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From: TSS ()
Subject: BSE update on the EU situation in 2006 GAIN Report Number: E47017 3/1/2007
Date: March 6, 2007 at 5:51 pm PST


> Number of BSE cases in the EU-25 down again by more than 40 percent in 2006.

> This decreasing trend now seems to occur throughout the EU-25

WE must ask Stanley Prusiner what spontaneous event made this happen :-O ...TSS

Voluntary Report - public distribution

Date: 3/1/2007

GAIN Report Number: E47017



Sanitary/Phytosanitary/Food Safety

BSE update on the EU situation in 2006


Approved by:

Debra Henke


Prepared by:

Yvan Polet

Report Highlights:

This 2006 update on the EU BSE/TSE situation shows another 40 percent decrease in BSE

prevalence in EU cattle herds compared to 2005. An update on new EU BSE/TSE-related

legislation as part of the EU TSE Roadmap is included.

Includes PSD Changes: No

Includes Trade Matrix: No

Unscheduled Report

Brussels USEU [BE2]


USDA Foreign Agricultural Service

GAIN Report

Global Agriculture Information Network

Template Version 2.09

GAIN Report - E47017 Page 2 of 3

UNCLASSIFIED USDA Foreign Agricultural Service

Number of BSE cases in the EU-25 down again by more than 40 percent in 2006.

BSE cases in the European Union (EU) in 2006 again decrease by more than 40 percent to

some 320 cases, compared to about 560 cases in 2005. This decreasing trend now seems to

occur throughout the EU-25. More background information on the BSE/TSE situation in the

EU can be found at the Commission website at

Country/Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Austria 1 0 0 0 2 2

Belgium 46 38 15 11 2 2

Czech Republic 2 2 4 7 8 3

Denmark 6 3 2 1 1 0

Finland 1 0 0 0 0 0

France 274 239 137 54 31 8

Germany 125 106 54 65 32 16

Greece 1 0 0 0 0 0

Ireland 246 333 183 126 69 41

Italy 48 38 29 7 8 7

Luxembourg 0 1 0 0 1 0

Netherlands 20 24 19 6 3 2

Poland 0 4 5 11 20 4

Portugal 110 86 133 92 51 33

Slovakia 5 6 2 7 3 0

Slovenia 1 1 1 2 1 0

Spain 82 127 167 137 103 67

Sweden 0 0 0 0 0 1

Switzerland 42 24 21 3 3 5

United Kingdom 1202 1144 611 343 226 132

Total 2170 2152 1362 872 562 323

Source: European Commission and updated by FAS/USEU.

Work on EC TSE Roadmap progressing rapidly

EC DGSANCO continues to work on its “TSE Roadmap1”, which was published on July 15,

2005. Again in 2006, new amendments2 were approved to the EU BSE legislation. Progress

on the TSE Roadmap now includes:

Amendments in the short and medium term (2005-2009):

-Age requirements for removal of Specified Risk Material (SRM) were raised. This has been

addressed in Commission Regulation (EC) No 1974/2005 of 2 December 2005

-Feed Ban: the zero-tolerance on bone spicules and the fishmeal ban were relaxed in

Commission Regulation (EC) No 1292/2005 of 5 August 2005.

-Monitoring Programs: reducing the number of BSE testing in line with epidemiological

considerations. The finding of a BSE case in Sweden in March 2006 has actually led to the

extension of the BSE monitoring to Sweden by Commission Regulation (EC) 688/2006.



GAIN Report - E47017 Page 3 of 3

UNCLASSIFIED USDA Foreign Agricultural Service

-Categorization of countries according to their BSE risk based on OIE categorization rules

will replace the EU’s GBR classification system as agreed in Regulation (EC) No 1923/2006

of December 18, 2006.

-Review of culling policy with regard to TSE’s in small ruminants. The finding in 2006 of BSE

a French goat and several suspected cases in sheep has led to increased monitoring of TSE's

in small ruminants as required in Commission Regulation (EC) 1041/2006.

-The culling of bovine cohort animals is expected to be reviewed in future legislation.

-Restrictions on UK beef exports were lifted through Regulation (EC) 657/2006 of 10 April


Amendments in the long-term (2009-2014) include:

-A gradual decrease in the level of surveillance to a level in line with OIE recommendations.

-A complete revision of the need for the removal of SRM’s

-The introduction of a system of certification of herds

Most issues foreseen for the 2005-2009 period of the TSE Roadmap have already been

agreed and implemented. Regulation (EC) No 1923/2006 also includes amendments to

make the BSE Regulation 999/2001 more compatible with Regulation 1774/2002 on animal


Regular updates on the European BSE/TSE situation can be found on our website at

Visit our website: our website It enables easy access

to USEU reports, trade and other practical information.




United States District Court, District of Arizona

USA v Roland Emerson Farabee
2: 07-wi-0001-01-EHC

Proceeding Type: Waiver/Plea

Judge: Honorable Earl H Carroll
Courtroom: Phoenix Courtroom #501, 5th Floor

Date: 01/17/2007 Court Reporter: Candy Potter
Time: 01:30 PM Courtroom Deputy: Bobbi Hightower

(may not reflect
all counts) 18:641 and 2 (Theft of Government Money and Adiding and Abetting) 1
18: 1341 and 2 (Mail Fruad and Aiding and Abetting) 2
18:1343 and 2 (Wire Fraud and Aiding and Abetting) - 3

U.S. Attorney: Long, Robert

Defense Attorney(s): Attorney Phone: Attorney Designation:
McDonald, Jr., A. Melvin retained

if my siphering is correct, that would be about another 2600 potential mad cows that went into the food chain. add that to these ;

>It should be noted that since the enhanced surveillance program began, USDA has also conducted approximately 9,200 routine IHC tests on samples that did not first undergo rapid testing.<

AND we know IHC is the least likely to find TSE.

and not to forget that one little old mad cow in TEXAS they rendered without any test at ALL.


IN TEXAS, cattle on feed for decades, fda says 5.5 grams ruminant protein,
if tainted with TSE, is not enough to kill a cow. actually, it's enough to
kill 100+ cows ;-)

and add these in ;

UPI previously reported that from 2001 to 2003 the USDA collected the wrong part of the brain in more than 200 cows that were being screened as part of its BSE surveillance program.

The USDA documents also indicate the agency never was able to identify or test 52 cows that came into the United States in 2001 along with the Washington cow that tested positive in 2003. Of these, 11 were considered to be "high risk" because they were born within a year and on the same premises as the infected cow.

These cows may have gone into the food supply and been consumed by people. The concern is humans can contract a fatal brain disease from eating beef products contaminated with the mad cow pathogen.

NOT to forget what Paul Brown TSE expert at CDC said ;



The U.S. Department of Agriculture was quick to assure the public earlier
this week that the third case of mad cow disease did not pose a risk to
them, but what federal officials have not acknowledged is that this latest
case indicates the deadly disease has been circulating in U.S. herds for at
least a decade.

The second case, which was detected last year in a Texas cow and which USDA
officials were reluctant to verify, was approximately 12 years old.

These two cases (the latest was detected in an Alabama cow) present a
picture of the disease having been here for 10 years or so, since it is
thought that cows usually contract the disease from contaminated feed they
consume as calves. The concern is that humans can contract a fatal,
incurable, brain-wasting illness from consuming beef products contaminated
with the mad cow pathogen.

"The fact the Texas cow showed up fairly clearly implied the existence of
other undetected cases," Dr. Paul Brown, former medical director of the
National Institutes of Health's Laboratory for Central Nervous System
Studies and an expert on mad cow-like diseases, told United Press
International. "The question was, 'How many?' and we still can't answer

Brown, who is preparing a scientific paper based on the latest two mad cow
cases to estimate the maximum number of infected cows that occurred in the
United States, said he has "absolutely no confidence in USDA tests before
one year ago" because of the agency's reluctance to retest the Texas cow
that initially tested positive.

USDA officials finally retested the cow and confirmed it was infected seven
months later, but only at the insistence of the agency's inspector general.

"Everything they did on the Texas cow makes everything USDA did before 2005
suspect," Brown said. ...snip...end

CDC - Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Variant Creutzfeldt ...
Dr. Paul Brown is Senior Research Scientist in the Laboratory of Central
Nervous System ... Address for correspondence: Paul Brown, Building 36, Room
4A-05, ...


Tuesday, September 12, 2006 11:10 AM

"Actually, Terry, I have been critical of the USDA handling of the mad cow issue for some years, and with Linda Detwiler and others sent lengthy detailed critiques and recommendations to both the USDA and the Canadian Food Agency."

OR, what the Honorable Phyllis Fong of the OIG found ;

Audit Report

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program – Phase II


Food Safety and Inspection Service

Controls Over BSE Sampling, Specified Risk Materials, and Advanced Meat Recovery Products - Phase III

Report No. 50601-10-KC January 2006

Finding 2 Inherent Challenges in Identifying and Testing High-Risk Cattle Still Remain

Greetings list members,

IF you remember correctly, i posted this ;

Date: Thu, 30 Dec 2004 12:27:06 -0600
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr.



> OH, i did ask Bio-Rad about this with NO reply to date;
> -------- Original Message --------
> Date: Fri, 17 Dec 2004 15:37:28 -0600
> From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
> To:
> Hello Susan and Bio-Rad,
> Happy Holidays!
> I wish to ask a question about Bio-Rad and USDA BSE/TSE testing
> and there inconclusive. IS the Bio-Rad test for BSE/TSE that complicated,
> or is there most likely some human error we are seeing here?
> HOW can Japan have 2 positive cows with
> No clinical signs WB+, IHC-, HP- ,
> BUT in the USA, these cows are considered 'negative'?
> IS there more politics working here than science in the USA?
> What am I missing?
> -------- Original Message --------
> Subject: Re: USDA: More mad cow testing will demonstrate beef's safety
> Date: Fri, 17 Dec 2004 09:26:19 -0600
> From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
> snip...end
> Experts doubt USDA's mad cow results


WELL, someone did call me from Bio-Rad about this,
however it was not Susan Berg.
but i had to just about take a blood oath not to reveal
there name. IN fact they did not want me to even mention
this, but i feel it is much much to important. I have omitted
any I.D. of this person, but thought I must document this ;

Bio-Rad, TSS phone conversation 12/28/04

Finally spoke with ;

Bio-Rad Laboratories
2000 Alfred Nobel Drive
Hercules, CA 94547
Ph: 510-741-6720
Fax: 510-741-5630

at approx. 14:00 hours 12/28/04, I had a very pleasant
phone conversation with XXXX XXXXX about the USDA
and the inconclusive BSE testing problems they seem
to keep having. X was very very cautious as to speak
directly about USDA and it's policy of not using WB.
X was very concerned as a Bio-Rad official of retaliation
of some sort. X would only speak of what other countries
do, and that i should take that as an answer. I told X
I understood that it was a very loaded question and X
agreed several times over and even said a political one.

my question;

Does Bio-Rad believe USDA's final determination of False positive,
without WB, and considering the new
atypical TSEs not showing positive with -IHC and -HP ???

ask if i was a reporter. i said no, i was with CJD Watch
and that i had lost my mother to hvCJD. X did not
want any of this recorded or repeated.

again, very nervous, will not answer directly about USDA for fear of
retaliation, but again said X tell
me what other countries are doing and finding, and that
i should take it from there.
"very difficult to answer"

"very political"

"very loaded question"

outside USA and Canada, they use many different confirmatory tech. in
house WB, SAF, along with
IHC, HP, several times etc. you should see at several
talks meetings (TSE) of late Paris Dec 2, that IHC- DOES NOT MEAN IT IS
NEGATIVE. again, look what
the rest of the world is doing.
said something about Dr. Houston stating;
any screening assay, always a chance for human
error. but with so many errors (i am assuming
X meant inconclusive), why are there no investigations, just false
said something about ''just look at the sheep that tested IHC- but were
positive''. ...


-------- Original Message --------
Subject: Your questions
Date: Mon, 27 Dec 2004 15:58:11 -0800
From: To:

Hi Terry:

............................................snip Let me know your phone
number so I can talk to you about the Bio-Rad BSE test.
Thank you


Bio-Rad Laboratories
2000 Alfred Nobel Drive
Hercules, CA 94547
Ph: 510-741-6720
Fax: 510-741-5630
Email: =================================


######### ##########


Subject: [Docket No. FSIS-2006-0011] FSIS Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine
Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE)

[Docket No. 03-025IFA] FSIS Prohibition of the Use of Specified Risk
Materials for Human Food and Requirement for the Disposition of
Non-Ambulatory Disabled Cattle



Docket No, 04-047-l Regulatory Identification No. (RIN) 091O-AF46 NEW BSE SAFEGUARDS 07/11/2004 09:34 PM

Importation of Whole Cuts of Boneless Beef From Japan

[Docket No. 05-004-2] RIN 0579-AB93


Peripheral Nerves

Issue: Two commenters stated that the underlying assumption of the
proposed rule, that whole cuts of boneless beef from Japan will not
contain tissues that may carry the BSE agent, is no longer valid
because researchers have found peripheral nervous system tissues,
including facial and sciatic nerves, that contain BSE infectivity.\2\
One of these commenters requested APHIS to explain whether and what
additional mitigation measures are needed to reduce the risks that
these tissues may be present in Japanese beef. This commenter further
requested an additional comment period to obtain public comment
regarding the manner by which APHIS intends to treat this new
scientific finding.

\2\ Bushmann, A., and Gruschup, M.; Highly Bovine Spongiform
Encephalopathy-Sensitive Transgenic Mice Confirm the Essential
Restriction of Infectivity to the Nervous System in Clinically
Diseased Cattle. The Journal of Infectious Diseases, 192: 934-42,
September 1, 2005.

Response: APHIS is familiar with the results of the study mentioned
by the commenters in which mice, genetically engineered to be highly
susceptible to BSE and to overexpress the bovine prion protein, were
inoculated with tissues from a BSE-infected cow. This study
demonstrated low levels of infectivity in the mouse assay in the facial
and sciatic nerves of the peripheral nervous system. APHIS has
evaluated these findings in the context of the potential occurrence of
infectivity in the peripheral nerves of cattle and the corresponding
risks of the presence of infectivity in such tissues resulting in
cattle or human exposure to the BSE agent. The results from these
experiments in genetically engineered mice should be interpreted with
caution, as the findings may be influenced by the overexpression of
prion proteins and may not accurately predict the natural distribution
of BSE infectivity in cattle. Further, the overexpression of prion
proteins in transgenic mice may not accurately mimic the natural
disease process because the transgenic overexpressing mice have been
shown to develop spontaneous lethal neurological disease involving
spongiform changes in the brain and muscle degeneration.\3\ In
addition, the route of administration to the mice was both
intraperitoneal and intracerebral, which are two very efficient routes
of infection as compared to oral consumption. Given these factors,
APHIS has determined that the finding of BSE infectivity in facial and
sciatic nerves of the transgenic mice is not directly applicable to
cattle naturally infected with BSE. Therefore, we do not consider it
necessary to make any adjustments to the risk analysis for this
rulemaking or to extend the comment period to solicit additional public
comment on this issue.

\3\ Westaway, D., et al.; (1994) Degeneration of Skeletal
Muscle, Peripheral Nerves, and the Central Nervous System in
Transgenic Mice Overexpressing Wild-type Prion Proteins. Cell 76, 117-129.


Issue: Two commenters expressed concern that there has been a
limited amount of research conducted on BSE infectivity in blood. One
of these commenters cited a report that discussed, among other things,
the detection of infectivity in sheep experimentally infected with BSE
via blood transfusions.\4\ This commenter also stated that the agent
that causes Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD), a chronic and fatal
neurodegenerative disease of humans, was detected in blood, and
questioned whether the BSE agent could be detected in blood as well.
The other commenter cited a study that detected infectivity in hamsters
experimentally infected with scrapie.\5\ This commenter requested that
APHIS ban the use of blood in cattle feed.

\4\ Pattison, J., et al.; UK Strategy for Research and
Development on Human and Animal Health Aspects of Transmissible
Spongiform Encephalopathies, 2005-2008. Available at
\5\ Castilla, J., et al.; Detection of Prions in Blood. Nature
Medicine, doi: 10.1038/nm1286, August 28, 2005, at 3.

Response: As stated in our risk analysis, the pathogenesis studies
of naturally and experimentally infected cattle have not detected BSE
infectivity in blood.
The first study mentioned by the commenter above demonstrated
transmission of disease from sheep experimentally infected with BSE to
another sheep via blood transfusions. We note that there are widely
acknowledged differences between the distribution of BSE infectivity in
the tissues of cattle and sheep. In addition, there is a significant
difference in susceptibility to infection based on the route of
transmission. Infection via oral consumption may be 10,000 times less
efficient than infection via intravenous injection, such as a blood
Both the United Kingdom's Department for Environment, Food and
Rural Affairs' Spongiform Encephalopathy Advisory Committee (SEAC) and
the European Commission's Scientific Steering Committee (SSC), which
are scientific advisory committees, evaluated the findings of
transmission of infectivity via blood transfusions in sheep
experimentally infected with BSE and concluded that

[[Page 73907]]

these findings did not indicate that additional mitigation measures
were necessary to protect public health.\6\ Therefore, based on
currently available information, APHIS considers it unlikely that the
experimental observations in sheep reflect a biologically significant
event for cattle or affect the safety of whole cuts of boneless beef
derived from cattle born, raised, and slaughtered in Japan.

\6\ Spongiform Encephalopathy Advisory Committee, Oct. 19, 2000,
Summary of SEAC Committee Meeting 29 September 2000. Available at
European Commission Scientific Steering Committee; The
Implications of the Recent Papers on Transmission of BSE by Blood
Transfusion in Sheep (Houston et al., 2000; Hunter et al., 2002),
Adopted by the SSC at its Meeting of 12-13 September. Available at


The study on scrapie-infected hamsters noted by the commenter
describes a process by which the abnormal prion protein can be
amplified and detected using current testing methods, such as a Western
blot. In this study, blood from hamsters experimentally infected with a
scrapie strain was collected when the animals demonstrated clinical
signs of disease. These blood samples were incubated with excess normal
prion protein from brain tissue for multiple cycles. If abnormal
protein is present in blood, it will convert the normal brain prion to
abnormal prion, yielding an increased amount of abnormal prion that can
be more easily detected. In this manner, the presence of abnormal prion
protein in the initial blood samples, which was present in levels too
low to detect using routine test methods, was demonstrated. While this
finding has many possibilities related to the development of diagnostic
tests, it does not demonstrate BSE infectivity in blood. We also note
that the international community largely considers that studies using
transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs) other than BSE in non-
bovine animals cannot be directly extrapolated to BSE in cattle because
of the significant interactions between the host species and the prion
strain involved.
Feed regulations in the United States are under the authority of
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), not APHIS. Therefore, the
commenter's request that APHIS ban the use of blood in cattle feed
falls outside the scope of this rulemaking. For these reasons, we are
not making any changes to the rule based on these comments.


Issue: Two commenters raised questions regarding the origin of CJD
in humans. One commenter noted that there are different strains of TSEs
being discovered in ruminants, and that new atypical strains of TSE in
cattle look similar to sporadic CJD in humans. Another commenter asked
if APHIS has considered whether sporadic CJD in humans might be caused
by atypical cases of TSEs that have been found in animals. This
commenter further questioned whether blood and other tissues may carry
BSE infectivity in cattle infected with atypical strains of the BSE
agent or other TSE agents.
Response: Sporadic CJD is the most common form of CJD. It has been
found in every country in the world where it has been looked for
including countries that are generally considered by the international
scientific community to be free of BSE and other TSEs (for example,
Australia and New Zealand). In general, it affects about one person per
million. No association between sporadic CJD and consumption of animal
products in general and/or infected or contaminated bovine products has
ever been documented. It is currently believed that sporadic CJD arises
through the spontaneous conversion of PrPC (normal cellular
prion protein) to PrPSC in an individual.\13\ In contrast,
atypical cases of BSE in cattle are rare and have been reported in only
few countries that experience BSE, such as Italy, Belgium, Japan, and
France. It has been speculated that the spontaneous or sporadic form of
BSE could exist in cattle, as well as humans.\14\

\13\ Stahl, N. and Prusiner, S.B.; (1991) FASEB-J. 5: 2799-807.
\14\ Biacabe; 2004 EMBO reports, Vol. 5, No. 1.


[[Page 73916]]

APHIS agrees with the commenter that reports indicate that some of
the atypical BSE cases, in particular the bovine amyloidotic spongiform
encephalopathy (BASE), and sporadic CJD have similar PrPSC
patterns. APHIS evaluated the findings in the context of risk of
exposure to cattle and humans. Currently, the relevance of the atypical
cases is unknown, but at this time there is no indication that any
control measures--such as feed bans or SRM requirements--should be
modified based on these cases. Additionally, although atypical cases of
BSE and sporadic CJD share similarities at this point, there is no
evidence that they are linked.
Issue: One commenter expressed concern over the number of citations
issued for various SRM violations during the June 2004 enhanced BSE
surveillance program in the United States. This commenter questioned
whether these incidents of noncompliance may have led to infective
materials entering the human or animal food chains. This commenter
cited the case of BSE detected in a 12-year-old cow in Texas as
evidence that infective materials may have entered the food chain. The
commenter suggested that noncompliance reports should be made more
easily available to the public in the future.
Response: FSIS inspectors are responsible for verifying the
effectiveness of an establishment's procedures. If FSIS personnel
determine that an establishment's procedures are ineffective in
preventing cross-contamination, the inspectors will take appropriate
action. We note that none of the meat from the 12-year-old BSE-infected
cow in Texas mentioned by the commenter entered the human food or
animal feed chains.

snip...full text ;

Importation of Whole Cuts of Boneless Beef from Japan [Docket No. 05-004-1] RIN 0579-AB93 TSS SUBMISSION

Docket No. 05-004-1 RIN 0579-AB93 BSE TSS was Received

I would kindly like to comment on [Docket No. 05-004-1] RIN 0579-AB93 ;

Exportation and importation of animals and animal products:
Whole cuts of boneless beef from-
48494-48500 [05-16422]

[Federal Register: August 18, 2005 (Volume 70, Number 159)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Page 48494-48500]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access []

Proposed Rules
Federal Register

This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER contains notices to the public of
the proposed issuance of rules and regulations. The purpose of these
notices is to give interested persons an opportunity to participate in
the rule making prior to the adoption of the final rules.


[[Page 48494]]


Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

9 CFR Part 94

[Docket No. 05-004-1]
RIN 0579-AB93

Importation of Whole Cuts of Boneless Beef from Japan

AGENCY: Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, USDA.

ACTION: Proposed rule.


SUMMARY: We are proposing to amend the regulations governing the
importation of meat and other edible animal products by allowing, under
certain conditions, the importation of whole cuts of boneless beef from
Japan. We are proposing this action in response to a request from the
Government of Japan and after conducting an analysis of the risk that
indicates that such beef can be safely imported from Japan under the
conditions described in this proposal.

DATES: We will consider all comments that we receive on or before
September 19, 2005.

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments by any of the following methods:
EDOCKET: Go to to submit or


BSE infectivity has never been demonstrated in the muscle tissue of
cattle experimentally or naturally infected with BSE at any stage of
the disease. Studies performed using TSEs other than BSE in non-bovine
animals have detected prions in muscle tissue. However, the
international scientific community largely considers that these studies
cannot be directly extrapolated to BSE in cattle because of the
significant interactions between the host species and the prion strain
Pathogenesis studies of naturally and experimentally infected
cattle have not detected BSE infectivity in blood. However,
transmission of BSE was demonstrated in sheep that received a
transfusion of a large volume of blood drawn from other sheep that were
experimentally infected with the BSE agent. The United Kingdom's
Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs' Spongiform
Encephalopathy Advisory Committee (SEAC) and the European Commission's
Scientific Steering Committee (SSC), which are scientific advisory
committees, evaluated the implication of this finding in relation to
food safety.\5\ The SEAC concluded that the finding did not represent
grounds for recommending any changes to the current control measures
for BSE. The SSC determined that the research results do not support
the hypothesis that bovine blood or muscle meat constitute a risk to
human health.\6\


BSE Risk Factors for Whole Cuts of Boneless Beef

The most significant risk management strategy for ensuring the
safety of whole cuts of boneless beef is the prevention of cross-
contamination of the beef with SRMs during stunning and slaughter of
the animal. Control measures that prevent contamination of such beef
involve the establishment of procedures for the removal of SRMs,
prohibitions on air-injection stunning and pithing, and splitting of
carcasses. These potential pathways for contamination and the control
measures that prevent contamination are described in detail in the risk
analysis for this rulemaking.
SRM Removal. Research has demonstrated that SRMs from infected
cattle may contain BSE infectivity. Because infectivity has not been
demonstrated in muscle tissue, the most important mitigation measure
for whole cuts of boneless beef is the careful removal and segregation
of SRMs. Removal of SRMs in a manner that avoids contamination of the
beef with SRMs minimizes the risk of exposure to materials that have
been demonstrated to contain the BSE agent in cattle.


Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD), a chronic and fatal
neurodegenerative disease of humans, has been linked since 1996 through
epidemiological, neuropathological, and experimental data to exposure
to the BSE agent, most likely through consumption of cattle products
contaminated with the agent before BSE control measures were in place.
To date, approximately 170 probable and confirmed cases of vCJD have
been identified worldwide. The majority of these cases have either been
identified in the United Kingdom or were linked to exposure that
occurred in the United Kingdom, and all cases have been linked to
exposure in countries with native cases of BSE. Some studies estimate
that more than 1 million cattle may have been infected with BSE
throughout the epidemic in the United Kingdom. This number of infected
cattle could have introduced a significant amount of infectivity into
the human food supply. Yet, the low number of cases of vCJD identified
to date indicates that there is a substantial species barrier that
protects humans from widespread illness due to exposure to the BSE


International Guidelines on BSE

International guidelines for trade in animal and animal products
are developed by the World Organization for Animal Health (formerly
known as the Office International des Epizooties (OIE)), which is
recognized by the World Trade Organization (WTO) as the international
organization responsible for the development of standards, guidelines,
and recommendations with respect to animal health and zoonoses
(diseases that are transmissible from animals to humans). The OIE
guidelines for trade in terrestrial animals (mammals, birds, and bees)
are detailed in the Terrestrial Animal Health Code (available on the
internet at The guidelines on BSE are contained in

Chapter 2.3.13 of the Code and supplemented by Appendix 3.8.4 of the


Greetings again APHIS ET AL,

THIS is not correct. IN fact, there are several factors i would like to kindly address. .......


WE MUST ADHERE TO THE BSE GBR RISK ASSESSMENTS, WE MUST WORK TO ENHANCE THOSE BSE GBR RISK ASSESSMENTS TO INCLUDE ALL ANIMAL TSEs, USDA/APHIS/GW ET ALs BSE MRR (Minimal Risk Region) should be REPEALED/DISBANDED/TRASHED/NADA and done away with for good. The BSE MRR policy is nothing more than a legal tool to trade all strains of TSEs globally...

Terry S. Singeltary Sr.

P.O. Box 42

Bacliff, Texas USA 77518

Your Comment with Title "[Docket No. 05-004-1] RIN 0579-AB93 BSE TSS " was Received.
The Identifier Assigned is "APHIS-2005-0073-0009".
An Electronic File was Attached to this Submission.

Please note that it may take between 24 and 72 hours for the EDOCKET staff to process your comment before it is available publicly through EDOCKET. You can use the identifier noted above to find your comment through the Quick or Advanced Search pages when it is available. ...........

EPA: Federal Register: Importation of Whole Cuts of Boneless Beef ...Importation of Whole Cuts of Boneless Beef From Japan , Federal Register document. ... we published in the Federal Register (70 FR 48494-48500, Docket No. ...

Importation of Whole Cuts of Boneless Beef from Japan [Docket No. 05-004-1] RIN 0579-AB93 TSS SUBMISSION

"[Docket No. 05-004-1] RIN 0579-AB93 BSE TSS " was Received (see below since comments were removed from www)


APHIS-2006-0041-0006 Comment from Terry S Singletary Sr 01/09/2007 PUBLIC SUBMISSIONS

APHIS-2006-0041-0006.1 Attachment to Singletary comment 01/09/2007 PUBLIC SUBMISSIONS


----- Original Message -----
From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
Sent: Sunday, February 25, 2007 12:35 PM

Greetings USDA,

I respectfully request the final results of the mouse bio-assays test that were to have supposedly began 2+ years late, 5 years ago, on the imported sheep from Belgium ?

WHAT happened to the test results and MOUSE BIO-ASSAYS of those imported sheep from Belgium that were confiscated and slaughtered from the Faillace's, what sort of TSE did these animals have ?

WERE they atypical scrapie, BSE, and or typical scrapie ?

HOW much longer will you refuse to give us this information ? and for what reason ?

WHY is it that the Farm of the Mad Sheep of Mad River Valley were quarantined for 5 years, but none of these farms from Texas and Alabama with Atypical TSE in the Bovine, they have not been quarantined for 5 years, why not, with the real risk of BSE to sheep, whom is to say this was not BSE ?


full text ;

FURTHERMORE, I respectfully request up front, that any fees for this FOIA be wavered due to the fact this information should be free to the public and is in the best interest for the public to have these final results, no financial gain from this FOIA information is to be made either. ...

Thank You,

kind regards,

Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
P.O. Box 42
Bacliff, Texas USA 77518



Sheep Test Results



Veterinary Services April 2002



Additional tests will be conducted to determine

exactly what TSE the animals have BSE or scrapie.

These tests involve the use of bioassays that consist

of injecting mice with tissue from the infected animals

Page 15 of 98


and waiting for them to develop disease. This testing

may take at least 2 to 3 years to complete.





--- Original Message ---

Subject: Sheep
Date: Sat, 12 Jun 2004 14:26:04 EDT

Mr. Singeltary.

I hope this finds you well. As you are aware I left the USDA last
year. I can only update you on the sheep before that time. Contact was
established with the UK on doing the bioassay studies. They agreed.
However, we were prioritized after their own needs, hence the delay. I
am aware that there are now additional labs in Europe running the mouse
bioassay strain typing. You will have to contact USDA for further word.

Linda Detwiler

My reply to Dr. Detwiler;

--- Original Message ---
Subject: Re: Sheep
Date: Sat, 12 Jun 2004 13:53:57 -0500
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."

hello Dr. Detwiler,

thanks for your kind reply.

> However, we were prioritized after their own needs, hence the delay.

not sure i understand that?

> You will have to contact USDA for further word.

already done that, and there answer was;

--- Original Message ---

Subject: Re: hello Dr. Sutton.question please.scrapie.TSS
Date: Thu, 20 May 2004 14:36:09 -0400

Dear Mr. Singeltary,

The Western blot tests on these animals were completed in April of this
year. That means that we can begin the mouse inoculations. To get the
results of the Western blot tests, you will need to submit a Freedom of
Information Act request through our FOIA office. The FAX number there is

Have a nice day,

Jim Rogers

--- Original Message ---

Subject: re-85th Meeting of SEAC - 30.11.04
Date: Tue, 21 Dec 2004 16:56:55 -0000
From: "Barlow, Tom (SEAC)"
To: "''"

Dear Mr Singeltary

Thank you for you enquiry to the SEAC secretariat about mouse bioassays
commissioned by the USDA to investigate TSE cases in imported sheep.

After making a number of enquiries, it appears that Defra were not involved
with this work. However, it is possible that a UK research laboratory was
contacted by the USDA about such tests but I have been unable to find out
any further information. You may wish to make further enquiries with the

Yours sincerely

Tom Barlow

Dr Tom Barlow
Spongiform Encephalopathy Advisory Committee (SEAC) Secretariat
Area 108, 1A Page Street, London SW1P 4PQ

Tel: 0207 904 6267


[Docket No. FSIS-2006-0011] FSIS Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine
Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE)

[Docket No. 03-025IFA] FSIS Prohibition of the Use of Specified Risk
Materials for Human Food and Requirement for the Disposition of
Non-Ambulatory Disabled Cattle



Suppressed peer review of Harvard study October 31, 2002.


ALL IN ALL, it's a terribly failed system of TSE surveillance and attempted erradication of this agent in the USA, a failed policy driven by industry greed and ignorance. ...

Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
P.O. Box 42
Bacliff, Texas USA 77518

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