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"...it was Singlaub's belief that the SOG boats triggered the Gulf of Tonkin incident."
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SOG V --
Phu Bai
SOG
IV: Up Country
by Jean d'Isle
' 
s
difficult as it was to tear 
myself
away from my ninth-floor accommodation with intermittent
electricity and sometimes running water, the time came to
head north to familiarize myself with SOG field
operations. In a few short days I had mastered the
essentials of the Vietnamese language: "Ba Me
Ba" was the name of the domestic beer (literally
"33"); and "You Dinky Dao ? (followed by
any American expletive)" was the phrase that you
yelled at the other drivers who dared to challenge you on
the road.
My first visit "up country" was to the large air and naval facility at Danang. Early one morning I boarded a C-130 at Tan Son Nhut and was on the ground in Danang before noon. The U.S. had invested huge amounts of money to turn this key northern location into a deep draft harbor and launch site for air operations into North Vietnam and in support of U.S. and allied ground operations in the South. There seemed to be a constant stream of aircraft into and out of Danang, from small unarmed FAO (Forward Air Observer) planes to thundering F-4's fully armed and on their way to the Red River Valley.
The SOG operation I was visiting in Danang was one of the "blackest" of their black programs. Hidden behind high fences and from the view of friend and foe alike was SOG's navy: several high speed (45 knots), heavily armed motor torpedo boats manufactured in Norway, called "NASTY's." These NASTY boats were manned entirely by Vietnamese crews as part of a psychological warfare operation. The mission of these boats and crews was to operate along the enemy coast as part of an elaborate program to convince the civilian population that a dissident North Vietnamese organization called the "Shining Sword of the Patriot" was actively working from inside North Vietnam to overthrow the Communist government. In addition to terrorizing military coastal installations with hit-and-run attacks, one or two NASTY boats would head north at night to board fishing boats and kidnap the occupants.
These fishermen were then taken to "Paradise Island" and held for several days or weeks, and "educated" about the "Shining Sword" movement. The island was off South Vietnam, but the detainees were told they were on the mainland of North Vietnam. The mock North Vietnamese village where they were held faced away from the mainland to reinforce this charade. Prisoners were treated very well and were eventually returned to the vicinity of their kidnapping and sent ashore in small boats with gifts of food and luxury items. Included in the gift package was a small radio fix-tuned to the frequency of a "Shining Sword" propaganda broadcast. It's hard to say whether this program was effective; but the enemy was concerned enough about the incursions to set periodic "junk traps." These were heavily armed boats disguised as fishing junks, who hoped to catch the SOG boats by surprise as they approached on their kidnapping mission. The junks usually came out second best in these encounters.
There is pretty strong reason to believe
that the Gulf of Tonkin incident of 1964,
which resulted in the resolution that widened the U.S.
involvement in the war, was precipitated by SOG's NASTY
boats rather than North Vietnamese torpedo boats. One
view is that the PT boats that "attacked" the
U.S. destroyers Maddox and Joy that night were in fact
SOG boats returning from a mission. Another view is that
the North Vietnamese torpedo boats that approached the
U.S. destroyers were responding to a SOG incursion and
did not intend to attack the destroyers. The highly
classified nature of the SOG operations certainly helped
muddy the possible connection. A congressional
investigation was initiated in early 1968 to see if the
Gulf of Tonkin Resolution/SOG relationship was fact or
speculation. Col Jack Singlaub, Chief of SOG during my
tour, was called back to Washington to testify at the
closed hearings. Although he didn't take over the SOG
organization until 1966, it was Singlaub's belief that
the SOG boats triggered the Gulf of Tonkin incident.
After the brief visit to SOG's Danang operation, I continued north to Phu Bai. Highway 1, the coastal road that runs the length of the South Vietnamese coast, had long since been declared unsafe to travel. VC and NVA forces had control of long stretches of this route and much of it was mined. Overland travel between Danang and Phu Bai was verboten. So, what might have been a nice scenic drive along the South China Sea, like California's Highway 1 near Big Sur overlooking the Pacific, turned into a brief but hairy C-123 flight.
A C-123 is a poor man's C-130: 2 engines instead of 4, and half the size. The pilot, who must have been a frustrated fighter jock, swung it out over the water around an intimidating mountain peak, and spiraled it in to the Phu Bai airfield to limit our exposure to ground fire. He never got enough altitude to bother closing the windows.
Although always glad to be back on the ground, I couldn't ignore the information received in Danang that the facility I was about to visit had been heavily mortared and partially overrun the night before. VC sappers had invaded the compound and tossed satchel charges into several structures. Was I ready for this?
__________________________________________________
Jean
d'Isle is a retired naval officer living
in Hawaii.
During his
military career he served in a number of overseas
assignments, including Germany, England, Spain, Viet Nam
and Puerto Rico. Following his retirement, he was an
adjunct faculty member of Hawaii Pacific University and
is currently under contract with the U.S. Navy at the
submarine base in Pearl Harbor.
Jean's column, View From d'Isle, is a regular feature of VegSource On-Line Magazine.