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From: TSS ()
Subject: USDA VS CREEKSTONE BSE/BASE/TSE TESTING Civil Action No. 06-0544 (JR)
Date: May 29, 2007 at 12:38 pm PST

US to Meatpackers: Don't Do Mad Cow Test

The Associated Press

WASHINGTON - The Bush administration said Tuesday it will fight to keep meatpackers from testing all their animals for mad cow disease.

The Agriculture Department tests less than 1 percent of slaughtered cows for the disease, which can be fatal to humans who eat tainted beef. But Kansas-based Creekstone Farms Premium Beef wants to test all of its cows.

Larger meat companies feared that move because, if Creekstone tested its meat and advertised it as safe, they might have to perform the expensive test, too.

A federal judge ruled in March that such tests must be allowed. The ruling was to take effect June 1, but the Agriculture Department said Tuesday it would appeal , effectively delaying the testing until the court challenge plays out.

Mad cow disease, or bovine spongiform encephalopathy, is linked to more than 150 human deaths worldwide, mostly in Britain.

There have been three cases of mad cow disease in the U.S. The first, in December 2003 in Washington state, was in a cow that had been imported from Canada. The second, in 2005, was in a Texas-born cow. The third was confirmed last year in an Alabama cow.

The Agriculture Department argued that widespread testing could lead to a false positive that would harm the meat industry. U.S. District Judge James Robertson noted that Creekstone sought to use the same test the government relies on and said the government didn't have the authority to restrict it.

----- Original Message -----
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
Cc: ; ; ; ;
Sent: Tuesday, May 29, 2007 2:07 PM
Subject: USDA VS CREEKSTONE BSE/BASE/TSE TESTING Civil Action No. 06-0544 (JR)

May 27, 2007

Honorable Michael Johanns
Secretary of Agriculture
U.S. Department of Agriculture
Room 200 Jamie Whitten Federal Building
Washington, D.C. 20250


Honorable Judge James Robertson
U.S. District Court
333 Constitution Ave. North West
Washington, D. C. 20001

Subject: Request to let the Creekstone vs. USDA court decision stand.

Ref: Letter from United States Animal Health Association, dated May 22,

Dear Mr. Secretary et al :

I am requesting that you allow the court decision in the Creekstone vs.
USDA to stand so that Creekstone may begin testing the beef they process
for BSE and or BASE and or any other TSE phenotype there of. WE must let
them test since the USDA et al refuse to do so properly. This is not to say
there should be no strict TSE testing protocols. IF testing is to take place
there must be strict TSE testing protocol to assure the most up to date,
and validated tests are used, and used properly. These tests must be
announced to
the public in a timely manner at every step of the way, validated and
confirmed by
the federal government, Weybridge, and an independent third party consumer
and there TSE expert of choice, in my opinion.

My mother died from a exceedingly rare strain of sporadic CJD i.e. the
Variant of CJD. My neighbors mother also lost his mother to a form of
sporadic CJD
exactly one year previously from the day my mother died. BOTH cases were
by autopsy. There is new data out about the BASE atypical BSE, which
pathologically is
more related to a phenotype of sporadic CJD, than the nvCJD in humans from
the UK.
To continue to ignore these scientific findings with the old UKBSEnvCJD only
theory is
not justified by science anymore. It is not logical.

The logic behind the reasons not to let test for TSE in the USA because of
The Virus Serum
Toxin Act of 1913 and or because of the recent letter from the USAHA (see
letter below) bring forth,
are totally bogus. NO one could screw the testing up any worse than the USDA
has done in the past.
The OIG and the GAO has shown this time and time again. The 2004 Enhanced
BSE surveillance
program where some 275,000+ cattle were tested for BSE was proven to be
terribly flawed from the
beginning. This documented time and time again. Even Paul Brown, known and
respected TSE scientist,
former TSE expert for the CDC said he had ''absolutely no confidence in USDA
tests before one year ago'',
and this was on March 15, 2006 ;

"The fact the Texas cow showed up fairly clearly implied the existence of
other undetected cases," Dr. Paul Brown, former medical director of the
National Institutes of Health's Laboratory for Central Nervous System
Studies and an expert on mad cow-like diseases, told United Press
International. "The question was, 'How many?' and we still can't answer

Brown, who is preparing a scientific paper based on the latest two mad cow
cases to estimate the maximum number of infected cows that occurred in the
United States, said he has "absolutely no confidence in USDA tests before
one year ago" because of the agency's reluctance to retest the Texas cow
that initially tested positive.

USDA officials finally retested the cow and confirmed it was infected seven
months later, but only at the insistence of the agency's inspector general.

"Everything they did on the Texas cow makes everything USDA did before 2005
suspect," Brown said. ...snip...end

CDC - Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Variant Creutzfeldt ...
Dr. Paul Brown is Senior Research Scientist in the Laboratory of Central
Nervous System ... Address for correspondence: Paul Brown, Building 36, Room
4A-05, ...


Tuesday, September 12, 2006 11:10 AM

"Actually, Terry, I have been critical of the USDA handling of the mad cow
issue for some years,
and with Linda Detwiler and others sent lengthy detailed critiques and
recommendations to both the
USDA and the Canadian Food Agency."

OR, what the Honorable Phyllis Fong of the OIG found ;

Audit Report

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program – Phase II


Food Safety and Inspection Service

Controls Over BSE Sampling, Specified Risk Materials, and Advanced Meat
Recovery Products - Phase III

Report No. 50601-10-KC January 2006

Finding 2 Inherent Challenges in Identifying and Testing High-Risk Cattle
Still Remain

Mr. Johanns, The August 4, 1997 FDA BSE ruminant to ruminant feed ban was
nothing more than ink on paper.
In 2007 alone, 10 MILLION plus pounds of banned blood laced MBM has already
gone out into commerce
for the feeding of banned product to cattle. yes, were still feeding cows
banned BSE/BASE product
in 2007, almost 10 years after the voluntary ban was put in place. guess
what, it aint working.

YOU and this Administration have failed terribly in protecting not only the
consumer, but your precious
commodity that you speak so highly of i.e. the beef industry. In your
continued efforts to cover up the real
mad cow problem in the USA, you have in fact only amplified it and continued
it's spread, and in doing so,
you have needlessly exposed millions to the TSE agent, from many different
proven routes and sources. The
only saving grace you have is the incubation period has been on your side.
It will catch up. When it does, when
the people finally figure all this out, when some of the millions you have
needlessly exposed to this agent become
clinical in the future, rest assured I will stand in line to see that you
and your administration are convicted for murder.
What you and this administration have done over the past 8 years is
criminal, in my opinion.
I have watched not only you, but the Bush administration thumb there nose to
science for almost 8 years, all to
protect the beef industry. The science was there, but you chose to ignore
it, and even manipulated science with the
bogus BSE MRR policy, all the while your were implementing that, you were
covering up another mad cow in Texas.
But thanks to the Honorable Phyllis Fong of the OIG, and an act of Congress,
that mad cow was finally proven positive,
unlike the other stumbling and staggering mad cow that was rendered without
any test at all in Texas, but by then you
had succeeded in the BSE MRR policy, the legal trading of all strains of TSE
globally. You and this administration have
done the same thing the UK did when they poisoned the globe with there
exporting of BSE, except you made it legal
now with the BSE MRR policy, and now we are dealing with BASE, a strain that
is more virulent to humans.
what happens when it mutates again? when cwd deer and elk and there
different phenotypes have all been rendered
into feed, along with scrapie infected sheep in the USA, and a few TME to
top that off, it will be a most interesting
recipe will it not, and an interesting case study for humans for decades to
come. sadly though, with the recent pet food
scandal, and the deaths there of, we have learned a few things. one, that
the elderly are expendable, but cats, dogs, and
adolescents are not. and that the problem of our feeding of food producing
animals has been tainted for decades. and with
the melamine scandal, as with the mad cow feed scandal, it's the same old
song and dance by you and the Bush administration,
everything is o.k., will not hurt you, cover-up and protect the industry at
all cost, and this will be another part of your sad legacy
in History Sir.

To not allow BSE/TSE testing in the USA, testing that will find, only proves
our point, you have and will continue to cover up
the real mad cow problem in the USA. and the world knows this. ...

Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
P.O. Box 42
Bacliff, Texas USA 77519

8100 Three Chopt Road, Suite 203
P. O. BOX K227
804- 285-3210 FAX 804-285-3367
Web Site:

May 22, 2007
Honorable Michael Johanns
Secretary of Agriculture
U.S. Department of Agriculture
Room 200 Jamie Whitten Federal Building
Washington, D.C. 20250

Dear Mr. Secretary:

The United States Animal Health Association (USAHA), wishes to express its
encouragement to you and the Department of Agriculture to appeal the
surrounding private testing for Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy. We hope
will strongly consider this as you work with the Office of General Counsel
on this

To support this appeal, we offer that this sets a detrimental precedence on
ability to regulate disease and testing processes in animal agriculture. As
appreciate the entrepreneurial spirit of Creekstone, the larger scale
could lead to devastating impacts for food animal production in this country
as it
relates to animal health. We do feel that private testing could hamper
health officials’ ability to locate disease occurrences, and exercise proper
to trace, control and eliminate them. As you are aware, there are a number
factors that raise concern among animal health leaders and diagnosticians.
encourage you to thoroughly consider those upon your decision to appeal.
We do recognize this is now a matter of the courts, and trust that our
ability to
safeguard animal health is not compromised as a result of this litigation.
Please let
us know if there is any further support we can provide.


Lee M. Myers
President, U.S. Animal Health Association
Cc: Dr. John Clifford



18 January 2007 - Draft minutes of the SEAC 95 meeting (426 KB) held on 7
December 2006 are now available.


64. A member noted that at the recent Neuroprion meeting, a study was
presented showing that in transgenic mice BSE passaged in sheep may be more
virulent and infectious to a wider range of species than bovine derived BSE.

Other work presented suggested that BSE and bovine amyloidotic spongiform
encephalopathy (BASE) MAY BE RELATED. A mutation had been identified in the


3:30 Transmission of the Italian Atypical BSE (BASE) in Humanized Mouse

Models Qingzhong Kong, Ph.D., Assistant Professor, Pathology, Case Western

Bovine Amyloid Spongiform Encephalopathy (BASE) is an atypical BSE strain
discovered recently in Italy, and similar or different atypical BSE cases
were also reported in other countries. The infectivity and phenotypes of
these atypical BSE strains in humans are unknown. In collaboration with
Pierluigi Gambetti, as well as Maria Caramelli and her co-workers, we have
inoculated transgenic mice expressing human prion protein with brain
homogenates from BASE or BSE infected cattle. Our data shows that about half
of the BASE-inoculated mice became infected with an average incubation time
of about 19 months; in contrast, none of the BSE-inoculated mice appear to
be infected after more than 2 years.

***These results indicate that BASE is transmissible to humans and suggest
that BASE is more virulent than
classical BSE in humans.***

6:30 Close of Day One

Diagnosis and Reporting of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease

Singeltary, Sr et al. JAMA.2001; 285: 733-734.



vCJD in the USA * BSE in U.S.
15 November 1999


U.S. Scientist should be concerned with a CJD epidemic in the U.S., as
2 January 2000


MARCH 26, 2003

RE-Monitoring the occurrence of emerging forms of Creutzfeldt-Jakob

disease in the United States

Email Terry S. Singeltary:

I lost my mother to hvCJD (Heidenhain Variant CJD). I would like to

comment on the CDC's attempts to monitor the occurrence of emerging

forms of CJD. Asante, Collinge et al [1] have reported that BSE

transmission to the 129-methionine genotype can lead to an alternate

phenotype that is indistinguishable from type 2 PrPSc, the commonest

sporadic CJD. However, CJD and all human TSEs are not reportable

nationally. CJD and all human TSEs must be made reportable in every

state and internationally. I hope that the CDC does not continue to

expect us to still believe that the 85%+ of all CJD cases which are

sporadic are all spontaneous, without route/source. We have many TSEs in

the USA in both animal and man. CWD in deer/elk is spreading rapidly and

CWD does transmit to mink, ferret, cattle, and squirrel monkey by

intracerebral inoculation. With the known incubation periods in other

TSEs, oral transmission studies of CWD may take much longer. Every

victim/family of CJD/TSEs should be asked about route and source of this

agent. To prolong this will only spread the agent and needlessly expose

others. In light of the findings of Asante and Collinge et al, there

should be drastic measures to safeguard the medical and surgical arena

from sporadic CJDs and all human TSEs. I only ponder how many sporadic

CJDs in the USA are type 2 PrPSc?

Copyright © 2003 Published by Elsevier Ltd.

Tracking spongiform encephalopathies in North America

Xavier Bosch

Available online 29 July 2003.

Volume 3, Issue 8, August 2003, Page 463

“My name is Terry S Singeltary Sr, and I live in Bacliff, Texas. I lost my
mom to hvCJD (Heidenhain variant CJD)
and have been searching for answers ever since. What I have found is that we
have not been told the truth. CWD
in deer and elk is a small portion of a much bigger problem.”

1997 TO 2006. SPORADIC CJD CASES TRIPLED, with phenotype
of 'UNKNOWN' strain growing. ...

There is a growing number of human CJD cases, and they were presented last
week in San Francisco by Luigi Gambatti(?) from his CJD surveillance

He estimates that it may be up to 14 or 15 persons which display selectively
SPRPSC and practically no detected RPRPSC proteins.

[Docket No. FSIS-2006-0011] FSIS Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine
Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE)

[Docket No. 03-025IFA] FSIS Prohibition of the Use of Specified Risk
Materials for Human Food and Requirement for the Disposition of
Non-Ambulatory Disabled Cattle



Sporadic creutzfeldt-jakob disease in two adolescents (sCJD, the big lie)
Date: May 28, 2007 at 7:58 am PST


(Adopted by the International Committee of the OIE on 23 May 2006)

11. Information published by the OIE is derived from appropriate
declarations made by the official Veterinary Services of Member Countries.
The OIE is not responsible for inaccurate publication of country disease
status based on
inaccurate information or changes in epidemiological status or other
significant events that
were not promptly reported to then Central Bureau............

Audit Report

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program – Phase II


Food Safety and Inspection Service

Controls Over BSE Sampling, Specified Risk Materials, and Advanced Meat
Recovery Products - Phase III

Report No. 50601-10-KC January 2006

Finding 2 Inherent Challenges in Identifying and Testing High-Risk Cattle
Still Remain

Report to Congressional Requesters:

February 2005:

Mad Cow Disease:

FDA's Management of the Feed Ban Has Improved, but Oversight Weaknesses
Continue to Limit Program Effectiveness:


January 2002 MAD COW DISEASE Improvements in the Animal Feed Ban and
Other Regulatory Areas Would Strengthen U.S. Prevention Efforts GAO-02-183

OIE BSE RECOMMENDATION FOR USA, bought and paid for by your local cattle
dealers i.e. USDA

Date: May 14, 2007 at 9:00 am PST

What Do We Feed to Food-Production Animals? A Review of Animal Feed
Ingredients and Their Potential Impacts on Human Health

Date: May 24, 2007 at 6:59 am PST

The Economic Impact of B.S.E. on the U.S. Beef Industry: BY NOT TESTING TO

Date: May 6, 2007 at 3:05 pm PST


Date: May 9, 2007 at 6:43 pm PST


Scrapie Agent (Strain 263K) Can Transmit Disease via the ORAL Route after
Persistence in Soil over Years

Date: May 16, 2007 at 10:01 am PST

Colorado Surveillance Program for Chronic Wasting Disease Transmission to

Date: Wed, 4 Apr 2007 16:22:22 -0500


Sent: Monday, April 02, 2007 2:37 PM


HUMAN and ANIMAL TSE Classifications i.e. mad cow disease and the UKBSEnvCJD
only theory

TSEs have been rampant in the USA for decades in many species, and they all
have been rendered and fed back
to animals for human/animal consumption. I propose that the current
diagnostic criteria for human TSEs only
enhances and helps the spreading of human TSE from the continued belief of
the UKBSEnvCJD only theory in 2005.
With all the science to date refuting it, to continue to validate this myth,
will only spread this TSE agent
through a multitude of potential routes and sources i.e. consumption,
surgical, blood, medical, cosmetics
etc. I propose as with Aguzzi, Asante, Collinge, Caughey, Deslys, Dormont,
Gibbs, Ironside, Manuelidis,
Marsh, et al and many more, that the world of TSE Tranmissible Spongiform
Encephalopathy is far from an
exact science, but there is enough proven science to date that this myth
should be put to rest once and for
all, and that we move forward with a new classification for human and animal
TSE that would properly identify
the infected species, the source species, and then the route. This would
further have to be broken down to
strain of species and then the route of transmission would further have to
be broken down. Accumulation and
Transmission are key to the threshold from subclinical to clinical disease,
and of that, I even believe that
physical and or blunt trauma may play a role of onset of clinical symptoms
in some cases, but key to all
this, is to stop the amplification and transmission of this agent, the
spreading of, no matter what strain.
BUT, to continue with this myth that the U.K. strain of BSE one strain in
cows, and the nv/v CJD, one strain in
humans, and that all the rest of human TSE is one single strain i.e.
sporadic CJD (when to date there are
6 different phenotypes of sCJD), and that no other animal TSE transmits to
humans, to continue with this
masquerade will only continue to spread, expose, and kill, who knows how
many more in the years and decades
to come. ONE was enough for me, My Mom, hvCJD, DOD 12/14/97 confirmed, which
is nothing more than another
mans name added to CJD, like CJD itself, Jakob and Creutzfeldt, or
syndrome, just another CJD or human TSE, named after another human. WE are
only kidding ourselves with the
current diagnostic criteria for human and animal TSE, especially
differentiating between the nvCJD vs the
sporadic CJD strains and then the GSS strains and also the FFI fatal
familial insomnia strains or the ones
that mimics one or the other of those TSE? Tissue infectivity and strain
typing of the many variants of
the human and animal TSEs are paramount in all variants of all TSE. There
must be a proper classification that
will differentiate between all these human TSE in order to do this. With the
CDI and other more sensitive
testing coming about, I only hope that my proposal will some day be taken

My name is Terry S. Singeltary Sr. and I am no scientist, no doctor and have
no PhDs, but have been
independently researching human and animal TSEs since the death of my Mother
to the Heidenhain Variant of
Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease on December 14, 1997 'confirmed'. ...TSS

et al.,
Civil Action No. 06-0544 (JR)


United States District Judge

The government’s additional argument, that private testing 14
somehow would interfere with USDA’s surveillance program, is
unexplained and therefore rejected.
Of greater concern is the possibility that private testing 15
could produce a false positive result, which might trigger
unnecessary public alarm. USDA has asserted this possibility as
a reason to avoid private testing. Indeed, the Bio-Rad kits that
Creekstone proposes using are used throughout the world,
including as part of the USDA’s own surveillance testing.
- 18 -

Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
P.O. Box 42
Bacliff, Texas USA 77518

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