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From: TSS ()
AMBASSADOR PORTMAN: My voice is a little scratchy today but I don't think we need four bottles of water up here. SEC. JOHANNS: Maybe they were anticipating really tough questions. AMB. PORTMAN: Yes. So we may need all four by the end of this. Thank you all very much for coming on a holiday Friday here locally, and I imagine I'll get to see some of you all over the next 10 days in Hong Kong. Mike Johanns, Secretary of Agriculture, and I are leaving tomorrow morning along with the U.S. delegation made up of several agencies. We'll be flying directly from Washington to Hong Kong. We'll then be spending about 10 days in Hong Kong working through these WTO issues hoping that we can make progress toward a successful completion of the Doha Development Agenda by the end of 2006. I am hopeful that in Hong Kong we can make incremental progress in a number of areas. One would certainly be a package for being sure that the least developed countries are assured that in this round they will receive very specific benefits to help them integrate fully into the global trading system and to be able to take advantage of the market opening opportunities that will arise from a successful Doha Round. We've got a lot of work to do. Hong Kong will not be a time for us to make some major breakthroughs that the United States had hoped for, but we do hope that we can make incremental progress and establish building blocks that would go toward even more progress early in the new year. In Hong Kong we will be stressing that improving market access is again the key to achieving the goals of the Doha round. We've said this many times, but it bears repeating-- the best way to promote development, expand economic opportunities and alleviate poverty in all countries is through expanded trade. And the only way to expand trade is for countries to open their markets in meaningful ways. This is particularly true in agriculture, which from the start has been at the core of the Doha Round. It's a tough issue. It's always a tough political issue back home. It's one reason that agriculture has not been part of previous rounds with the exception of the Uruguay Round. The previous seven didn't include agriculture. But it's in agriculture where you find the highest tariffs and you find the highest trade-distorting subsidies. It's also an area where many developing countries see that they have a comparative advantage. They have the ability to sell their products overseas and they're looking for a more level playing field. That's why it I support Doha. The broad development goals of the Doha Round depend on progress in agriculture, and increasing market access in agriculture will benefit farmers everywhere. The World Bank has studied this and indicated that 93 percent of the gain in agriculture will come from gains in market access. This is particularly true though among farmers in the developing world who confront an average world tariff of 62 percent in agriculture. We must also reduce trade-distorting domestic supports. And the United States has taken the lead in putting a proposal on the table. It reduces trade-distorting supports here, in Europe, in Japan, and other countries that provide support -- and eventually under the U.S. proposal, eliminating trade-distorting support. In Hong Kong though I think we need to make progress to get there in two fronts. One is, again to give the least developed countries more assurance as to what they will get from the round, and that is basically the trade capacity help to be able to take advantage of the trade openings. And second, we need to make incremental progress in all three of these areas: agriculture, manufacturing and services. QUESTION: (unclear) SEC. JOHANNS: U.S. inspection programs are really beyond a doubt safe. And I'll offer a couple thoughts on that. The analysis or report you referenced there, if you'd asked me a question where you said, Mike, your inspectors found zero problems, I'd say, wait a minute, that sounds rather remarkable; I wonder what's going on out there. But the report actually indicates they're doing their job. They're identifying the issues that we need to deal with and then demanding that those issues be fixed. The other thing I would tell you about Japan, and this is really unique to Japan -- as you know we've agreed in this first phase with Japan to start at meat from animals 20 months and under. And you're just not going to find BSE there. It's just not there. So from a number of standpoints, I can safely assure the Japanese consumer that beef is safe. But probably the best assurance I can give them is as you know the Japanese process over the last two years has been enormously meticulously carried out, painstakingly so. At times we couldn't even detect progress. I mean that's how thorough and comprehensive this process was. And at every stage of the process the conclusion was reached that U.S. beef is safe as Japanese beef. Then you do a comparison of the countries. We have a herd size of about 90 million. We process about 30 million animals a year, thereabouts, probably a little bit more than that. We've been able to identify since the enhanced surveillance started one case that was actually so difficult to find we had to test and test and test to find it even. Japan is familiar with BSE. They've now identified their 20th case of BSE. So in working with the Japanese government and with food safety people it was not like we were working with people who had never had any exposure to BSE issues. So when you factor it all in, all the things we've done, I can assure the Japanese consumer beyond a shadow of a doubt that beef is safe. And we're very anxious to return it to their marketplace. And we'll work with the consumers. We know that it's been a very long process and we have work to do with the consumers. We're going to do everything we can to accomplish confidence in U.S. beef. And I'm very, very confident that we will achieve that. AMB. PORTMAN: All the way in the back corner? QUESTION: (off-mike) http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/!ut/p/_s.7_0_A/7_0_1OB/.cmd/ad/.ar/sa.retrievecontent/.c/6_2_1UH/.ce/7_2_5JM/.p/5_2_4TQ/.d/3/_th/J_2_9D/_s.7_0_A/7_0_1OB?PC_7_2_5JM_contentid=2005%2F12%2F0543.xml&PC_7_2_5JM_navtype=RT&PC_7_2_5JM_parentnav=TRANSCRIPTS_SPEECHES&PC_7_2_5JM_navid=TRANSCRIPT#7_2_5JM >>>The other thing I would tell you about Japan, and this is really unique to Japan -- as you know we've agreed in this first phase with Japan to start at meat from animals 20 months and under. And you're just not going to find BSE there. It's just not there. So from a number of standpoints, I can safely assure the Japanese consumer that beef is safe. <<< r i g h t! kinda like the WMD issue and gitmo, no lies here either. the myth that cattle under 30 months of age are free from BSE/TSE is just that, a myth, and it's a false myth ! the youngest age of BSE case to date is 20 months old; As at: 31 May http://www.defra.gov.uk/animalh/bse/bse-statistics/bse/yng-old.html http://www.defra.gov.uk/animalh/bse/index.html The implications of the Swiss result for Britain, which has had the most http://www.sare.org/htdocs/hypermail/html-home/28-html/0359.html https://web01.aphis.usda.gov/BSEcom.nsf/0/b78ba677e2b0c12185256dd300649f9d?OpenDocument&AutoFramed SO, with GWs BSE MRR policy, like i said, it is nothing more than a legal tool to trade ALL STRAINS of this mad cow agent around the globe. WE know of atypical TSE in USA via Marsh et al, and we know when USA scrapie is transmitted to USA cow, it does not look like UK BSE. BUT what about Japans beef brought into USA? seems they have atypical TSE in Japan cattle that is in very young cattle and evidently, there TSE agent has even been detected in the peripheral nerves (sciatic nerve, tibial nerve, vagus nerve), so why would USA want to import that into USA$ With our much superior BSE/TSE surveillance system in USA cattle and the fact we have had this fabulous ruminant to ruminant mad cow feed ban in effect since 8/4/97, where no cattle have been fed ruminant protein since then;-), why should we risk this new phenotype of TSE to the USA, since we have all the other TSEs here in the USA under control:-(not)$ Muscle tissue has recently been detected with PrPSc Yoshifumi Iwamaru, Yuka Okubo, Tamako Ikeda, Hiroko Hayashi, Mori- Priori Disease Research Center, National Institute of Animal Health, 3-1-5 Abstract Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) is a disease of cattle that causes The specified risk materials (SRM) are tissues potentially carrying BSE The 11th BSE case in Japan was detected in fallen stock surveillance. PrPSc was detected in brain, spinal cord, dorsal root ganglia, trigeminal Our results suggest that the currently accepted definitions of SRM in 179 T. Kitamoto (Ed.) The hardback book title is 'PRIONS' Food and Drug Safety snip...end THIS brings up about another 9,200 points of concern. IF you look above at these two atypical TSE cows from Japan, (of which we could very well export more just like it), please notice the testing protocol; >>># 8b, 9c cows Elisa Positive, WB Positive, IHC negative, histopathology 9,200 points of mad cow concern is the fact the USDA et al DID NOT use rapid TSE test OR WB test to test for BSE/TSE on 9,200 cattle, they used the least likely to find the agent only, the IHC, of which, DID NOT show up on two of those very young atypical positive Japanese cows, PLUS, like the one TEXAS cow they did finally confirm after 7+ months of trying to cover up. besides this, we have some 500,000 bse/tse test, the infamous June 2004 enhanced BSE/TSE surveillance (cover-up) program, where here the testing protocol was terribly flawwed on all these cows, where only IHC and rapid testing was used, no WB. Dr. Detwiler warned of this problem way back; USDA 2003 We have to be careful that we don't get so set in the way we do things that Dr. Detwiler: That's on the slaughter. But on the clinical cases, aren't Dr. Keller: Tissues are routinely tested, based on which tissue provides an Dr. Detwiler: That's on the slaughter. But on the clinical cases, aren't National Veterinary Services Laboratory (NVSL) Immunohistochemistry (IHC) Testing Summary The BSE enhanced surveillance program involves the use of a rapid screening test, followed by confirmatory testing for any samples that come back "inconclusive." The weekly summary below captures all rapid tests conducted as part of the enhanced surveillance effort. It should be noted that since the enhanced surveillance program began, USDA has also conducted approximately 9,200 routine IHC tests on samples that did not first undergo rapid testing. This was done to ensure that samples inappropriate for the rapid screen test were still tested, and also to monitor and improve upon IHC testing protocols. Of those 9,200 routine tests, one test returned a non-definitive result on July 27, 2005. That sample underwent additional testing at NVSL, as well as at the Veterinary Laboratories Agency in Weybridge, England, and results were negative. ... http://www.aphis.usda.gov/lpa/issues/bse_testing/test_results.html APHIS et al forgets to add here that on that one additional non-definitive test of July 27, 2005, here again they could not use WB due to samples being preserved. Here in 2005 we have still not gotten the proper BSE/TSE testing protocol done correctly, after being told that we did since 1997. hey, but its not about 'sound science' or 'human health'. GWs enhanced SRM program was nothing more than commodities and futures in action; Our analysis suggests that if all slaughter animals are tested, but there is no increase in access to either the Japanese or South Korean markets, the result would be a net loss of $17.50 (the estimated cost of testing) per head. Alternatively, if full access to the Japanese and South Korean markets is regained without implementing a broad based BSE testing program, the potential revenue gain ranges from about $45 to $66 per head (Figure 1). http://www.oznet.ksu.edu/library/agec2/MF2679.pdf GW seems to get his cake and eat it too $ nothing like 'sound science' in this administration, to hell with human health. IN TEXAS we feed our cattle 5.5 grams of potentially BSE/TSE tainted protein, and that's o.k. per the FDA; FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Note: On Dec. 23, 2003, the U.S. Department of Agriculture reported that a cow in Washington state had tested positive for bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE, or mad cow disease). As a result, information on this Web page stating that no BSE cases had been found in the United States is now incorrect. However, because other information on this page continues to have value, the page will remain available for viewing. FDA ANNOUNCES TEST RESULTS FROM TEXAS FEED LOT FDA has determined that each animal could have consumed, at most and in total, five-and-one-half grams - approximately a quarter ounce -- of prohibited material. These animals weigh approximately 600 pounds. It is important to note that the prohibited material was domestic in origin (therefore not likely to contain infected material because there is no evidence of BSE in U.S. cattle), fed at a very low level, and fed only once. The potential risk of BSE to such cattle is therefore exceedingly low, even if the feed were contaminated. According to Dr. Bernard Schwetz, FDA's Acting Principal Deputy Commissioner, "The challenge to regulators and industry is to keep this disease out of the United States. One important defense is to prohibit the use of any ruminant animal materials in feed for other ruminant animals. Combined with other steps, like U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) ban on the importation of live ruminant animals from affected countries, these steps represent a series of protections, to keep American cattle free of BSE." Despite this negligible risk, Purina Mills, Inc., is nonetheless announcing that it is voluntarily purchasing all 1,222 of the animals held in Texas and mistakenly fed the animal feed containing the prohibited material. Therefore, meat from those animals will not enter the human food supply. FDA believes any cattle that did not consume feed containing the prohibited material are unaffected by this incident, and should be handled in the beef supply clearance process as usual. FDA believes that Purina Mills has behaved responsibly by first reporting the human error that resulted in the misformulation of the animal feed supplement and then by working closely with State and Federal authorities. This episode indicates that the multi-layered safeguard system put into place is essential for protecting the food supply and that continued vigilance needs to be taken, by all concerned, to ensure these rules are followed routinely. FDA will continue working with USDA as well as State and local officials to ensure that companies and individuals comply with all laws and regulations designed to protect the U.S. food supply. WE know what happens to most stumbling and staggering suspect mad cows in TEXAS too. THERE tissue samples either sit up on a shelf for 7+ months waiting for everyone to forget about, OR ; FDA Statement Statement on Texas Cow With Central Nervous System Symptoms FDA, which is responsible for the safety of animal feed, immediately began an investigation. On Friday and throughout the weekend, FDA investigators inspected the slaughterhouse, the rendering facility, the farm where the animal came from, and the processor that initially received the cow from the slaughterhouse. FDA's investigation showed that the animal in question had already been rendered into "meat and bone meal" (a type of protein animal feed). Over the weekend FDA was able to track down all the implicated material. That material is being held by the firm, which is cooperating fully with FDA. Cattle with central nervous system symptoms are of particular interest because cattle with bovine spongiform encephalopathy or BSE, also known as "mad cow disease," can exhibit such symptoms. In this case, there is no way now to test for BSE. But even if the cow had BSE, FDA's animal feed rule would prohibit the feeding of its rendered protein to other ruminant animals (e.g., cows, goats, sheep, bison). FDA is sending a letter to the firm summarizing its findings and informing the firm that FDA will not object to use of this material in swine feed only. If it is not used in swine feed, this material will be destroyed. Pigs have been shown not to be susceptible to BSE. If the firm agrees to use the material for swine feed only, FDA will track the material all the way through the supply chain from the processor to the farm to ensure that the feed is properly monitored and used only as feed for pigs. To protect the U.S. against BSE, FDA works to keep certain mammalian protein out of animal feed for cattle and other ruminant animals. FDA established its animal feed rule in 1997 after the BSE epidemic in the U.K. showed that the disease spreads by feeding infected ruminant protein to cattle. Under the current regulation, the material from this Texas cow is not allowed in feed for cattle or other ruminant animals. FDA's action specifying that the material go only into swine feed means also that it will not be fed to poultry. FDA is committed to protecting the U.S. from BSE and collaborates closely with the U.S. Department of Agriculture on all BSE issues. The animal feed rule provides crucial protection against the spread of BSE, but it is only one of several such firewalls. FDA will soon be improving the animal feed rule, to make this strong system even stronger. #### http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/news/2004/NEW01061.html WE know now, and we knew decades ago, that 5.5 grams of suspect feed in TEXAS was enough to kill 100 cows. look at the table and you'll see that as little as 1 mg (or 0.001 gm) caused 7% (1 of 14) of the cows to come down with BSE; Risk of oral infection with bovine spongiform encephalopathy agent in primates Corinne Ida Lasmézas, Emmanuel Comoy, Stephen Hawkins, Christian Herzog, Franck Mouthon, Timm Konold, Frédéric Auvré, Evelyne Correia, Nathalie Lescoutra-Etchegaray, Nicole Salès, Gerald Wells, Paul Brown, Jean-Philippe Deslys snip... BSE bovine brain inoculum 100 g 10 g 5 g 1 g 100 mg 10 mg 1 mg 0·1 mg 0·01 mg Primate (oral route)* 1/2 (50%) Cattle (oral route)* 10/10 (100%) 7/9 (78%) 7/10 (70%) 3/15 (20%) 1/15 (7%) 1/15 (7%) RIII mice (icip route)* 17/18 (94%) 15/17 (88%) 1/14 (7%) PrPres biochemical detection The comparison is made on the basis of calibration of the bovine inoculum used in our study with primates against a bovine brain inoculum with a similar PrPres concentration that was inoculated into mice and cattle.8 *Data are number of animals positive/number of animals surviving at the time of clinical onset of disease in the first positive animal (%). The accuracy of bioassays is generally judged to be about plus or minus 1 log. icip=intracerebral and intraperitoneal. Table 1: Comparison of transmission rates in primates and cattle infected orally with similar BSE brain inocula Published online January 27, 2005 http://www.thelancet.com/journal/journal.isa It is clear that the designing scientists must also have shared Mr Bradley’s surprise at the results because all the dose levels right down to 1 gram triggered infection. 6. It also appears to me that Mr Bradley’s answer (that it would take less than say 100 grams) was probably given with the benefit of hindsight; particularly if one considers that later in the same answer Mr Bradley expresses his surprise that it could take as little of 1 gram of brain to cause BSE by the oral route within the same species. This information did not become available until the "attack rate" experiment had been completed in 1995/96. This was a titration experiment designed to ascertain the infective dose. A range of dosages was used to ensure that the actual result was within both a lower and an upper limit within the study and the designing scientists would not have expected all the dose levels to trigger infection. The dose ranges chosen by the most informed scientists at that time ranged from 1 gram to three times one hundred grams. It is clear that the designing scientists must have also shared Mr Bradley’s surprise at the results because all the dose levels right down to 1 gram triggered infection. [BBC radio 4 FARM news] http://www.maddeer.org/audio/BBC4farmingtoday2_1_03.ram http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/03/slides/3923s1_OPH.htm 2) Infectious dose: To cattle: 1 gram of infected brain material (by oral ingestion) http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/sci/bio/bseesbe.shtml SADLY, DEC 2005 SHOWS THAT WE STILL HAVE A SERIOUS PROBLEM WITH BSE/TSE MAD COW DISEASE FEED October 11, 2005 Mad Cow Disease: An Evaluation of a Small Feed Testing Program FDA Implemented in 2003 With Recommendations for Making the Program a Better Oversight Tool. GAO-06-157R, October 11 http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-157R CVM Update To help prevent the establishment and amplification of BSE through feed in the United States, FDA implemented a final rule that prohibits the use of most mammalian protein in feeds for ruminant animals. This rule, Title 21 Part 589.2000 of the Code of Federal Regulations, here called the Ruminant Feed Ban, became effective on August 4, 1997. This is an update on FDA enforcement activities regarding the ruminant feed regulation. FDA's CVM has assembled data from the inspections that have been conducted AND whose final inspection report has been recorded in the FDA's inspection database as of November 26, 2005. As of November 26, 2005, FDA had received over 41,000 inspection reports. The majority of these inspections (around 68%) were conducted by State officials under contract to FDA, with the remainder conducted by FDA officials. Inspections conducted by FDA or State investigators are classified to reflect the compliance status at the time of the inspection based upon the objectionable conditions documented. These inspection conclusions are reported as Official Action Indicated (OAI), Voluntary Action Indicated (VAI), or No Action Indicated (NAI). An OAI inspection classification occurs when significant objectionable conditions or practices were found and regulatory sanctions are warranted in order to address the establishment's lack of compliance with the regulation. An example of an OAI inspection classification would be findings of manufacturing procedures insufficient to ensure that ruminant feed is not contaminated with prohibited material. Inspections classified with OAI violations will be promptly re-inspected following the regulatory sanctions to determine whether adequate corrective actions have been implemented. A VAI inspection classification occurs when objectionable conditions or practices were found that do not meet the threshold of regulatory significance, but do warrant advisory actions to inform the establishment of findings that should be voluntarily corrected. Inspections classified with VAI violations are more technical violations of the Ruminant Feed Ban. These include provisions such as minor recordkeeping lapses and conditions involving non-ruminant feeds. An NAI inspection classification occurs when no objectionable conditions or practices were found during the inspection or the significance of the documented objectionable conditions found does not justify further actions. The results to date are reported here both by “segment of industry” and “in total”. NOTE – A single firm can operate as more than one firm type. As a result, the categories of the different industry segments are not mutually exclusive. RENDERERS These firms are the first to handle and process (i.e., render) animal proteins and to send these processed materials to feed mills and/or protein blenders for use as a feed ingredient. Number of active firms whose initial inspection has been reported to FDA – 274 Number of active firms handling materials prohibited from use in ruminant feed – 185 (68% of those active firms inspected) Of the 185 active firms handling prohibited materials, their most recent inspection revealed that: 1 firm (0.5%) was classified as OAI 11 firms (5.9%) were classified as VAI LICENSED FEED MILLS FDA licenses these feed mills to produce medicated feed products. The license is required to manufacture and distribute feed using certain potent drug products, usually those requiring some pre-slaughter withdrawal time. This licensing has nothing to do with handling prohibited materials under the feed ban regulation. A medicated feed license from FDA is not required to handle materials prohibited under the Ruminant Feed Ban. Number of active firms whose initial inspection has been reported to FDA – 1,079 Number of active firms handling materials prohibited from use in ruminant feed – 426 (39% of those active firms inspected) Of the 426 active firms handling prohibited materials, their most recent inspection revealed that: 0 firm (0%) was classified as OAI 8 firms (1.9%) were classified as VAI FEED MILLS NOT LICENSED BY FDA These feed mills are not licensed by the FDA to produce medicated feeds. Number of active firms whose initial inspection has been reported to FDA – 5,165 Number of active firms handling materials prohibited from use in ruminant feed – 2,036 (39% of those active firms inspected) Of the 2,036 active firms handling prohibited materials, their most recent inspection revealed that: 2 firms (0.1%) were classified as OAI 24 firms (1.2%) were classified as VAI PROTEIN BLENDERS These firms blend rendered animal protein for the purpose of producing quality feed ingredients that will be used by feed mills. Number of active firms whose initial inspection has been reported to FDA -- 340 Number of active firms handling materials prohibited from use in ruminant feed – 147 (43% of those active firms inspected) Of the 147 active firms handling prohibited materials, their most recent inspection revealed that: 0 firms (0%) were classified as OAI 7 firms (4.8%) were classified as VAI RENDERERS, FEED MILLS, AND PROTEIN BLENDERS This category includes only those firms that actually use prohibited material to manufacture, process, or blend animal feed or feed ingredients. Number of active renderers, feed mills, and protein blenders whose initial inspection has been reported to FDA – 6,576 Number of active renderers, feed mills, and protein blenders processing with prohibited materials – 539 (8.2% of those active firms inspected) Of the 539 of active renderers, feed mills, and protein blenders processing with prohibited materials, their most recent inspection revealed that: 3 firms (0.6%) were classified as OAI 23 firms (4.3%) were classified as VAI OTHER FIRMS INSPECTED Examples of such firms include ruminant feeders, on-farm mixers, pet food manufacturers, animal feed salvagers, distributors, retailers, and animal feed transporters. Number of active firms whose initial inspection has been reported to FDA – 13,477 Number of active firms handling materials prohibited from use in ruminant feed – 3,748 (28% of those active firms inspected) Of the 3,748 active firms handling prohibited materials, their most recent inspection revealed that: 8 firms (0.2%) were classified as OAI 95 firms (2.5%) were classified as VAI TOTAL FIRMS Note that a single firm can be reported under more than one firm category; therefore, the summation of the individual OAI/VAI firm categories will be more than the actual total number of OAI/VAI firms, as presented below. Number of active firms whose initial inspection has been reported to FDA – 16,476 Number of active firms handling materials prohibited from use in ruminant feed – 4,553 (27% of those active firms inspected) Of the 4,553 active firms handling prohibited materials, their most recent inspection revealed that: 9 firms (0.2%) were classified as OAI 107 firms (2.4%) were classified as VAI Issued by: [Docket No. 03-025IFA] FSIS Prohibition of the Use of Specified Risk Materials for Human Food and Requirement for the Disposition of Non-Ambulatory Disabled Cattle 03-025IFA From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. [flounder9@verizon.net] Sent: Thursday, September 08, 2005 6:17 PM To: fsis.regulationscomments@fsis.usda.gov Subject: [Docket No. 03-025IFA] FSIS Prohibition of the Use of Specified Risk Materials for Human Food and Requirements for the Disposition of Non-Ambulatory Disabled Cattle Greetings FSIS, I would kindly like to submit the following to [Docket No. 03-025IFA] FSIS Prohibition of the Use of Specified Risk Materials for Human Food and Requirements for the Disposition of Non-Ambulatory Disabled Cattle THE BSE/TSE SUB CLINICAL Non-Ambulatory Disabled Cattle Broken bones and such may be the first signs of a sub clinical BSE/TSE Non-Ambulatory Disabled Cattle ; snip...FULL TEXT ; http://docket.epa.gov/edkfed/do/EDKStaffAttachDownloadPDF?objectId=090007d480993808 http://docket.epa.gov/edkfed/do/EDKStaffCollectionDetailView?objectId=0b0007d48096b40d ======================================================== ======================================================== OLD TSS SUBMISSIONS; Docket No, 04-047-l Regulatory Identification No. (RIN) 091O-AF46 NEW BSE SAFEGUARDS (comment submission) https://web01.aphis.usda.gov/regpublic.nsf/0/eff9eff1f7c5cf2b87256ecf000df08d?OpenDocument http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/03n0312/03N-0312_emc-000001.txt Docket Management Docket: 02N-0273 - Substances Prohibited From Use in Animal Food or Feed; Animal Proteins Prohibited in Ruminant Feed Comment Number: EC -10 Accepted - Volume 2 PART 2 PDF]Freas, William TSS SUBMISSION File Format: PDF/Adobe Acrobat - Page 1. J Freas, William From: Sent: To: Subject: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. [flounder@wt.net] Monday, January 08,200l 3:03 PM freas ... http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/01/slides/3681s2_09.pdf Asante/Collinge et al, that BSE transmission to the 129-methionine genotype can lead to an alternate phenotype that is indistinguishable from type 2 PrPSc, the commonest _sporadic_ CJD; http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/03/slides/3923s1_OPH.htm http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/03/Mar03/031403/96N-0417-EC-2.htm Docket No. 2003N-0312 Animal Feed Safety System [TSS SUBMISSION http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/03n0312/03N-0312_emc-000001.txt # Docket No: 02-088-1 RE-Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of Docket Management Docket: 02N-0276 - Bioterrorism Preparedness; Registration of Food Facilities, Section 305 http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/02n0276/02N-0276-EC-254.htm OTC External Analgesic Drug Products, ... EMC 7, Terry S. Singeltary Sr. http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/03/oct03/100203/100203.htm DOCKETS ENTERED on 2/5/03. ... EMC 4 Terry S. Singeltary Sr. Vol#: 2. 03N-0009 Federal Preemption of State & Local Medical Device Requireme. ... Docket: 02N-0370 - Neurological Devices; Classification of Human Dura Mater Comment Number: EC -1 Accepted - Volume 1 ... 00D-1662 Use of Xenotransplantation Products in Humans. http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/03/Jun03/060903/060903.htm 2003D-0186 APE 5 National Renderers Association, Inc. Vol#: 2 APE 6 Animal Protein Producers Industry Vol#: 2 APE 7 Darling International Inc. Vol#: 2 EMC 1 Terry S. Singeltary Sr. Vol#: 3 http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/01/Oct01/101501/101501.htm TSS
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