controlled risk country for BSE from the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE). Certain cattle tissues capable of transmitting BSE, known as specified risk material (SRM), are being banned from all animal feed, pet food and fertilizer. As a result, there are new requirements for anyone handling, transporting or disposing of cattle remains, including renderers; fertilizer, pet food and feed manufacturers; waste management facilities and veterinarians. Beginning July 12, 2007, a CFIA permit will be required to transport and receive SRM in any form. This system will allow the CFIA to verify that SRM does not enter the animal feed system. Anyone who needs a permit can apply in advance of July 12 by contacting their nearest CFIA office or by calling 1-800-442-2342. The permit application form is also available online, at www.inspecton.gc.ca/bse. In addition, livestock producers must no longer use any feed products containing SRM. The CFIA encourages producers to use up all current on-farm supplies of feed, and to make sure that all new feed purchases are SRM-free. The CFIA remains committed to working closely with industry associations to ensure that all stakeholders are in compliance as soon as possible. Any regulated parties who have questions about the enhanced feed ban or their responsibilities are encouraged to contact the CFIA. -30- Media Inquiries: FACT SHEET FOR FISH BY-PRODUCT RENDERERS Overview On July 12, 2007, a series of amendments to the Feeds Regulations, 1983, and For the purposes of this fact sheet, fish by-product renderers are defined New requirements for fish by-product renderers All rendering facilities (including those processing fish by-products) must CFIA fish by-product rendering survey Conducting the survey will allow CFIA Feed Program inspectors to inform If you are a fish by-product renderer, you are encouraged to discuss the Rendering Plant Operating Permits BY JULY 12, 2007, ALL FISH BY-PRODUCT RENDERERS MUST HAVE A CFIA RENDERING For more information, please contact a CFIA Feed Program Specialist in your Atlantic Area: 902-426-1410 Feed Ban Enhancement
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