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From: TSS ()
Subject: OUTLOOK 07: US Pins Hope Of MAD COW Beef Trade On Safety Status from OIE (GOD HELP US)
Date: December 18, 2006 at 9:47 am PST

OUTLOOK 07: US Pins Hope Of Beef Trade On Safety Status

WASHINGTON (Dow Jones)--Despite the return of U.S. beef to some foreign markets after mad-cow disease was found in the U.S. three years ago, many borders remain closed, and the Bush administration is hoping an international beef safety status will shake loose remaining barriers.

U.S. Department of Agriculture and U.S. Trade Representative negotiators are counting on the weight of the approval of the World Organization for Animal Health, known commonly by the French acronym OIE, behind them come May. They are letting foreign governments know that after May they won’t just be turning away U.S. beef, they’ll be spurning international sanction.

Ron DeHaven, administrator of USDA’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, told Dow Jones Newswires in an interview that the OIE offers third-party authority on what beef products can or cannot be traded safely when the producer country has found mad-cow disease, also known as bovine spongiform encephalopathy, in its herds.

“We want to have discussions based on the science and having a science-based OIE categorization of the U.S. bolsters significantly our position in having those discussions,“ DeHaven said.

Selling Beef To China

Those discussions will begin in earnest after the OIE rules in May on a U.S. status, but precursory talks have already begun with countries such as China in what some USDA officials have dubbed the “World Tour.“

U.S. beef is safe and you don’t have to take the U.S. government’s word for it. That’s the message delivered last week to China by USDA and USTR officials.

China, considered to represent a vast potential for beef exports in the future as rising incomes boost consumption, has been especially vexing to the U.S.

Chinese Vice Premier Wu Yi promised in April that the country was ready to begin talks to resume imports of U.S. beef. That sparked U.S. optimism and over the following two months then-Undersecretary J.B. Penn traveled twice to Beijing. USDA chief veterinarian John Clifford visited once to impress upon the Chinese the safety of U.S. beef.

Little consensus was reached between the USDA officials and their Chinese counterparts, but that didn’t stop the country from living up to what it believed was enough to meet Vice Premier Wu Yi’s promise.

It was in late June that China unilaterally announced a trade deal to allow U.S. beef imports. The USDA, appalled at what it called unscientific restrictions, rejected the deal.

The core of the problem in differences with China, USDA’s DeHaven said this week, is that you have two countries with two interpretations of beef safety.

“We can talk science with them all day long,“ DeHaven said. “They sometimes interpret the science differently than we do and again I think that emphasizes the importance of this OIE categorization -- an independent third-party making a determination -- rather than us trying to tell the Chinese how they should interpret the science.“

There are some recent developments, though, showing new cooperation on agricultural trade between the two countries. The U.S. this week reassured China that it will soon be able to export processed chicken here – something China has been requesting for some time.

Also this week, USDA Undersecretary for Food Safety Richard Raymond and Chinese Vice Minister Ge Zhirong signed an agreement not to punish U.S. exporters immediately for violations discovered in meat and poultry shipments. That may prove important to U.S. beef exporters worried about shipping beef to China if trade resumes.

The OIE Deliberates

All OIE determinations are guidelines and nothing is mandated for its 167 member countries, USDA spokesman Jim Rogers said, but the guidelines do carry significant weight.

The World Trade Organization asks its members to follow OIE guidelines or put into writing why they don’t, Rogers said.

The organization, on its Web site, says: “OIE standards are recognized by the World Trade Organization as reference international sanitary rules.“

So for the first time ever the U.S. is asking the OIE for official beef safety status in order to convince trading partners that the three U.S. BSE cases have no bearing on the safety of U.S. exports.

An ad hoc committee convened by the OIE has already met to discuss the U.S. submission for BSE status - handed over for review in October - and the panel will likely meet again before making its recommendation to the standing Scientific Commission, DeHaven said.

The Scientific Commission will in turn make its own recommendation to the full 167 member countries and a vote will be had in May at the annual OIE meeting.

The OIE voted last year at its annual May meeting to simplify its country risk categories to “negligible,“ “controlled“ and “undetermined.“

“Negligible“ status is the best and reserved for countries considered to have the smallest risk of BSE -- a cattle disease that can be passed to humans through tainted meat -- but a “controlled“ designation would almost be just as good, DeHaven said.

“Anything that we would want to trade internationally, we could pretty much trade as a ’controlled’ risk country,“ DeHaven said. “The difference between ’controlled’ and ’negligible’ is that the ’negligible’ risk country doesn’t have to have all of the safeguards in place that a ’controlled’ risk country would have.“

And the U.S. already has in place those BSE safeguards, such as a cattle surveillance program, a ban on feed materials that can transmit the disease and regulations prohibiting certain bovine materials from the food supply, DeHaven said.

That doesn’t mean the U.S. would be just as happy with either designation. A “negligible“ status is preferred, DeHaven said, because it would make trade negotiations easier.

But there is one complicating factor weighing against the U.S. OIE guidelines call for countries to be able to trace BSE-infected cattle to their origins and find.

The U.S. generally has that ability, DeHaven said, but failed to find out where the last infected cow was from.

Alabama was where the third case of BSE was discovered in the U.S. The discovery was made in March and government officials immediately began efforts to find out where the cow was born and likely infected, but gave up the search in early May.

USDA officials said they believed the cow was at least 10 years old when it died, but had only been at the Alabama farm for about a year before its death.

“The fact that we were not able to find the birth herd of the Alabama cow certainly doesn’t help our situation. On the other hand, it’s not to say that we don’t have the ability to trace animals.“

The USDA was able to determine the origin of other infected cattle as well as find some other birth cohorts -- cattle raised with the infected cow.

“No country has been able to find every birth cohort of every positive cow,“ DeHaven said.

Source: Bill Tomson Dow Jones Newswires 202-646-0088


> “We want to have discussions based on the science and having a science-based OIE categorization

> of the U.S. bolsters significantly our position in having those discussions,“ DeHaven said.

my God, how deep can this BSe get. Johanns, GW et al at USDA and the OIE's policy on the legal trading of all strains of TSE i.e. the BSE MRR policy has absolutely nothing to do with science and everything to do with commodities and futures. we cannot fire GW, but Johanns must go. they sold there soul (and ours) to the devil with this policy. it set back the eradication of BSE/TSE to the very beginning of when it was first documented in 1985. what it says is it's o.k. to feed other countries our strain of TSE and visa versa, but of course this had to wait until the USDA finally stumbled on there first documented case. there nothing more than a bunch of hypocrites. it's disgusting and sickening. the stench coming from Johanns et al at USDA is overwhelming.



>>>New methodology, under the auspices of the OIE, is

under construction within the EU and EFSA and the Panel recommended that once these

classifications had been finalised they should harmonised with those used in the EFSA

BSE QRA guidance document. The Panel anticipated that this harmonisation may have a

knock-on impact on the QRA calculations, conclusions and recommendations and that,

again, future Panel members should review this, and other, inputs of the QRA and address

this impact using their “self-tasking mandate” option.<<<


sample survey via oie for bse is about 400 test via 100 million cattle, if i am not mistaken. MOST countries that went

by these OIE guidelines all eventually went down with BSE. ...TSS

THE OIE has now shown they are nothing more than a National Trading Brokerage for all strains of animal TSE.

AS i said before, OIE should hang up there jock strap now, since it appears they will buckle every time a country

makes some political hay about trade protocol, commodities and futures. IF they are not going to be science based, they

should do everyone a favor and dissolve there organization. ...

Page 95 of 98




see full text ;

IT'S as obvious as day and night, either Larry, Curley, and Mo have been at the helm of the

USDA/APHIS/FSIS/FDA/CDC/NIH et al for many many years, or the incompetence of these agencies are so inept,

either through ignorance and or just too overweight with industry reps., they then should be all done away with and a

single agency brought forth, and if not, how will you correct this ongoing problem ?

Johanns et al at USDA doing the TEXAS TWO STEP again. what's good for the goose, is NOT good for the gander i.e. bone chips ;


Release No. 0460.06
Office of Communications (202) 720-4623

Transcript of Agriculture Secretary Mike Johanns meeting with the Press Regarding beef trade with South Korea

December 6, 2006

SEC. JOHANNS: I'm going to, we'll issue this statement, but I'll go ahead and read it just so we have it on tape here. This relates to South Korea's rejection of the third shipment of beef. I'm very disappointed in the decision by South Korea to reject all three U.S. beef shipments sent since South Korea leaders announced on September 11, '06, that their border is open to U.S. beef. The rejection of the third shipment clearly illustrates that South Korea officials are determined to find an excuse to reject all beef products from the United States.

There is absolutely no food safety issue with any of these shipments. I find it difficult to accept that bone fragments the size of one-half of a grain of rice were found through visual inspection of 10 metric tons of beef as is South Korea's claim regarding the third shipment -- despite the fact that it went through unusually rigorous inspection by the U.S. exporter before it was shipped.




NOTE: Revisions of this Import Alert include modification of the alert title
and charge, and clarification of the reason for this alert, and of the
guidance section. Changes are highlighted by asterisks (***)


(Note: This import alert represents the Agency's current guidance to FDA field
personnel regarding the manufacturer(s) and/or product(s) at issue. It does
not create or confer any rights for or on any person, and does not operate to
bind FDA or the public).

PRODUCT: Animal feeds and feed ingredients that may contain
ingredients of animal origin [See Attachment]

PRODUCT CODE: 69[][][][][] - medicated animal feeds
70[][][][][] - non-medicated animal feeds
71[][][][][] - by products for animal food
72[][][][][] - pet and laboratory animal food

PROBLEM: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Certain animal
feeds and feed ingredients from BSE-affected or BSE-at-risk
countries that may contain ingredients of animal origin.


PAC: 71R844

COUNTRY: See Attachment

SHIPPERS: See Attachment

CHARGE: *** "The article is subject to refusal of admission
pursuant to Section 801(a)(1)in that it appears that such
article has been manufactured, processed, or packed under
insanitary conditions." *** (OASIS Charge Code: MFR INSAN)

OFFICE: Center for Veterinary Medicine, HFV-230, and ORO/Division of
Import Operations and Policy, HFC-170

ALERT: *** The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA),
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS),
Veterinary Services (VS) regulates the importation of
animals and animal-derived materials. More specifically,
under 9 CFR 95.4, the USDA does not allow the importation of
animal feeds or feed ingredients that contain or consist of
processed animal protein (e.g. meat and bone meal) and other
animal waste and by product materials that have been derived
from animals that have been in specified BSE-affected and
BSE-at-risk countries. The USDA may, however, allow for the
importation of specific non-ruminant animal-derived
products, provided the product is the subject of a valid
USDA import permit (VS Form 16-6)

BSE is the bovine form of a group of uniformly fatal
Neurological diseases known as TSEs (Transmissible
Spongiform Encephalopathies). BSE appears to be spread in
part through feeding of infected material to cattle. At
this time, the causative agent is unknown and there is no
test for the presence of the agent in animal derived
products. There appears to be a link between the bovine
TSE, BSE, and a human form of TSE known as vCJD (new variant
Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease).

In support of the USDA/APHIS import prohibitions, the FDA
instituted Import Alert #99-25, "Detention Without Physical
examination of Animal Feed, Animal Feed Ingredients and
Other Products For Animal Use Consisting or Containing
Ingredients of Animal Origin and NOT the subject of a valid
USDA permit."

To ensure compliance with Import Alert #99-25, the FDA has a
sampling program to conduct random sampling and analysis of
feed and feed ingredients for the presence of animal tissues
offered for entry into the U.S. The firms listed in the
Attachment of this Import Alert #71-02 have offered feed
and/or feed ingredients into the U.S. that have been found
to contain animal protein upon sampling and analysis. ***

GUIDANCE: *** Districts may detain without physical examination
products offered for import from those firms that are listed
on the attachment. In order to fully evaluate whether such
products contain ingredients of animal origin subject to
detention under Import Alert #99-25 and, if so, whether this
problem has been corrected, FDA recommends that firms
provide the following information:

1. Evidence that the firm has determined that the
products it is importing are no longer subject to
detention under Import Alert 99-25, because it has
taken appropriate steps to prevent the presence of
animal material in feed and feed ingredients.
This should be documented by:

a. Results of the firm's investigation(s) into the
problem of animal protein contamination.

b. Documentation showing corrective action(s).
This should include at a minimum:

1) a description of the current processes
being used to prevent contamination and

2) verification that the processes are

c. Documentation, based on current feed microscopy
analytical methodology, that a minimum of five
(5) consecutive import entries have been
released by FDA based on private laboratory
analyses that show the shipments contain no
material of animal origin. Requests to remove
from the DWPE list multiple products from a
manufacturer should include a minimum of twelve
(12) import entries representative of products
covered by detention without physical


2. Evidence that the product is the subject of a valid
USDA import permit (VS Form 16-6).

All requests for removal from DWPE should be forwarded
to(HFC-170)at the address below. Requests will be
forwarded to CVM for evaluation.

Food And Drug Administration
Division, Import Operations and Policy
(HFC-170), Room 12-38
5600 Fishers Lane
Rockville, MD 20857 ***


FOI: No purging is required

KEYWORDS: feeds, mammalian protein, animal, BSE, TSE

PREPARED BY: Dave Krawetz, DIOP, (HFC-170) 301-594-3872
Linda Wisniowski, DIOP, (HFC-170) 301-443-6553
CVM contact: Neal Bataller, HFV-230, 301-827-0163

INTO FIARS: January 21, 2004

Firms/Products on Detention without Physical Examination:


Firm name and address: Product/product code: Reason:

Agricore United Medicated animal feeds Muscle tissue
P.O. Box 420 69[][][][][] blood material
Carseland Non-medicated animal feeds
Alberta, Canada T0L 070 70[][][][][]
FEI# 3004318200 5/10/04

Aliments Breton Inc. Poultry Feed Avian and mammalian
1312 St.George Street 70M[][]03 bones, hairs, soft
St. Bernard, Quebec, Canada 6/2/05 tissue and feathers
FEI# 3004346002

Cereales D.L. Ltee Medicated animal feeds Blood, Bone
25 Avenue Du Pont 69[][][][][] material present
Saint-Louis De Gonzague Non-medicated animal feeds
Quebec, Canada J0S 1T0 70[][][][][]
FEI# 3003447727 4/6/04

Dawn Foods Products Medicated animal feeds Muscle tissue
75 33rd St. E 69[][][][][] feather barbule
Saskatoon, Canada S7K3K7 Non-medicated animal feeds material
FEI# 1000344064 70[][][][][]

Excel Feeds Ltd. Medicated feeds Blood material, bovine
3007 Turner St. 69[][][][][] hair, and mammalian
Abbotsford, B.C., Non-medicated feeds bone material
Canada V2S7T9 70[][][][][]
FEI #3004316870 9/15/06

Landmark Feeds Inc. Macintosh Beef Calf Grower Contains
1950 Brier Park Rd. NW with corn suspect
Medicine Hat 70M--01 muscle and
Alberta Canada T1C 1V3 8/24/04 blood tissue
FEI# 3001400728

Land O Lakes Feeds Bagged medicated Blood and
90540 London Rd., RR#2 animal feeds blood meal
Wingham, Ontario, Canada 69[][][][][]
N0G 2W0 Bagged non-medicated
FEI# 3004318728 animal feeds

Louis Dreyfus Canada Ltd. Medicated animal feeds Muscle tissue
(Brass Facility) 69[][][][][]
P.O. Box 689 Non-medicated animal feeds
Wilkie, Saskatchewan 70[][][][]
Canada SOK 4WO 12/30/03
FEI #3004283114

Masterfeeds Medicated animal feeds Blood material
11 Jamieson Ave. 69[][][][][]
Picture Butte, AB Non-medicated animal feeds
T0K 1VO, Canada 70[][][][][]
FEI #3003541855 10/3/03

Oleet Processing Ltd Medicated feeds Mammalian muscle
Box 26011 69[][][][][] and mammalian bone
Regina, SK, Canada Non-medicated feeds material
S4R8R7 70[][][][][]
FEI #3003334575 9/15/06

Ritchie Smith Feeds Inc. Medicated animal feeds Blood, muscle
33777 Enterprise Avenue 69[][][][][] tissue, and
Abbotsford, BC, V2S 4N9 Non-medicated animal feeds feather barbule
Canada 70[][][][][]
FEI #1000501066 10/3/03

Sure Crop Feeds Medicated animal feeds Feather barbules,
Box 250, Hwy 97 North 69[][][][][] suspect muscle
Grindrod, B.C., Canada Non-medicated animal feeds tissue, suspect
FEI# 1000399575 70[][][][][] blood, suspect
9/30/05 mammalian and
poultry bones,
animal hair,
bovine and porcine
mitochondrial by

Unifeed Medicated animal feeds Blood and
1810 39th Street 69[][][][][] unidentified
Lethbridge, Alberta, Non-medicated animal feeds animal hair
Canada 70[][][][][]
FEI# 1000435528 10/3/03

Unifeed Limited dba Mixed ration for cattle Suspect muscle
Sure Crop Feeds 69[][][][][]/70[][][][][] tissue and bone
1150 Industrial Dr. 9/30/05 mammalian material
Armstrong, B.C. Canada
FEI #3003110241 Address Change



TSM International Ltd. Rawhide Baseball Baseball covering
No. 17 Bao Ching St (Dog Chew) appears to be natural
Taipei, Taiwan 72[][][][][] material.
Republic of China 71[][][][][] (Soft Tissue Present)
FEI# 3004202751 4/6/04


Volume 12, Number 12–December 2006


On the Question of Sporadic

or Atypical Bovine SpongiformEncephalopathy and

Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease

Paul Brown,* Lisa M. McShane,† Gianluigi Zanusso,‡ and Linda Detwiler§

Strategies to investigate the possible existence of sporadic

bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) require

systematic testing programs to identify cases in countries

considered to have little or no risk for orally acquired disease,

or to detect a stable occurrence of atypical cases in

countries in which orally acquired disease is disappearing.

To achieve 95% statistical confidence that the prevalence

of sporadic BSE is no greater than 1 per million (i.e., the

annual incidence of sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease

[CJD] in humans) would require negative tests in 3 million

randomly selected older cattle. A link between BSE and

sporadic CJD has been suggested on the basis of laboratory

studies but is unsupported by epidemiologic observation.

Such a link might yet be established by the discovery

of a specific molecular marker or of particular combinations

of trends over time of typical and atypical BSE and various

subtypes of sporadic CJD, as their numbers are influenced

by a continuation of current public health measures that

exclude high-risk bovine tissues from the animal and

human food chains.


Sporadic CJD
The possibility that at least some cases of apparently sporadic CJD might be due to infection by sporadic cases of BSE cannot be dismissed outright. Screening programs needed to identify sporadic BSE have yet to be implemented, and we know from already extant testing programs that at least a proportion of infected animals have no symptoms and thus would never be identified in the absence of systematic testing. Thus, sporadic BSE (or for that matter, sporadic disease in any mammalian species) might be occurring on a regular basis at perhaps the same annual frequency as sporadic CJD in humans, that is, in the range of 1 case per million animals.

Whether humans might be more susceptible to atypical forms of BSE cannot be answered at this time. Experimentally transmitted BASE shows shorter incubation periods than BSE in at least 1 breed of cattle, bovinized transgenic mice, and Cynomolgus monkeys (12,13). In humanized transgenic mice, BASE transmitted, whereas typical BSE did not transmit (13). Paradoxically, the other major phenotype (H) showed an unusually long incubation period in bovinized transgenic mice (12).

The limited experimental evidence bearing on a possible relationship between BSE and sporadic CJD is difficult to interpret. The original atypical BASE strain of BSE had a molecular protein signature very similar to that of 1 subtype (type 2 M/V) of sporadic CJD in humans (5). In another study, a strain of typical BSE injected into humanized mice encoding valine at codon 129 showed a glycopattern indistinguishable from the same subtype of sporadic CJD (15). In a third study, the glycopatterns of both the H and L strains of atypical BSE evidently did not resemble any of the known sporadic CJD subtypes (12).

To these molecular biology observations can be added the epidemiologic data accumulated during the past 30 years. The hypothesis that at least some cases of apparently sporadic CJD are due to unrecognized BSE infections cannot be formally refuted, but if correct, we might expect by now to have some epidemiologic evidence linking BSE to at least 1 cluster of apparently sporadic cases of CJD. Although only a few clusters have been found (and still fewer published), every proposed cluster that has been investigated has failed to show any common exposure to bovines. For that matter, no common exposure has been shown to any environmental vehicles of infection, including the consumption of foodstuffs from bovine, ovine, and porcine sources, the 3 livestock species known to be susceptible to transmissible spongiform encephalopathies. Additional negative evidence comes from several large case-control studies in which no statistically significant dietary differences were observed between patients with sporadic CJD and controls (16,17).

On the other hand, the difficulty of establishing a link between BSE and CJD may be compounded by our ignorance of the infectious parameters of a sporadic form of BSE (e.g., host range, tissue distribution of infectivity, route of transmission, minimum infectious dose for humans, whether single or multiple). Presumably, these parameters would resemble those of variant CJD; that is, high infectivity central nervous system and lymphoreticular tissues of an infected cow find their way into products consumed by humans. Transmissions that might have occurred in the past would be difficult to detect because meat products are generally not distributed in a way that results in detectable geographic clusters.

Barring the discovery of a specific molecular signature (as in variant CJD), the most convincing clue to an association will come from the observation of trends over time of the incidence of typical and atypical BSE and of sporadic and variant CJD. With 4 diseases, each of which could have increasing, unchanging, or decreasing trends, there could be 81 (34) possible different combinations. However, it is highly likely that the trends for typical BSE and variant CJD will both decrease in parallel as feed bans continue to interrupt recycled contamination. The remaining combinations are thus reduced to 9 (32), and some of them could be highly informative.

For example, if the incidence of atypical BSE declines in parallel with that of typical BSE, its candidacy as a sporadic form of disease would be eliminated (because sporadic disease would not be influenced by current measures to prevent oral infection). If, on the other hand, atypical BSE continues to occur as typical BSE disappears, this would be a strong indication that it is indeed sporadic, and if in addition at least 1 form of what is presently considered as sporadic CJD (such as the type 2 M/V subtype shown to have a Western blot signature like BASE) were to increase, this would suggest (although not prove) a causal relationship (Figure 5).

Recognition of the different forms of BSE and CJD depends upon continuing systematic testing for both bovines and humans, but bovine testing will be vulnerable to heavy pressure from industry to dismantle the program as the commercial impact of declining BSE cases ceases to be an issue. Industry should be aware, however, of the implications of sporadic BSE. Its occurrence would necessitate the indefinite retention of all of the public health measures that exclude high-risk bovine tissues from the animal and human food chains, whereas its nonoccurrence would permit tissues that are now destroyed to be used as before, once orally acquired BSE has disappeared.



3:00 Afternoon Refreshment Break, Poster and Exhibit Viewing in the Exhibit

3:30 Transmission of the Italian Atypical BSE (BASE) in Humanized Mouse

Models Qingzhong Kong, Ph.D., Assistant Professor, Pathology, Case Western Reserve

Bovine Amyloid Spongiform Encephalopathy (BASE) is an atypical BSE strain
discovered recently in Italy, and similar or different atypical BSE cases
were also reported in other countries. The infectivity and phenotypes of
these atypical BSE strains in humans are unknown. In collaboration with
Pierluigi Gambetti, as well as Maria Caramelli and her co-workers, we have
inoculated transgenic mice expressing human prion protein with brain
homogenates from BASE or BSE infected cattle. Our data shows that about half
of the BASE-inoculated mice became infected with an average incubation time
of about 19 months; in contrast, none of the BSE-inoculated mice appear to
be infected after more than 2 years. ***These results indicate that BASE is
transmissible to humans and suggest that BASE is more virulent than
classical BSE in humans.

6:30 Close of Day One

1997 TO 2006. SPORADIC CJD CASES TRIPLED, with phenotype
of 'UNKNOWN' strain growing. ...

There is a growing number of human CJD cases, and they were presented last
week in San Francisco by Luigi Gambatti(?) from his CJD surveillance

He estimates that it may be up to 14 or 15 persons which display selectively
SPRPSC and practically no detected RPRPSC proteins.


MARCH 26, 2003

RE-Monitoring the occurrence of emerging forms of Creutzfeldt-Jakob

disease in the United States

Email Terry S. Singeltary:

I lost my mother to hvCJD (Heidenhain Variant CJD). I would like to

comment on the CDC's attempts to monitor the occurrence of emerging

forms of CJD. Asante, Collinge et al [1] have reported that BSE

transmission to the 129-methionine genotype can lead to an alternate

phenotype that is indistinguishable from type 2 PrPSc, the commonest

sporadic CJD. However, CJD and all human TSEs are not reportable

nationally. CJD and all human TSEs must be made reportable in every

state and internationally. I hope that the CDC does not continue to

expect us to still believe that the 85%+ of all CJD cases which are

sporadic are all spontaneous, without route/source. We have many TSEs in

the USA in both animal and man. CWD in deer/elk is spreading rapidly and

CWD does transmit to mink, ferret, cattle, and squirrel monkey by

intracerebral inoculation. With the known incubation periods in other

TSEs, oral transmission studies of CWD may take much longer. Every

victim/family of CJD/TSEs should be asked about route and source of this

agent. To prolong this will only spread the agent and needlessly expose

others. In light of the findings of Asante and Collinge et al, there

should be drastic measures to safeguard the medical and surgical arena

from sporadic CJDs and all human TSEs. I only ponder how many sporadic

CJDs in the USA are type 2 PrPSc?

Diagnosis and Reporting of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease

Singeltary, Sr et al. JAMA.2001; 285: 733-734.




[Docket No. 03-025IFA] FSIS Prohibition of the Use of Specified Risk
Materials for Human Food and Requirement for the Disposition of
Non-Ambulatory Disabled Cattle

[Docket No. FSIS-2006-0011] FSIS Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine
Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE)



9 December 2005
Division of Dockets Management (RFA-305)

James J. Kramer, Ph.D.
Vice President, Corporate Operations

Embassy of Japan

Dockets Entered on December 22, 2005
2005D-0330, Guidance for Industry and FDA Review Staff on Collection of
by Automated ... EC 203, McDonald's Restaurants Corporation, Vol #:, 34 ...

03-025IF 03-025IF-631 Linda A. Detwiler [PDF]
Page 1. 03-025IF 03-025IF-631 Linda A. Detwiler Page 2. Page 3. Page 4.
Page 5. Page 6. Page 7. Page 8. Page 9. Page 10. Page 11. Page 12.

03-025IF 03-025IF-634 Linda A. Detwiler [PDF]
Page 1. 03-025IF 03-025IF-634 Linda A. Detwiler Page 2.
Page 3. Page 4. Page 5. Page 6. Page 7. Page 8.

Page 1 of 17 9/13/2005 [PDF]
... 2005 6:17 PM To: Subject: [Docket
No. 03-025IFA]
FSIS Prohibition of the Use of Specified Risk Materials for Human Food ...

03-025IFA 03-025IFA-6 Jason Frost [PDF]
... Zealand Embassy COMMENTS ON FEDERAL REGISTER 9 CFR Parts 309 et al
[Docket No. 03-
025IF] Prohibition of the Use of Specified Risk Materials for Human Food and

In its opinion of 7-8 December 2000 (EC 2000), the SSC ... [PDF]
Page 1. Linda A. Detwiler, DVM 225 Hwy 35 Red Bank, New Jersey 07701 Phone:
Cell: 732-580-9391 Fax: 732-741-7751 June 22, 2005 FSIS Docket Clerk US ...

Terry S. Singeltary SR.
P.O. Box 42
Bacliff, Texas USA 77518

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